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Preface 
Proponents of Reformed epistemology claim, in contrast to 
those standing in the long line of natural theology, that belief in 
God need not be rooted in argument but can be based, more or less 
directly, on experience. One of the results of their suggestion is 
that certain beliefs about God are just as rational as beliefs about 
perceived physical objects. I argue against this claim here. 
Although I am critical of Reformed epistemology in this respect, 
there is much of value in its ideas. One central notion is that theis­
tic beliefs are rational in ways similar to our nontheistic beliefs. I 
view this idea as important to our understanding of theistic belief 
and its rationality. But to which nontheistic beliefs are theistic be­
liefs similar? My thesis is that beliefs about God are just as rational 
as beliefs about human persons, rather than beliefs about non­
human physical objects. The theory in which this epistemological 
parity can be made out, however, is not foundationalism, as two 
of the main Reformed epistemologists argue. Holism is a happier 
home for theistic belief. At least so this book suggests. 
In certain ways, some of the writings of John Hick and George 
Mavrodes are the most recent ancestors of Reformed epistemol­
ogy, for they take experience of the divine seriously as part of the 
epistemic map that epistemologists of religion need to sketch. The 
more recent set of arguments and discussions centers in the work 
of William P. Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. 
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It is from Plantinga and Wolterstorff that the "Reformed" in "Re­
formed epistemology" comes, since both philosophers are intellec­
tually rooted in the Reformed theological tradition (they stand in 
the theological line traceable to John Calvin). And so the name 
remains. Regardless of what one calls Reformed epistemology, or 
who its intellectual ancestors are, its central claims are important 
and intriguing. 
As always with works of this kind, the author owes much to 
many people for a variety of activities. I can hardly separate my 
thinking from that of my teachers, J. William Forgie, Francis W. 
Dauer, and Burleigh T. Wilkins. They, along with Philip Clayton, 
Richard F. Galvin, V. James Mannoia, Shirley A. Mullen, Alvin 
Plantinga, and David E. Schrader, read all or parts of the manu­
script at several stages too disparate to summarize easily. Each pro­
vided helpful comments and suggestions. William P. Alston, as the 
series editor, read the manuscript several times and offered valuable 
philosophical advice along the way. Although he disagrees with 
me on various important points, one could not ask for a more 
helpful and fair editor. Director John Ackermann, of Cornell Uni­
versity Press, enthusiastically supported the project since our first 
contact. Kay Scheuer, Joanne Hindman, and John Thomas im­
proved the prose in many ways. As well as those who read the 
manuscript, there are those who encouraged its writing. Among 
them are Mark Bernstein, Steven D. Fratt, Arthur R. Miller, Stan­
ley Obitts, Jeanne Reeseman, James F. Sennett, Saranindranath 
Tagore, and Robert Wennberg. They have, in a variety of ways, 
cheered the writing on. 
I spent five years teaching at Westmont College in Santa Bar­
bara, California. My friends and colleagues from that time deserve 
thanks, and the following people in particular deserve special men­
tion for their contributions. The "Tea Group" was, during much 
of the time I was writing, a weekly source of intellectual stimula­
tion and moral support that took me beyond my own narrow con­
cerns to those of the broader intellectual community. The group 
was made up of historians, political scientists, biblical scholars, lit­
erary experts, and theologians. Its members were Steven Cook, 
A. R. "Pete" Diamond, Robert H. Gundry, Michael McClymond, 
Bruce McKeon, Shirley A. Mullen, William Nelson, John Rapson, 
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Thomas Schmidt, and Jonathan Wilson. Ned Divelbiss and John 
Murray provided carrel space for me to work in the Roger 
Voskuyl Library, along with unflagging good cheer. George Blank­
enbaker, vice president for academic affairs, arranged faculty de­
velopment grants to provide me with summer research time. Lois 
Gundry, the secretary for the philosophy and religious studies de­
partments, and her staff retyped portions of the manuscript into 
the computer from my handwritten changes. Since I moved to the 
University of Texas at San Antonio, Thomas Wood, of the Divi­
sion of English, Classics, and Philosophy, likewise worked at the 
computer for me. Adrian A. Amaya helped me read the page 
proofs. 
Parts of Chapters 6 and 7 originally appeared as "The Analogy 
Argument for the Proper Basicality of Belief in God" in the Inter­
national Journal for Philosophy of Religion 21 (1987): 3-20. It is re­
printed by permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers. Parts of 
Chapter 10 originally appeared as "Can Belief in God Be Con­
firmed?" in Religious Studies (1988): 311-23. Parts of Chapter 12 
originally appeared as "Passionate Religion: Toward a Theory of 
Epistemic Commitment for Theistic Belief' in The Logic of Ra­
tional Theism: Exploratory Essays, ed. William Lane Craig and Mark 
S. MCLeod (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990). 
My niece, Martha Anderson, spent the summer of 1991 in Santa 
Barbara with my family and took care of my son while I worked 
in the library. Now three years old, Ian Alexander Malone 
MCLeod came along in the middle of my writing. He has grown 
into an unsurpassed delight, nothing less than the dance of God in 
our living room. Finally, my wife, Rebecca L. M. MCLeod, not 
only read the manuscript and was a member of the "Tea Group" 
but listened to me talk-endlessly-about the ideas in this book. 
She has walked with me the path of truth, joy, and love-but es­
pecially love-for over sixteen years. How can I thank her? Words 
fail. 
MARKS. MCLEOD 
San Antonio, Texas 
CMP Christian mystical practice 
CP Christian practice 
]d Deontological justification 
Abbreviations 
]di Involuntary deontological justification 
]c Evaluative justification 
]cg Grounds evaluative justification 
]t'g Grounds evaluative justification (applied to epistemic practices) 
]n Normative justification 
)ns Strong normative justification 
]nw Weak normative justification 
PP Perceptual practice 
PT Parity thesis. There are many versions of the parity thesis, the 
most general of which is this: Under appropriate conditions, (1) 
S's engaging in an epistemic practice EP, which generates theis­
tic beliefs (of a specified kind), or (2) S's believing that p, where 
p is a theistic belief (of a specified kind), has the same level and 
(specified) kind of epistemic status as (3) S's engaging in an 
epistemic practice EP*, which generates nontheistic beliefs (of a 
specified kind), or (4) S's believing that p*, where p* is a non­
theistic belief (of a specified kind). 
PTA Alston's parity thesis: Under appropriate conditions, both S's en­
gaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are )nw· 
x i v  J Abbreviations 
PT AS Alston's strong parity thesis: Under appropriate conditions, both 
S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are Jt'w 
PT� Alston's parity thesis* : Under appropriate conditions, both S's 
engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are prima facie rational. 
PT N New parity thesis: Under appropriate conditions, engaging in CP 
and engaging in unique person practice have, for S, the same 
level and strength of overall rationality. 
PTp1 Plantinga's parity thesis: Under appropriate conditions, where no 
overriders are present, S's belief that p, where p is a belief about 
God, has the same nonclassical normative proper basicality (the 
strongest level) as S's belief that p*, where p* is a paradigm 
belief. 
P1\� Plantinga's parity thesis': Under appropriate conditions, where no 
overriders are present, S's belief that p, where p is a belief about 
God, has at least the same nonclassical normative proper ba­
sicality (the strongest level) as S' s belief that p*, where p* is a 
perceptual belief. 
PT1� Plantinga's parity thesis*: For person S, whose epistemic equip­
ment is functioning properly in the appropriate environment, 
paradigm beliefs and theistic beliefs have the same level of epis­
temic warrant. 
PTt,; Plantinga' s parity thesis*' : For a person S, whose epistemic 
equipment is functioning properly in the appropriate environ­
ment, physical object beliefs and theistic beliefs have the same 
level of epistemic warrant. 
SP Sense perceptual (doxastic) practice 
SPP Sense perceptual (doxastic) practice 
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Introduction: Paradigms, 
Theism, and the 
Parity Thesis 
Few claims are more controversial than that beliefs about God 
are rational. Challenges to theism are many and diverse, ranging 
from the problem of evil to the meaninglessness of theistic ut­
terances. Given this healthy and robust religious skepticism, it is 
somewhat surprising and refreshing to discover philosophers who 
claim that beliefs about God are not only rational but just as ratio­
nal as many nontheistic beliefs that nearly everyone accepts as ob­
viously rational. In short, they argue for a kind of epistemic parity 
between theistic and nontheistic beliefs. 
Perhaps this claim is less surprising in light of twentieth-century 
developments in epistemology, philosophy of science, and other 
related fields. The profound difficulty of spelling out the rationality 
of scientific claims and theories is by now well known among phi­
losophers. Not only are scientific claims difficult to pin down vis­
a-vis rationality, but the notion of rationality is itself, to understate 
the point, less than obviously clear. In fact, it is considered vital 
these days to spell out what is meant by the term "rational" before 
discussing whether a given belief is rational. Since my topic is the 
rationality of belief in God, I should be, accordingly, expected to 
do just that. Nevertheless, although I am prepared to point toward 
the neighborhoods in which to find the notions of rationality that 
are my concern here, I do not provide detailed directions at this 
early stage. There are two reasons to be reticent. First, the neigh-
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borhoods are crowded and not well lit. Second, the work of the 
philosophical mapmakers in this area is work in progress; many 
concepts of rationality are currently being explored, and the two 
philosophers on whom I concentrate-William P. Alston and Al­
vin Plantinga-are directly in the thick of these explorations. Since 
in this essay I consider, as well as extend, the thought of two 
working epistemologists, it is important to note that their thinking 
on these topics has developed over several years. In short, any map 
of the neighborhoods will be quite complex, and thus to point at 
this juncture to details would be to run ahead without preparation 
into the dark. It is better to let the details unfold as we proceed. Be 
that as it may, maps start out only as sketches, and thus it serves us 
well if some account of the parity thesis can be given, leaving the 
details of description until needed. 
I. The Parity Thesis and Epistemic Status 
As noted, some philosophers claim that theistic beliefs (viz. , be­
liefs about God or his activity) are as epistemically viable as com­
monly held nontheistic beliefs. I call this claim the "parity thesis": 
Parity Thesis1 (PT1): Theistic beliefs have the same epi­
stemic status as commonly held but obviously rational 
nontheistic beliefs. 
There are many questions to ask about PT 1• What is epistemic sta­
tus? What is rational belief? Which theistic beliefs have the sug­
gested status? which nontheistic beliefs? For example, is the belief 
that God loves me, formed under conditions often considered ad­
verse to the truth of that belief-say, having experiences of great 
evil-just as epistemically viable as the belief that I see a computer 
while I am looking at a computer and other conditions are normal? 
The first issue to note is a point now widely accepted among epis­
temologists. The applicability of epistemic notions is context-de­
pendent. Thus, any version of the parity thesis must be tied to 
specific conditions. So: 
Parity Thesis2 (PT 2): Under appropriate conditions, a 
theistic belief (of a certain kind) has the same epistemic 
status as a nontheistic belief (of a certain kind), 
where the "certain kinds" must be specified. 
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What does it mean to say that two beliefs have the same epi­
stemic status? Alston describes what he calls the "epistemic point 
of view. " He writes that "that point of view is defined by the aim 
of maximizing truth and minimizing falsity in a large body of be­
liefs," where the qualification about a "large body of beliefs" is 
added in order to avoid reaching the aim simply by believing only 
what is obviously true. 1 In regard to the epistemic point of view, 
there are many important notions that range, on the positive side, 
from certainty through knowledge to (something like the inele­
gantly stated) not deontologically unacceptable, with many rungs 
on the ladder in between. 2 To discover the many related notions, 
and understandings of those notions, one can begin considering 
philosophers (standing in a long tradition) who think knowledge is 
justified true belief. Depending on whom one reads, justification is 
understood as anything from epistemic dutifulness to reliability or 
coherence. And rationality can be understood as what Plantinga 
calls "Foley rationality" after Richard Foley's account in The The­
ory of Epistemic Rationality in which rationality is aligned with ac­
tion aimed at some goal. 3 Or it can be understood as a deontologi­
cal notion dealing with one's noetic duty. As well, rationality can 
be thought of in terms of noetic virtue. Finally, some epistemol­
ogists use the term warrant. Plantinga, for example, separates 
warrant or positive epistemic status (that thing, enough of which, 
along with true belief, is sufficient for knowledge) from justifica­
tion because the latter term suggests "duty, obligation, permission, 
and rights-the whole deontological stable. "4 And, he notes, the 
L William P. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," in Alston, Epi­
stemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univer­
sity Press, 1989), p. 83; originally in Monist 68 (1985): 57-89. 
2. Two points need to be mentioned here. First, perhaps the ladder metaphor 
is misleading, unless the ladder is more like a rope web with connections in all 
directions. The notions of rationality, epistemic justification, warrant, and truth 
are connected in many ways and not in any neat or obvious fashion. See Alston, 
"Concepts of Epistemic Justification," and Alvin Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic 
Status and Proper Function," Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 1-50. Second, I say 
"positive," for one might say that there is a range of negative epistemic notions as 
well. For example, there is Roderick Chisholm's notion of withholding judgment, 
as well as all the notions surrounding what is irrational to believe. 
3. Richard Foley, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality (Cambridge, Mass.: Har­
vard University Press, 1987). 
4. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function," p. 3- Plantinga 
most fully makes the distinction between warrant and justification in Warrant: The 
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latter notions do not play a direct role in knowledge at all. In 
somewhat the same vein, but for different reasons, Alston argues 
that justification is not necessary for knowledge. 5 The important 
point is that there is no single nor even a mere handful of central 
epistemic notions. 
Given that epistemic notions are so disparate, one should won­
der how the parity thesis, as described above, is to be understood. 
It is difficult to give a general but interesting version of the thesis; 
it is better to evaluate detailed and specific versions. But this makes 
matters complex, for there are perhaps as many detailed versions as 
there are understandings of epistemic notions. As first steps toward 
spelling out at least some of these more specific versions, consider 
that PT2 remains open in at least three ways: (1). It remains open 
with regard to the exact nature of epistemic status. For example, is 
it a normative notion or a truth-conducive notion, and, if it is nor­
mative, how are we to understand the nature of the normative 
account? (2). It remains open with regard to various epistemic fea­
tures beliefs falling under it might have. For example, even though 
two beliefs might have the same epistemic status with regard to a 
normative, permissive justification, they need not have the same 
status in terms of other features necessary for knowledge-say, 
Plantinga's notion of warrant-or, perhaps, in terms of other kinds 
of justification-say, a truth-conducive kind (where a beliefs being 
justified comes to something like "more probably true than false" 
or perhaps "at least likely to be true"). (3). It remains open not 
only with regard to the kind of epistemic status but to the level or 
strength of that status. Given, for example, that two beliefs have a 
certain kind of truth-conducive justification, one may have more 
of that kind of justification than the other. So, although both are 
justified, one is more probably true than the other. 
Perhaps to close at least this last bit of open-endedness, the par-
ity thesis is best stated in this way: 
Parity Thesis3 (PT 3): Under appropriate conditions, a 
theistic belief (of a certain specified kind) has at least the 
same kind and level of epistemic status as a nontheistic 
belief (of a certain specified kind). 
Current Debate, and Warrant and Proper Function (both New York: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1992). 
5. See Alston, "Justification and Knowledge," in Epistemic Justification. 
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But since it is not just beliefs with which epistemologists are con­
cerned but also the practices that generate them and the people 
who form the beliefs and follow the practices, the final general 
account of the parity thesis is this: 
Parity Thesis: Under appropriate conditions, (1) S's en­
gaging in an epistemic practice EP, which generates theis­
tic beliefs (of a specified kind), or (2) S's believing that p, 
where p is a theistic belief (of a specified kind), has the 
same level and (specified) kind of epistemic status as (3) 
S's engaging in an epistemic practice EP*, which gener­
ates nontheistic beliefs (of a specified kind), or (4) S's be­
lieving that p*, where p* is a nontheistic belief (of a spec­
ified kind). 
This is a very general claim. In order that the parity thesis have 
some epistemological teeth, the practices or beliefs on both the 
theistic and nontheistic sides of the balance need to be specified and 
described in more detail. For example, suppose the thesis claimed 
something like this: 
Parity Thesissense perceptual: Under appropriate conditions, 
theistic beliefs about God's presence in my life and the 
practices that generate them have the same level of deon­
tological epistemic justification as sense perceptual beliefs 
and the practices that generate them. 
Although one might wish for more specificity yet (e. g. , what are 
the appropriate conditions, what exactly is deontological justifica­
tion, and what are the inner workings of sense perception and the 
theistic belief-forming practice?), at least this version has some bite 
and, in fact, is a claim with which many-theists and nontheists 
alike-might disagree. It is clear that one cannot decide on the 
truth of the parity thesis unless specific versions are laid out for 
inspection. 
I believe, however, that the general version of the parity thesis 
captures something of the spirit of the work of both Plantinga and 
Alston and, more generally, of the position sometimes called Re­
formed epistemology. This is a self-descriptive term used by some 
philosophers associated in one way or another with Calvin College 
6] Rationality and Theistic Belief 
and the Reformed tradition in Christian theology. 6 Plantinga and 
Nicholas Wolterstorff are two central figures of this group. Alston, 
another central figure, is not of Reformed theological background, 
at least in the same sense. He has, nevertheless, worked extensively 
with Plantinga and Wolterstorff on the epistemology of religion. 
For ease of discussion, I simply baptize Alston a Reformed epis­
temologist. Although I believe each of the Reformed epistemolo­
gists would agree (or would have agreed, given some of their writ­
ings) in spirit with the parity thesis, each of them has a different 
picture of which theistic beliefs (or practices) and nontheistic beliefs 
(or practices) have epistemic parity. As noted, I focus here on the 
work of Plantinga and Alston. I take their work as normative of 
the approach of Reformed epistemology. 7 
2. Paradigms of Rational Belief 
If one ignores the claims of global skepticism by turning one's 
philosophical back on the skeptic, certain kinds of beliefs emerge as 
paradigms of rationally held beliefs-beliefs about medium-sized 
physical objects, for example. Indeed, Alston takes such beliefs to 
be central when he concentrates on what he calls "perceptual prac­
tice" (PP) and its deliverances as paradigmatically rational. 8 It is 
rational, he admits, to believe that there is a tree in front of me 
only under certain conditions, for example, when the lighting is 
sufficient or when my perceptual faculties are operating normally. 
But given these conditions, many physical object beliefs-specifi­
cally those we form using sense perception and its related epistemic 
practices-are paradigm cases of rational beliefs. 9 Alston also pro-
6. There appears to be no necessary connection between the epistemological 
accounts developed by the Reformed epistemologists and the theological tradition 
with which they have been identified. 
7· Another way to think of Reformed epistemology is to note its reliance on, 
and use of, the work of Thomas Reid. All these philosophers, Plantinga, Alston, 
and Wolterstorff, appeal at various points to Reid's work. 
8. See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," in Faith and Ratio­
nality: Reason and Belief in God, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (No­
tre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). 
9. The phrase "physical object beliefs" is much broader than the phrase "per­
ceptual beliefs." But many of our physical object beliefs result from the use of our 
perceptual capacities. My concern is with physical object beliefs taken in the nar-
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vides a detailed account of the nature of the rationality qua justi­
fication he has in mind. Even without considering those details, 
one can see clearly, given his comparison of perceptual and theistic 
beliefs and practices, that Alston has held some version of the par­
ity thesis in several works. 10 
Plantinga likewise is concerned with certain paradigm cases of 
rational belief He includes cases of perceptual belief such as that I 
now see a tree (when I am looking at one), but his range of admis­
sible beliefs is larger than simply the set of sense perceptual beliefs. 
He suggests that it is perfectly rational to believe that that person is 
in pain (when she is writhing in pain before us) and that I remem­
ber eating breakfast this morning (when it seems to me that I re­
member eating breakfast). Here we see Plantinga's willingness to 
include in the set of paradigmatically rational beliefs two other 
kinds of belief often held to be problematic for human ratio­
nality-memory beliefs and beliefs about other minds. This inclu­
sivism, long characteristic of Plantinga' s work, is indicative of the 
spirit of the Reformed epistemologists. 11 Both Alston and Plantinga 
have appealed to fairly weak notions of rationality: Alston appeals 
to weak, normative justification, Plantinga to proper basicality, 
where this notion is to be understood within a normative account 
of rationality in which one is permitted to believe, or where one is 
within one's rights in believing, a proposition. 12 Thus, the parity 
thesis emerges. 
In the broader work of Alston and Plantinga there are variations 
on this theme. The work of Plantinga since about 1986 concen­
trates on what he calls "warrant" -as Plantinga says, that thing, 
enough of which, along with true belief, gives humans knowledge. 
And Alston is well known for his work in general epistemology. 
Nevertheless, Plantinga's work on epistemology from about 1979 
rower sense of those delivered by perception. Unless a cleaner distinction is called 
for, I do not make it. 
IO. He moves away from this position in Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemol­
ogy of Religious Experience (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). I have 
more to say about this in Chapter 8. 
I r. See, for example, Plantinga, God and Other Minds: A Study in the Rational 
Justification of Belief in God (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967). 
12. See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," and Plantinga, 
"Reason and Belief in God," both in Faith and Rationality. 
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through I986 is concerned to evaluate the charge that one cannot 
rationally hold theistic beliefs since such beliefs are supposed to be 
noetically deficient, whereas perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, 
and beliefs about other minds are not. And in several essays Alston 
considers both normative and evaluative accounts of justification 
where he appears not to be concerned about knowledge per se. I 
use these earlier works, where various accounts of the parity thesis 
emerge, as a springboard for a broader discussion that includes 
consideration of later developments. 
It seems fair to say, overall, that Alston and Plantinga point to 
three pivotal kinds of belief as paradigms of rational belief: (percep­
tually delivered) physical object beliefs, memory beliefs, and beliefs 
about other minds. To facilitate discussion in the remaining pages, 
let us take the following as examples of members of the set of 
paradigm rational beliefs. 
(I) .  A tree is there. 
(2). That person is in pain. 
(J). I ate breakfast this morning. 
When I refer to the paradigm beliefs, I have these examples in 
mind, although they are simply representative of the set of para­
digmatically rational beliefs more broadly construed as the sets 
of (perceptually delivered) physical object beliefs, memory beliefs, 
and beliefs about other minds. 
Given these examples, the parity thesis has the following appli­
cation. The beliefs that 
(4). God created the world. 
(5). God created the flower that is before me. 
(6). God forgives my sin. 
have the same level and kind of epistemic status as (I), (2), and (J). 
Of course, the kind must be specified, and one must leave open the 
possibility that other kinds of epistemic status may accrue to either 
theistic or paradigm beliefs while not accruing to the others. The 
strongest versions of the parity thesis have it that theistic and para­
digm beliefs have exactly the same kind and level of epistemic sta-
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tus and that that level and kind are the best (or strongest) kind of 
justification available. 13 But the central point is that any skepticism 
with regard to the specific kind of justification laid at the feet of the 
paradigm beliefs is a skepticism to be laid at the feet of the theistic 
beliefs, and vice versa. I do not mean to claim, and neither does 
Plantinga or Alston, that there are no differences among (1), (2), 
and (3) or among (4), (5), and (6). The point is rather that the 
general kinds of consideration that go into providing the ratio­
nality of the paradigm beliefs also go into providing the rationality 
of theistic beliefs, and vice versa. 
3. Goals 
If the parity thesis captures a central claim of Reformed epis­
temology, then Reformed epistemology puts forth an intriguing 
claim. That theistic beliefs may have the same epistemic status as 
other more commonly accepted nontheistic beliefs is a suggestion 
many theists would surely welcome. But do theistic beliefs have 
such a status? My overarching goal is to argue that, strictly speak­
ing, none of the versions of the parity thesis attributable to Alston 
or Plantinga is successful. Each one fails because of a lack of recog­
nition of the necessary role of an epistemic base-a set of back­
ground beliefs-in the formation and justification of certain kinds 
of belie( But I do wish to defend, and work within, the general 
spirit of the Reformed epistemological frame work. Insofar as I 
have success in the latter task, this is an essay in Reformed epis­
temology (i.e., in its spirit) rather than an essay on Reformed epis­
temology (i.e., critical of it). Insofar as I have success in the for­
mer, this is also an essay on Reformed epistemology. 
My aims fall into three categories. First, I wish to contribute to 
the ongoing discussion of the rationality of belief in God, for much 
disagreement about it remains. It does seem to a great many phi­
losophers of religion that belief in God is rational. I throw in my 
lot with these. But there is disagreement among philosophers of 
religion not only about whether theistic belief is rational but also 
IJ. It should be noted that what counts as best may need analysis. One might 
ask, best for what-truth, living a peaceful life, being happy? 
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about how it is rational. I hope to add at least a modicum of insight 
into this latter debate. 
My second area of concern is to provide an account and analysis 
of various versions of the parity thesis and related suggestions aris­
ing out of Reformed epistemology. The claims of Alston and Plan­
tinga are my focus, and I present some criticisms of the positions 
of each. I believe these criticisms raise some difficult, and overlap­
ping, challenges to each of their more or less explicit versions of 
the thesis, in particular where epistemic parity is said to exist be­
tween sense perception and theistic epistemic practices. But there 
are also problems when some of their more recent work is applied 
to other versions of the parity thesis, versions that I construct 
based on their fundamental strategies. I explore these as well. 
I weigh Alston's and Plantinga's various parity theses and find 
them wanting. In particular, their accounts of theistic experience 
and the epistemic practices that generate theistic belief need refin­
ing. Once this is done, the third aim can be fulfilled: to suggest and 
defend a version of the parity thesis that does not fall prey to the 
criticisms laid against the theses suggested by Alston and Plan­
tinga. As well, I draw several important parallels between the two 
practices to which this new parity thesis calls attention. Hence, I 
attempt to make a positive case for the plausibility of the parity 
thesis thus understood. Overall, then, I hope to clarify and defend 
the project of Reformed epistemology. 14 
14. There are two respects in which I am hesitant to characterize my position as 
Reformed. The first is that both Alston and Plantinga take foundationalist posi­
tions in their epistemological theories. As becomes clear, I am less sanguine about 
foundationalism than either Alston or Plantinga. But Wolterstorffs position is not 
(or at least not clearly) foundationalist, and so perhaps my position is not ill-de­
scribed as Reformed. Second, both Plantinga and Alston are unabashed metaphysi­
cal realists. Since my philosophical youth, I too have been so unabashed. In (what I 
hope is only) my early mid-life, I have become unsure of this position. (Do philos­
ophers qua philosophers have mid-life crises?) But I need not commit myself to 
one position or the other here, since much of what I say is, I believe, compatible 
with a metaphysical realist position. Whether or not one's being a metaphysical 
realist is a necessary condition of being epistemologically Reformed is not an issue 
I enter here. 
[ 2 ] 
Alston's Parity Thesis 
A version of the parity thesis is clearly seen in Alston's work. 
His strategy in some seminal essays is to embed the justification of 
beliefs in the rationality of what he calls "epistemic (or doxastic) 
practices. "1 He then argues that the kind of ju stification available 
for the practice that provides u s  with beliefs abou t  the physical 
world is the same kind of ju stifi cation available for the practice that 
generates beliefs abou t God. He further argues that the level or 
strength of justification is the same. My goal in the present chapter 
is twofold. First, I lay out the central tenets ofAlston's argu ment 
in "Christian Experience and Christian Belief, " supplementing 
them with some claims made in two other essays and in Perceiving 
God. Second, I provide the outline of a challenge to Alston' s posi­
tion. Although a fuller and more developed accou nt of this chal­
lenge is defended in Chapter 3, I suggest here that if the challenge 
is su ccessful, it calls for some distinctions within Alston's account 
of epistemic ju stification. These distinctions raise some questions 
abou t Alston's version of the parity thesis. 
1. See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," and "Religious Ex­
perience and Religious Belief," Nous 16 (1982): 3-14. Of the two listed here, I 
concentrate mostly on the first. 
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I. Epistemic Pra ctices a nd Bel iefs 
In "Christian Exper ience and Christia n  Bel ief' Alston introduces 
the notion of an epistemic pra ctice. An epistemic pra ctice, he says, 
is "a more-or-less r egular and fixed procedure  of for ming bel iefs 
under certain conditions, where the content of the belief is some 
more-or-less determinate function of the conditions. "2 The notion 
of a practice is more basic than  the notion of a bel ief insofar as one 
considers epistemic status. If one can show that a pra ctice is justi­
fied (or tha t one' s engaging in a pra ctice is justified), then (typ­
ically) by extension its del iverances are justified. So Alston' s central 
concern is whether we are epistemically justified in engaging in 
certain epistemic practices. 
He has two practices in mind. The fir st provides us with (ma ny 
of our) bel iefs about the physical world; Alston call s this "per cep­
tual practice" (PP) or "sense perceptual practice" (SPP or SP). 3 The 
second provides (some of) us with beliefs about God; he call s it 
"Christian practice" (CP) and la ter introduces the notions of "mys­
tical practice (MP) and "Christia n  mystical practice" (CMP). 4 
2. Epistemic Justifica tion 
Alston claims that CP and PP have the sa me kind of epistemic 
justification. What kind of epistemic justifica tion do they have? He 
distinguishes two. Ther e  is an evaluative sense of justifica tion, Je· 
Here the concern is that one' s hol ding of a bel ief be l egitimate vis­
a-vis the concer n for attaining truth and avoiding falsity; the con­
cerns are those of what Alston call s the epistemic point of view. If 
2. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 110. I use "epistemic 
practice" and "doxastic practice" interchangeably. 
J. He uses PP, SPP, and SP to refer to this practice. I prefer the first, but I use 
the other abbreviations when they are more natural in quoting certain essays. The 
reason for Alston's shift from PP to SPP or SP is that he later develops arguments 
to the conclusion that one can perceive God, or at least that there is no reason to 
think one cannot. Once having broadened the category of perception to include 
access to God, Alston needed a more specific terminology by which to pick out the 
perception of physical objects. The fullest treatment of the possibility of the per­
ception of God is in Perceiving God. 
4· Again the shift in terminology is at least partly because of Alston's need for 
further specificity. The later two terms are introduced in Perceiving God. I use CP 
unless another term is needed for ease of exposition. 
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one is justified in holding a belief in this sense, then the circum­
stances in which the bel ief are held are such that the bel ief is at least 
l ikely  to be true. Alston admits that there is much work to be done 
in discovering what the var ious con ditions for Je are. But when 
that work is done, he says, what Je boils  down to is a kind of 
rel iabil ist un derstanding of ration ality: a belief is Je when it was 
formed or is sustained by an epistemic practice that can be gen er­
ally rel ied on to produce true rather than false bel iefs. 5 
Je is to be contrasted with a normative understan ding of justifica­
tion , ]m which is normative in that it deals with how well a person 
does in l ight of the norms required of us simply in virtue of bein g 
cognitive beings. We have, in short, some obl igations  and duties 
with respect to bel ief an d bel ief for mation because of the fact that 
we are seekers of truth. Jn and Je can be contrasted in this way. 
Consider a naive member of an isolated primitive tribe who, along 
with his fellows, unhesitatingly accepts the traditions of the tribe. 
That is, he believes that p wherever the traditions of the tribe, as 
recited by the elders, include the assertion that p. He is ]n in doing 
so, for he has no reason whatsoever to doubt these traditions. Ev­
ery one he knows accepts them without question, and they do not 
conflict with anything else he believes. And yet, let us suppose, this 
is not a reliable procedure of belief formation; and so he is not ]c in 
engaging in it. Conversely, a procedure may be in fact reliable, 
though I have strong reasons for regarding it as unreliable an d so 
would not be ]n in engaging in it; to do so would be to ignore those 
reasons and so would be a violation of an intellectual obligation. • 
There is, then, a clear difference between Jn and Je· 
A further distin ction within the normative con cept of justifica­
tion runs r oughly parall el to the two positions taken in the William 
James-W. K. Clifford debate on the ethics of bel ief. Since our goal 
as epistemic beings is to seek the truth, Cl ifford demands that one 
ought not hold a bel ief unless one has adequate reasons  for so do­
ing. James denies this claim, suggesting that one can hold a bel ief 
5· A fuller account of evaluative justification is available in Alston, "Concepts 
of Epistemic Justification," and "An Internalist Externalism," in Epistemic Justifica­
tion (the latter originally in Synthese 74 [I988): 265-83). I return to these essays in 
Chapter 4· 
6. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. I I 5· 
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unless one has some reason not to hold it. In effect, Cl ifford de­
mands that we avoid as much error as possibl e, whereas James 
affirms the search for as much truth as possibl e. These parallel a 
strong version Gns) and a weak version Gnw) of normative justifica­
tion. The strong version has it that one is justified in engaging in a 
practice if and onl y  if one has reasons for thinking the practice 
rel iabl e. On the weak version, one is justified in engaging in a 
practice when there are no reasons for regarding the practice as 
unrel iabl e. Some important relationships hold among Je, ]ns• and 
Jnw· Perhaps the most important of these is that if one sets out to 
discover whether a belief or practice is Je then one is setting out to 
discover whether one could  be Jns in holding that bel ief or engag­
ing in that practice. 
Alston makes two central claims. First, one is never Jns in engag­
ing in either PP or CP because one cannot have adequate reasons 
for supposing either practice to be Je· (It does not follow that one 
or the other cannot be Je but only  that one has no adequate reasons 
to think it is. ) Second, both PP and CP can be Jnw for a person. 
The answer to the question with which this section began-what 
kind of epistemic justification do PP and CP share? -is, then, that 
CP and PP share Jnw· Alston' s version of the parity �hesis might 
thus be described: 
Parity Thesis Alston (PTA): Under appropriate conditions, 
both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are Jnw· 
There is a natural extension to bel iefs: 
Under appropriate conditions, both S's bel ief that p, 
where p is a theistic bel ief, and S's bel ief that p*, where 
p* is a perceptual bel ief, are Jnw· 7 
7· This extension, although tacit in Alston's suggestions in "Christian Experi­
ence and Christian Belief," is perhaps incautious. Alston argues elsewhere that one 
must be careful not to confuse levels when dealing with epistemological concerns; 
what applies at one level may not at another. Although he writes in his earlier 
essays that a belief is justified if and only if the practice that generates it is, as his 
ideas develop it becomes clear that, although it may be rational for someone to 
engage in a practice, that in itself does not entail that the beliefs generated by the 
practice are justified. Rationality entails neither justification nor reliability. Alston 
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Alston does not intend his claims to be weak-kneed. First, PP 
and CP have the same level (weak) and kind (normative) of justi­
fication, and al though either CP or PP may be Je one cannot have 
adequate reasons to think either is. 8 Second, he aims his sights 
higher than simple epistemic neutral ity for PP and CP. His general 
goal is to consider the "possibil ity that one' s experience can pro­
vide justification sufficient for rational acceptance. "9 Thus, al­
though both PP and CP are epistemically permissible practices, this 
kind of justification is intended to be understood as sufficient for · 
some sort of positive epistemic status. Epistemic permission to en­
gage in a practice and, by extension, to hold beliefs thereby del ivered 
is sufficient for epistemic acceptance of the delivered bel iefs, even 
though one has no adequate reasons to take the practice to be Je· 
3· The Justification of Perceptual Practice 
Alston describes the basic accounts phil osophers have given in 
trying to show that PP is Je· He does not discuss any of these in 
detail but notes their general failure to win the phil osophical day. 10 
Thus, the prospect of PP being Jns is not good. Furthermore, he 
argues, in a later essay I discuss in Chapter 4, that if one practice can be shown to 
be reliable they all can. Justification is easily had for just about any practice and 
hence just about any belief Alston therefore shifts the question he asks about prac­
tices away from the issue of justification to the issue of their rationality. This shift 
allows him to evaluate the relative strength of our doxastic practices. It turns out, 
then, that engaging in an epistemic practice should be evaluated in terms of ratio­
nality and not justification, and thus some important questions need to be raised 
about the "natural" extension suggested above or, perhaps better, about PTA itself. 
To begin with, is it appropriate or worthwhile to speak of the justification of 
practices (as opposed to beliefs)? Should we not rather speak of the rationality of 
practices? And what does this mean for beliefs? 
8. Perhaps PTA should include a clause noting that CP and PP share at least ]nw 
in order to recognize that they both might be Jc· But Alston seems to suggest in 
"Christian Experience and Christian Belie£'' that our knowledge that an epistemic 
practice is Jc is limited and therefore that the strongest claim we can legitimately 
make is that CP and PP are ]nw· See Chapter 4 for an explanation of Alston's 
apparent change of mind on this matter. 
9· Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. II 1. 
10. There is a fuller discussion in Perceiving God and an even fuller discussion in 
Alston's forthcoming book on general epistemology (the latter of which is noted in 
Perceiving God). 
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suggests that as far as he knows no one has come up with any 
good reasons to think PP is unreliable. There being, apparently, no 
good reasons, PP is Jnw· 
At this point Alston refers the reader to Thomas Reid' s work. 
Reid suggests that the Creator endows human beings with a strong 
tendency to trust their belief-forming practices, noting that no 
practice can be provided noncircular reasons for accepting it as reli­
able. Thus, if we "are to have any chance of acquiring knowledge, 
we must simply go along with our natural reactions of trust with 
respect to at least some basic sources of belief, provided we lack 
sufficient reason for regarding them as unreliable. "11 Furthermore, 
any appeal to one or another of those practices as more basic than 
the others, with the goal in mind of justifying the less basic by the 
more basic, is illegitimate. We have no reason to single out, for 
example, the practice delivering self-evident beliefs as providing 
more accurate access to truth than PP. D escartes' s strategy of pick­
ing out one practice and using it to justify others is arbitrary. 12 PP 
is Jnw and this, Alston claims, gives us at least some chance at 
knowledge about the physical world. 
4· The Justification of Christian Practice 
D oes CP have the same kind of justification as PP? Is CP Jnw? By 
the nature of the case, one need not produce some set of reasons to 
show that CP is Jnw· Nevertheless, CP is often not accepted as Jnw • 
so some kind of account can be helpful. The best that can be done 
is to present PP, which we accept as Jnw •  alongside CP in order to 
compare the two. If there are no differences signifi cant vis-a-vis 
epistemic justification, then if one accepts PP as Jnw one can accept 
CP as Jnw· 13 Alston argues that there are no such differences and in 
effect, therefore, argues for the truth of PTA . 
I I. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. II9. 
I2. Alston does not wish to suggest that one cannot check what might be called 
"subpractices" by a larger practice in which a subpractice is embedded. One might, 
for example, check the reliability of a thermometer by the larger perceptual prac­
tice. 
I 3. One might think there is some sort of argument from analogy here, but I do 
not think this is the case. Alston's comparision is merely a comparision; it is not 
intended as an argument from the justification of one practice to the justification of 
another. 
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Epistemic situations are often analyzed in the following way. In­
stead of having empirical information plain and simpl e, it appears 
that what we have is, on the one hand, a datum such as "I am 
being appeared to in a computerish way" or "I seem to see a com­
puter" or "A computerish sense datum is in my visual field" and, 
on the other hand, bel iefs such as that there is a computer in front 
of me. How does one l egitimately move from the content of one' s 
mental l ife to a claim about the (independently) existing physical 
real ity? Supposedly, the (independently existing) computer gen­
erates the datum via some psychophysical process. Thus the em­
pirical claim, "There is a computer in front of me, " is a hybrid 
resul ting from the datum and an expl anation (via the mysterious 
psychophysical process). But now we are in the difficul t  position 
with PP of having a bifurcation between experience and expl a­
nation. Simil arly with CP, the suggestion goes. One has certain 
kinds of experience, such as it seeming to one that God cares for 
us, and theological expl anations, such as that God does care for us. 
How is one to overcome either of these bifurcations? 
Alston registers his skepticism about the two standard ways by 
which phil osophers attempt to overcome the bifurcation for PP. 
Some try to show that the existence of the physical world is the 
best expl anation of the data we have. But, says Alston, it is un­
l ikely that one can "specify the purely subjective experiential data 
to be explained without relying on the 'independent physical 
world' scheme in doing so, " and thus the expl anation route seems 
closed. 14 Neither does the phenomenal ist approach of taking physi­
cal object bel iefs to be bel iefs about actual and possible  sense expe­
rience fare well , according to Alston. The best move is to reject the 
bifurcation al together and seek to justify the claim that we are in 
direct contact with the objects of the physical world. He suggests a 
parallel strategy for CP: 
The question concerns the justifiability of a certain practice-the 
practice of forming physical-object beliefs directly on the basis of 
perception rather than as an explanation of what is perceived or ex­
perienced. Another way of characterizing the practice in q uestion is 
to say that it is a practice of using a certain conceptual scheme (the 
"independently existing physical object" conceptual scheme) to spe­
cify what it is we are experiencing in sense perception. If I may use 
14. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 109. 
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the term "objectification" for "taking an experience to be an experi­
ence of something of a certain sort," then we may say that the prac­
tice in question is a certain kind of objectification of sense experi­
ence, an objectification in terms of independently existing physical 
objects. Let us use the term "perceptual practice" (PP ) for our famil­
iar way of objectifying sense experience. In parallel fashion I will 
... use the term "Christian practice" (CP ) for the practice of objec­
tifying certain ranges of experience in terms of Christian theology. 15 
In the case of PP, the experience is taken to be an  experience of the 
object itself and not merely a psychologica l datum. Alston a lso 
says the believer takes himself to be directly aware of the object; he 
does not cla im that the subject is directly aware. Further, Alston 
suggests tha t  we should understand our formation of physica l ob­
ject beliefs simply by our "objectification" of a range of experience 
in terms of certa in concepts. On his suggestion, the datum of the 
experience generating physica l  object beliefs is not expla ined by 
reference to objective entities but is simply understood as a n  expe­
rience of those entities. 
A brief detour is necessa ry here. In "Christian Experience and 
Christia n Belief' Alston uses the language of one' s ta king an  expe­
rience to be an  experience of a certa in sort as opposed to the cla im 
that  one's experience is of a certa in sort. In his more fully orbed 
theory of perception, however, he makes the following cla ims: 
As I see the matter, at the heart of perception (sensory and other­
wise ) is a phenomenon variously termed presentation, appearance, or 
givenness. Something is presented to one's experience (awareness ) as 
so-and-so, as blue, as acrid, as a house, as Susie's house, or what­
ever. I take this phenomenon of presentation to be essentially inde­
pendent of conceptualisation, belief, judgment, "taking," or any 
other cognitive activity involving concepts and propositions. It is 
possible, in principle, for this book to visually present itself to me as 
blue even if I do not take it to be blue, think of it as blue, concep­
tualise it as blue, judge it to be blue, or anything else of the sort. 
Thus Alston distances his theory of perception from those in which 
the object of the experience is sa id itself to be constituted in part or 
in whole by the conceptual fra mework and beliefs of the perceiver. 
15. Ibid. 
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Nevertheless, Alston's claims about presentation do not really af­
fect his claims about PP and CP. In fact, Alston goes on to say: 
"No doubt, in mature human perception this element of presenta­
tion is intimately inter twined with conceptualisation and belief, but 
presentation does not consist in anything like that. " So, although 
Alston holds that the object of perception is a given, one' s concep­
tual scheme can nevertheless influence how one takes the given: 
It is essential not to confuse what appears with what it appears as. 
My conceptualised knowledge and belief can affect the latter but not 
the former. If to perceive X is simply for X to appear to one in a 
certain way, and if the concept of appearance is unanalyzable, then it 
would appear that we can enunciate no further conceptually neces­
sary conditions for perception. But that does not follow. In declar­
ing the concept of appearance (presentation) to be unanalyzable I 
was merely denying that we can give a conceptually equivalent for­
mulation in other terms; I was not denying that conceptually neces­
sary conditions can be formulated in other terms. 
Alston' s realism about the given should not be confused with the 
suggestion that the given itself is all that is necessary  for per ceptual 
exper ience. 16 
Let us return  now to consider PP. Alston' s point is that the data 
of the experiences generating physical object beliefs are not ex­
plained by reference to objective entities but rather such experi­
ences are simply understood as experiences of those entities. So it 
goes with CP as well. Alston is careful to distinguish between "ex­
periences in which the subject takes himself to be directly aware of 
God" and other interesting cases in which someone is "simply . . .  
disposed to believe . . .  that what is happening in his experience is 
to be explained by God' s activity. "17 How does the account of these 
experiences go? As we have lear ned, Alston uses the term "objec­
tify" to stand for "taking a cer tain kind of exper ience as an experi­
ence of something of a cer tain sort. " In the physical object case, we 
take sense experiences as experiences of physical objects (rather 
than psychological data). He suggests, then, that just as we form 
r6. Alston, "Experience of God: A Perceptual Model," paper delivered at the 
Wheaton Philosophy Conference, Wheaton, Illinois, October 1989, pp. 2-4. A 
fuller treatment of this topic is found in Alston, Perceiving God, chap. r. 
17. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 107. 
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physical object bel iefs directl y  on the basis of perception so we 
form theistic bel iefs directl y  on the basis of theistic experience. 
There is not to be, presumabl y, any inference from the one to the 
other; the formation of bel ief is immediate. Thus, whenever we 
have perceptual experiences, we take ourselves to be in contact 
with physical objects. Just so, whenever we have theistic experi­
ences, we take ourselves to be in contact with God or at least his 
activities. But how are we to understand "theistic experience"? 
Alston says that a certain range of experience is objectified in 
certain terms. What is this range of experience in the real m of 
theistic bel ief? He suggests that there are certain Christian or rel i­
gious experiences that can be objectified. He del imits the experi­
ences about which he is concerned by setting aside what are typ­
ically called mystical experiences-those experiences sometimes 
had by saints and ascetics. He is concerned more with experiences 
open to the typical , lay Christian. 18 He al so sets aside experiences 
that might be described as visions. He does not wish to set aside all 
sensory mediation-for example, seeing the glory of God in the 
mountains. Nevertheless, he l imits his final concern to what we 
might call direct experiences of God. These experiences need not 
be in the forefront of one' s consciousness, but they are not experi­
ences from which one infers the presence of God. God is somehow 
(to be taken as) directly present, just as the tabl e to my l eft is (taken 
by me to be) directly present. 
Given this range of experiences, and Alston' s acc ounts of PP and 
CP, how does the argument for PTA go? Clearly, PP is Jnw· It is 
often suggested, however, that CP is significantly different from 
PP, and these differences show that CP and PP do not have the 
same kind of epistemic justification. Al ston writes: 
I believe that many people are inclined to take CP to be discredited 
by certain ways in which it differs from PP, by the lack of certain 
salient features of PP. The se include the f ollowing: 
I. Within PP there are standard ways of checking the accuracy of 
any particular perceptual belief. If, by looking at a cup, I form the 
18. This remains true even in Perceiving God, where Alston uses the rubric 
"mystical practice" to name the subject of his concern, although at least some of 
his examples in this more recent work are from what is thought of more stan­
dardJY as the mystical literature. Still, his concern is not experiences of unity with 
God but rather with experiences where God is taken to be present, in a sense 
Alston specifies, to the experiencer's consciousness. 
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belief that there is coffee in it, I can check this belief for accuracy by 
smelling or tasting the contents; I can get other observers to look at 
it, smell it, or taste it; I can run chemical tests on it and get other 
people to do so. 
2. By engaging in PP we can discover regularities in the behavior 
of objects putatively observed, and on this basis we can, to a certain 
extent, effectively predict the course of events. 
3· Capacity for PP, and practice of it, is found universally among 
normal adult human beings. 
4· All normal adult human beings, whatever their culture, use 
basically the same conceptual scheme in objectify ing their sense ex­
perience. 19
( 2 I 
Alston responds in both a negative and a pos1t1ve way to these 
supposed disanalogies between PP and CP. Only the negative re­
ply need concern us for the present. 
The conclusion of the negative reply is that PP's possession of 
features I-4 is best seen "as a rather special situation that pertains 
specifically to certain fundamental aspects of that particular practice 
in this particular historical-cultural situation rather than as an in­
stance of what is to be expected of any reliable epistemic practice. "20 
Alston's argument is roughly that although I-4 are features that 
one might desire to have attached to an epistemic practice, it does 
not follow that a practice's failing to have them is a reason to reject 
the practice's claim to reliability. In fact, PP's possession of I-4 
does not give us a reason to take PP as reliable. 
To simplify matters, let us consider features 1 and 2 together and 
then 3 and 4· Features I and 2 have the common focus of calling 
attention to predictability, whereas 3 and 4 have the common focus 
of calling attention to the universal human participation in the 
practice. 21 So first, I and 2. PP is what Alston calls a "basic prac­
tice." It is a practice that "constitutes our basic access to its subject 
matter. We can learn about our physical environment only by per­
ceiving it, by receiving reports of the perceptions of others, and by 
carrying out inferences from what we learn in these first two ways. 
We can not know anything a priori about these matters, nor do we 
19. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 121. 
20. Ibid., p. 128. 
21. This observation is made by Peter Van lnwagen in the abstract "Abnormal 
Experience and Abnormal Belief," Nous 15 (1981): 13-14. 
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have any other sort of experiential access to the physical world. " 
Thus, if one tries to take features I and 2 as reasons for judging PP 
to be reliable, one is involved in a "vicious circularity. "22 So no 
adequate reason can be given. 
As an alternative, Alston suggests that, although I and 2 do not 
provide us with reasons for the reliability of PP, perhaps they be­
token or manifest reliability. Thus, the first part of the anti-CP 
charge reduces to the claim that I and 2 manifest reliability but that 
CP lacks I and 2. Their absence is supposed to be a reason to reject 
the reliability of CP. But surely it is not. If I and 2 are not neces­
sary conditions for reliability, as Alston argues, then the only alter­
native left for the anti-CP challenge is that I and 2 are general 
features of reliability, features such that the absence thereof pro­
vides at least prima facie reason to reject a practice as not reliable. 
In response, Alston offers one central reason why we should not 
think I and 2 are general features of reliable practices. This reason 
is hinted at by the practice of pure mathematics. The practice of 
pure mathematics does not allow for predictability precisely be­
cause it does not deal with changing objects. This example indi­
cates that "whether a practice could be expected to yield predic­
tion, if reliable, depends on the kind of subject matter with which 
it deals. "23 He then suggests that it is only accidental and not neces­
sary to PP that predictability is built into it. 
As for features 3 and 4, not everyone engages in the practice of 
pure mathematics, so the claim that everyone engages in the same 
epistemic practices is not true; universal participation need not be a 
feature of a reliable practice. Also, it is not at all clear that all peo­
ple of various cultures objectify experience in the way Western 
people do. Alston admits that this is a controversial area, but since 
the issue is unclear and, I might add, not even clearly decidable, 
perhaps it should not be pressed on either side. 
Given these considerations, although the presence of features I-
4 may be cognitive desiderata, their absence does not give us a 
reason to reject the reliability of a practice failing to have them. PP 
and CP thus have, according to Alston, the same kind of epistemic 
22. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," pp. I 17, 124. 
23. Ibid., p. 127. 
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justification, Jnw· Just as we have no reason to reject the reliability 
of PP, so we have no reason to reject the reliability of CP. 
5· Alstonian Theistic Experience 
In the next section I introduce a challenge to PTA which I draw 
from some recent philosophical work on the epistemic value of 
mystical experiences. To develop the challenge, however, I need a 
clearer explanation of Alston's account of experience. Experience, 
whether in PP or CP, is such that the object of one's experience is 
taken to be directly present. Alston resists any bifurcation of one's 
belief formation into parts, claiming that one simply takes one's 
experience to be of a certain object; one objectifies one's experience 
immediately into the categories appropriate to that experience. 
Sense experiences are objectified into phy sical object beliefs via the 
independently existing physical object scheme. Theistic experi­
ences are objectified into theistic beliefs via the (Christian) theo­
logical object scheme. How should one understand the experiences 
that the theist objectifi es into theistic belief? 
Since the belief formation is noninferential, one expects the con­
tent of the experience to be relevant to the content of the belief. 
But what is the content of the experience? Here there appears to be 
a certain looseness in Alston's presentation in "Christian Experi­
ence and Christian Belief." Although he indicates early in his essay 
that he does not want to rule out experiences in which one might 
see the glory of God in majestic natural scenes or hear God speak 
in the words of a friend, he later specifies that he is restricting 
himself 
to experiences in which the subject takes himself to be directly 
aware of God, rather than simply being disposed to believe, how­
ever firmly, that what is happening in his experience is to be ex­
plained by God's activity. Thus if after responding to the Gospel 
message, I find myself reacting to people in a different kind of way, 
I may firmly believe that this is due to the action of the Holy Spirit 
on my soul; but if I do not seem to myself to be directly experienc­
ing the presence of the Holy Spirit, if I am not disposed to answer 
the question "Just what did you experience?" or "Just what were 
you aware of?" with something that begins "The Holy Spirit .. . , " 
Rationality and Theistic Belief 
then this experience does not fall within our purview . . . .  No 
doubt, this is often a difficult distinction to make. 24 
The first examples indicate a certain overlap in experience be­
tween theist and nontheist. For example, presumably both theist 
and nontheist (can) see the natural scene and both (can) hear the 
voice of the friend. In the remaining example, the nontheist pre­
sumably does not react to people in a way different than before 
hearing the gospel. This is an experience to which the nontheist has 
no access. The question is whether Alston can include both kinds 
of example-those in which there is an overlap of experience be­
tween theist and nontheist and those in which there is no overlap. 
In the cases in which a theist and a nontheist appear to be having 
the same experience-viewing the beautiful mountains-but 
where only the theist forms the belief that God made them or that 
they reveal the glory of God, it may appear that there is an experi­
ential overlap. But I think this is not the case. Insofar as Alston's 
suggestions go, it seems that there must be two separate experien­
tial contents, for if the experiential contents were the same for both 
theist and nontheist then the difference in beliefs would need to be 
explained either by a difference in inference and explanation added 
to the experience or by the nontheist's failure to have a theistic 
conceptual or belief framework. An inferential addition is not al­
lowed by Alston's own case; the objectification is to be immediate. 
And the failure of the nontheist to have the theistic conceptual or 
belief framework seems at best an unlikely explanation. Presum­
ably both theist and nontheist take the mountains to be present in 
Alston's objectification sense. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the 
theist confuses the presence of mountains with the presence of 
God. Even if the theist has some theistic conceptual or belief 
framework the nontheist lacks, the theist needs some additional 
(and different) content in her experience to objectify it legitimately 
in theistic terms. It seems at least prima facie clear that the content 
of the experience should be related to the content of the belief gen­
erated. Just as I would deny , under normal circumstances, that 
there is a tree in front of me while I am in a room with no view of 
trees (i.e., while not having any experiences whose content in-
24. Ibid., pp. 107-8. 
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eludes what I take to be a tree), so the theist should deny, under 
normal circumstances, that she is in direct contact with God while 
not having an experience the content of which she takes to be 
theistic. The mere presence of mountains and a theistic framework 
is not enough for the generation of a justified theistic belief. 
Some comments from Perceiving God can help us here. Alston 
writes: 
What distinguishes perception from abstract thought is that the ob­
ject is directly presented or immediately present to the subject so that 
"indirect presentation" would be a contradiction in terms. To tease 
out a concept of directness that has an opposite within the_ category 
of presentation, let's go back to sense perception .... We can distin­
guish directly seeing someone from seeing her in a mirror or on tele­
vision. We have presentation on both sides of this distinction. Even 
when I see someone in a mirror or on television, the person appears 
to me as such-and-such, as smiling, tall, or smartly dressed. That 
person can be identified with an item in my visual field. This con­
trasts with the case in which I take something as a sign or indication 
of X but do not see X itself (X does not appear anywhere within my 
visual field), as when I take a vapor trail across the sky as an indica­
tion that a jet plane has flown by. Here I don't see the plane at all; 
nothing in my visual field looks like a plane. Let's call this latter 
kind of case indirect perceptional recognition, and the former kind (see­
ing someone on television) indirect perception. We can then say that 
indirect is distinguished from direct perception of X by the fact that 
in the former, but not in the latter, we perceive X by virtue of 
perceiving something else, Y. In the indirect cases I see the person, 
T, by virtue of seeing a mirror or the television screen or whatever. 
On the other hand, when I see T face to face there is nothing else I 
perceive by virtue of perceiving which I see T. 25 
Here Alston distinguishes between direct and indirect perception. 
How do the two kinds of examples I noted from "Christian Expe­
rience and Christian Belief' fit into the scheme from Perceiving 
God? Alston says in Perceiving God that he once thought cases of 
indirect perception and indirect perceptual recognition could not be 
distinguished, as far as the object of the perception (or recognition) 
was God. This indicates that when he wrote "Christian Experience 
and Christian Belief' he meant to focus only on direct experiences. 
25. Alston, Perceiving God, pp. 2o-21. 
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But Alston also tells us in the later work that some seminar stu­
dents convinced him that, if God could appear to him as loving or 
powerful or glorious when he is not sensorily aware of a field of 
oats (or whatever), then God could appear to him as loving or 
powerful or glorious when that comes through his sense percep­
tion of the field of oats. Alston continues by noting that he has 
nothing to say against this possibility. 26 
What is of importance here is that Alston now thinks that cases 
in which God appears through something else, rather than directly, 
can be classified as cases of indirect perception and need not be 
classified as cases of indirect perceptual recognition. Nevertheless, 
he makes it clear that his focus in Perceiving God is the possibility of 
direct perception of God rather than the more complicated indirect 
perception. His reason is that the former is a simpler phenomenon 
than the later. Given this historical information, I believe it is safe 
to suggest that Alston' s examples of experiencing God when hear­
ing a friend' s voice or seeing a natural scene are best understood as 
cases of indirect perception and that we are therefore right here to 
understand Alston' s main concern to be the direct type of experi­
ence of God. But we also learn that my way of passing over the 
more complex cases of indirect perception of God may be too 
easy. Perhaps there is something more going on in cases in which 
one experiences God through hearing a friend' s voice or a beautiful 
scene than some kind of inference or explanation added to the ex­
perience.27 
One way of spelling out Alston' s notion of direct experience 
is the following. 28 Suppose Alston is right and we do objectify 
26. Ibid., p. 28. 
27. I have more to say on this in Chapters 6 and 7, for I take Plantinga's exam­
ples of experiencing God to be of this type, rather than the direct type. In short, I 
attempt later to do some of the work on the more complex cases of indirect per­
ception which are not Alston's focus. 
28. Alston goes into some detail in accounting for various levels of immediacy 
of perception in Perceiving God. He sums up his position by noting three grades of 
immediacy: "(A) Absolute immediacy. One is aware of X but not through any­
thing else, even a state of consciousness. (B) Mediated immediacy (direct percep­
tion). One is aware of X through a state of consciousness that is distinguishable 
from X, and can be made an object of absolutely immediate awareness, but is not 
perceived. (C) Mediate perception. One is aware of X through the awareness of 
another object of perception" (pp. 21-22). (A) is exemplified by awareness of a 
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our experiences. He seems to have in mind a range of experience 
united by some commonality; for example, in the physical object 
case it is sensory experience that is common and, it seems, in the 
theistic case the commonality is a sort of "theistic sense. " Although 
Alston does not explicitly take note of it in "Christian Experience 
and Christian Belief, " on analysis it appears that there is a kind of 
link between sense perceptual experiences and physical object be­
liefs, for example, between "I am appeared to treely" and "I see a 
tree. " 29 This link need not and perhaps cannot be one of belief, at 
least insofar as beliefs generate inferential beliefs, but there is a link 
of the following sort. No one forming the belief "I see a tree" 
would deny that she is being appeared to treely. The link is a sort 
of linguistic or conceptual one. 
Now, according to Alston's claims in "Experience of God: A 
Perceptual Model" and in Perceiving God, the given in an experi­
ence is not dependent on the perceiver's concepts or beliefs. Thus 
caution is called for here. This linguistic-conceptual link to which I 
am calling attention need not imply an antirealist theory of percep­
tion or, for that matter, an antirealist metaphysic. Alston may be 
right that in principle a tree may be present to me even if I do not 
take it to be a tree, think of it as a tree, conceptualize it as a tree, 
judge it to be a tree, or anything else of the sort. Nevertheless, it 
seems true enough that, if I form the belief that I see a tree, I will 
not deny that I am appeared to treely. 30 Thus, in distinguishing be­
tween direct experiences and experiences of other kinds it is helpful 
state of consciousness. (B) is exemplified by being aware of Reagan as he comes 
within one's perceptual range. (C) is exemplified by being aware of Reagan's im­
age on the television screen. I believe that what I have to say in the main text 
provides one account of direct experience that could be spelled out in terms of 
mediated immediacy or direct perception. 
29. He does note the difficulty in specifying purely subjective experiences with­
out reference to "schemes" in doing so; see "Christian Experience and Christian 
Belief," p. 109. 
30. A brief explanation of the terminology used in this context may be in order. 
In this case, the "adverbial" construction is intended to call attention to the linguis­
tic nature of the link without committing me to any existence claims. In its 
broader use in epistemology, the point is to emphasize how I am appeared to rather 
than how things appear to me; see Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 2d ed. 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 29-30, for a more detailed ex­
planation of this terminology. 
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to note that one can appeal to the language used to describe the 
content of direct experiences. 31 It is a language relying on the phys­
ical object conceptual scheme itself. If I take myself to see a tree 
and go on to describe the experience underlying the formation of 
the corresponding belief ("I see a tree" ), I use language such as "I 
am appeared to treely. " The description of the experience makes 
covert reference to the tree or, to make the point more general, to 
the physical object. Let us give this link the name "lingo-concep­
tual link. " 
Now, one might suggest that there need not be a lingo-concep­
tual link. For example, the experience could be described in terms 
of patches of greenishness falling into certain patterns or having a 
certain shape. But this seems an unlikely account. Our experience 
is gestaltlike and does not seem reducible to the more basic compo­
nents. At least, when asked why one thinks she sees a tree the reply 
is something like "I am appeared to treely" and the account is not 
typically given further analysis. 
If there is a range of experiences picked out by the terms "theis­
tic experience" or "Christian experience" (understood as direct ex­
perience), one might surmise that the existence of a similar link can 
be discovered in theistic belief formation. When the belief "God 
wants me to love people more fully" is formed, the description of 
the experience underlying it would, one might expect, make co­
vert reference to theistic language-"being appeared to theistically. " 
Thus the range of experiences to which Alston can point, given the 
objectification scheme he describes, seems not to overlap in con­
tent with the experiences of the nontheist. 32 Alston' s suggestions 
seem to rule out understanding his examples as allowing both the­
ists and nontheists to have the same experiential content in their 
3 r. This seems true enough for beliefs expressed by perceptual verbs. But what 
of straight physical object beliefs that might, as Alston suggests, be based on expe­
rience, for example, "Suzie's house needs painting"? The link here is perhaps not as 
direct, but there still is one. If my belief that Suzie's house needs painting is based 
in experience, I must be looking at (or have looked at) Suzie's house. So "Suzie's 
house needs painting" is linked to "I see (saw) Suzie's house needing paint," which 
in tum is linked to "I am (was) appeared to in a Suzie's house-needing-paint-like 
manner." 
32. Whether it is best to describe such experiences as one experience with two 
contents or as two experiences, one of which occurs at the same time as the other, 
is not important here. 
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experiences. So the experiences objectified by theists into theistic 
belief are experiences only the theist has- or, at least if had by a 
nontheist, they are ignored, explained away, or otherwise not ob­
jectified. 
6. A Challenge to the Alstonian Parity Thesis 
Two sorts of questions can be distinguished in a consideration of 
perception-like theistic experiences. The first is whether the experi­
ence is veridical as opposed to hallucinatory. The second is what 
the experience (whether veridical or hallucinatory) is an experience 
of, what the object of the experience is. The second question is 
relevant here. 
In an essay on mysticism, J. William Forgie isolates the phenom­
enological content of the experience from other background beliefs 
and "items of knowledge" which he calls the "epistemic base. " 
When seeking to identify a person one sees, he argues, one must 
make reference to the epistemic base. For example, to identify the 
young man next door when one knows that identical twins Tom 
and Tim Tibbetts both live there, one must rely on other back­
ground information such as the fact that Tom is out of town this 
week. Since experiences of both Tom and Tim Tibbetts are phe­
nomenologically the same, knowing Tom is out of town allows 
one to identify this young man as Tim Tibbetts. Thus a purely 
phenomenological description of the experience could not take the 
form "It was an experience of Tim Tibbetts." Such a description 
must rely on the epistemic base. There is nothing in the phenome­
nological experience that guarantees that this is an experience of 
Tim rather than Tom, "or for that matter any of a number of other 
things- a third 'look-alike, ' an appropriately made-up dummy, 
or even a cleverly devised hologram- an accurate perception of 
which could be phenomenologically indistinguishable from the ex­
perience in question. "33 
To show that no experience can be phenomenologically an expe­
rience of God-that is, to show that "it's of God" cannot be a true 
phenomenological description of any experience-Forgie employs 
33. J. William Forgie, "Theistic Experience and the Doctrine of Unanimity," 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion I 5 (1984): 13-30, quotation p. 14. 
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a "divide and conquer" strat egy. "God " can be understood to be 
either a (disguised) de finit e d es cri ption or a proper name: 
If it is a proper name, then if an experience is to be phenome­
nologically of God, the content of the experience must guarantee 
that its object is a certain unique individual, the one named by 
"God, " and not any other. It must not be possible, that is, for the 
experience to constitute an accurate "perception" of some individual 
other than God . . . .  On the other hand, if "God" is a description, 
meaning (let us suppose ) "the all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good 
creator of the heavens and the earth, " then a theistic experience need 
only be phenomenologically of some individual or other-it doesn't 
matter which one-who satisfies that description. In this case it is 
required only that it not be possible that the experience constitute an 
accurate perception of something that fails to satisfy the description. 34 
The first option, taking "God" to be a proper name, d oes not 
provid e an account of how one could have a phenomenological 
experience that guarantees that it is an experience of God. For such 
a guarantee to be possible, one would have to identify the object of 
the experienc e as having what Forgie calls a "uniquely instantiable 
property [UIP]." The only likely candidates for such pro pe rt ies are 
those such as "being Socrates" or, in the t heistic cas e, "being 
God. " But neither of these properties is giv en as part of a phenom­
enol ogical e xpe rience itself, just as it is not given in the experi ence 
of the young man next door that he is Tim rather than Tom Tib­
bet ts. F orgie says that the point about sense experience can be put 
in two ways: 
(r) At best sense experiences are phenomenologically of things 
that appear in a certain way, but since properties of the form "being 
something that looks (sounds, feels, etc. )-or is capable of looking 
(etc. )-this way" are not UIPs, sense experiences are not phenome­
nologically of individuals. 
(2) If a sense experience is to be phenomenologically of an indi­
vidual, it is not enough that that individual have a UIP. It must have 
a UIP of the form "being something which appears-or which is 
capable of appearing-in a certain way. " It is because no object of 
sense experience seems to have a UIP of that form that no sense 
experience is phenomenologically of an individual. 
34. Ibid., p. 16. 
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Forgie admits that if mystical (theistic) experiences are radically un­
like perceptual experiences then perhaps his argument is not rele­
vant. Nevertheless, insofar as the analogy is accurate his point 
seems to stand. Forgie also admits that he cannot provide an argu­
ment to conclude that there are no UIPs of the sort in question. 
Nevertheless, it seems at least unlikely that such UIPs are in the 
offing given the following intuition: for any allegedly phenome­
nological experience of God, there is a possible world in which 
"the causal laws pertaining to the relations between possible objects 
of 'perception' and the 'perceivers' of those objects are such that 
some individual, not identical to God, is capable of appearing in 
just the way displayed in the experience in question." In short, if 
"God" is a proper name, then experiences that phenomenologically 
guarantee that their object is God are not possible. 35 
The second possibility, taking "God" to be a disguised definite 
description, fares no better. What is needed here for a phenome­
nological experience to guarantee itself as an experience of God is 
not that it be an experience of an individual but only that it be of 
something having certain properties. In God' s case the properties 
could be all-knowing, all-powerful, and so forth. Forgie first 
makes the Humean observation that causation, whether of one 
event causing another or of some agent causing some event or 
some substance, is not phenomenologically in the experience. If 
this is true, then there are difficulties with the suggestion that any­
one could recognize something as having certain properties having 
to do with powers or beliefs- all-powerful, all-knowing, and so 
forth. Whether the properties have to do with powers or belief, 
ultimately one's recognition of them depends on recognition of 
causal relations: 
The best candidate for an experience which is phenomenologically 
of something having certain powers and beliefs is one which is phe­
nomenologically of something manifesting those powers or expres­
sing those beliefs. I f  there can be no experience which is phenome­
nologically of some power, or some belief, by itself, ... perhaps an 
experience can be phenomenologically of something manifesting a 
power or expressing a belief. I f  so, then an experience itself could 
guarantee that its object is something manifesting, and hence pos-
35. Ibid., p. r8. 
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sessing, that power, and also something expressing, and so having, 
that belief. But here is where the earlier point about causation is 
important. If causation is not phenomenologically presentable then 
neither is agency. If some agent is manifesting a power or expres­
sing a belief, that agent is causing something to happen, producing 
some state of affairs. But if no experience is phenomenologically of 
someone's causing or producing a state of affairs (as opposed to that 
state of affairs simply co-existing with the agent or coming into 
existence while the agent is present ),  then no experience will be phe­
nomenologically of someone manifesting a power or expressing a 
belief. So the best candidate for an experience which is phenome­
nologically of something having certain powers or beliefs turns out 
not to be up to the job. 36 
The ge ne ra l point is that there i s  nothi ng in  the phenomenologica l 
aspect of the experience a lone tha t  enti tles the perceiver to claim 
tha t  i t  i s  an e xpe rience of God, whether "God" i s  understood to be 
a disguised definite description or a proper na me . 
Based on the kinds of suggestion s Forgie  makes, I propose the 
followi ng cha llenge to PTA. PP a nd CP do not have the same 
strength of e piste mic justification, si nce CP, unlike PP, requires 
a role for background beliefs for the gen eration and jus tifica ti on 
of i ts delivera nces. This specia l role for CP' s ba ckground beli efs 
weakens the level of strength of justi fica tion for CP-generated be­
li efs. This is not to say that beli efs delivered by CP are not justi­
fied, nor even that they a re not Jn· Nevert he les s, they are not as 
st ro ngly justified a s  PP-delivered beli efs. Ca ll this  the "ba ckground 
be lief cha llenge . "  
Thi s  cha llen ge suggests that, insofar a s  Alston mea ns for his a c­
count of belief formation to be a n  a ccount of noninferentia l belief 
formation in volvin g only a n  objectification of e xperien ce, then 
perhaps there i s  a need for more clari ty about the notions of "non­
inferential" and "objectification" to which Alston a ppea ls . Theistic  
beli efs a ppear to depend in  some way on a set of ba ckground be­
liefs. The ba ckground belief challenge suggests that  any ti me one 
forms a G ustified) belief about an  individua l qua epistemically iden­
tifiable individual (as well, I think, as  about an  individua l' s  action 
qua uniquely attri buta ble to tha t  individua l), the belief is inferentia l 
or i nterpretive; or at  lea st, i f  noninferentia l, i t  relies in some epi -
36. Ibid., pp. 20-21 .  
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stemical ly significant way on backgrou nd beliefs as opposed to re­
ly ing merely on the application of a conceptu al scheme. 37 I argue 
below that some of ou r doxastic practices do indeed involve an 
epistemically significant place for backgrou nd beliefs, but where 
the background beliefs do not form an inferential basis for the be­
lief generated. 
A second issu e arises in connection with the backgrou nd belief 
challenge. Let u s  grant that CP does involve backgrou nd beliefs. Is 
the same not tru e for the generation of PP beliefs? And if so, are 
not the teeth of the challenge removed? Alston himself presents 
several way s in which backgrou nd beliefs may enter into PP. I 
argue in Chapter 3 that there is a special position for backgrou nd 
beliefs in CP that PP does not requ ire, thu s defending the chal­
lenge. But first there are distinctions and observations to be made. 
In most of ou r waking hours, we find ou rselves engaged in PP. 
The beliefs it generates tou ch mu ch of what we believe in general 
and virtually all we believe abou t the physical world and its furni­
tu re. PP delivers beliefs abou t all kinds of physical objects: hou ses, 
rocks, trees, elephants, cars, onions, compu ters, and sweet pota­
toes, to name only a minu scule number. It also delivers beliefs 
abou t particu lar hou ses, rocks, trees, elephants, cars, onions, and 
sweet potatoes. In many cases, the beliefs generated by PP come 
and go, and the objects we form beliefs abou t are not important 
enou gh for us  to name or otherwise identify so as to be able to 
reidentify them. For example, if I am in a new city , being driven 
throu gh its streets, PP may lead me to believe all sorts of things 
abou t the new physical environment in which I find myself. For 
the most part, however, I do not pay enough attention so that later 
I might be able to sort out one hou se from another, as far as my 
beliefs abou t them are concerned. Unless, in short, there is some­
thing spectacu lar abou t a given physical scene or u nless I have 
some specifi c reason or need to remember information abou t a 
given bit of the phy sical environment, I simply do not form beliefs 
abou t objects which are focu sed on allowing me to reidentify the 
object. Still, I may be forming many beliefs via PP as I drive 
37· Alston himself allows for the possibility of mediate or indirect justification 
of beliefs by their relation to other beliefs. And not all these need be inferential. See 
"Concepts of Epistemic Justification," p. 101. 
PORTLAND CENTER liBRARY 
34] Rationality an d Theistic Belief 
aroun d the city, an d these beliefs classify the objects of my experi­
ence into kin ds of things with certain properties not shared with 
any others. 
What I wish to emphasize is not the classificatory type of belief 
just noted but what I call "epistemically un ique in dividual beliefs" 
(where it is the object of the belief that is in dividual, not the be­
liefs). I mean by the term "epistemically unique individual" n ot 
simply one of a kin d but on e of a kin d with certain unshared prop­
erties an d identifiable an d reidentifiable as such. CP delivers beliefs 
about such an object. The focus of CP is only one kin d  of thing, a 
divin e en tity. An d CP delivers beliefs about the only member of its 
kin d, God. 38 (Note the promin ent place of discussion of proper 
n ames an d definite description s  in Forgie' s argument.) The central­
ity in CP of a unique in dividual who is (taken to be) identifiable 
an d reidentifiable is dear. But not on ly is he central, the entire 
epistemic practice is oriented toward forming beliefs about this sin ­
gle in dividuaP9 
This is quite different from PP, where beliefs are gen erated 
willy-nilly about coun tless thin gs (an d even countless kin ds of 
thin gs), many of which we do not bother to identify as the un ique 
in dividuals they are but rather only classify as members of a certain 
kind. Contrast "I see the white rock next to the oak in my front 
yard" with "I see a rock." The latter can be un derstood merely to 
classify the object of my experience as being a member of a certain 
kin d or, in so doing, to attribute certain properties to the object. 
The former picks out the object of my experience as the in dividual 
rock it is-the white on e beside the oak in my front yard. Pre­
sumably, beliefs generated by CP are closer to the latter than to the 
former, that is, closer to epistemically unique in dividual beliefs 
than to classificatory beliefs. One reason for this may simply be 
that there is on ly on e divin e in dividual, God. 40 
38. God may not be the member of a kind; if he is not, then CP does not deliver 
beliefs about any kind of thing, but about a very special thing. 
39. This is not to say that no other individual would ever play a role in CP. I 
might sense that God wants me to love my wife more, for example. The point is 
that God is the focal point of CP. 
40. Even in classificatory beliefs one is classifying a unique individual as a rock, 
tree, or something else. But the point is the focus or emphasis of the beliefs con­
tent, not simply the object of the belie£ 
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There i s  much more to say about this  di fference between PP and 
CP, but for now we can merely introduce the i ssues that are the 
focus not only of the discussion of PTA but of the challenge to 
Reformed epistemology's emphasis on pari ty in  general. The dif­
ference between CP and PP is that the former i s  solely ori ented 
toward beliefs about an epistemically unique individual, the latter 
i s  not so ori ented. This di fference requires, in  turn, a special epi­
stemic role (yet to be fully specified) for background beliefs in  the 
generation of CP's deliverances. Thi s special place for background 
beli efs i s  absent in  the generation of a good many, i f  not all, of 
PP's deliverances. D o  background beli efs have a special position in  
CP that they do not have in  PP, and i f  so, i s  this  position epi­
stemi cally important? I tackle these questions in  reverse order , 
postponing a full inquiry into the former question unti l the next 
chapter. For now, let me assume an affir mative answer to the first 
question and go on to discuss an answer to the second. 
Let us assume that PP and CP differ on the place of background 
beliefs i n  the generati on of G ustified) beli efs. As a prelimi nary run 
toward getting at the suspi cion that the di ffering roles of back­
ground beliefs are epistemi cally important, let us distinguish be­
tween three kinds of belief formation. The first i s  that of Alston's 
objecti fication; these beli efs are the result of a lingo-conceptual 
scheme alone being applied noni nferentially to experience. Let us 
call these "conceptual-reading beli efs" and their corresponding 
practices "conceptual-reading practices. " The second kind are those 
beliefs formed inferentially; these beli efs are the result of conscious, 
di scursive (deductive, inductive, or i nterpretive) reasoning. Let us 
call these "i nferential beliefs" and their corresponding practi ces "in­
ferential pr actices. " The third kind is  noninferential but where 
something more than concepts are appli ed to experience; concepts 
and substantive beliefs are appli ed, albeit  noni nferentially, to expe­
rience. One's epistemic base includes background informati on (in 
the form of beli efs) that i s  used, along with concepts, to generate 
beli efs. Let us call these "noninferential medi ated beli efs" and the 
corresponding practices "noninferential mediated practi ces. " 
Although we can allow that all these modes of belief generation 
can provide us with justified beliefs, i t  might sti ll be the case that 
conceptual-readi ng beli efs have a privi leged posi tion. We are, in 
fact, attracted to these noninferential, merely conceptually read be-
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l iefs. We give them a special place in our epistemic hierarchies. The 
reason for this is a kind of Cartesian worry about inferences or 
interpretations. Conceptual-reading bel iefs simpl y  have the l east 
chance of going astray. In cases of inference, the longer and more 
compl icated the reasoning, the more l ikely  one is led down the 
epistemic garden path. One thus suspects that, even where the rea­
soning is not inferential or even conscious, the more compl icated 
the intell ectual moves, the more l ikely one is to go astray. Further­
more, the bel iefs required for the inferences and interpretations of­
ten, perhaps always, themselves need justification. Should we not 
suspect that any bel iefs required for Alston' s CP objectifications 
also need to be justified (or have justification), whereas our basic 
conceptual schemes, as used in PP, do not? What then of the non­
inferential mediated bel iefs? I suspect that these are in a sort of 
hal fway house between conceptual-reading and inferential bel iefs. 
The epistemic justification for noninferential mediated beliefs, al ­
though not as strong as the justification for conceptual -reading be­
liefs, is not as weak as the justification for inferential bel iefs. N one 
of this is to say that any of these three kinds of bel ief is not justi­
fied; it is only to note a ranking of strengths of justification. 
According to Alston, the objectification of perceptual experience 
via a conceptual scheme does not invol ve discursive reasoning, ex­
planation, interpretation, or any appeal to background bel iefs, at 
least in a l arge number of cases. In contrast to this, as I argue l ater 
(see Chapter 3 , Section 2), forming bel iefs about Tom and Tim 
Tibbetts or God always invol ves at least a noninferential role for 
background bel iefs. The l atter seem to be, once again (see Chapter 
8, Section 1) ,  at least sl ightly  l ess high on the epistemic l adder than 
the former, and bel iefs about epistemically unique individuals  (at 
least where these do not derive from PP)41 therefore do not appear 
to have the same epistemic status as bel iefs formed via Alston's 
objectification. According to PTA the two kinds of bel iefs (percep­
tual and theistic), given appropriate circumstances, not onl y  have 
the same kind of epistemic justification but also the same level or 
strength of that kind. It seems that the justification attached to con­
ceptual -reading bel iefs may be (sl ightly) stronger than that attached 
41. PP can give us beliefs about epistemically unique individuals, but these do 
not require background beliefs .  At least that is what I argue in Chapter J. 
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to noninferential mediated beliefs. But then, if PP provides a non­
inferential conceptual reading of experience whereas CP does not, 
then CP and PP do not share the same epistemic level. And this is 
true even if they share the same kind of justification, namely, Jn· 
Ev en granting this initial description of the two kinds of case, is 
this argument not just a quibble ov er matters of little significance? 
Perhaps beliefs deliv ered v ia noninferential mediated belief genera­
tion are, for all intents and purposes, Jnw· Since Jnw merely de­
mands that there not be reasons to reject the epistemic practice as 
unreliable, discov ering that a practice appeals to background beliefs 
does not show that the practice is not Jnw· The definition of Jnw 
simply makes no reference to how the practices work. Perhaps by 
the letter of the law Alston is correct and PTA is true. Neverthe­
less, the distinctions noted here seem to indicate some need for a 
more finely tuned notion of Jnw and the parity thesis in which it is 
embedded. Are there not further gradations of justification within 
the weak v ersion ofJn? And do these not rely on the internal work­
ings of the practices? Alston himself hints at such a possibility 
when he admits that features 1-4 (those attached to PP but not to 
CP) are "desiderata for an epistemic practice. If we were shaping 
the world to our heart' s desire, I dare say that we would arrange 
for our practices to exhibit these features. . . . T hings go more 
smoothly, more satisfyingly, from a cognitiv e  point of view where 
these features are exhibited. Since PP possesses these v irtues and 
CP does not, the former is, to that extent and in that way, superior 
from a cognitive point of view. "42 
This cognitive superiority does not push PP beyond Jnw· Neither 
does CP' s  lack of it keep CP from being Jnw· In fact, after this 
suggestion Alston goes on to argue that the features that generate 
or allow for this cognitive superiority are not necessary for re­
liability. But surely Alston' s comment indicates the possibility of 
some ranking within Jnw· Within this possibility it is natural to 
suggest that noninferential mediated practices do not share the 
same strength as conceptual-reading practices, at least, one can say, 
from a cognitive point of view. T hus, although PTA is true as a 
general claim, further refinement indicates a ranking within Jnw by 
which CP turns out to be less attractive than PP. Is this lack of 
42. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," pp. 123-24. 
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attractiveness more than a cognitive issu e? Is it an epis temic one? I 
have sugges ted an intu itive cas e for its being epis temic bu t have 
not developed the idea fully. Let me s imply s tate here that I believe 
the issu e is an epis temic one becaus e the background beliefs need 
jus tifi cation. 
The issue of whether backgrou nd beliefs need jus tification is an 
important one, bu t I pos tpone a dis cuss ion of it, and some fu rther 
refinements of the notions of conceptu al-reading and noninferential 
mediated practices and beliefs , until Chapters 6 and 7· For now, 
assu ming that that promissory note is su ccess fu lly paid, and that 
PP and CP do in fact differ on the role of backgrou nd beliefs ,  we 
can sugges t  that PTA is , s trictly s peaking, fals e, for there are cogni­
tive and epis temic rankings within Jnw that PTA does not recog­
nize. In the next chapter I argu e  that PP and CP do differ on the 
role of backgrou nd beliefs .  
[ 3 ] 
The Role of Background Beliefs 
The background belief challenge to PTA is that, whereas CP in­
volves an epistemically important position for background beliefs, 
PP does not, and therefore PTA is false. I have two goals for this 
chapter. The first is to explore the role of background beliefs in PP 
and CP and, by doing so, to defend the background belief chal­
lenge. Second, I consider two possible rejoinders Alston might 
make to the challenge and argue that neither is successful. 
I. Alston on Background Beliefs in Perceptual 
Practice 
Is the working assumption of the last section in Chapter 2 cor­
rect; do PP and CP differ on whether background beliefs enter into 
the generation and justification of beliefs? It would be neat and tidy 
if one could simply say that CP does involve background beliefs 
whereas PP does not. But philosophy is rarely neat and tidy. 
In Perceiving God, Alston's central thesis is that "putative direct 
awareness of God can provide justification for certain kinds of be­
liefs about God. " 1  One might thus surmise that Alston defends a 
parity thesis in this work. He does not, however, but not for the 
1. Alston, Perceiving God, p. 9. 
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kinds of reasons I have been suggesting. Alston argues there that 
background beliefs sometimes enter into sense perceptual belief 
formation, and that they do in several different ways. The same is 
true, he says, for CP (or, as he names it there, mystical percep­
tion). He suggests that one belief can be partly mediately based and 
partly immediately based. He raises the question whether any be­
lief is ever strictly immediately based, that is, justified on the basis 
of experience alone. His reply is affirmative, but he does recognize 
that sometimes, at least, background beliefs also have a function. 
He considers three different kinds of beliefs that might play a role 
and suggests several ways their functions differ from one another. 
Overall, however, he wants to suggest that, although background 
beliefs may play a role, it happens far less frequently than is some­
times thought and, most important for the thesis that one can per­
ceive God, background beliefs need not have a place at all. If Al­
ston is right, then as far as PTA is concerned the background belief 
challenge fails. But I believe the challenge does not fail, so I also 
believe that Alston is not right about the significance of back­
ground beliefs in CP and PP. 
I noted above that Alston does not defend a parity thesis in Per­
ceiving God. He does not do so, for he now thinks that PP and CP 
differ because CP runs into problems with religious plurality (as 
well as a lesser problem with checking procedures). I return to 
Alston's discussion of these in Chapter 8. Our immediate concern 
is background beliefs. Nevertheless, if it turns out that Alston is 
wrong about the function of background beliefs in CP, that is, if it 
turns out that there is a special role for background beliefs in CP 
which is absent in PP, then he has one more reason to reject a 
parity thesis between PP and CP. 
Is there, then, a special role for background beliefs in CP? To 
answer this question, we need to consider Alston's position on 
background beliefs in PP. He quickly deals first with what he calls 
"perceptual cues. " Psychology teaches us that several factors are 
involved in the way things appear to us. It is not implausible to 
suppose that our psyches take certain cues into account in the for­
mation of perceptual beliefs. But it is equally obvious that most of 
us are completely, or almost completely, unaware of taking such 
factors into account. Still, it is sometimes suggested that, for 
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example, "perceptual beliefs Gudgments) of distance are based on 
cognitions of factors of the sort just mentioned. "2 
How do beliefs about these cues function in the formation and 
justification of perceptual beliefs? There are three positions taken 
on this. One is that an inference (albeit unconscious) takes place. A 
second suggests that the workings are completely causal and not 
doxastic. The third falls in between, with the suggestion that there 
is a kind of "subdoxastic" taking account of the cues. Alston sim­
ply notes, and rightly so I think, that if there are beliefs involved in 
such cases they are involved in "a maximally hidden way. " It is, 
therefore, difficult to find sufficient reasons to suppose that such 
background information is epistemically important. 
Alston's second suggestion deals with what he calls "adequacy 
assumptions. " His concern is the attribution of nonsimple sensory 
predicates to external objects. We make such attributions on the 
basis of sense experience, and when we do we are assuming that a 
certain pattern of sensory qualities (difficult to describe in detail) is 
a reliable indicator of the predicate's applicability. Alston calls such 
assumptions "adequacy assumptions (or beliefs). " He writes: 
When I take it that X is a house, or your house, or a chair, or the 
chair we just bought, or a copy of Process and Reality, or a wave, or 
Coit Tower, or my wife, or a primrose, I am, in effect, supposing 
that the particular pattern of sensory qualia X is presenting to me at 
that moment is, at least in those circumstances, a reliable indication 
ofX's being a house, or your house, or a chair. That being the case, 
am I not basing my belief not just on the sensory appearance of X 
but also on my belief that a sensory appearance of that sort is a 
reliable indication that what is appearing is a house ... ? Isn't every 
case of nonsimple sensory-predicate attribution subject to evalua­
tion, at least in part, in terms of mediate justification?' 
Furthermore, although our paradigm case of a belief being based 
on another is the conscious inference, we must, says Alston, recog­
nize other cases in which no conscious inference is involved. For 
example, one's belief that Frank is out of town might be based on 
one's being told that he is, even though one never infers the former 
2. Ibid., p. 83. 
J. Ibid., p. 84. 
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from the latter. Given this broader understanding of the "based 
on" relationship, could it be that all our attributions of nonsimple 
sensory predicates rely, although not consciously so, on adequacy 
assumptions? Even if there are unconscious bases for beliefs, says 
Alston, the following two observations still carry a strong negative 
presumption against adequacy assumptions being part of the basis. 
The first is that perceivers are typically not aware of adequacy as­
sumptions being part of the basis for perceptual beliefs. The second 
is that in many cases they are not the sorts of things to which one 
has access. 
The stronger case against adequacy assumptions being part of 
the basis is that there is a level confusion lurking in the neighbor­
hood. To be justified in an attribution of nonsimple sensory predi­
cates one need not be justified in believing the adequacy assump­
tions that support the predication. The assumption need only be 
true. 4 It is simply not true that "what it takes for a condition, C, to 
be sufficient for P (call this 'what it takes' 'A') must itself be part of 
any sufficient condition for P. The fallacy is immediately evident 
once we see that if A is satisfied, then, by the very terms of the 
example, C is sufficient for P by itself, and A need not be added to 
it to get sufficiency. "5 Alston's point is not that adequacy beliefs 
never play a role in the justification of perceptual beliefs but simply 
that they ne�d not do so. 
The third kind of belief that can be relevant in perceptual belief 
formation Alston calls "contextual beliefs. " There are three types 
of contextual beliefs: beliefs about the setting, beliefs about posi­
tion, and beliefs about normality. The first of these deals with spa­
tiotemporal issues. Many houses look alike, and my knowing I am 
on Elm Street, rather than some other, may be a factor in my 
identifying the house that is the object of my experience. Beliefs 
about position are concerned with angle of view, distance from the 
observer, and state of the medium. Finally, Alston explains beliefs 
about normality by example. Suppose that I thought people, trees, 
dogs, and tables were constantly annihilated but replaced with ex­
act replicas. This would lead me to form somewhat different be-
4· There is much to be said about and for Alston's concern with level confu­
sions. I return to this theme in the next chapter. 
5· Alston, Perceiving God, p. 86. 
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liefs on the basis of the sensory array that meets me each day. Do I 
thus have, contrary to the supposition, an assumption about the 
relative constancy and permanence of physical substances as part of 
the basis for my normal perceptual beliefs? Such an assumption 
Alston calls a "normality assumption. " 
In the position and normality cases, says Alston, we are not 
aware of background beliefs, if we have them, at least in the ma­
jority of cases. And if such beliefs do play a role it is not required 
that they be part of the basis but only that they be true, just as with 
adequacy assumptions. But Alston admits that the case for situa­
tional beliefs being part of the basis for perceptual beliefs is stron­
ger. In many cases one's location does seem important. For exam­
ple, in identifying the large body of water to the west as the Pacific 
Ocean, one's being in California seems to be significant. But Al­
ston thinks this is not the normal case. "Even if just after forming 
the belief ["Those buildings are the World Trade Center"], I reflect 
that if I hadn't known I was in New York City I wouldn't have 
judged those buildings to be the World Trade Center, it doesn't 
follow that being in New York City was part of my basis for the 
belief. "6 Other options are possible, including that the reflection in 
question calls attention to what would be required for the ade­
quacy of the basis, rather than its being part of the basis itself. So, 
although situational beliefs may sometimes have a part in the justi­
fication of other beliefs, they need not do so in every case. 
But the situation is different with contextual beliefs than with 
adequacy beliefs: 
Here the adequacy assumption is not that the sensory pattern, A, is 
generally indicative of the presence of a 0. It is rather that, given an 
underlying supposition that A is an adequate basis for an attribution 
of 0 only in certain circumstances rather than others, the belief in 
question is that the present circumstances are of the former sort. 
That gives the belief a greater claim to be considered part of the 
basis, for it does indicate something distinctive about this situation 
rather than just amounting to a blanket approval of the phenomenal­
objective connection. But, by the same token, it offers us a different 
kind of alternative to holding that it must form part of the basis. 
Remember the point that the justification of perceptual beliefs is al-
6. Ibid., p. 90. 
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ways prima facie, subject to being overridden by sufficient indica­
tions to the contrary. This gives us another way in which a belief 
can be relevant to the justification of another belief. It can be nega­
tively relevant by constituting an (actual or possible) overrider or by 
ruling out such. 7 
Thus the suspicion that such background beliefs are relevant to the 
justification of other beliefs is explicable not in terms of their being 
required as part of the basis itself but as actually or possibly over­
riding the basis or by ruling out overriders. 
Alston takes himself to have dealt with both the subject and 
predicate components of perceptual beliefs: "In both cases we have 
argued that the justification might be either purely immediate or 
partly mediate. As for the former, we have suggested that I might 
both be able to justifiably take the perceived object to be your 
house and be able to justifiably believe of it that it is shingled, just 
on the basis of the way it looks. In both cases background beliefs 
would normally be playing some role, even if they are not part of 
the basis. " Alston goes on to suggest that there may be concern 
that object identification poses greater difficulty for immediate jus­
tification than does property attribution. He believes, however, 
that this concern is unfounded. Object identifications do not pose 
greater difficulty, since one can think of object identification in 
terms of identifying the subject as one that bears certain properties. 
Furthermore, any property that can figure in subject identification 
can also figure as a predicate. "Instead of forming the belief that 
your house needs painting, I could form the belief that that is your 
house, or that that building that needs painting is your house. "8 
There may, however, be a difference in degree in the possibility 
of purely immediate justification for subject and predicate attribu­
tion. "An indefinitely large plurality of unique individuals is out 
there to be recognized, whereas there are comparatively few prop­
erties we have any real need to distinguish. Hence it is more feasi­
ble for us to store relatively fixed ways of recognizing properties 
by their appearance than to build up comparably direct ways of 
recognizing individuals. "9 This, Alston claims, suggests that in rec-
7· Ibid. 
8. Ibid., pp. 91-92. 
9. Ibid., p. 92. 
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ognizing individuals we usually store up ways of perceptually rec­
ognizing distinguishing properties of them and then use what we 
have stored to recognize the individuals. We typically do not do 
this in cases of property recognition. He says, however, that this is 
only a difference of degree. We can and do, he continues, identify 
individuals directly from their sensory appearance and sometimes 
do recognize properties on the basis of others. 
Finally, there is a way in which beliefs attributing certain proper­
ties to a perceived object can play a role in the generation and justi­
fication of an identificatory belief but not be part of the basis of it. 
The belief that so-and-so is round-faced and slightly bent over may 
have as its basis a certain look, and that look may be sufficient not 
only for the property attribution but also for the subject identifica­
tion. In fact, the look by which one identifies so-and-so may be 
sufficient for the subject identification only because it is also suffi­
cient for the attribution of the property. But one need not have 
made the attribution in order to have made the identification. 
Thus, concludes Alston, although background beliefs can and 
sometimes do function in the justification of PP-delivered beliefs, 
they need not do so. Furthermore, it happens less frequently then 
is sometimes thought. When it does happen, background beliefs 
typically function not as part of the basis itself but in such a way 
that their truth is either required for the adequacy of the justifica­
tion or is negatively relevant, that is, as potential or actual over­
riders. 
2. Christian Practice and Background Beliefs 
Alston goes on to suggest that many of the roles background 
beliefs play in PP are alive in CP as well. Still, says Alston, it is 
important to be clear that, even though background beliefs are 
sometimes relevant in the justification of perceptually generated 
theistic beliefs, it remains possible that God appears to one as being 
0 and, if he does, and that is the whole story, one is immediately 
justified in the belief that God is 0. This point is essential for his 
thesis in Perceiving God-that direct awareness of God can provide 
justification for beliefs about God. 
Beyond this, however, beliefs generated by CP may be partly 
mediately justified. Just as with PP, adequacy beliefs may be oper-
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ating. In fact, in many accounts of mystical belief formation (that 
Alston cites), the predicates applied to God in perceptually gener­
ated beliefs go beyond what is explicitly given in the experience. 10 
Although positional and situational considerations have limited sig­
nificance in CP, since God is not spatially located, normality as­
sumptions can come in. One might suspect that one's supposed 
experience of God is being artificially induced, or the work of the 
devil, or caused by a nervous imbalance. But, on the other hand, 
there are some consequences of theistic experience that can indicate 
that the belief formation is a normal one. Spiritual and moral 
fruits, for example, might show the justificatory efficacy of theistic 
experience. Alston also admits that theological or metaphysical 
background beliefs can have parts in belief formation and justifica­
tion. In none of these cases, however, as with PP and its back­
ground beliefs, do these background beliefs have to be part of the 
basis, even though they may play epistemically related roles of the 
kinds noted. 
So, to answer the question with which this chapter began-do 
CP and PP differ on the role of background beliefs?-Alston gives 
a definite negative reply. Both PP and CP may sometimes have 
background beliefs as part of their bases, but they nee� not do so. 
If Alston is correct, then, as far as the argument of the previous 
chapter goes, even if there are background beliefs involved in CP, 
they are not epistemically important as far as distinguishing the 
deliverances of CP and PP are concerned. Since in neither case do 
background beliefs need to form part of the epistemic basis of the 
beliefs generated, it seems one cannot suggest that the deliverances 
of CP differ from those of PP in terms of the strength of their 
justification because of their background beliefs. 
I find myself in disagreement with Alston on this point. Al­
though I think a great deal of what he says about the function of 
background beliefs is correct, I believe he overlooks some impor­
tant features of belief formations dealing with epistemically unique 
individuals. 
To deal with the suggestion that it is not possible to recognize 
directly something one experiences as God, Alston writes: 
10. Ibid., pp. 12-20. 
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We should not suppose that in order to succeed in perceptually rec­
ognizing an object of perception as X (i.e., become perceptually jus­
tified in believing, or perceptually know, that the object is X), it is 
necessary that the object appears to one as Ill, where Ill is a property 
uniquely possessed by X. To perceptually recognize your house, it 
is not necessary that the object even display features that are in fact 
only possessed by your house, much less features that only your 
house could possess. It is enough that the object present to my expe­
rience features that, in this situation or in situations in which I gen­
erally find myself, are sufficiently indicative of (are a reliable guide 
to) the object's being your house. And so it is here. For me to rec­
ognize what I am aware of (X) as God, all that is necessary is that X 
present to me features that are in fact a reliable indication of their 
possessor's being God, at least in situations of the sort in which I 
typically find myself. It is, again, not required that these features 
attach only to God, still less that they be such that they can attach 
only to God. And it is a matter for detailed investigation what sorts 
of appearances satisfy that condition, just as in the case of sensorily 
perceived objects. 11 
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Alston takes these suggestions to reply to questions such as how 
could a nythin g  of which I am directly aware uniquely identify the 
creator of heaven and earth, an absolutely perfect being of infinite 
power and goodness. Such is the kind of question behind the back­
ground belief challenge to PTA. The challenge's reply is that one 
cannot directly experience X as being God, since there are no 
properties that are both unique to God and capable of being experi­
enced by us. The challenge's position explicitly denies the point 
Alston makes. Which is right? 
I believe the challenge is closer to the truth. We can get at the 
issue here by considering a phrase in Alston's own denial, just 
quoted. "It is enough," says Alston, "that the object present to my 
experience features that, in this situation or in situations in which I 
generally find myself, are sufficiently indicative of . . .  the object's 
being your house. " Or, in the case of God, "all that is necessary is 
that X present to me features that are in fact a reliable indication of 
their possessor's being God, at least in situations of the sort in which I 
typically find myself." What are these situations? What are the fea­
tures that can be sufficiently indicative of the object in question? 
I I. Ibid.' pp. 96-97-
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And, furthermore, what connection is there between the situations 
and the features? 
Let us take PP first. Earlier I suggested that PP gives us both 
epistemically unique individual beliefs and classificatory beliefs. 
But the two are not unrelated. The very means by which we clas­
sify or categorize things-their properties-are also the means by 
which we identify them. Alston suggests that there need not be a 
unique feature attached to an object by which the object can be 
identified. But he does not, I believe, distinguish carefully enough 
between what we can call kind features and unique features. Sure, 
Suzie's house may share kind features with other houses; they 
might have the same floor plan, be the same color, and have the 
windows placed in the same locations. But the use of the word 
"same" here is not, obviously, intended to pick out features at the 
numerically same position. The houses share the features "having 
such-and-such floor plan," "being pink, " and "having windows in 
the living room, kitchen, and bedrooms. " But the houses them­
selves occupy different spatial locations. What distinguishes the 
houses in fact are not the kind features-features many houses 
might share-but the unique features which, I suggest, turn out to 
be made up of a group of features best understood as a collection 
of kind features located at a specific spatiotemporal point. Suzie's 
house does have a unique property: the property of "being a pink, 
shuttered, . . .  bungalow at Fourth and Main. " Thus, not only do 
kind features distinguish houses from trees, rocks, and elephants, 
as well as one kind of house from another, but those very same 
features, located at a spatiotemporal point, are what make this 
house the unique one it is. 
But Alston does not deny this. He only denies that it is necessary 
that the house display such a unique feature. Let us call the collection 
of kind features located at a spatiotemporal point the "collective 
feature. " Now the question is, does one experience the collective 
feature that distinguishes Suzie's house from all others? Alston sep­
arates the situation or location information from what is experi­
enced when perceiving Suzie's house. Perhaps this is right. Perhaps 
it is right because one cannot typically experience, on the basis of 
phenomena alone, being in New York or California. 12 But that 
12. It may be possible to get this kind of belief out of experience alone. P erhaps 
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suggests that this information at best functions in the form of 
background beliefs; it is information brought to the experience and 
not given in it. But then Alston can admit this and say the role this 
information plays is that of the potential or actual overrider rather 
than part of the basis for the belief. 
I believe, however, that it is a mistake to separate the situational 
information from the other features of the experience. It seems to 
me that the location information is not part of the belief system 
I have when I form the belief (on perception alone) that this is 
Suzie's house. Rather, it is part of the conceptual scheme I bring to 
the experience. I objectify the experience as Suzie's house-the 
pink, shuttered bungalow at Fourth and Main. At least this is true 
for what we might call "local situation information," that is, spatial 
information that picks out where I am vis-a-vis the local geogra­
phy (this neighborhood or that street) rather than the larger geog­
raphy (such as New York City or California). That I am located in 
New York or California does seem to be part of my belief system, 
and when the generation of one of my beliefs requires that sort of 
information then clearly the belief generated is at least partly medi­
ate. But that I am in one neighborhood rather than another, on one 
street rather than another, is given directly in experience and thus 
the identification of Suzie's house is read off the experience rather 
than into it via background beliefs. In the local cases no belief 
about neighborhoods in required, since that information is built 
into the conceptual scheme I bring to the experience. 
Thus, as far as object identification within PP is concerned, PP 
can be a conceptual reading practice and Alston is correct. Al­
though background beliefs do sometimes play a role in the genera­
tion of physical object beliefs, they need not do so. He is incorrect, 
however, in his claim that for one perceptually to recognize an 
epistemically unique object the object need not display a unique 
feature. It is not enough for the object to display features that, in 
the perceptually given situation in which I find myself, are suffi-
one sees a building or set of buildings, or certain geographic features that are 
unique to a certain city. But this would be the exception to the rule. You have to 
be in special, well-known geographic locations for this to happen-in Anaheim 
outside Disneyland, by the Hollywood sign, or at the Statue of Liberty, and the 
like. Being somewhere in a small C alifornia town or on a street in Brooklyn will 
not do it. 
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ciently indicative of the object's being the unique one I take it to 
be. The "perceptually given situation in which I find myself' is 
always a spatiotemporally unique one, and the features I perceive 
are sufficiently indicative of the object's being the unique one I take 
it to be only because I am in that spatiotemporally unique situa­
tion. But being in the location is not enough; that location must 
also be part of what is given in experience. The feature the object 
needs to display and, in fact, that only it can display, is the collec­
tive feature made up of certain kind features at a certain (local) 
spatiotemporal location. We objectify our experience in exactly 
these terms. PP is a conceptual-reading practice. 
CP, in contrast, is arguably not a conceptual-reading practice. 
There is no spatiotemporally unique situation in which the believer 
finds herself as she experiences God. Nor, as has been argued, is 
there any feature of God that one can experience which could not 
also appear attached to other beings. Alston says that all that is 
necessary for one to recognize X as God is that X present to one 
features that are in fact a reliable indication of X's being God, at 
least in situations of the sort in which I typically find myself. But 
what might such features be that could not be duplicated by other 
supernatural beings? With PP, the spatiotemporal information al­
lows for the possibility of a check against duplicability. With God, 
no such check exists, so the mere appearance of godlike features 
always leaves one with doubts, or at least with possible grounds 
for doubt, as to the identity of the object of the experience. PP 
takes care of those doubts with spatiotemporal information given 
in the experience. 
Here we return to the difference between CP and PP noted ear­
lier. With PP one can generate both classificatory beliefs (beliefs 
that result from sorting among kinds of things; see Chapter 2, Sec­
tion 6) and epistemically unique individual beliefs. With CP no 
classificatory beliefs are generated within the practice. One need 
not sort out the focus of the practice from other things, since there 
is only one kind of thing with which the practice is concerned and 
only one member of the kind, God. One need not sort out God 
from among other things or kinds of things, since the practice has 
no other focus than God. And it is built into the practice itself that 
any features attributable to the objects of belief generated by the 
practice are features only that object can have. But this raises the 
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issue of religious plurality and the host of other practices parallel to 
CP, such as Jewish practice, Muslim practice, and the like. What is 
to keep one of these other gods from appearing to me with the 
same properties of the Christian god? There is no spatiotemporal 
grid that can help, and the background belief challenge seems to 
stand. There need to be unique properties that can be experienced, 
and there are none as far as God is concerned. 
To generate the belief that the object of my experience is God, 
that is, the god of Christianity rather than one of the others, I must 
bring background information to the experience. But this, unlike 
local situation information, is not something that is read off the 
experience; it is not part of my conceptual scheme. It is, instead, 
substantive information I use to read the experience. Is it part of 
the basis of my belief? This is a difficult question. Let us answer an 
easier question first. Need the information be part of a conscious 
inference? No, and this is where noninferential mediated practices 
come in. We might have an experience to which we bring both our 
conceptual scheme and our substantive beliefs and yet objectify our 
experience directly into language contained in the combination of 
the two. A noninferential mediated practice is just what its name 
suggest, noninferential even though the justification is mediated 
through beliefs and not just conceptual schemes. Are beliefs deliv­
ered by CP, therefore, partly immediately based and partly medi­
ately based? No, not if what is meant by the latter is that a con­
scious inference is involved. Are the beliefs part of the basis? No, 
not if what is meant is conscious inference; but yes, if what is 
meant is that, unless I hold the beliefs, the justification does not go 
through. And it will not do simply for the beliefs to be true. They 
must be part of my noetic framework. The reason is that the in­
formation in the beliefs is needed for the objectification to go 
through, and this is not just a matter of justification but of getting 
the belief itself generated. 
There is more to be said about the position of background be­
liefs in CP and their epistemic importance. Nevertheless, enough 
has been said to begin to evaluate my tentative suggestion that CP 
has a special place for background beliefs that PP fails to have and 
thus that PTA is not true. If I am right in the argument of this 
section, then CP and PP do differ on the function of background 
beliefs. And if this role is epistemically important, as I suggested in 
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Chapter 2, then PTA is not true. But there are some potential re­
sponses and rejoinders to the account as presented thus far, and we 
can consider them n ow. 
3. A Potential Response and Rejoinder 
Perhaps Alston could attempt to circumvent this challenge by 
suggesting that in fact one need not use background beliefs in the 
formation and justification of theistic beliefs. Instead he might sug­
gest an understanding of experience in which the needed interpre­
tive structures and concepts are part of the experie nce itself. Such 
an approach to mystical experiences is uncovered and discussed by 
J. William Forgie. 
After discussing several "hyper-Kantian" interpreters of mystical 
experience, Forgie writes: 
The picture these writers present seems so far a familiar one. For 
Kant, experience is a compound, a product of sensory intuitions. 
filtered, as it were, through a priori concepts . . .. But as we will see, 
this "rival " view is really [not just Kantian but) hyper-Kantian in at 
least two respects: 
(1) First, for Kant the a priori concepts, the categories, are twelve 
in number and are shared by all mankind. And they are inescapable. 
Human beings must experience the world in terms of cause and 
effect, and substance and attribute, if they are to experience it at all. 
. . . But the rival view extends an experience-shaping role to con­
cepts and beliefs which vary from one culture-more pertinently, 
one religious tradition-to another. Mystical or religious experi­
ences are partially determined or shaped by concepts and beliefs that 
are peculiar to the particular religious tradition of the one having the 
experience. Let us call these elements which shape experience, but 
are not categories, "category-analogues." 
(2) Second, experience for Kant is, very roughly speaking, essen­
tially judgemental; having experience is inseparable from making 
judgements about it. The categories "shape " experience by deter­
mining that those judgements will take certain forms. They do not 
contribute to the phenomenological content of the experiences they 
shape . . .. [However,] category-analogues shape experience by par­
tially determining its phenomenological content. 13 
13. J. William Forgie, "Hyper-Kantianism in Recent Discussions of Mystical 
Experience," Religious Studies 21 (1985): 205-18, quotation p. 208. 
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According to the hyper-Kantians, mystical experiences are a result 
of "category-analogues" and "experiential input" working together 
so that one cannot, legitimately, separate the two. The phenome­
nological content of an experience is a hybrid of category-ana­
logues and other sensory (or sensory like) input. Further, unlike 
Kant's understanding of experience, according to which all humans 
share the same categorical structure and hence have the same expe­
rience, mystical experiences are different from one another because 
our category-analogue structures are different. 
Forgie goes on to argue that, if the hyper-Kantian understanding 
of mystical experience is plausible, it carries with it "sceptical im­
plications about one sort of evidential value mystical experiences 
are sometimes thought to have. "14 He has in mind here the pre­
sumption of veridicality typically given to sensory experience and 
often extended to mystical experience, namely, that barring special 
circumstances, what one seems to experience is what one experi­
ences-that one's experiences are, barring special circumstances, 
accurate. 
Although this presumption of veridicality seems to be true for 
ordinary sensory experiences, it is not true for hyper-Kantian expe­
riences, whether sensory or mystical. Forgie suggests that the pre­
sumption of veridicality is not upset by the Kantian categories, but 
it is by the category-analogues. "Suppose I am in the presence of a 
supernatural being who acts on some appropriate 'faculty' of mine. 
During this encounter certain sensory or super-sensory input gets 
mixed with input from the category-analogues, with the result that 
I have an experience in which it appears that I am confronting a 
personal and loving being."15 Now, further suppose that the suffi­
cient cause of my experience of those characteristics is the cate­
gory-analogues. After ruling out certain potential confusions about 
what this picture entails, Forgie goes on to argue that the hyper­
Kantian explanation rules out the presumption of veridicality. 
At least that is what we would say in a sense perceptual case. 
Suppose one sees the arches in a cathedral as Gothic because of a 
category-analogue, when the arches are actually Romanesque. Be­
fore discovering the existence of the category-analogue, one would 
follow our usual rule suggested by the presumption of veridicality: 
14· Ibid., p. 205. 
IS. Ibid., p. 2I6. 
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what one sees is what is there to see. But once discovering the 
causal role of the category-analogues, the presumption of verid­
icality is no longer granted epistemic weight. In like manner, if we 
have an experience of a personal and loving being and the experi­
ence of the characteristics is caused by category-analogues and we 
know this, then the experience loses its presumption of verid­
icality-unless the category-analogues are epistemically justified. 
But how could they be? Our categories need no justification, at 
least not in a straightforwardly epistemic sense, since they are what 
make experience possible. Furthermore, the categories seem not to 
be the kind of thing that could be justified. Likewise, it seems, 
with category-analogues. With the latter, however, we do not 
need them for experience to be possible. So why trust them to give 
us veridical beliefs-unless the content of the category-analogues 
could be understood in some other way, perhaps as beliefs? But 
this is what Alston needs to avoid. 
If this argument is correct, the hyper-Kantian understanding of 
theistic experience removes any presumption in favor of the expe­
rience's veridicality. We can therefore conclude that, insofar as Al­
ston might attempt to use a hyper-Kantian approach to defend his 
objectification account of theistic experience, there is little if any 
presumption in favor of the veridicality of the resulting experience. 
Barring other special circumstances or conditions that make it rea­
sonable to take the experience as veridical, theistic beliefs formed 
via hyper-Kantian experience do not have the same epistemic sta­
tus as the deliverances of PP.16 Thus this potential rejoinder is not 
successful. 
4· A Second Response and Rejoinder 
A second rejoinder to the background belief challenge can be 
found in Alston's own work. Alston argues that 
r6. One might suggest that this is merely another version of what Alston al­
ready rules out, namely, that challenge that calls attention to the lack of universal 
objectification of experience. Although nearly everyone uses PP, not everyone uses 
CP . But a moment's thought shows that the hyper-Kantian challenge rests on 
different grounds, grounds accepted by all in the case ofPP . If we reject instances of 
the employment of PP because of hyper-Kantianism, we should surely reject in­
stances of CP because of hyper-Kantianism-unless there are special reasons not to. 
But it is difficult to see what those reasons might be in this case. 
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even if an individual's account of the phenomenology of his/her 
own experience is not infallible, it must certainly be taken seriously. 
Who is in a better position to determine whether S [the person pur­
porting to have theistic experiences] is having an experience as of 
something's presenting itself to S as 0 than S? Thus we would need 
strong reasons to override the subject's confident report of the char­
acter of her experience. And where could we find such reasons? I 
suspect that most people who put forward . .. alternative diagnoses 
do so because they have general philosophical reasons for supposing 
either that God does not exist or that no human being could per­
ceive Him, and they fail to recognize the difference between a phe­
nomenological account of object presentation, and the occurrence of 
veridical perception. In any event, once we get straight about all 
this, I can not see any reason for doubting the subjects' accounts of 
the character of their experiences, whatever reasons there may be for 
doubting that God Himself does in fact appear to them. 17 
I have been careful to distinguish between the question of verid­
icality and the question about the object of the experience. Further­
more, the point of my argument is to deny Alston's claim that 
there is no reason for doubting the subjects' accounts. On the phe­
nomenological level, I have suggested, one does have at least some 
reason to be suspicious of the subjects' characterization of their ex­
periences as being of God. 
My argument is based on an analysis of what can be given phe­
nomenologically in the experience. There is never a direct, concep­
tual-reading experience that is phenomenologically of God or any 
other epistemically unique person. Belief formations involving 
epistemically unique individuals always involve a role for back­
ground beliefs or for spatiotemporal information given in the ex­
perience. This is true whether the belief formation is inferential or 
not. But the only things we can experience as having the requisite 
kind of spatiotemporal location are physical objects, and those, for 
the most part, only of a certain class-those without intentionality 
and free will that gives them the ability to move around (i.e., any 
physical thing that is neither a human nor a nonhuman animal). 
Thus one cannot experience phenomenologically a uniquely instan­
tiable property or any property that is guaranteed phenome­
nologically to identify an epistemically unique individual where 
17. Alston, "Experience of God," p. 7-
[ 5 5  
56 ] Rationality and Theistic Belief 
that individual does not have what we can call "spatiotemporal 
rootedness." 
Alston claims that the subjects' accounts do exactly what I have 
argued they cannot do legitimately: 
If our cases are to conform to our account of perceptual conscious­
ness, they must (phenomenologically) involve God's appearing to 
their awareness as being and/or doing so-and-so. And so our sub­
jects do tell us. God is experienced as good, powerful, loving, com­
passionate, and as exhibiting "plentitude." He is experienced as 
speaking, forgiving, comforting, and strengthening. And yet how 
can these be ways in which God presents Himself to experience? 
Power and goodness are complex dispositional properties or bases 
thereof, dispositions to act in various ways in various situations. 
And to forgive or to strengthen someone is to carry out a certain 
intention. None of this can be read off the phenomenal surface of 
experience. This is quite different from something's presenting itself 
to one's sensory consciousness as red, round, sweet, loud, or pun­
gent. Isn't it rather that the subject is interpreting, or taking, what she 
is aware of as being good or powerful, as forgiving or strengthen­
ing? But then what is God experienced as being or doing?'" 
Alston considers this issue in his "Perception of God, "19 but he 
summarizes his argument briefly in the essay just quoted: 
The basic point is that we have different sorts of concepts for speci­
fying how something looks, sounds, tastes, or otherwise percep­
tually appears. There are phenomenal concepts that specify the phe­
nomenal qualia that objects present themselves as bearing-round, 
red, acrid, etc. But there are also comparative concepts that specify a 
mode of appearance in terms of the sort of objective thing, event, 
property or whatever, that typically (normally . .. ) appears in that 
way. In reporting sensory appearances we typically use comparative 
concepts whenever the appearance involves something more com­
plex than one or two basic phenomenal qualities. Thus we say, "She 
looks like Susie," "It tastes like a pineapple," "It sounds like Bach." 
There undoubtedly is in these cases some complex pattern of simple 
phenomenal qualia, but it is usually beyond our powers to analyze 
the appearance into its simple components. And so we are typically 
thrown back on the use of comparative concepts to report how 
18. Ibid. 
19. Alston, "The P erception of God," Philosophical Topics 16 (1988): 23-52. 
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something looks, tastes. . . . And so it is in our religious cases. Our 
subjects were telling us God presented Himself to their experience as 
a good, powerful, compassionate, forgiving being could be ex­
pected to appear. And so in reporting modes of appearance in the 
way they do they are proceeding just as we do in reporting modes 
of sensory appearance.'" 
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One might attempt to use these claims in reply to the back­
ground belief challenge to PTA. One might say, for example, that 
one has a complex concept of God, and that phenomenologically 
describing what one perceives when engaging in CP does not in­
volve appeal to background information or beliefs but only to the 
concept. I believe, however, that Alston's suggestions cannot be 
used in response to the points of my analysis. Suppose that we 
grant Alston his distinction between phenomenal and comparative 
concepts and we further grant him the point that we use phenome­
nal concepts in cases of simple identifications and comparative con­
cepts in cases of complex identifications-those cases in which 
there is a need for specifying a "mode of appearance in terms of the 
sort of objective thing." But identifying a sort of thing-a house, 
car, person-is not the same as identifying an individual thing. In 
identifying Suzie's house, Tom versus Tim Tibbitts, and God, we 
are identifying what I have called epistemically unique individuals, 
not sorts. So, although we do make claims such as "It looks like 
Suzie's house" or "It looks like Tom," these kinds of appeals are 
not, I suggest, comparing one's present experience to concepts of 
other houses or people but to one's memory of an earlier (or imag­
ined) experience of the epistemically unique individual person or 
thing. 
But there are two kinds of case with which we need to concern 
ourselves: cases where the object involved is spatiotemporally 
rooted and cases where the object is not. In both cases memory is 
important, since we must be "introduced" to the object. In the case 
of spatiotemporally rooted objects, the introduction can be done 
simply by our experiencing, for the first time, the object qua the 
object-at-this-location (or by "experiencing" the object in our 
mind's eye as someone describes the object-at-such-and-such-loca­
tion). We then use the local situation information, now "locked 
20. Alston, "Experience of God," pp. 7-8. 
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into" our conceptual scheme, to form beliefs about the episte­
mically unique object when we reidentify it. Here memory func­
tions only in the sense that the spatiotemporal information be­
comes part of our conceptual scheme. 
In the other case, there is no information we can "lock in" that 
uniquely picks out, when taken together with the nonspatiotem­
poral features, the object in question. Thus there is always an ap­
peal, conscious or not, back to our initial introduction, whether 
the introduction is a literal one-say, by the human person we are 
meeting or by a mutual acquaintance-or some other kind of in­
troduction, such as when we meet an animal and give it a name or 
otherwise identify it. 21 But, in these cases, when we reidentify the 
person or animal we must appeal to background beliefs, since there 
is not sufficient information in our conceptual schemes. And the 
phenomenological information given in our reidentificatory expe­
riences is never enough to identify them, even when we do re­
member "what they look like." The possibility of mistaken iden­
tity is a live one, since any feature this person has is a feature she 
may share with someone else, at least as far as experience alone 
goes. 
Thus, in this second class of cases, to identify an epistemically 
unique spatiotemporally nonrooted individual, we must have 
background information of a substantial sort such as "Tim is out of 
town. " Unlike the concept of house or person-( comparative) sor­
tal concepts-which can be applied successfully in totally new situ­
ations, concepts of epistemically unique individuals cannot be. The 
phenomena themselves, even when the perceiver has a fully de­
veloped conceptual framework, cannot do it. To identify an epi­
stemically unique spatiotemporally nonrooted individual, in short, 
we must appeal to information other than mere concepts, even if 
they are comparative concepts. So there are three kinds of complex 
21. There is, perhaps, a kind of continuum involved with spatiotemporal root­
edness. A tree is more or less permanently fixed, a house likewise. But animals are 
not. Some of them, however, are caged, corraled, or otherwise fixed and thus have 
a somewhat stationary location. Other animals are not and are free to go where 
they please, barring physical obstacles. Humans, along with certain birds and sea 
creatures, are perhaps at the high end of this scale with the least fixed location, 
unless jailed, kept in zoos, or otherwise constrained. God, being nonspatial alto­
gether, is the paradigm case of an object that is not spatiotemporally rooted. 
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identifications, one in which comparative concepts are used to 
identify a sort of thing, one in which local spatiotemporal concepts 
(initially created in the perceiver in his or her first real or imagined 
experience of the object) are used to identify an epistemically 
unique but spatiotemporally rooted individual, and one in which 
beliefs are used to identify and reidentify an epistemically unique 
but spatiotemporally nonrooted individual. Alston does not distin­
guish among these three. 
Alston is right in calling attention to the distinction between 
simple and complex cases of perceptual identification, but this does 
nothing to explain how, in the cases of complex individual identi­
fication, we identify the object of the perception. Everything in 
my argument could be true even if Alston's basic distinction is a 
good one: totaling all the experienced qualia does not give us con­
clusive grounds for the individual identification, except in cases of 
spatiotemporally rooted individuals. 
If the arguments of this and the preceding chapter are correct, 
some questions about PP and CP still need to be answered, along 
with questions about Jnw· Is Alston's notion of Jnw finely tuned 
enough? Is there not a difference between a practice that supplies us 
with conceptual-reading beliefs and one that provides us with non­
inferential mediated beliefs? And does this difference not give us 
some cause for concern about whether CP, since it does appear to 
rely on background beliefs, is as epistemically secure as PP? Now, 
if this difference is a reason to question CP's epistemic strength as 
compared to PP's, then PTA fails. But at this stage all that is safe to 
conclude is that Jnw is too broad a category and therefore stands in 
need of further refinement. 
[ 4 ] 
Alstonian Justification Revisited 
In Chapters 2 and 3 I presented an Alstonian version of the par­
ity thesis as well as a challenge to it. I turn now to consider the 
arguments of several of Alston's more recent essays. In particular I 
concentrate on those aspects of his thought in which he delineates 
his more considered account of epistemic justification as well as the 
claim that one can be justified in believing that an epistemic prac­
tice is reliable. My argument is that the claims of these later essays 
on epistemic justification challenge those of the earlier, raising 
again the question of the parity thesis: do sense perceptual beliefs 
and the practice that generates them have the same epistemic status 
as theistic beliefs and the practice that generates them?1 
1. A warning is needed here. Alston's essays with which I deal in this chapter 
make several terminological and substantive shifts from "Christian Experience and 
Christian Belief." Although I believe the development of Alston's thought to be 
quite consistent, with a clear and fundamentally unchanging understanding of epi­
stemic justification and rationality, his use of terms and emphasis do change occa­
sionally. I attempt to keep the shifts straight and to do so I introduce, by way of 
suggestion, where I believe his terms and their references overlap. When it is not 
clearly possible to do so, I note that and let Alston's usage stand while atttempting 
to work around any unclarity to which so doing gives rise. 
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1. Epistemic Justification Again 
In "Concepts of Epistemic Justification" Alston delineates two 
different kinds, and several subkinds, of epistemic justification. 
The broad categories for that discussion are what he calls "deon­
tological epistemic justification" and "evaluative epistemic justifica­
tion": 
Deontological Epistemic Justification (Jd): S is Jd in be­
lieving that p if and only if in believing that p S is not 
violating any epistemic obligations. 
Evaluative Epistemic Justification Ue): S is Je in believing 
that p if and only if S's believing that p, as S does, is a 
good thing from the epistemic point of view. 
The "as S does" in the second account is intended to call attention 
to the particularity of this believing rather than believings of p un­
der any conditions. 
In a note, Alston points out that he was convinced by Alvin 
Plantinga that "deontological, " rather than "normative, " is a more 
accurate term for what Alston strives to describe in the first ac­
count above. This suggests that his account of deontological justi­
fication is an extension of the accounts of normative justification 
provided in his earlier essay. To avoid bogging down in exegetical 
arguments about shifts in terminology, I simply present Alston's 
arguments in the new terminology. Thus, in the remainder of this 
section I spell out in further detail Alston's accounts of ]d and Je, 
and related issues, returning later to consider his explanation of 
how a person can be justified in believing that an epistemic practice 
is reliable. 
Alston rejects the claim that ]d. or any version of it, is the best 
understanding of justification from the epistemic point of view. To 
understand the central point of Alston's argument against ]d, it is 
best if we get before us what he takes to be the strongest candidate 
from among the deontological competitors for epistemic justifica­
tion. After rejecting a voluntarist account of ]d (because most of 
our beliefs are not under our direct voluntary control), he suggests 
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two possible accounts of an involuntarist ]d· 2 The first, where the 
subscript "i" stands for "involuntary": 
Involuntary ]d Od;): S is ]di in believing that p at t if and 
only if there are no intellectual obligations that (1) have to 
do with the kind of belief-forming or sustaining habit the 
activation of which resulted in S' s believing that p at t, or 
with the particular process of belief formation or suste­
nance that was involved in S's believing that p at t, and 
(2) which are such that (a) Shad those obligations prior to 
t; (b) S did not fulfill those obligations; and (c) if S had 
fulfilled those obligations, S would not have believed that 
p at t. 
The second is the same as the first, but (c) is replaced, for reasons I 
leave up to the reader to fill in, by 
(c') if S had fulfilled those obligations, then S's belief­
forming habits would have changed, or S's access to rele­
vant adverse considerations would have changed, in such 
a way that S would not have believed that p at t. 
Alston rejects the deontological understanding of epistemic justi­
fication, for "Jdi does not give us what we expect . . . . The most 
serious defect is that it does not hook up in the right way with an 
adequate, truth-conducive ground. " In other words, "I may have 
done what could reasonably be expected of me in the management 
and cultivation of my doxastic life, and still hold a belief on outra­
geously inadequate grounds. " There are several possible sources of 
this discrepancy. One might have grown up in "cultural isolation, " 
following the noetic leadership of the authorities of one's tribe and 
not having any reasons to reject their authority as reliable. Yet the 
tradition of the tribe might be very poor reason for believing that 
p. Or one might be deficient in cognitive powers or have poor 
training one lacks the time or resources to overcome. Alston 
writes: 
What this spread of cases brings out is that ]di is not sufficient for 
epistemic justification; we may have done the best we can, or at 
least the best that could reasonably be expected of us, and still be in 
2. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," pp. 89, 94, 95, 99· 
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a very poor epistemic position in believing that p; we could, blame­
lessly, be believing p for outrageously bad reasons. Even though )di 
is the closest we can come to a deontological concept of epistemic 
justification if belief is not under direct voluntary control, it still 
does not give us what we are looking for. 
So Alston rejects deontological justification as the best understand­
ing of epistemic justification; it falls short of what is wanted from 
the epistemic point of view. 3 
What account of Je does Alston give in "Concepts of Epistemic 
Justification"? Here Je is an internalist notion with an externalist 
constraint. Consider the internalist aspect first. There are, says Al­
ston, two popular ideas about what internalism is. The first takes 
justification to be internal in that "it depends on what support is 
available for the belief from 'within the subject's perspective, ' in 
the sense of what the subject knows or justifiably believes about 
the world. " The second "takes the 'subject's perspective' to include 
whatever is 'directly accessible' to the subject, accessible just on the 
basis of reflection. " To these readings Alston adds a third that con­
trasts with both as well as with reliabilist understandings of justi­
fication: "What I take to be internal about justification is that 
whether a belief is justified depends on what it is based on 
(grounds); and grounds must be other psychological state(s) of the 
same subject. " He continues: "So in taking it to be conceptually 
true that one is justified in believing that p iff one's belief that p is 
based on an adequate ground, I take justification to be 'internal' in 
that it depends on the way in which the belief stems from the be­
liever's psychological states, which are 'internal' to the subject in 
an obvious sense. " So Je is an internalist notion. 4 
In "lnternalism and Externalism in Epistemology" Alston fur­
ther develops these notions, labeling the first "perspectival internal-
J. Ibid. , pp. 95-96. See Alston, "The Deontological Concept of Epistemic 
Justification," in Epistemic Justification (originally in Philosophical Perspectives 2 
(1988]: 257-99), for an extended discussion of his rejection of deontological con­
cepts of epistemic justification as the central notion of justification given the epi­
stemic point of view. 
4· Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," p. 107. This is in contrast to 
Je as Alston describes it elsewhere. In "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," 
p. II5, he claims that Je might, when all the hard work is done, boil down to a 
kind of reliabilist understanding of rationality. His more considered judgment does 
not, however, ignore reliability, as the next few paragraphs delineate. See note 7 
for more detail. 
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ism" (PI) and the second "access internalism" (AI). 5 The relation­
ship between the two, Alston says, is that "we can think of AI as a 
broadening of PI. Whereas PI restricts justifiers to what the subject 
already justifiably believes . . .  AI enlarges that to include what the 
subject can come to know just on reflection . . . .  AI, we might say, 
enlarges the conception of the subject's perspective to include not 
only what does in fact occur in that perspective . . .  but also what 
could be there if the subject were to turn his attention to it. " Alston 
has serious reservations about both PI and AI. He writes that 
the only arguments of any substance that have been advanced [in 
support of PI] proceed from a deontological conception of justifica­
tion and inherit any disabilities that attach to that conception. In­
deed, PI gains significant support only from the most restrictive 
form of a direct voluntary control version of that conception, one 
that is, at best, of limited application to our beliefs. As for AI, the 
arguments in the literature that are designed to establish a direct 
recognizability version [the strongest version where the justifier is 
said to be directly recognizable iff S needs only to reflect clear­
headedly on the question of whether or not the (justifying) fact ob­
tains in order to know that it does] markedly fail to do so! 
Reservations notwithstanding, Alston believes that a moderate 
version of AI can be supported, although along lines very different 
from those he considers and rejects in "Internalism and External­
ism in Epistemology. "7 This moderate version of AI is, I take it, 
5· In "An Intemalist Externalism," p. 233,  Alston adds another type of inter­
nalism, which he calls "consciousness internalism" (CI). CI, Alston argues, has 
"the crushing disability that one can never complete the formulation of a sufficient 
condition for justification. " But we need not concern ourselves with this version of 
internalism here. Although Alston distances his own position in "Concepts of 
Epistemic Justification" from both PI and AI, in "An lnternalist Externalism" and 
in "lntemalism and Externalism in Epistemology" (also in Epistemic Justification; 
originally in Philosophical Topics 14 [ 1986]: 179-221) he identifies his position with 
a "moderate AI. " 
6. Alston, "Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology," pp. 214, 224. 
7· In note 4 I called attention to a shift in Alston's description of Je from 
"Christian Experience and Christian Belief' to "Concepts of Epistemic Justifica­
tion." In the former essay, p. 115, he writes that "Sis justified in the evaluative 
sense in holding a certain belief provided that the relevant circumstances in which 
that belief is held are such that the belief is at least likely to be true. In other terms, 
being Jc requires that in the class of actual and possible cases in which beliefs like 
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a recast understanding of the third account of internalism Alston 
notes in "Concepts of Epistemic Justification"-the account mak­
ing reference to grounds and psychological states. In the moderate 
version of AI, the accessibility of the states that justify beliefs must 
not be so demanding as to be unrealistic or so weak as to include 
too much: 
What is needed here is a concept of something like "fairly direct 
accessibility." In order that justifiers be generally available for pre­
sentation as the legitimizers of the belief, they must be fairly readily 
available to the subject through some mode of access much quicker 
than lengthy research, observation, or experimentation. It seems 
reasonable to follow [Carl] Ginet's lead and suggest that to be a 
justifier an item must be the sort of thing that, in general, a subject 
can explicitly note the presence of just by sufficient reflection on his 
situation. 
Alston goes on to note that he does not know how to make this 
notion more precise. He summarizes by saying that "to be a justi­
fier of a belief, its ground must be the sort of thing whose instances 
are fairly directly accessible to their subject on reflection. "8 
Alston's defense of this internalist requirement comes as an at­
tempt not to prove its necessity but rather to explain the presence 
of the requirement. He says that the reason we have the concept of 
"being justified" in holding a belief flows from the "practice of 
critical reflection on our beliefs, of challenging their credentials and 
responding to such challenges-in short the practice of attempting 
that are or would be held in circumstances like that, the belief is usually true. 
Much needs to be done to work out what kinds of circumstances are relevant, how 
to generalize over beliefs, and so on. Pretending that all that has been done, I 
would like to suggest that what this boils down to is that the way the belief was 
formed and/or is sustained is a generally reliable one, one that can generally be 
relied on to produce true rather than false beliefs. " He continues in a note, p. 133 ,  
n. 4 :  "And not just that the practice has a good track record up to now; rather it is 
a lawlike truth that beliefs formed in accordance with that practice, in those kinds 
of circumstances, are at least likely to be true." Although his more recent work 
does not totally ignore reliabilist considerations, there is an addition to Alston's 
reliabilist demands. Another way of reading these claims, of course, is that the 
second account of Jc is not intended to be a development of the first. Perhaps, 
however, there are too many similarities to make this interpretation likely. 
8. Alston, "An Intemalist Externalism,"  p. 238. 
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to justify our beliefs. "9 Alston is clear that being justified and justi­
fying are not the same thing and argues that the former concept 
was developed in the context of a demand for the latter. Thus the 
AI requirement we all have intuitively is a natural result of the 
social practices in which we engage. Thus epistemic justification is 
intemalist. 
But it carries an extemalist constraint. In "Concepts of Epistemic 
Justification" Alston's concern is to tie the notion of justification to 
the notion of a truth-conducive ground. He writes that "what a 
belief is based on we may term the ground of the belief. A ground, 
in a more dispositional sense of the term, is the sort of item on 
which a belief can be based. " Furthermore, "we want to leave open 
at least the conceptual possibility of direct or immediate justification 
by experience (and perhaps in other ways also), as well as indirect or 
mediate justification by relation to other beliefs (inferentially in the 
most explicit cases). Finally, to say that a subject has adequate 
grounds for her belief that p is to say that she has other justified 
beliefs, or experiences, on which the belief could be based and 
which are strongly indicative of the truth of the belief. "10 So the 
goodness of a belief from the epistemic point of view is its posses­
sion of grounds of this type. Thus his final account of Je, where the 
subscript "g" stands for "grounds":11 
Grounds Je Oeg): S is ]eg in believing that p if and only if 
S's believing that p, as S did, was a good thing from the 
epistemic point of view, in that S's belief that p was based 
on adequate grounds and S lacked sufficient overriding 
reasons to the contrary. 
How is this position extemalist? Alston distances ]eg from a 
straightforwardly reliabilist account of justification. He says that 
"it may be supposed that ]eg as we have explained it, is just re­
liability of belief formation with an evaluative frosting. For where 
a belief is based on adequate grounds that belief has been formed in 
a reliable fashion. " But to take reliability as a criterion of justifica-
9· Ibid. , p. 236. 
ro. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," pp. Ioo-101. 
1 I. Ibid. , p. 1o6. In this context, a beliefs being "based on" another does not 
imply inference; see Alston's discussion on pp. 99-100. 
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tion, or simply to identify justification with reliability, would be 
mistaken. The internalist character of justification blocks any such 
move. Reliable belief formation may occur where the belief is 
formed on some basis outside the believer's psychological states. In 
fact, "I might be so constituted that beliefs about the weather to­
morrow which apparently just 'pop into my mind' out of nowhere 
are in fact reliably produced by a mechanism of which we know 
nothing, and which does not involve the belief being based on any­
thing. Here we would have reliably formed beliefs that are not 
based on adequate grounds. "12 Since a belief could be reliably 
formed but not be internal in the requisite sense, justification and 
reliability are not the same thing. Nevertheless, there is a close 
relationship between reliability and justification. Alston claims 
"that the most adequate concept of epistemic justification is one 
that will put a reliability constraint on principles of epistemic justi­
fication. " He continues: "By a 'reliability constraint' I mean some­
thing like this. Take a principle of justification of the form: 'If a 
belief of type B is based on a ground of type G, then the belief is 
justified.'  This principle is acceptable only if forming a B on the 
basis of a G is a reliable mode of belief formation. On this view, a 
reliability claim is imbedded in every claim to justification. " Thus, 
although reliability and justification are not the same thing, they 
remain intimately connected. 13 
This claim is further explicated and defended in "An Internalist 
Externalism. " Although there are internalist considerations in what 
the grounds for a belief are, Alston rejects the notion that there is 
an internalist restriction on the adequacy (as opposed to the exis­
tence) of grounds for believing. That the adequacy of the grounds 
be internal is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for justi­
fication. Taking necessity first, PI restrictions on adequacy run into 
the difficulty of requiring an infinite hierarchy of justified beliefs, 
for a PI necessary condition would claim something like "one is 
justified in believing that p only if one knows or is justified in 
believing that the ground of that belief is an adequate one. " Since 
no one can fulfill this requirement without having to be justified on 
12. Ibid. , pp. 108-9. 
13. Alston, "Epistemic Circularity" (in Epistemic justification; originally in Philos­
ophy and Phenomenological Research 47 [ 1986]: 1-30), pp. 321-22. 
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every new level, a PI restriction cannot be a necessary one. On the 
other hand, an AI restriction may be construed in this way: "S is 
justified in believing that p only if S is capable, fairly readily on the 
basis of reflection, to acquire a justified belief that the ground of S's 
belief that p is an adequate one. " This fails to be necessary in that, 
although it might be within human capacity to have such justifica­
tion, "it is by no means always the case that the subject of a justi­
fied belief is capable of determining the adequacy of his ground, 
just by careful reflection on the matter, or, indeed, in any other 
way." A weaker AI version falls prey to similar difficulties.14 
What about sufficiency? Since the AI requirement is weaker than 
the PI requirement, it is only necessary, says Alston, to show that 
the PI requirement is not sufficient. The PI version of sufficiency 
for adequacy states: "S's belief that p is based on an accessible 
ground that S is justified in supposing to be adequate. "15 Does this 
version ensure truth conducivity; what notion of justification is to 
be used here? If it is not truth-conducive, the internalist moves 
away from the goals of the epistemic point of view. But it is hard 
to see that one can appeal to a truth-conducive notion without its 
involving an externalist appeal. Perhaps one can shift the question 
to a higher level, but that only weakens the demand momentarily; 
at some level one must return to externalist requirements or lose 
the epistemic point of view by appealing to non-truth-conducive 
grounds. Thus, "in order for my belief that p, which is based on 
ground G, to be justified, it is quite sufficient, as well as necessary, 
that G be sufficiently indicative of the truth of p. It is in no way 
required that I know anything, or be justified in believing any­
thing, about this relationship. No doubt, we sometimes do have 
justified beliefs about the adequacy of our grounds, and that is cer­
tainly a good thing. But that is icing on the cake. " There is, then, 
an externalist constraint on epistemic justification. 16 
]eg is an evaluative concept, it does not require that beliefs be 
within our direct control, it connects belief with the likelihood of 
truth, it permits the grounds for belief to be within the subject's 
cognitive states, and finally it allows for some "disagreement over 
14. Alston, "An Internalist Externalism," pp. 239-40. 
15. Ibid. , p. 242. 
16. Ibid. , pp. 243-44. 
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the precise conditions [of justification] for one or another type of 
belief. "17 Alston concludes that, since ]eg is the only candidate to 
exhibit all these desiderata, it is clearly the winner for best candi­
date for the notion of epistemic justification. 
2. The Justification of Reliability Claims 
My concerns are the nature of epistemic justification and its con­
nection to the reliability of epistemic practices and beliefs about the 
reliability of epistemic practices. In the previous section I sketched 
Alston's account of the former. Since Alston discusses the latter 
issue in two different, albeit overlapping ways, it is best if the two 
approaches are separated. In the remainder of this chapter I deal 
with what I call Alston's "direct approach, " leaving the "doxastic 
practice approach" for Chapter 5. 
The direct approach is found in "Epistemic Circularity. " There 
Alston claims both that one can be justified in reliability claims 
about the procedures and mechanisms by which beliefs are gener­
ated and that one can justify such reliability claims. In fact, he says, 
since reliability claims are imbedded in every claim to justification, 
"what it takes to justify a reliability claim will be at least part of 
what it takes to justify a justification claim. "18 How does Alston 
account for the justification of reliability claims? Relying on the 
distinction between being justified in a belief p and justifying one's 
belief that p, as well as on the notion that some epistemic practices 
are basic epistemic practices, he argues that one can be justified in 
reliability claims about practices by appeal to beliefs generated by 
those practices. This argument involves a kind of circularity in rea­
soning-what he calls "epistemic circularity" -but this is not a 
logical circularity and the justification is not thereby vitiated. 
Taking sense perception as an example of a source of belief, Al­
ston suggests that its reliability cannot be established in a noncir­
cular fashion. As he did in "Christian Experience and Christian 
Belief, " he continues in "Epistemic Circularity" to call sense per­
ception, as well as other epistemic practices (e.g., memory, intro­
spection, and deductive and inductive reasoning), "basic practices"; 
17. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification, " p. II I. 
r8. Alston, "Epistemic Circularity," p. 322. 
Rationality and Theistic Belief 
these are basic sources of belief. He defines basic sources: "0 is an 
(epistemologically) basic source of belief = df. Any (otherwise) 
cogent argument for the reliability of 0 will use premises drawn 
from 0. "19 If sense perception is a basic source or practice, then 
one should expect to find the only means of justifying 
reliability claims about the practice to be arguments containing 
premises generated, at some point, by the practice itself. 
Such arguments are not logically circular, on Alston's account of 
logical circularity as he narrows down that notion. Logical circu­
larity involves the conclusion of an argument figuring among the 
premises. In epistemic circularity, however, what is at stake is not 
the conclusion (such and such a source of belief is reliable) figuring 
in the premises. Rather, it is that certain propositions which are 
true and which are derived from the source shown reliable by the 
argument are, in foct, from the source in question. The conclusion 
itself does not appear in the premises. The issue is the epistemic 
status of the premises. Alston's discussion hinges on the distinction 
between being justified and the activity of justifying. The premises 
are justified, but the conclusion still needs to be justified. Alston 
gives the following example:20 
(1) 1. At lt. S1 formed the perceptual belief thatpt. and p1• 
2.  At t2. S2 formed the perceptual belief that p2, and p2• 
Therefore, sense experience is a reliable source of belief. 
Here a large number of perceptual beliefs are laid out, and each 
belief is reported to be true. Supposing that 97 percent of the be­
liefs were true, this inductive argument, says Alston, would allow 
its user to become justified in the belief that sense experience is a 
reliable source of belief. Of course, that sense experience is a reli­
able source of belief nowhere shows up in the premises, for they 
are only reports of the formation of sense beliefs and their truth. 
But the reliability of sense perception is "practically assumed" by 
19. Ibid. , p. 326. 
20. Ibid. , p. 327· 
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the premises. In using argument (1) to establish that sense percep­
tion is reliable, one is already, implicitly or explicitly, taking sense 
perception to be reliable. The need for this presupposition does not 
result from syntactic or semantic considerations: it is a result of 
neither the logical form of the argument nor the meaning of the 
premises. It is, rather, the result of our epistemic situation as hu­
mans. 21 It is an "epistemic presupposition, " and the circularity to 
which it is tied is an "epistemic circularity. " 
Arguments such as (I) can be used to justify the belief that sense 
perception is reliable only if some principle of justification such as 
(2) is true:22 
(2) If one believes that p on the basis of its sensorily appear­
ing to one that p, and one has no overriding reasons to 
the contrary, one is justified in believing that p. 
All it takes to be justified in a perceptual belief, if (2) is true, is that 
the belief come from one's experience in a certain way, given the 
absence of overriding conditions militating against the truth of the 
belief. One need not also be justified in accepting (2) or any related 
or similar reliability principle. One does not have to be justified in 
believing the conclusion of (I) in order for (I) to provide justifica­
tion for one's belief in that conclusion. Thus (I) can be used to 
justify one's belief that sense perception is reliable, if some princi­
ple such as (2) is true. Furthermore, (I) continues to provide justi­
fication even if one moves from implicitly assuming that sense per­
ception is reliable to being explicitly aware that one is assuming it. 
The force of the argument is not lost by one becoming more clear 
about where the force lies, says Alston. 
Such epistemically circular arguments cannot be used rationally 
to produce conviction that sense perception (or any other belief 
source) is reliable. One already has that conviction by practical as­
sumption. Nor, says Alston, can one provide what he calls "full 
reflective justification," where he means that not only is a given 
belief p shown to be justified but all other beliefs used in the justi­
fication of p are shown to be justified. When a belief is fully reflec-
2 1 .  Ibid., p. 328. 
22. Ibid. , p. 3 3  r. 
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tively justified, "no questions are left over as to whether the subject 
is justified in accepting some premise that is used at some stage of 
the justification. "23 There are limits on justification; one cannot jus­
tify everything at once. To do so, or at least to attempt to do so, 
does involve one in logical circularity. To demand full reflective 
justification is to demand too much. To recognize the limitations 
on our reasoning power is simply to recognize the humble state of 
our epistemic situation. It does not commit one to the more radical 
forms of skepticism. 
Thus, according to Alston, not only can one justify one's belief 
that a source is reliable but one can be justified in it. By way of 
summary, it is worth quoting Alston at length: 
We are interested not only in the prospects of an argument like [(r)] 
being used to justify belief in [the reliability of sense perception], but 
also in the prospects of one's being justified in believing [that sense 
perception is reliable] by virtue of the reasons embodied in the 
premises of [(r)]. The distinction being invoked here is that between 
the activity of justifying a belief that p by producing some argument 
for p, and the state of being justified in believing that p. Of course one 
way to get into that state is to justify one's belief by an argument. 
We have already seen that this is possible with [(r)]. However, it is a 
truism in epistemology that one may be justified in believing that p, 
even on the basis of reasons, without having argued from those rea­
sons top, and thus without having engaged in the activity of justify­
ing the belief. Since we do not often engage in such activities we 
would have precious few justified beliefs if this were not the case. 
Indeed, we have exploited this possibility in claiming that one may 
be justified in accepting the premises of [(r)] without having justified 
them by argument. If the latter were required one would have to 
appeal to [the claim that sense perception is reliable] as a premise, 
and the enterprise of justifying [that sense perception is reliable] 
would run into logical circularity. It even seems possible to be justi­
fied, on the basis of reasons, in believing that p without so much as 
being able to produce an argument from those reasons to p. It may 
be that the reasons are too complex, too subtle, or otherwise too 
deeply hidden (or the subject too inarticulate), for the subject to 
recover and wield those reasons. 24 
23. Ibid., p. 342. 
24. Ibid. , pp. 334-35. 
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3. Alstonian Justification Old and New 
What relationships hold between the older accounts of Je, ]nw• 
and Jns• on the one hand, and h and ]eg on the other? And what 
results can we expect for the claims of "Christian Experience and 
Christian Belief' and, in particular, the parity thesis, given the ar­
guments of "Epistemic Circularity" and "Concepts of Epistemic 
Justification"? 
I do not think a detailed correlation between the older notions­
from "Christian Experience and Christian Belief' -and the 
newer-from the other essays I have considered-is easy to pro­
vide. There are, however, some more or less general correlations. 
For example, Jn is clearly the ancestor of ]d, since both are ex­
plained in exactly the same terms. We can thus take Alston's con­
cern in "Christian Experience and Christian Belief' to be the same 
as that in "Epistemic Circularity" and "Concepts of Epistemic Jus­
tification";  that is, we can work on the premise that the former 
essay takes Jns and Jnw as accounts of justification which are in com­
petition with ]eg· All are possible accounts of the justification of 
beliefs from the epistemic point of view. 
What follows from this alignment? First, the arguments showing 
that ]di is not the best candidate for justification from the . epi­
stemic point of view seem to apply equally well to Jnw· This point 
does not, however, refute the argument of "Christian Experience 
and Christian Belief." One might still be Jnw in holding a belief p 
even though one does not have the best kind of epistemic justifica­
tion. And Je may remain out of the believer's reach. 
In the earlier work, however, Alston claims that one could never 
have sufficient reasons for taking a practice or its deliverances to be 
Je (even though they might be Je). He concludes there that, al­
though PP and CP could both be Je, the best we can have is Jnw for 
engaging in either of them. Thus Alston writes that, "if we are 
to have any chance of acquiring knowledge, we must simply go 
along with our natural reactions of trust with respect to at least 
some basic sources of belief, provided we lack sufficient reason for 
regarding them as unreliable."25 We must, that is, take Jnw as the 
best we can do and trust that it will lead us to the right practices-
25. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 1 19. 
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practices that are in fact Je· But why should we take Jnw beliefs and 
practices to move us toward Je? Other than that we have nowhere 
else to turn, Alston gives no reason in the earlier essay. He seems 
to have shifted his position on this matter in "Epistemic Circu­
larity, " however, for he argues that one can both justify a belief 
that a practice is reliable and be justified in such a belief (even if one 
has not attempted to justify it). And this is done, importantly, on 
the basis of reasons. 
If Alston is right in the claims of "Epistemic Circularity" and 
"Concepts of Epistemic Justification, " then perhaps his claim in 
"Christian Experience and Christian Belief' that one cannot be Jns 
in engaging in a basic practice is incorrect. One can, according to 
his later argument, have good reasons to engage in a basic practice, 
even though those reasons are circular. And Alston himself says 
that, "if I set out to discover whether a practice is Je, that is, 
whether it is reliable, then I will also be investigating the question 
of whether one could be Jns in engaging in that practice. "26 Once one 
discovers that there are reasons to think the practice reliable and 
that those reasons are one's own, then surely one finds not just that 
one could be Jns in engaging in the practice but that one is Jns in 
engaging in it, that is, unless Jns requires that the reasons for sup­
posing a practice reliable be somehow outside the practice itself. It 
is possible that Alston did think, at the writing of the earlier essay, 
that the reasons must not be circular, that they must be outside the 
practice. The whole notion of a practice being basic relies on the 
presence of circularity in attempts at justification. But even if Al­
ston did think that at an earlier time, he apparently became con­
vinced that some kinds of circularity-such as epistemic circu­
larity-are acceptable means to epistemic justification. 
So it appears that one can be Jns in engaging in a basic practice­
that is, that one has some reasons for taking a basic practice to be 
reliable. And it is a clear inference from "Epistemic Circularity" 
and "Concepts of Epistemic Justification" that one can be Jns in a 
practice, at least as far as having reasons is concerned. What is not 
clear is whether one has met the normative demands of Jns simply 
by having reasons or whether some further conditions need to be 
met. I suspect there are further conditions, but Alston does not 
26. Ibid., p. II7. 
Alstonian Justification Revisited [ 7 5 
specify what they are. But even if he did, would it be worth find­
ing out about those conditions if, in fact, normative or deontologi­
cal accounts of justification do not give us what we desire in terms 
of the epistemic point of view? If one could provide reasons for the 
claim that a practice is reliable, would one not want to understand 
those reasons as providing evaluative justification for the practice 
rather than normative or deontological justification? I believe so. 
The really important question, from the epistemic point of view, is 
whether one can be }eg in a belief that a practice is reliable. I believe 
Alston provides the structure that permits an affirmative reply to 
this question. 
How would the basic structure of arguments for a belief that 
some practice is reliable look? Generalizing from Alston's example, 
such an argument would rely on some principle such as this: 
(3) If S believes that p on the basis of p's being delivered to S 
by epistemic practice EP, and S has no overriding reasons 
to the contrary, Sis justified in believing that p. 
Given the truth of (3), S can justifiably hold propositions such as 
this: 
(4) At t, S formed the EP belief that p, and p. 
Now, S need not be justified in holding the epistemic principle (3). 
Such a requirement would lead to logical circularity. But because 
of that principle, S can be justified in holding propositions having 
the same form as (4). But then S can string together propositions 
in the form of (4) to produce an inductive argument to the conclu­
sion that EP is reliable. 
But what happens if the justification being demanded is of the }eg 
type? Let us call the belief that some practice is reliable R. For S to 
be }eg in believing R, it would have to be the case that S's believing 
that R, as S does, is a good thing from the epistemic point of view, 
in that S' s belief that R is based on adequate grounds and S lacks 
sufficient overriding reasons to the contrary. This is simply an ap­
plication of Alston's general account of }eg· Let us assume that 
there are no overriding conditions. Thus what is important is that 
S have adequate grounds for believing R. According to Alston's 
account, to have adequate grounds for a belief such as R, one need 
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only have adequate (although epistemically circular) reasons. So let 
us say that at t1 the practice in question generates belief Pt. at t2 it 
generates p2, and so on. Suppose further that 97 percent of these 
beliefs are true. S can thus conclude that the practice is reliable, and 
hence S is justified in believing R. 
Now, what we are after is whether this justification is the kind 
specified by the account of ]eg· It is as long as inductive reasoning as a 
source of belief is in fact reliable. Is it? One way to answer that ques­
tion is to explore whether the belief that it is reliable is Jeg· But 
one's initial justification of R does not rely on whether one has 
justified the further belief that induction is reliable. One need only 
be justified in that belief. So it appears that one can be ]eg in a belief 
that a practice is reliable. 
Not only can one be ]eg in the belief that the practice is reliable, 
but by extension it seems that one can be ]eg in engaging in the 
practice itself. Here is an account of Jeg applied to practices rather 
than beliefs: 
Grounds* Je (J�) S is J� in engaging in an epistemic prac­
tice EP iff S's engaging in EP, as S does, is a good thing 
from the epistemic point of view, in that S's engaging in 
EP is based on adequate grounds and S lacks sufficient 
overriding reasons to the contrary. 
Here something needs to be said about the notion of adequate 
grounds for engaging in an epistemic practice. Alston says that a 
ground for a belief is "the sort of item on which a belief can be 
based. " But basing a belief on a ground is not obviously the same 
as basing one's engaging in a practice on a ground. Nevertheless, 
perhaps it is enough if we piggyback the notion of grounds for 
engaging in a practice on the grounds for a belief that that practice 
is reliable. (Here we have a sufficient but perhaps not a necessary 
condition for grounds for engaging in a practice. There may be 
other ways of having grounds for engaging in a practice besides a 
[ justified] belief that the practice is reliable. ) So, the sort of thing 
that one can base one's engaging in a practice on is a belief that in 
turn has grounds. Add to all this that these latter grounds are ade­
quate and by extension that the grounds for engaging in a practice 
are adequate. In the case under consideration, what would the ade-
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quate grounds be? Surely by Alston's own account, if one is justi­
fied via an argument that rests on reliably formed beliefs (even if it 
is epistemically circular) in the belief that the practice is reliable, 
then one is justified in engaging in the practice. This all seems con­
sonant with Alston's claim that "a particular belief is justified if and 
only if we are justified in engaging in a certain epistemic practice. "Zl 
Although this claim does not demand that one is justified in a belief 
p if and only if one is justified in the second-order belief that the 
practice that generates p is justified, my argument shows that one 
can both justify and be justified in holding the second-order belief 
and thus that engaging in the practice believed to be justified is 
justified and hence that beliefs generated by the practice, such as p, 
are justified. Although not required by his claim, the justification 
of the second-order belief (in the reliability of the practice) seems 
to show that one is justified in engaging in the practice and thus, to 
borrow Alston's metaphor, is icing on the epistemological cake. 
So it appears on this interpretation that one can be )eg in the 
belief that a practice is reliable. By extension, one can be J� in 
engaging in that practice. I noted above that the question of Jns 
may be less important than "Christian Experience and Christian 
Belief' suggests, given that we could have )eg for a practice. Nev­
ertheless, it seems that one could also be Jns in engaging in a basic 
practice. One already has the reasons needed. All that is required 
beyond those reasons is whatever it takes to meet the normative 
demands. Given that those are met, one could have Jns for the be­
lief that a practice is reliable. Thus one could be Jns in engaging in a 
practice and thus, according to Alston's own argument, one could 
be Jns in engaging in PP. This is quite a different result from that 
suggested in "Christian Experience and Christian Belief. " So, by 
Alston's later arguments, one could be both J� and Jns in engaging 
in PP, not only Jnw in so doing. 
This conclusion raises several questions about PTA. Although 
the original version may be true-both CP and PP may be Jnw 
(here I am ignoring the background belief challenge)-much of 
our interest in PTA derives from the supposition that neither PP 
nor CP can do any better thanJnw· It appears that PP can do better, 
by Alston's own argument. Now the question is whether CP can 
27. Ibid., p. IIO. 
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do as well. Can a person be Jtg or Jns in engaging in CP? Could 
Alston suggest a new, and stronger, version of the parity thesis? 
Let us consider Jtg, since Alston claims that its near relative, ]eg• is 
the understanding of epistemic justification that has the most going 
for it from the epistemic point of view. Might Alston suggest, for 
example, the following: 
Parity Thesis Alston Strong (PT As): Under appropriate con­
ditions, both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP 
are J1g. 
Might he then continue by claiming that PTAs is true? PP, it has 
been argued, can be Jtg. CP's having the same status rests on the 
provision of reasons for the reliability of CP. Can such reasons be 
given? 
4· A Challenge to Alston's Strong Parity Thesis 
One challenge to PT AS can be seen if we return to the argument 
presented above for the claim that one can be ]eg in believing that a 
practice is reliable and apply it to the question of CP's reliability. 
The resulting argument looks like this: for S to be ]eg. in believing 
that CP is reliable, it would have to be the case that S's believing 
that CP is reliable is a good thing from the epistemic point of 
view, in that S's believing that CP is reliable is based on adequate 
grounds and S lacks sufficient overriding reasons to the contrary. 
Assuming that there are no overriding conditions, what would the 
adequate grounds have to be for S's belief that CP is reliable to be 
]eg? One needs adequate (albeit epistemically circular) reasons. So 
let us say that CP produces beliefs p1, p2, p3, and so forth, and that 
these beliefs (or a large percentage of them) are true. At this point 
the argument appeals to induction to move from these beliefs to 
the general belief that CP is reliable. 
But here the argument runs afoul. With PP a large number of 
beliefs are generated, literally tens of thousands, so that the induc­
tive base for the general conclusion that PP is reliable is sufficiently 
strong to support the conclusion. But one must wonder, just when 
does an inductive argument become a strong one? How many be­
liefs does one need in the inductive base? Is there a sufficiently large 
base of beliefs generated by CP? In some cases perhaps there are, 
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but one suspects that often the inductive base is not strong enough. 
How often does the Christian believer employ CP (or how often 
does CP work in her)? And does the believer trust her ability to use 
CP well enough to trust its deliverances? These are important is­
sues, but there are more pressing questions to ask. 
First, it appears that any attempt to produce an overall justifica­
tory argument for the reliability of a practice appeals to an induc­
tive subargument; that is, the inductive subargument is essential to 
the overall argument. No substitution is available. Second, the ap­
peal to induction assumes that the belief-forming practice is some­
thing we can test by applying it more than once. Third, the use of 
induction rests on the assumption that the things about which the 
induction is made are regular and predictive. Since the last two 
points are intimately connected, I deal with them more or less to­
gether. 
Of the first point, let me say that Alston's subargument is an 
inductive track-record argument. Is the inductive track-record sub­
argument essential? The first point to make is that, even if it is not, 
Alston's argument uses one. As far as the argument I have con­
structed (and now criticize) follows Alston's reasoning, if my argu­
ment is successful, I have at least shown that PT As cannot be de­
fended by that kind of argument. But then how could it be 
defended? There needs to be some positive argument. Perhaps 
there are other kinds of inductive arguments to which one might 
appeal-an inference to the best explanation, for example. But the 
points I make here about God's unpredictability seem to infect all 
inductive subarguments, of the track-record variety or not. And so 
I cast the following comments in general terms about induction. 
What of noninductive arguments? It is hard to see what they 
might be, in this case. To avoid logical (but allow epistemic) circu­
larity, it is hard to see that any premise that allows a deductive 
move to the needed conclusion is forthcoming. Alston begins with 
a practical assumption of reliability, and this gets the argument off 
the ground. But if one begins with practicality alone, one ends 
with practicality alone if the logical moves are deductive. So it 
looks as if an inductive subargument of some type is needed. 
Induction is an epistemic practice in which we appeal to past 
states of affairs and infer that these will continue into the future or 
we appeal to the presence of certain qualities or properties in ob-
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jects and infer that these will be present in the future, and the like. 
In other words, induction assumes that the objects with which 
it deals do not change, at least radically, from one moment to 
the next, or that the changes themselves are regularly repeating 
changes, and that a good case can be made from the past into the 
future. PP likewise deals with objects (or changes) that are regular 
and predictive. It is natural, in fact, to link our practice of induc­
tion to the practice of perception, understanding the two as rising 
together in our cognitive past. Although not the same thing, in­
duction and PP make similar assumptions about their subject mat­
ters. The key assumption for our purposes is that the objects with 
which they deal are predictable. Thus, since both PP and induction 
work well in their dealings with the physical world, the appeal to 
inductive principles to show the reliability of PP is both natural 
and, it seems, legitimate. It is, as Alston admits, built into PP that 
the objects that are its central concern are the kind of objects about 
which predictions can be made. Predictions are likewise the heart­
beat of induction. With these predictions we can anticipate and 
control, to some extent, physical objects. 
With CP, however, the connections with induction are much 
less clear. If, for example, the applicability of induction to a set of 
objects assumes that those objects do not change (in important 
ways) over time, or that any changes are predictable, and yet God 
does change (at least in unpredictable ways in his actions toward 
us), of what use is an inductive argument to show that the practice 
through which we have access to God-CP-is reliable? The issue 
here is really one of the nature of the practice as well as of the 
objects the practice supposedly accesses. With PP, the practice's 
ostensible predictive nature cannot be separated from the ostensible 
nature of the objects with which it deals. Of course one can safely 
infer from the past activity of this or that physical object to its 
future; that is part and parcel of the conceptual scheme of PP. On 
the other hand, if the nature of the practice is so intimately tied to 
the nature of its objects, and God is not predictable, then why 
would CP be predictable? It is not, as Alston admits. But then in 
what way can one appeal to an inductive argument to show that 
CP is reliable? Unlike stones and trees, God is not predictable; we 
cannot assume he will be or act in the future as he was or did in the 
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past or that CP will give us access to him in the future as it has in 
the past. God and his activities are not capable of being anticipated 
or controlled. 28 
Does this mean simply that one does not have, or at least that 
one cannot count on, a large number of generated beliefs from 
which to infer inductively a claim of reliability, as I suggested ear­
lier? No, my suggestion here is stronger than that. I mean to say 
that no induction from the past engagements of CP can be used 
legitimately as an inductive base. It is part of the understanding of 
the world that is embedded in CP (or in which CP is embedded) 
that God does not have to give us any information. In fact, Alston 
argues that, given the assumptions that God is somewhat myste­
rious and that he has made us such that we cannot discern regu­
larities in his nature and activities, then "if an epistemic practice 
were to lead us to suppose that we had discovered regular patterns 
in the divine behavior or that divine activity is equally discernible 
by all, that would be a reason for regarding the practice as unreli­
able. "29 If the assumption about the indiscernibility of regularity in 
God's nature and activities is correct, then how could one safely 
infer from the past deliverances of CP that it is reliable? And if the 
inductive subargument is irreplaceable in the overall justificatory 
argument, then a belief that CP is reliable cannot be justified by 
that larger argument. 
Alston has suggested in correspondence that my discussion does 
not take into account that, whereas "induction concerns the rela­
tions between beliefs and facts that make the beliefs true (where 
they are true), what is unpredictable is the object the beliefs are 
about. So that it is one thing that is unpredictable (God) and an­
other thing that is the topic of the induction (truth about beliefs 
28. There is a potential problem with this suggestion, since it is a mainstream 
belief of Christians that God is constant and dependable. How is one to square the 
(apparent) nonpredictability of God with his purported dependability and con­
stancy? I do not know how to resolve this problem except to suggest that, even if 
God is ultimately or finally dependable, nothing we know about him gives us 
insight into how he will carry out this dependability. It does not, in short, seem 
obviously contradictory to say that God is dependable but nonpredictable or that 
he is faithful but full of surprises. My challenge deals only with the apparent ele­
ment of surprise in God's ways of dealing with humanity. 
29. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 1 29. 
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about God when formed in a certain way). "30 This distinction is a 
good one. Let us see how it affects my argument. 
An inductive subargument for the reliability of CP, following 
Alston's pattern, looks something like this: 
(5) 1. At ft. S1 formed the CP belief that Pt. and p1. 
2. At t2, S2 formed the CP belief that p2, and p2• 
Therefore, CP is a reliable source of belief. 
Alston's note calls attention to the fact that the basis for the induc­
tion is the relationship between the conjuncts of the premises, and 
the issue is not, therefore, one of predictability or nonpredic­
tability. The move to the generalization is not based directly on the 
facts about the object of the belief (in this case God) but on the fact 
that the beliefs generated by CP are true. So it does not matter, for 
the efficacy of the induction, whether the objects of the beliefs are 
predictable or not. 
Although I agree with Alston's basic point that the induction 
itself is based on the relationship between the conjuncts of the 
premises, there remains something curious about CP. This feature 
of CP calls special attention to the object of the beliefs generated 
by CP in an inductive argument supporting CP's reliability. PP is a 
practice over which we have some control. If we do not wish to 
form visual beliefs, we can close our eyes. If we do not wish to 
form auditory beliefs, we can plug our ears. And so forth. Even 
though we are constantly bombarded, during our waking hours, 
with sensory information, there are certain measures we can take 
to control how PP works with that information. The corollary to 
this point is that generally the objects about which PP generates 
beliefs are always present to us. They are constant and predictably 
so. Thus we know what to do to engage in PP. We also know 
perfectly well what it would be to use PP to generate beliefs and 
then to reuse PP to validate those same beliefs. But it is less than 
clear that we know the same about CP. Even if we do have beliefs 
30. Personal letter dated November 26, 1990. 
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delivered to us by CP, it, unlike PP, is not the kind of practice we 
can call up on demand. We cannot simply turn our head in the 
right direction and use or apply CP. Having received some infor­
mation by sight, I can return again to that spot and use sight to 
validate the original belie( But what do I do having received the 
information that God wants me to spend most of my time on 
philosophical theology rather than other philosophical concerns? 
How do I reuse CP to test that belief? 
Perhaps there are certain things the Christian can do. For exam­
ple, one subpractice of CP may be reading Scripture. Insofar as it 
is, the Christian can pick up the Bible and read it, just as with PP 
one can open one's eyes and look again. When we open our eyes 
and turn our head in the right direction we can, more or less, trust 
that our sight gives us the information needed to validate our ear­
lier belief. But God need not reveal himself to us today when we 
read the Scriptures, and thus the testability of CP lacks the kind of 
repeatability of PP. And this brings us to my main reply to Al­
ston's criticism. The objects of beliefs generated by PP do not do 
anything to lead us to engage in PP. There is no conscious decision 
or motivation on their part to initiate PP for us. This is not true 
with CP. Presumably God must initiate CP. The unpredictability 
of God, therefore, indicates that no inductive move from CP-gen­
erated beliefs and their corresponding truth-making facts can pro­
vide sufficient grounds for concluding that CP is reliable (or will 
be reliable in the future). CP may work in entirely different ways 
each times in operates. A lack of predictability on God's part does 
lead to the failure of the inductive argument needed to show CP 
reliable. 
Furthermore, the predictability of the objects of PP beliefs is pre­
cisely what makes the repeatability of our engaging in PP possible. 
This repeatability allows for a kind of commitment to PP's re­
liability that in turn gets the inductive argument going. Here I shift 
to discuss the premises of Alston's argument, and hence it is Al­
ston's "practical assumption" that is at stake. The move from the 
generation of true perceptual beliefs (from experience and PP) to 
the claim that PP is reliable depends on the practical assumption 
that PP is reliable. This assumption must only be practical, of 
course; otherwise one is involved in a logical rather than epistemic 
circle. But how can one make even the practical assumption? We 
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make it, I believe, because the deliverances of PP are so well con­
firmed by the past predictive power of induction and PP. It is thi� 
(predictive kind of) confirmation that "indicates" ("betokens, " 
"manifests") PP's reliability in the first place. 31 But this confirma­
tion is internal to the practice itself: induction seems either part and 
parcel of PP or so intimately connected that one cannot engage in 
induction without relying on PP (or other practices dealing with 
predictable objects) and its internal assumptions. Thus one should 
not view the (predictive) confirmation of the practice's deliverance� 
as independent grounds or reasons for taking the practice to be 
reliable. Nevertheless, confirmation may generate an initial trust in 
the practice and hence the practical assumption is not irrational. I 
am sure Alston would not take just any practice-let us say my 
taking the pain in my knee to indicate that a Canadian hockey team 
will take the Stanley Cup-as a practice one can practically assume 
to be reliable. The presence of a reliability indicator is what sug­
gests the practical assumption in the first place. 
So, in addition to the move from the premises to the conclusion 
relying on the predictive nature of the objects, the internal (predic­
tive) confirmation of beliefs also depends on the regularity of the 
objects over which the practice generating those beliefs ranges. 
With CP such (predictive) confirmation appears not to be present. 
The objects of the practice (God and his activities) are not regular 
or predictable. Insofar as they are not, the practical assumption 
does not seem plausible. There is no indicator of reliability to sug­
gest that one make a practical assumption. So, although one need 
not go on to show that induction itself is a reliable source of belief, 
one must have an argument with a strong enough set of beliefs to 
make a sound inductive move. CP appears to lack such a base, for 
the practical assumption of CP's reliability does not have the net­
work of confirmation that the related PP assumption has. Thus, 
although PP is J�-one can generate an inductive, albeit episte­
mically circular, argument for the reliability of PP-CP appears not 
to be, since the requisite argument slips in some assumptions about 
the nature of CP and its objects which are not true of that practice. 
3 r .  See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief, " p. 1 25, for a full 
explanation of these terms. See Chapter IO, and Mark S. MCLeod, "Can Belief in 
God Be Confirmed?" Religious Studies 24 (1988): 3 1 1-23, for further developmen1 
of this and a non predictive kind of confirmation. 
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I am suggesting, then, that although there may be an argument 
justifying the belief that PP is reliable, insofar as that argument 
rests on induction there can be no parallel argument for CP. There 
are two points to my argument. First, because of the unpredictable 
nature of the object of CP, one cannot go from the premises 
(which contain truth claims about CP's deliverances) to the conclu­
sion about CP' s reliability. Second, not even the initial practical 
assumption about CP's reliability is well founded, since, once 
again, the nature of the object of CP does not allow for the internal 
confirmatory platform that would lead one to make the practical 
assumption in the first place. These two issues are connected, be­
cause both rely on the unpredictability of God. So what suggests a 
lack of force behind the practical assumption for CP turns out ulti­
mately to challenge the move from the premises, even if true, to 
the conclusion. 
Does Alston have a response? He admits (and, in fact, makes 
"epistemological hay out of') the fact that PP has confirmation and 
predictive power whereas CP does not. On the basis of this kind of 
observation, says Alston, some have rejected the reliability of CP. 
He goes on to argue, however, that although confirmation and 
predictive power are indicative of reliability, they are not necessary 
for reliability. Can Alston use a related response against my sug­
gestions, claiming, for example, that CP need not have confirma­
tion and yet can still be legitimately practically assumed to be reli­
able? I think not. It is true that a practice could be reliable and its 
deliverances not be confirmed. Still, the argument under consid­
eration, taken as a whole, relies on induction. Inductive arguments 
can have success only where the base allows a predictive move 
from the past to the future. With a well-confirmed base such 
moves are plausible. As we have seen, this issue arises at two 
stages, with the practical assumption and with the move from 
premises to conclusion. With CP, however, the predictive applica­
tion to future cases appears risky both with regard to the main 
argument and with regard to the initial confirmation that might 
suggest the practical assumption in the first place. The predictive 
repeatability simply seems absent. What other reliability indicator 
is available? None, and thus, insofar as Alston's argument requires 
induction, we cannot make an appeal to the argument to show that 
CP is Jfg. Alston's move earlier to ignore CP's lack of confirma-
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tion, and his subsequent claim that CP can be Jnw' does not rely on 
an inductive argument. In fact, Jnw does not rely on argument at 
all. In the case of Jnw' Alston's concern is with reasons against the 
reliability of CP, and lacking confirmation and predictability does 
not constitute a reason against reliability. But with J!g the case is 
different, for now we are dealing with a lack of reasons for re­
liability. J!g demands positive reasons and those simply are not, 
and perhaps cannot be, provided by CP. So PT AS appears not to be 
true. 
Alston does say that CP has its own internal self-support. Does 
this help him with PTAs? CP's self-support comes in terms of spir­
itual development which, Alston suggests, is internal to the prac­
tice. What is spiritual development? 
CMP [CP], including the associated Christian scheme that has been 
built up over the centuries, generates, among much else, the belief 
that God has made certain promises of the destiny that awaits us if 
we follow the way of life enjoined on us by Christ. We are told that 
if we will turn from our sinful ways, reorder our priorities, take a 
break from preoccupation with our self-centered aims long enough 
to open ourselves to the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit, then 
we will experience a transformation into the kind of non possessive, 
nondefensive, loving, caring, and sincere persons God has destined 
us to become. 
This brief account does not do full justice to the notion of spiritual 
development. Nevertheless, some Christians do develop in these 
ways, and this provides some type of self-support for CP. Even so, 
if we pay attention to the ways Christians treat their spiritual 
development, we note that there is no predictive guarantee that 
someone will mature as a Christian believer. Alston himself writes 
that this development happens "not immediately and not without 
many ups and downs. 32 This is no surprise, for we are dealing with 
humans and their foibles, as well as with a God about whom even 
believers are hesitant to predict things. And there is, of course, 
much more to be said here. 
But the main point is that spiritual development is also un­
predictable and that this indicates the unlikelihood that even an 
32. Alston, Perceiving God, p. 252. 
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inductive argument bolstered with spiritual development as inter­
nal support can be used to move one to a justified belief in re­
liability. 
Since the inductive argument is so prominent in the overall justi­
ficatory argument, its absence effectively kills the justificatory ar­
gument and hence the claim that one can be ]eg in a belief that CP 
is reliable. Can one use the self-support of spiritual formation as an 
indicator of reliability, that is, as enough for a practical assumption 
of reliability? Perhaps, for spiritual development does occur among 
those involved in CP, and there is a kind of confirmation that at­
taches to CP because of the spiritual development of its practi­
tioners. This is not a predictive kind of confirmation, however, 
and an inductive argument based on it would be shaky at best. I 
have more to say about the notion of a nonpredictive confirmation 
in Chapters 10 and 1 1 ,  and I postpone detailed discussion until 
then. 
I believe it is safe to conclude that PT As is false. What about the 
Jns of CP? For the reasons presented against the ]eg of CP, its Jns 
must be rejected as well. Thus although PP may be, according to 
some of Alston's work, Jns• CP cannot be. And in the case of CP, 
one cannot know that it is ]eg· 
I have argued that some of Alston's more recent work militates 
against the conclusions of his earlier work. A stronger parity thesis 
emerges from this more recent work. But PT AS fails because of a 
lack of inductive support for CP's reliability. There is one final 
consideration that raises serious questions about PT AS· I turn to 
explore Alston's doxastic practice approach to epistemology in the 
next chapter. 
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We have thus far considered two different versions of the parity 
thesis. Neither of them is successful, or so I have argued. There is a 
third possibility, however, one that emerges from some claims in 
Alston's "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach to Epistemology." My 
goals in this chapter are to explain Alston's doxastic practice ap­
proach, to explain the parity thesis that emerges from that ap­
proach, and to show how the background belief challenge applies 
to it. This is the last of the parity theses I mine out of Alston's 
work. 
I. A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology 
In the essay in question, Alston suggests a second approach to 
the issue of being justified in a belief that a practice is reliable. He 
distinguishes between metaepistemology and substantive episte­
mology. The former is "a view about epistemology, its nature, 
conduct, methodology, and prospects-rather than a position de­
veloped in the prosecution of the discipline itself."' The latter is the 
doing of epistemology proper-the discovery of epistemic prac­
tices, exploring how they are structured, what the criteria of justi-
I. Alston, "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach to Epistemology," in Knowledge 
and Skepticism, ed. M. Clay and K. Lehrer (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 
p. 24. 
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fication or rationality are, and so forth. The distinction is impor­
tant for my argument, for one cannot decide about the viability of 
the parity thesis without understanding the connections between 
epistemic justification and reliability, and one cannot understand 
these connections without understanding at what level one's ques­
tions about them arise. 
So, in "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach," a metaepistemological 
essay, Alston gives an account of the rationality of engaging in an 
epistemic practice with an eye on the issue of whether an epistemic 
practice is reliable. This contrasts with the epistemological essay, 
"Epistemic Circularity," in which Alston defends, using the more 
direct approach considered in Chapter 4, the thesis that one can be 
justified in believing that a practice is reliable. How do these ap­
proaches fit together? The burden of this section is to outline Al­
ston's argument in "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach" with a view 
to explaining how that argument impinges on the conclusions of 
"Epistemic Circularity."  In particular, I aim at spelling out the 
connections Alston thinks there are among rationality, justifica­
tion, and reliability, for we cannot get clear about the final version 
of Alston's parity thesis unless we are clear about these connec­
tions. 
The central question of" A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach" is how 
one is to determine which, if any, epistemic principles are adequate 
or, in other words, what it takes to be justified in accepting a prin­
ciple of justification. That, of course, depends on what justification 
is. Alston works here with the truth-conducive account discussed 
in Chapter 4· Given this account, to show that a principle is accept­
able one must show that it specifies a reliable mode of belief forma­
tion. But to do this is to rely, at some point, on a circular argu­
ment, since every mode of belief formation belongs to a basic 
practice. As we have seen in "Epistemic Circularity," Alston ar­
gues that not all circular arguments are logically so and in particu­
lar argues that one kind of circular argument can lend support to 
beliefs about reliability. In short, "epistemic circularity does nQt 
prevent one from showing, on the basis of empirical premises that 
are ultimately based on sense perception [where sense perception is 
his example of an epistemic practice], that sense perception is reli­
able." The problem with this, as he puts it, is that "whether one 
actually does succeed in this depends on one's being justified in 
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those perceptual premises, and that in turn, according to our as­
sumptions about justification, depends on sense perception being a 
reliable source of belief. In other words, if (and only if) sense per­
ception is reliable, we can show it to be reliable. But how can we 
cancel out that if?"2 
The problem, otherwise stated, is that, given this approach to 
justifying reliability beliefs, any belief-forming mechanism or prac­
tice can be validated, on certain assumptions: 
If all else fails, we can simply use each belief twice over, once as 
testee and once as tester. Consider crystal ball gazing. Gazing into 
the crystal ball, the seer makes a series of pronouncements: p, q, r, 
s .... Is this a reliable mode of belief-formation? Yes. That can be 
shown as follows. The gazer forms the belief that p, and, using the 
same procedure, ascertains that p. By running through a series of be­
liefs in this way, we discover that the accuracy of this mode of be­
lief-formation is 100%! . . . Thus, if we allow the use of mode of 
belief-formation M to determine whether the beliefs formed by M 
are true, M is sure to get a clean bill of health. But a line of argu­
ment that will validate any mode of belief-formation, no matter 
how irresponsible, is not what we are looking for. We want, and 
need, something much more discriminating. 3 
This "retesting" approach for showing a practice reliable appears 
to be what Alston advocates in "Epistemic Circularity," although 
there he fills in the details of how the argument might go. If I am 
correct about this, then Alston is between a rock and a hard place. 
On the rocky side, he has to show why my suggestions about the 
unavailability of the retesting for CP do not vitiate the skeptical 
claim that all practices have "trivial self-support" (as Alston later 
calls it) and therefore why we should not use the retesting ap­
proach to evaluate a practice's reliability. On my account, PP turns 
out to be epistemically superior to CP. In other words, even given 
the antecedent assumption of reliability needed for the soundness 
of the argument (to the conclusion that a practice is reliable and 
hence justifiably engaged in), there are some practices for which 
trivial self-support is not forthcoming. CP is one such practice. 
But Alston rejects the possibility of using the retesting approach to 
2. Ibid., p. 3· 
J. Ibid. 
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the end of showing a belief in reliability justified. He instead claims 
that all practices appear to have this trivial self-support, and thus 
that we need some other way of adjudicating between practices in 
terms of their reliability. 
Which brings us to the hard place: PT As appears to be trivially 
true. If all practices can be shown to be reliable via this trivial self­
support, then not only is PT As true, but a parity thesis stating that 
all practices have J.; is true. This is obviously not the case, as Al­
ston clearly assumes in the essay under consideration. Neverthe­
less, let Alston's point stand, and let us see how he makes out his 
case in answering the question he sets before us: how are we to 
adjudicate among epistemic practices in terms of their reliability? I 
return to this rocky terrain in the next section. 
What is the doxastic practice approach? Alston relies on the 
work of Wittgenstein (stripped of its verificationist assumptions) 
and Reid to help him out. Several aspects of their thought are help­
ful. First, "we engage in a plurality of doxastic practices, each with 
its own sources of belief, its own conditions of justification, its 
own fundamental beliefs, and, in some cases, its own subject mat­
ter, its own conceptual framework, and its own repertoire of pos­
sible "overriders. "' These practices, although distinct, are not 
wholly independent and are engaged in together rather than sep­
arately. Furthermore there are "generational" and "transforma­
tional" practices, the former producing beliefs from nondoxastic 
inputs, the latter transforming belief inputs into other beliefs. Each 
of the generational practices has its own distinctive subject matter 
and conceptual scheme. Second, "these practices are acquired and 
engaged in well before one is explicitly aware of them and critically 
reflects on them." Practice thus precedes theory: first we must 
learn to engage in a practice, and only then can we reflect on its 
nature. Third, practices of belief formation develop in the context 
of wider spheres of practice. For example, "we learn to form per­
ceptual beliefs along with, and as a part of, learning to deal with 
perceived objects in the pursuit of our ends." Finally, "these prac­
tices are thoroughly social: socially established by socially mon­
itored learning, and socially shared. "4 
So far, says Alston, this is just cognitive social psychology. 
4· Ibid., pp. s-s. 
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What has this to do with epistemology? Here he shifts to an indi­
rect approach. Rather than asking how psychology helps us deter­
mine which epistemic practices are reliable-in other words, a 
question about epistemic justification-he asks what resources the 
approach gives us for determining whether a given practice is ratio­
nally accepted or engaged in. 
There are, says Alston, two positions one might take on the 
connection between psychology and epistemology. The first, "au­
tonomism," "holds that epistemology is autonomous vis-a-vis psy­
chology and other sciences dealing with cognition. It holds that 
epistemology is essentially a normative or evaluative enterprise, 
and that here as elsewhere values are not determined by fact." The 
difficulty with this position is just that there appear to be no nonar­
bitrary standards by which to carry out an evaluation of epistemic 
practices. To evaluate epistemic practices one must engage in 
them. According to "heteronomism," in contrast, "if the epis­
temologist is to escape such arbitrariness, he must content himself 
with delineating the contours of established doxastic practices, per­
haps neating them up a bit and rendering them more internally 
coherent and more consonant with each other. He must give up 
pretensions to an Archimedean point from which he can carry out 
an impartial evaluation of all practices. "5 There is, then, an antin­
omy between autonomism and heteronomism. 
Alston's solution to the antinomy is twofold. First, he notes that 
neither side does full justice to epistemology. Autonomism has the 
difficulties already noted and is forced to recognize that the attrac­
tiveness of certain principles lies simply in the fact that we learned 
to engage in practices in which those principles are embedded and 
we did so before reflecting on the practices. On the other side, the 
heteronomist fails to recognize that to relegate epistemology to a 
corner where its only task is to tidy up its principles is to overlook 
the nature of epistemology as a philosophical enterprise, an enter­
prise that asks general questions. Second, he distinguishes between 
"a more or less tightly structured practice with more or less fixed 
rules, criteria, and standards, on the one hand, and a relatively free, 
unstructured "improvisational" activity on the other." The former 
1s more or less narrowly confined by antecedent rules and pro-
s. Ibid., pp. IO-I I. 
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cedures that constitute the practice (although not everything is in­
variable). The latter calls for an exercise of "judgment" that relies 
on "no established rules or criteria [that] put tight constraints on 
what judgment is to be made in a particular situation." Philosophy 
falls on the second side of the contrast and so the resolution to the 
antinomy is as follows: 
The epistemologist, in seeking to carry out a rational evaluation of 
one or another doxastic practice, is not working within a particular 
such practice. Nor need she be proposing to establish a novel prac­
tice, the specifications of which she has drawn up herself in her 
study. On the other hand, she need not abjure everything, or any­
thing, she has learned from the various practices she has mastered. 
She makes use of her doxastic skills and tendencies, not by follow­
ing the relatively fixed rules and procedures of some particular prac­
tice, but by using all this in a freer fashion. 6 
Thus, the doxastic practice approach to epistemology recognizes 
the importance of what we learn at our mother's knee but also 
the value of critical reflection on what we learn. This leaves un­
answered the question with which Alston set out: how can we go 
about justifying epistemic practices as reliable? We cannot establish 
reliability for one practice without establishing it for all. But if we 
shift the question to, what is the rational attitude toward epistemic 
practices? some progress can be made. Rejecting the view that radi­
cal skepticism with regard to epistemic practices is viable, Alston 
notes that we can take all socially established practices to be prima 
facie rational; that is, we can take all socially established practices as 
"rationally engaged in, pending sufficient reasons to take any of 
them as unreliable, and pending any other sufficient disqualifying 
considerations, if any. "7 Why limit the scope to the socially estab­
lished rather than opening it to all practices? Simply put, eccentric 
practices such as Cedric's consultation of sun-dried tomatoes as an 
indicator of stock market activity do not have a track record. Only 
when a doxastic practice has persisted over many generations does 
it earn the right to be considered seriously. There is a presumption 
in favor of socially established practices which idiosyncratic prac­
tices do not have. 
6. Ibid., pp. 12-14. 
7· Ibid., p. 16. 
94] Rationality and Theistic Belief 
If we are to evaluate practices then, we have to do it in terms of 
a negative approach. Which practices disqualify themselves? That 
depends on the kinds of considerations taken into account as po­
tential disqualifiers. Alston suggests three. First, a practice can be 
disqualified by "persistent and irremediable inconsistency in its 
output." This counts as a disqualifier because massive inconsis­
tency is a sure indicator of significant falsehood in one's set of be­
liefs. Second, a massive and persistent inconsistency between the 
outputs of two practices indicates that at least one of them is 
faulty. Alston suggests that we follow a conservative route at this 
point, taking the more firmly established practice over the less. His 
reason? It seems to him to be "the only principle that . . .  [is] both 
unchauvinistic and eminently plausible. "8 
Alston's final suggestion "has to do not with a ground for defini­
tive rejection, but with something that will strengthen or weaken 
the prima facie acceptability. The point is this. A practice's claim to 
acceptance is strengthened by significant 'self-support,' and the 
claim is weakened by the absence of such." How can Alston turn 
to self-support, since he has rejected epistemically circular consid­
erations? There are, he says, different sorts of self-support. The 
sort of self-support in which the same belief is used both as tester 
and testee is too easy and provides only trivial results. Not all 
kinds of self-support are so trivial: 
Consider the following ways in which SPP [sense perceptual doxas­
tic practice] supports its own claims. (r) By engaging in SPP and 
allied memory and inferential practices we are enabled to make pre­
dictions, many of which turn out to be correct, and thereby we 
are able to anticipate and control, to some considerable extent, the 
course of events. (2) By relying on SPP and associated practices we 
are able to establish facts about the operations of sense perception 
that show both that it is a reliable source of belief and why it is 
reliable. These results are by no means trivial. It can not be taken for 
granted that any practice whatever will yield comparable fruits. It is 
quite conceivable that we should not have attained this kind or de­
gree of success at prediction and control by relying on the output of 
SPP; and it is equally conceivable that this output should not have 
put us in a position to acquire sufficient understanding of the work­
ings of perception to see why it can be relied on. To be sure, an 
8. Ibid., p. 17. 
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argument from these fruits to the reliability of SPP is still infected 
with epistemic circularity; apart from reliance on SPP we have no 
way of knowing the outcome of our attempts at prediction and con­
trol, and no way of confirming our suppositions about the workings 
of perception. Nevertheless, this is not the trivial epistemically cir­
cular support that necessarily extends to every practice. Many prac­
tices can not show anything analogous; crystal ball gazing and the 
reading of entrails cannot. Since SPP supports itself in ways it con­
ceivably might not, and in ways other practices do not, its prima 
facie claims to acceptance are thereby strengthened; and if crystal ball 
gazing lacks any non-trivial support, its claims suffer by compari­
son.• 
[ 9 5 
This does not mean that we should expect all practices to be self­
supported in the SPP way, for example, by predictive capabilities. 
Such requirements are neither necessary nor important for other 
practices. But we can and should look at other practices to consider 
their fruits and whether they are appropriate to the aims of those 
practices. The basic point is, however, that practices may or may 
not have self-support of this epistemically circular but nontrivial 
sort and thereby be strengthened or weakened from the point of 
view of their overall rationality. 
Alston closes the essay by considering the relationship between 
rationality as he construes it and the original issues of reliability 
and justification. As it turns out, the prima facie rationality of en­
gaging in a practice entails neither the reliability of the practice nor 
a justification for a belief in its reliability. This is true, in part at 
least, because the notion of justification cum reliability is an "ob­
jectivist " notion whereas the notion of rationality is an "subjec­
tivist " one, the former applying to beliefs, the latter applying to 
practices. Why the distinction? 
The short story is this. I have tried to be objectivist as long as possi­
ble. But the difficulties in establishing justification (rationality) for 
beliefs in an objectivist sense drives us (sooner or later, and why 
make it any later? ) to appeal to an internalist rationality for prac­
tices. If one still wonders why we couldn't have used an internalist 
conception of justification for beliefs in the first place . . . 
. . . the answer is quite simple. So long as we consider beliefs in 
9. Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
Rationality and Theistic Belief 
isolation, we have no sufficient basis for an internalist judgment of 
rationality . . . .  We come onto something really helpful only when 
we take the mode of belief-formation concretely, as an aspect of a 
practice that is socially established and that plays a central role in 
human life. Then, and only then, do we find reasons for a judgment 
that it is reasonable to engage in the practice. 
What then is the connection between the rationality of a practice 
and its reliability? "To accept some doxastic practice . . .  as rational 
is to judge that it is rational to take it as a way of finding out what 
(some aspect of) the world is like; it is to judge that to form beliefs 
in accordance with this practice is to reflect the character of some 
stretch of reality. " This move does not imply an entailment of re­
liability by rationality. But logical entailment is not the only kind. 
There is pragmatic implication, for example, such as that found in 
belief; in believing p one is taking p to be true. But the belief in p 
does not entail p's truth, and neither does rationality entail re­
liability. Nevertheless, judging a practice to be rational seems to 
imply that one soundly judges it to be reliable and also that one 
soundly judges it to be justifiably engaged in. 10 
2. Alstonian Justification Old and New Once More 
How are Alston's various versions of justification and rationality 
related? We have seen some relations. My interest, however, is in 
connecting the conclusions of" A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach" to 
the two versions of the parity thesis I have suggested. One way 
to approach this task is to ask how Alston's notion of rationality 
is related to the notions of Jns and Jnw as originally construed in 
"Christian Experience and Christian Belief. " Alston's original intu­
itions were to suggest that Jnw is the best we can do from the epi­
stemic point of view, since Je is out of reach. This leaves us with 
only a prima facie notion of justification. As we have seen, later he 
argues that ]eg is possibly attainable and that in fact it is the most 
desirable from the epistemic point of view. Later yet, he suggests 
that, although we may have the better kind of epistemic justifica­
tion, full reflective justification is not possible. This leaves us with 
a notion of rationality spelled out in terms of what is prima facie. 
IO. Ibid., pp. 2 1-2]. 
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Perhaps Alston's shift to the doxastic practice approach is con­
nected to his original intuition-that Je is not within our reach, or 
at least not fully so. Because Alston shifts ground when moving 
from justification to rationality, we end up not with ]eg plain and 
simple but ]eg understood through the doxastic practice approach 
that in turn leaves us with prima facie judgments as to the J� of a 
practice and thus the ]eg of its deliverances. 
In the previous chapter I noted that much of our interest in PTA 
derives from the supposition that both PP and CP are only Jnw· 
Since it looks as if PP is capable of being more strongly supported 
(from the epistemic point of view) than CP-for example, to the 
level of J� rather than just Jn-PTA is not so interesting. We want 
something more than prima facie justification if we can get it, so 
PT AS comes out as worthy of consideration. But now that we 
know that J� must be, so to speak, filtered through a doxastic 
practice approach, should we not recast Alston's parity thesis in 
terms of prima facie rationality? Since, according to Alston, all 
epistemic or doxastic practices can be shown to be reliable (using 
the trivial methodology he suggests and the assumption it makes), 
the interesting claim that a practice is reliable is disabled; no sorting 
among practices seems epistemically promising. The move to the 
question of rationality resurrects the possibility of sorting among 
practices. Although a judgment that it is rational to engage in a 
practice includes a sound judgment that the practice is reliable, the 
former entails neither that the practice is reliable nor our needing to 
show that the practice is reliable. 
Given this suggestion, a new parity thesis emerges: 
Parity Thesis'tston (PT:x): Under appropriate conditions, 
both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are prima 
facie rational. 
Understood in this way, Alston's parity thesis avoids the problems 
presented above but once again needs evaluation. Is it true? 
The first thing to note is that PTX does not fall prey to the 
charge that CP lacks indicators of reliability whereas PP does not, 
where this is taken to show that one is rational whereas the other is 
not. This charge is not successful against PTX for the reasons Al­
ston develops in defending CP's Jnw in "Christian Experience and 
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Christian Belief." Unlike PTAs• where positive reasons are needed 
to show reliability, prima facie rationality and Jnw are explained in 
terms of negative conditions, namely, that a practice is prima facie 
rationally engaged in (or Jnw) unless there are reasons not to take it 
as rational (or justified). So a lack of confirmation or, for that mat­
ter, a lack of any indicator of reliability does not remove the prima 
facie rationality needed for PTl 
But what Alston says does allow for various levels of strength of 
rationality beyond the prima facie when he points to various kinds 
of self-support for an epistemic practice. Significant self-support 
adds to the overall rationality of engaging in a practice. The trivial 
testee-tester type of self-support cannot help us distinguish among 
various strengths of rationality, for such support is, says Alston, 
available for all doxastic practices. But other kinds of self-support 
are not. For example, the predictability engendered by SPP, its 
usefulness in anticipating and controlling the course of events, and 
the fact that we can use SPP to understand how it operates provide 
self-support of a kind that not every practice has. Crystal ball gaz­
ing and the reading of entrails have neither these features nor any­
thing analogous. Since SPP supports itself in ways it might not 
have, and in ways that other practices do not, its claims to ratio­
nality are stronger than they might otherwise have been. 
But there is an important warning to consider here:· 
We must be careful not to take up another chauvinistic stance, that 
of supposing that a practice can be non-trivially self-supported only 
in the SPP way. The acceptability of rational intuition or deductive 
reasoning is not weakened by the fact that reliance on the outputs of 
these practices does not lead to achievements in prediction and con­
trol. The point is that they are, by their very nature, unsuitable for 
this use; they are not "designed" to give us information that could 
serve as the basis for such results. Since they do not purport to 
provide information about the physical environment, it would be 
unreasonable in the extreme to condemn them for not providing us 
with an evidential basis for predictive hypotheses. Similarly, I have 
argued in . . .  ["Christian Experience and Christian Belief'] that it is 
equally inappropriate to expect predictive efficacy from the practice 
of forming beliefs about God on the basis of religious experience, 
and equally misguided to consider the claims of that practice to be 
weakened by its failure to contribute to achievements of this ilk. On 
the other hand, we can consider whether these other practices yield 
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fruits that are appropriate to their character and aims. And it would 
seem that the combination of rational intuition and deduction yields 
impressive and fairly stable abstract systems, while the religious ex­
periential practice mentioned earlier provides effective guidance to 
spiritual development." 
The lack of predictive efficacy of a practice does not show that 
the practice is unreliable. And we must not expect all practices to 
have the kind of nontrivial self-support that separates the non­
trivially supported from the trivially supported in terms of ratio­
nality. Nor must we expect all kinds of nontrivial self-support to 
be alike. There are then at least two classes of doxastic practices: 
those that are trivially supported (all practices fall into this class) 
and those that have additional, nontrivial support (a subclass of the 
larger). 
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Can the differences among the nontrivial kinds of self-support 
allow us to divide the subclass into further subclasses in terms of 
strength of overall rationality? Perhaps, but Alston suggests no 
way to do this. In fact, one might make the following argument 
against such an adjudication. Since it is not the case that the result 
of SPP (its help in our getting around in the physical world) is 
epistemically superior to results of other practices (the building of 
stable abstract systems or spiritual development), how could one 
adjudicate between them? These goals and results are not epistemic 
but practical, and on that point the goals and results of each prac­
tice may simply be different. When the practices work well they 
are self-supported in a way that distances them from those that do 
not work well-those that are merely trivially self-supported-and 
thus strengthened in their claim to rationality. But once moved 
into the inner circle of nontrivially self-supported practices, further 
adjudication on epistemic grounds seems unlikely. For the goals 
and results are internal, as is the judgment that those goals are met 
by the results. It is the internal nature of the judgment that appar­
ently disallows epistemic comparison of the winning practices. 
Thus it seems unlikely that one can successfully make out an argu­
ment that PP is more strongly nontrivially self-supported than CP 
on epistemic grounds. A challenge to PT� based on that approach 
does not seem to have a high likelihood of success. 
I I. Ibid.' p. 19. 
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But this argument needs to contend with two issues. First is the 
issue of evaluating CP and PP in terms of the closeness of the cog­
nitive connection between the experiences and the beliefs generated 
by the practices. Recall that CP and PP seem to differ on whether 
they are conceptual-reading practices or noninferential mediated 
practices. I argued that PP is the former, CP the latter, and that 
Alston needs to refine further the notion of Jnw· Taking prima facie 
rationality and its connections to epistemic justification and re­
liability as further refinements of the general idea behind Jnw• or at 
least of Alston's initial intuition that Jnw is the best we can do epi­
stemically, perhaps it can be suggested that there are levels of 
strength within the winning circle of epistemic practices. Would 
such adjudication among levels be an epistemic adjudication? I be­
lieve so, but I postpone the detailed argument for this point until 
Chapter 8. 
Second, if, as Alston says, the features of predictability, univer­
sal engagement, and like conceptual schemes are "desiderata for an 
epistemic practice " from a cognitive point of view, then PP is su­
perior in that way to CP and to all other practices that fail to have 
those features, by his own admission. 12 Of course, that things "go 
more smoothly, more satisfyingly, " from the cognitive point of 
view when certain features are present does not in itself show that a 
practice with those features is reliable. On this point Alston seems 
quite correct. But it does show, on Alston's terms, that a practice 
failing to have those features, or analogous features, does not have 
as strong a rational claim. This is indicated by Alston's unwilling­
ness to accept those doxastic practices that are idiosyncratic or not 
socially accepted, such as Cedric's sun-dried tomato approach to 
the stock market or the use of entrails for teaching us about politi­
cal events. These idiosyncratic practices lack the significant self­
support of the predictable SPP, for example. 
But can we rank practices within the subclass of the nontrivially 
self-supported by kinds of self-support? We can, given Alston's 
admission that, "if we were shaping the world to our heart's de­
sire, I dare say that we would arrange for our practices to exhibit 
these features [e. g. , predictive power, universal engagement, and 
12. See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," pp. 123-24, for 
details. 
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so forth]," after which he goes on to argue that CP and PP are 
both Jnw even though the former lacks the features whose presence would 
increase its cognitive attractiveness. 13 But this ranking is done from the 
cognitive point of view, and one wonders what cognition has to 
do with epistemic justification. Being cognitively more satisfying 
does not provide evidence of reliability and hence does not provide 
evidence of justification either. Perhaps the best we can say is that 
the cognitive attractiveness influences only one's rational engage­
ment in a practice. And, as Alston argues, rationality and justifica­
tion are not the same thing. But that cognitive attractiveness influ­
ences the rational acceptance of a practice does at least indicate our 
preference for certain kinds of practice over others (e. g. , predictive 
practices over nonpredictive), and accordingly we can rank prac­
tices in terms of their desirability from a rational-cognitive point of 
view. The more desirable a practice is from the cognitive point of 
view, the more rational it is to engage in that practice. This point 
links to the first issue, for surely it is more desirable from the cog­
nitive point of view to have our beliefs closely read off our experi­
ences; the distinction between conceptual-reading and noninfer­
ential mediated practices becomes important at precisely this 
juncture. Insofar as a practice puts our beliefs more directly in 
touch with the experiences that generate them than not (that is, 
insofar as a practice is a conceptual-reading practice rather than a 
noninferential mediated practice), it is more rational to engage in 
that practice. 
Is there a direct connection between the nontrivial self-support 
to which Alston points (predictive power or spiritual formative 
power) and conceptual-reading versus noninferential mediated 
practices? If being conceptually read is more cognitively satisfying 
than being noninferentially mediated, then one might suggest that 
only practices that are the former are also predictive or universally 
engaged in. But this is not the case, since there are epistemic prac­
tices that seem to be neither conceptually read nor predictive, 
for example, pure mathematics. Pure mathematics, it would seem, 
should rank fairly high in terms of our rational engagement 
therein. Nevertheless, just as we would construct the world, if we 
could, in such a way that our experiential epistemic practices had 
IJ. Ibid., p. 124. 
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the features of predictability, universal engagement, and so forth, 
so we would construct the world such that our experientially based 
practices were of the conceptual-reading sort. Such a world is more 
desirable from the cognitive point of view. That we have such a 
wish allows for a ranking of strengths of rationality on the simple 
ground that one practice more immediately connects the beliefs it 
generates to the experiences on which it rests than others. 
Thus the ranking of practices from within the subclass of ratio­
nal practices is quite complex. It involves ranking certain features 
dealing with the internal goals of a practice to its deliverances (e. g. , 
does the practice aim to be predictive and is it? vs. does the practice 
aim to develop its participants's spiritual formation and does it?). 
But it also involves sortings on the basis of whether a practice 
is experientially based (pure mathematics vs. PP or CP) as well as 
rankings among experientially based practices in terms of how 
closely connected the beliefs it delivers are to the experiences that 
generate those beliefs. This last ranking seems to involve a signifi­
cant epistemic aspect, for the noninferential mediated generation of 
beliefs involves other background beliefs that stand in need of epi­
stemic justification, an issue to which I return in Chapters 7 and 8. 
What does all this have to do with PT�? I am suggesting that 
one can rank practices within the subclass of the nontrivially self­
supported from a cognitive point of view and that, although some 
practices rank higher than others, this does not show that the lower 
are not prima facie rational. But then even though PT� may be 
true, it stands in need of further refinement, just as PTA does. Al­
though it is interesting that CP and PP are both prima facie ratio­
nal, if there are further levels of strength of rationality to which we 
have access, then we ought to consider those. Although PP and CP 
may have the same kind of rationality-PP with its predictive self­
support and CP with its spiritual development self-support-the 
former has a stronger level of self support; PP is a conceptual­
reading practice and CP is only a noninferential mediated practice. 
As such, the former ranks more highly in terms of its overall ratio­
nality. Thus although PT� is, left without refinement, true, a 
closer analysis indicates that PP and CP do not have the same level 
of rational strength beyond the prima facie level, and a more cir­
cumspect statement of the parity thesis needs to indicate that dif­
ference in level. 
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The original thought behind the parity thesis was that PP and 
CP have the same kind and level of epistemic justification. Alston's 
epistemology seems to indicate that ultimate judgments of re­
liability, and hence justification, can only be done (in any helpful 
way) from the point of view of rationality.14 Does PT'X fulfill the 
original aims of Alston's project in comparing religious and non­
religious beliefs and practices? Insofar as one's judgment that one's 
engaging in a practice is rational is a judgment that one's engaging 
in it is justified and that the practice is reliable, then yes it does. 
And perhaps that is the best we can do-a sort of meta­
epistemological thesis that CP and PP are on a par. But even un­
derstood in metaepistemological terms, PT'X stands in need of fur­
ther refinement because of the various strengths of the claims to 
rationality beyond the merely prima facie level. 
In this and the previous several chapters I have argued that Al­
ston's initial parity thesis stands in need of further clarification and 
that a stronger version based on his later work is not true. In 
Chapter 2 I raised difficulties based on distinctions between nonin­
ferential mediated belief formation and conceptual-reading belief 
formation. Applying those distinctions, I have suggested that, al­
though noninferential mediated beliefs (or practices) and concep­
tual-reading beliefs (or practices) might be Jnw• the former are not 
as strongly justified as the latter. The distinction on which that 
argument rests was uncovered by considering the problems of 
identifying individuals. Such identifications require, following the 
background belief challenge, a special role for background beliefs 
(beyond mere concepts) in the generation of beliefs about spatio­
temporally nonrooted individuals. The failure of the stronger ver­
sion of the parity thesis (PT As) rests on a lack of inductive evidence 
for the claim that CP is reliable. This lack of evidence is traceable 
in part to a lack of regularity and predictability of the object the 
beliefs are about and hence a lack of confirmation for the deliv­
erances of CP. But a further account of the parity thesis (PT'X) is 
developed in which the emphasis is shifted from epistemic justifica­
tion to prima facie rationality. Here too there are various rankings 
14. Internal judgments of reliability can be made within the practice on the basis 
of evidence. 
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beyond the prima facie one can give to practices and thus, although 
PT'X is more refined than PT A• it still needs to include a reference 
to the various ways a practice may be ranked. Once that is done, 
CP and PP, although both minimally prima facie rational, can also 
be shown to have different levels of strength beyond the prima 
facie. But we are primarily interested in the account of the stron­
gest kind and level of rationality (cum justification) we can have, 
and we therefore want the parity thesis to reflect that strength. 
Since CP and PP can apparently be ranked beyond the prima facie 
level, and they turn out, if my argument is correct, to have differ­
ent levels of strength beyond the prima facie, PT'X is the strongest 
parity thesis we can have. Stronger versions turn out to be false. In 
short, PT'X, like PT A• does not reflect what more can be said. It is 
misleading in a certain way-leaving us, perhaps, with the false 
confidence that since both PP and CP have prima facie rationality 
they are equal in epistemic strength. They are not. 
[ 6 ] 
Plantinga' s Parity Thesis 
Alvin Plantinga's epistemology of religion is no less complex 
than Alston's. It can be divided into two parts. The first, both 
historically and in the order I consider it here (this and the next 
chapter) , is Plantinga's development of the notion of the proper 
basicality of beliefs; this is his clearest defense of the parity thesis. 
In this context, Plantinga's chosen language is that of "epistemic 
justification" and "rationality. " This is to be contrasted with the 
second part of his epistemology, in which Plantinga develops and 
defends his account of "epistemic warrant" or "positive epistemic 
status. "  There his concern is the quality, property, or thing, 
enough of which converts mere true belief into knowledge. In the 
essays and books in which he considers these issues, he does not 
explicitly consider a parity thesis. Nevertheless, I discuss this as­
pect of his epistemology in Chapter 9. 
In defending his version of the parity thesis, Plantinga encour­
ages us to reconsider epistemic foundationalism and its relationship 
to theistic belief. He further urges us to reject evidentialism, 
which, he claims, is rooted in a certain version of foundationalism. 
In this chapter my initial concern is to introduce Plantinga's earlier 
work on rationality, noting the major tenets of his understanding 
of foundationalism as well as his arguments against evidentialism 
and the particular foundationalist understanding of justification he 
claims undergirds it. From this discussion emerges a description of 
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Plantinga's version of the parity thesis. I then suggest a challenge 
to it. 
I. Foundationalism 
Plantinga's general concern is whether belief in God, that is, the 
belief "God exists, "  can be (as opposed to is) rational. 1 To show 
how it can be rational, he tries to show how it can be "properly 
basic" in a foundational system of justification. On Plantinga's ac­
count, epistemological foundationalism is a normative view. 2  One 
of its goals is to lay down conditions for rational belief. He writes: 
"According to the foundationalist, there is a right way and a 
wrong way with respect to belief. People have responsibilities, du­
ties and obligations with respect to their believings just as with 
respect to their (other) actions. "  To be rational, then, "is to exer­
cise one's epistemic powers properly-to exercise them in such a 
way as to go contrary to none of the norms for such exercise. "3 To 
be rational, on this account, is something a person does; it has to 
do with one's responsibility or, more broadly, one's following the 
norms in epistemic matters. Having stated what it is to be rational, 
of course, does not obviously clarify the related issue of epistemic 
justification of belief. Here Plantinga is sometimes unclear. He ap­
parently uses the terms "rational" and "irrational" interchangeably 
with "justified" and "unjustified. "  And his claims are, on the one 
hand, about beliefs: beliefs are rational (or justified) . On the other 
hand, he talks about rational noetic structures (or even simply of "be­
ing rational, " as in the above quotation) . In the main, his concern 
seems to be justified belief. We can, then, pass over the notion of 
1. Normally, Planting a speaks not of the belief that God exists but of belief in 
God. The latter is to be understood as the former. I follow Plantinga in this conve­
nient shorthand. Also, as it turns out, the general concern for Plantinga is beliefs 
about God and his activity (e.g., God's creation of the flowers), from which there 
is an immediate inference to "God exists." Again, for convenience, I sometimes do 
not distinguish between the belief that God exists and other theistic beliefs. 
2. At least he thinks this in the account given in the Reformed epistemology 
essays published between 1979 and 1985, the essays and ideas around which this 
chapter is written. 
3. Alvin Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," Proceed­
ings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 54 (1980): 49-62, quotation pp. 
53-54· 
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rationality iiberhaupt and concern ourselves with the justification or 
propriety of beliefs .  We can do this safely because Plantinga's com­
ments about rationality are tied closely to his comments about jus­
tification, both being normative notions and, presumably, the jus­
tification of (most of) one's believings being at least necessary for 
the rationality of one's noetic structure or more generally for one's 
being (epistemically) rational. 
First, then, some comments about Plantinga's notion of noetic 
structure. He says: "A person's noetic structure is the set of propo­
sitions he believes together with certain epistemic relations that 
hold among him and these propositions. "4 These relations include 
the basis relation (that I believe p on the basis of q), the supports 
relations (that one belief or set of beliefs provides evidential back­
ing for another belief), and the propriety of beliefs (those that are 
inferential are "properly nonbasic" only if appropriately based on 
others, and those that are noninferential are "properly basic" only 
if certain hard-to-specify conditions are met). Plantinga also men­
tions strength of belief, depth of ingression, epistemic history, and 
relations between belief and acceptance as candidates for important 
aspects of noetic structures. Of all these aspects of noetic struc­
tures, I concentrate on the notion of properly basic beliefs. 
Plantinga notes various types of foundationalism and isolates 
two in particular: classical (or strong) and weak. He writes: "Sup­
pose we say that weak foundationalism is the view that (I) every 
rational noetic structure has a foundation [i. e. , a set of properly 
basic beliefs], and (2) in a rational noetic structure, non-basic belief 
is proportional in strength to support from the foundations . "  Clas­
sical foundationalism, in contrast, consists of weak foundational­
ism plus certain specified criteria for proper basicality. What are 
those criteria? "Ancient and medieval foundationalists tended to 
hold that a proposition is properly basic for a person only if it is 
either self-evident or evident to the senses; modern foundational­
ists-Descartes, Locke, Leibniz and the like-tended to hold that 
a proposition is properly basic for S only if either self-evident or 
incorrigible for S. "5 Plantinga sometimes identifies classical foun­
dationalism as the disjunction of ancient and medieval with mod-
4· Ibid. 
s. Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
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ern foundationalism, but he does not always do so. In places he 
treats classical foundationalism simply as modern foundationalism. 
Unless otherwise indicated, I use the term "classical foundational­
ism" in the broader, disjunctive sense. 
The belief that God exists is, of course, neither self-evident, nor 
incorrigible, nor evident to the senses. If Plantinga is to show how 
belief in God can be properly basic, he must show that classical 
foundationalism is false. One of his goals is to accomplish that 
task. 
2. Evidentialism 
By showing classical foundationalism to be false and arguing 
that belief in God can be properly basic in some other foundational 
system of justification, Plantinga may be able to show how belief 
in God can be epistemically justified. But the so-called irrationality 
(nonjustified status) of belief in God should not be seen simply as a 
problem arising out of classical foundationalism. In a significant 
way, says Plantinga, the charge of irrationality-that belief in God 
is not justified-is rooted in "evidentialism" and can be generally 
stated as the "evidentialist objection to theistic belief. "6 
Evidentialism is the view represented by the following: 
(I) There are obligations or standards of excellence with re­
spect to belief. 
Additionally, Plantinga cites a claim of W. K. Clifford:7 
(2) "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to be­
lieve anything upon insufficient evidence. " 
How are the obligations or standards of (1) to be understood? Plan­
tinga's earliest Reformed epistemology essays suggest several dif-
6. Just as foundationalism is a normative thesis, so is evidentialism. Some of 
Plantinga's claims about evidentialism are virtually identical to his claims about 
foundationalism. See Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," 
p. 53, and "Reason and Belief in God," p. 30. 
7. As quoted in Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 25; from W. K. 
Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief," in Lectures and Essays, vol. 2, Essays and Reviews 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1879), originally in Contemporary Review, 1877. 
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ferent forms the obligations might assume, but he moves in a later 
essay to a model employing the notion of standards rather than 
obligations. The motivation for this shift need not concern us here. 8 
But perhaps the following captures more of Plantinga's spirit in 
characterizing evidentialism: 
(2') It is either intellectually wrong or intellectually defective 
for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence. 
We can understand (2') to be a more explicit expression of (2) . 
Plantinga gives a list of evidentialists that includes Aquinas, Des­
cartes, Locke, Blanshard, Russell, Scriven, Clifford, and Flew. 
What common philosophical view is shared by this otherwise var­
ied collection of philosophers? In part it is a view about the epi­
stemic status that belief in God must have if it is justified. Follow­
ing (1) and (2'), they all agree that 
(3) It is irrational or unreasonable to accept theistic belief in 
the absence of sufficient evidence or reasons. 
Some evidentialists also hold a further claim: 
(4) We have no evidence or at any rate not sufficient evidence 
for the proposition that God exists. 9 
Others do not. Here the evidentialist objection comes to the fore. 
The objection is rooted in the alleged truth of claims (I), (2'), (3) , 
and (4) and concludes that belief in God is not justified. Thus, all 
evidentialist objectors are evidentialists, but the converse is not 
true. Evidentialism, then, is the view that minimally (I ) ,  (2'), and 
(3) are true. The evidentialist objection is that evidentialism is true, 
as is (4). Thus, the belief that God exists ought not to be held or is 
noetically unfortunate, untidy, or substandard. 
Plantinga disagrees with the evidentialist objector on at least two 
8. For obligations, see, for example, Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 
pp. 3 r-34. For standards, see Plantinga, "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Ob­
jection to Belief in God," in Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment: 
New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Robert Audi and William J. Wain­
wright (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1986), p. II r. 
9. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 27. 
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accounts. First, he thinks there is evidence for the belief that God 
exists. 10 Although this disagreement is important, I do not explore 
it here. Second, he thinks evidence is not needed for justified belief 
in God. The evidentialist responds that nothing is more reasonable 
than (3); if there is no evidence or reason to believe in God, one 
should not do so on pain of irrationality. But Plantinga does not 
mean by his claim that no evidence whatsoever is needed for justi­
fied belief in God. What he means by "reason" or "evidence" is not 
simply justification in all its varied forms. Rather, he has in mind 
discursive justification. We can say that a belief p is discursively 
justified for some person S when S holds p because of some other 
belief or beliefs she holds. Presumably, the truth of these other 
beliefs is taken by S to make p's truth more likely than if they were 
not true. Plantinga does not give a complete account of the rela­
tionship between the justifying belief(s) and the justified belief, but 
we can surmise that it must be some sort of inferential relationship. 
Discursive justification does not include, then, noninferential justi­
fication. It does not include justification where p is justified by 
some sort of experience (e.g . ,  my being appeared to in a certain 
way) or by some feature of the proposition itself (e.g . ,  self-evi­
dence). Thus, in the typical case, the belief that 2 + 1 = 3 is not 
discursively justified but held on the grounds of self-evidence. 
When Plantinga speaks of evidentialists holding (3), he attributes to 
them the view that belief in God must be discursively justified. 
A problem with Plantinga's claims arises here. Claim (2') is that 
evidence is needed for any belief to be intellectually nondefective or 
intellectually permissible. If Plantinga understands evidence as dis­
cursive justification and (2') is true, then every belief must be jus­
tified by some other belief. Foundational models of justification 
seem to be excluded. But I think this is simply a slip of the pen. 
Plantinga need not attribute the stronger view to the evidentialist; 
the evidentialist need not claim that all beliefs must be discursively 
justified. She need only claim that beliefs that cannot be (or are 
not) properly nondiscursive, as far as their justification is con­
cerned, must be discursively justified. In fact, Plantinga claims, ev­
identialism is rooted in classical foundationalism. Thus, the beliefs 
ro. See, for example, the ontological argument in Plantinga, God, Freedom, and 
Evil (Grand Rapids, Mich. : Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 85-II2. 
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that are properly basic-those beliefs that are either self-evident, 
incorrigible, or evident to the senses-need not be provided evi­
dence in the way (2') demands. Claim (2') should be replaced by 
(2*) It is either intellectually wrong or intellectually defective 
for anyone to believe, on insufficient evidence, any belief 
requiring discursive justification. 
Naturally, if the evidentialist objector's challenge is to make sense, 
the belief "God exists" must require discursive justification. Thus, 
(3) should be replaced by 
(3*) Since belief in God requires discursive justification, 1t 1s 
irrational, unreasonable, or unjustified to accept theistic 
belief in the absence of sufficient evidence or reasons. 
Our corrected picture of evidentialism is that minimally {I), 
(2*), and (3*) are true. The evidentialist objector believes not only 
that evidentialism is true but that (4) is also true. Thus, belief in 
God is irrational. Plantinga can now be seen as rejecting (3*) and 
(4). 
Despite Plantinga's disagreements with (3*) and (4), he does 
think (I) is true. He writes that "it seems plausible to hold that 
there are obligations and norms with respect to belief, and I do not 
intend to contest this assumption."'' Extrapolating from his later 
work, I assume he would no longer put forth this claim alone but 
instead make appropriate modifications in light of the demands of 
noetic excellence or nondefectiveness. 12 Thus, he would affirm 
(I*) There are obligations, standards of excellence, or (other) 
normative patterns to follow with respect to belief which, 
when followed, provide permissive justification for a be­
lief. 
The evidentialist thus would hold (I*), (2*), and (3*), and the evi­
dentialist objector would add (4). 
r I. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 3 I. 
12. Whether (2*) is something Plantinga believes is not clear. I presume he 
would not obviously disagree, but I suspect he would be hesitant to say that there 
is a class of beliefs whose members noetically demand discursive justification. 
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Two aspects of Plantinga's thought deserve special attention. 
First, his account of epistemic justification is an account of a nor­
mative notion of epistemic justification. 13 Although he does not 
spell out the details of the position, the notion of justification with 
which he is concerned is in the neighborhood of permissive justi­
fication, that is, what one is permitted to believe given that one has 
done as much as can be expected vis-a-vis the normative require­
ments for belief, whether those requirements are deontologically 
based or otherwise. Second, he disagrees not only with the eviden­
tialist objector but also with some of the claims of the evidentialist. 
Not only is there discursive evidence for belief in God, but even 
were there not, belief in 'God could nonetheless be justified. Al­
though Plantinga holds that discursive justification for belief in 
God can be given, it is not required for justification, at least in the 
sense of permissive, normative justification. The evidentialist is 
wrong; belief in God does not require discursive justification. 
We are not yet in a position to state Plantinga's version of the 
parity thesis. We do know that it involves a permissive, normative 
notion of justification (not unlike Alston's Jnw• in some respects) . It 
also includes some reference to the fact that theistic beliefs need not 
be nonbasic but can be properly basic. 
3. The Failure of Classical Foundationalism 
Plantinga argues in two ways against classical foundationalism. Let 
us call these the "incoherence argument" and the "widespread belief 
argument. "  First, the incoherence argument. Plantinga captures clas­
sical foundationalism's criteria for proper basicality in this way:14 
(5) A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and 
only if p is either self-evident to S, incorrigible for S, or 
evident to the senses for S. 
On the classical foundationalist's view, not only is the disjunction 
of the criteria sufficient for proper basicality, but it is necessary as 
well. Plantinga's concern is with the necessity of the criteria. 
13. He may hold other understandings of justification to be plausible as well. 
And he certainly holds that normative justification and epistemic warrant are not 
the same thing; see Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function," 
pp. 2-3· 
14. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 59. 
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According to classical foundationalism, says Plantinga, beliefs 
are either properly basic, properly nonbasic, or not justified. Plan­
tinga asks, of these alternatives, which is (5)? To be justified, (5) 
must be either properly basic or properly nonbasic. If it is properly 
basic it must be either self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the 
senses. It is none of these. It must, then, be properly nonbasic. To 
be properly nonbasic, (5) must be supported by a belief from the 
foundation. Is it thus supported? It is not easy to see how. In sum­
mary the challenge is this. If the statement of the criteria, that is, 
(5), cannot be anchored, as it were, by its own expressed criteria, 
how is it to be anchored? If it cannot be anchored on classical foun­
dationalism's own grounds, it is either noetically substandard or 
we ought not believe it. Classical foundationalism is self-referen­
tially incoherent. 
The widespread belief argument simply has it that, even were it 
coherent to believe (5), such an account of epistemic justification 
would make many of our beliefs unjustified. Plantinga has in mind 
beliefs about the past and other minds. These follow neither de­
ductively, inductively, nor on a probabilistic basis from the basic 
beliefs allowed by (5) . This shows that (5) is false or at least un­
justified, for surely many beliefs about other minds and the past are 
justified. Here Plantinga's parity thesis begins to emerge, for the 
development of a theory that allows us to hold that these wide­
spread beliefs are justified leads to a theory that allows belief in 
God to be justified on similar grounds. He concludes that, given 
these two arguments, classical foundationalism is in poor shape. It 
is not, according to Plantinga, a viable epistemic model for norma­
tive, permissive justification. 15 
4· Plantinga's Nonclassical, Normative 
Foundationalism 
The death of classical foundationalism does not signal the end of 
all foundational models of justification; Plantinga remains a foun­
dationalist .  Two further points are relevant in this regard. First, a 
beliefs being neither self-evident, incorrigible, nor evident to the 
15. I believe he would add that classical foundationalism is not a viable epi­
stemic model for many other kinds of justification as well, including that justifica­
tion ("warrant") needed for knowledge. 
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senses does not rule out its being properly basic. The rejection of 
the classical criteria does not leave the foundationalist with no­
where to turn. Having shown that the classical criteria do not pro­
vide necessary conditions for proper basicality does not entail the 
nonexistence of all criteria. Just as the critic of the verification prin­
ciple of meaningfulness does not, on showing the principle false, 
have to admit that there are no criteria for meaningfulness, Plan­
tioga does not have to admit that there are no criteria for proper 
basicality after rejecting the classical criteria. 
Second, on rejecting a particular set of criteria for proper ba­
sicality one need not have a replacement in order to recognize be­
liefs as properly basic. One need not know what the criteria are in 
order to recognize that some beliefs are properly basic. Also, one 
need not know the criteria to recognize that something is not prop­
erly basic. Again, just as the critic of the verification principle of 
meaningfulness can know that "T'was brillig and the slithy toves 
did gyre and gymble in the wabe" is not meaningful, the critic of 
the classical criteria can know that some belief is not properly ba­
sic, even though neither critic is able to replace the rejected criteria. 
One can remain a foundationalist without an explicit account of 
the criteria for foundational beliefs. 
What of the criteria, then? Are there criteria necessary and suffi­
cient for proper basicality? It is less than clear that there are, for 
Plantinga's suggested method for discovering the criteria leads to a 
much more open understanding of the role of criteria for proper 
basicality than that provided by classical models of foundational­
ism. He writes in this now oft-quoted passage that 
the proper way to arrive at such a criterion is, broadly speaking, 
inductive. We must assemble examples of beliefs and conditions such 
that the former are obviously properly basic in the latter . . . . We 
must then frame hypotheses as to the necessary and sufficient condi­
tions of proper basicality and test these hypotheses by references 
to those examples. Under the right conditions, for example, it is 
clearly rational to believe that you see a human person before you: a 
being who has thoughts and feelings, who knows and believes 
things, who makes decisions and acts. It is clear, furthermore, that 
you are under no obligation to reason to this belief from others you 
hold; under those conditions that belief is properly basic for you. 
But then (5) . . . must be mistaken; the belief in question, under 
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those circumstances, is properly basic, though neither self-evident 
nor incorrigible [nor evident to the senses] for you. Similarly, you 
may seem to remember that you had breakfast this morning, and 
perhaps you know of no reason to suppose your memory is playing 
you tricks. If so, you are entirely justified in taking that belief as 
basic. Of course it isn't properly basic on the criteria offered by 
classical . . . foundationalists; but that fact counts not against you 
but against those criteria. 
Accordingly, criteria for proper basicality must be reached from 
below rather than above; they should not be presented as ex Cathe­
dra, but argued to and tested by a relevant set of examples. But there 
is no reason to assume, in advance, that everyone will agree on the 
examples. The Christian will of course suppose that belief in God is 
entirely proper and rational; if he doesn't accept this belief on the 
basis of other propositions, he will conclude that it is basic for him 
and quite properly so. Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn 
Murray O'Hare may disagree, but how is that relevant? Must my 
criteria, or those of the Christian community, conform to their ex­
amples? Surely not. The Christian community is responsible to its 
set of examples, not to theirs. 16 
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Rather than arbitrarily legislate the criteria for proper basicality, we 
must inductively examine our noetic structures. On the basis of 
what we take to be properly basic, we must come to agreement on 
the criteria. If we disagree on which beliefs ought to be accepted as 
properly basic, our criteria are different. This suggests that proper 
basicality and its criteria are relative, in some way, person to per­
son or community to community. 
Plantinga continues by noting that criteria arrived at in the par­
ticularistic way he suggests may not be polemically useful. If we 
arrive at different criteria when using the inductive procedure, we 
may not be able to use those criteria to reject another's examples of 
properly basic beliefs. He wants to deny, however, that just any 
belief can be properly basic. He says that in fact properly basic 
beliefs stand in relation to the conditions in which they are formed, 
and this relationship provides justification for properly basic be­
liefs .  Properly basic beliefs are not, says Plantinga, groundless. 
16. Plantinga, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?" Nous 15 (1981): 41-51, quota­
tion p. so. 
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It is tempting to raise the following sort of question. If belief in 
God is properly basic, why cannot just any belief be properly basic? 
Could we not say the same for any bizarre aberration we can think 
of? What about voodoo or astrology? What about the belief that the 
Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween? Could I properly take that 
as basic? . . . If we say that belief in God is properly basic, will we 
not be committed to holding that just anything, or nearly anything, 
can properly be taken as basic, thus throwing wide the gates to irra­
tionalism and superstition? 
Certainly not. 17 
One thing is clear: Plantinga wishes to reject a certain kind of arbi­
trariness; he wants to reject an arbitrariness in which just any belief 
can be properly basic, an arbitrariness in which a Great Pumpkin 
belief is epistemically justified. 18 So, not just any belief can be taken 
as properly basic. A belief is properly basic only in certain circum­
stances-only when it is grounded. But which circumstances pro­
vide grounding? 
Plantinga does not provide a formal account of the relationship 
between beliefs and the conditions in which they are formed. He 
instead provides some hints. I focus on two points. First, if one has 
no reason to suspect that a belief is not justified, it is justified (or 
perhaps, if one has no reason to doubt one's epistemic practice, 
e. g. ,  one's memory, the beliefs it generates are justified) . Second, 
if one has done all that can be expected epistemically with regard 
to a belief, it is justified. Plantinga also provides the following ex­
amples. 19 He notes that the conditions in which the beliefs are 
formed may be much more complex than the examples suggest, 
but nonetheless "I see a tree" is properly basic if I am being appeared 
to treely, "that person is in pain" is properly basic when I am aware 
of that person displaying pain behavior, and "I had breakfast this 
morning" is properly basic if I seem to remember having breakfast 
this morning. Since these beliefs are not based on other beliefs, they 
are basic. They are not, however, arbitrary or groundless. 
I7. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 74· 
I 8. One is tempted to call this arbitrariness "relativism," but that term is surely 
a loaded one. To avoid much potential confusion, I continue in my use of the term 
"arbitrary" (and its cognates). 
I9. I refer to these as the "paradigms" of justified belief or as the "paradigms" of 
properly basic beliefs; see Chapter I, Section 2. 
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The circumstances vary the conditions in which a belief is prop­
erly basic, but if a belief is properly basic there is a true proposition 
of the sort:20 
( 6) In conditions C, S is justified in taking p as basic. 
Certain kinds of conditions thus ground certain kinds of belief as 
basic. The beliefs are justified by those conditions, although one 
does not hold the beliefs on the basis of some other belief. Such 
beliefs are nondiscursively justified or properly basic. 
Some clarifications are possible here. First, surely some features 
can be noted and agreed on which are necessarily shared by all 
properly basic beliefs. For example, p is a properly basic belief only 
if p is basic (not based on other beliefs) and proper (meets the con­
ditions for the proper basicality of p) . These purely formal cri­
teria-call them "formal" or "universal" criteria-are not, appar­
ently, of concern to Plantinga. 
A second level of criteria-call them "material" or "general" cri­
teria-can be distinguished. Self-evidence, being evident to the 
senses, and incorrigibility are examples. As Plantinga argues, these 
examples are neither severally nor jointly necessary for proper ba­
sicality. Any belief meeting one of these criteria, however, is prop­
erly basic. It may well be possible to complete the set so that a 
disjunction of these three criteria and some other criterion (or crite­
ria) forms a set necessary for proper basicality. Meeting any mem­
ber of the set (or combination of members of the set) would be 
sufficient for proper basicality, but at least one of the set must be 
met for a belief to be properly basic. This set, one might say, is the 
instantiation of the formal criterion of propriety. To be properly 
basic, a belief must meet at least one of the general criteria. 
Finally, a third level of criteria can be distinguished-call them 
"particular" criteria. My having the experience of what I take to be 
a blue patch is an example of a particular criterion. This may be a 
necessary condition of the proper basicality of the belief "I see a 
blue patch," although not for beliefs in general. Plantinga suggests 
that my being appeared to redly is necessary and sufficient for the 
proper basicality of the belief "I am appeared to redly. "21 These are 
20. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 79. 
21. See ibid. , p. 77· 
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the conditions in which "I am appeared to redly" is basic and prop­
erly so. The conditions do vary from belief to belief, and perhaps 
from moment to moment or person to person, but there nonethe­
less are conditions for each properly basic belief which confer on 
the belief the status of epistemic propriety. When one goes through 
the inductive procedure to discover the conditions in which one's 
basic beliefs are properly basic, it seems that the general criteria are 
discovered only by considering the particular criteria. The general 
criteria may then be inferred from whatever is shared in common 
by sets of particular criteria for proper basicality. Plantinga uses the 
term "criteria" to cover both what I have called material or general 
criteria and particular criteria. 22 
Thus Plantinga provides us with the outline of a nonclassical, 
normative foundationalism. There are beliefs, both basic and non­
basic. The former may be properly basic under certain conditions. 
The discovery of those conditions is up to the community (or indi­
vidual, as the case may be). The latter are, presumably, properly 
nonbasic when appropriately based on other properly basic beliefs 
or based on beliefs that are in turn based appropriately on properly 
basic beliefs and so forth. In all cases, the propriety or appropriate­
ness of the beliefs is a normative one. 
5· Proper Basicality, Theistic Beliefs, and the Parity 
Thesis 
Plantinga claims that with the collapse of classical foundation­
alism the door is open to the possibility of belief in God being 
properly basic. At least there is no reason to think that belief in 
God cannot be. In fact, Plantinga's own version of foundationalism 
is specifically designed to allow belief in God to be properly basic. 
But is belief in God truly properly basic? Those in the tradition of 
Reformed Christian theology answer affirmatively, says Plantinga, 
and he enthusiastically concurs. 23 He says little, however, about the 
conditions that ground or justify belief in God as basic. He argues 
that classical foundationalism is false but does not replace the crite­
ria he rejects with his own. He claims instead that even without 
22. I thank Bill Forgie for helpful discussion on these distinctions. 
23. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 73. 
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knowing the criteria for proper basicality one can know (in many 
cases) which beliefs are and are not properly basic. The conditions 
in which properly basic beliefs are provided grounding can thus be 
discovered inductively. From these conditions one can discover the 
criteria. Even though one does not know the conditions in which 
belief in God is properly basic, it may nevertheless be properly 
basic. The issue should not be decided without a close look at the 
beliefs of religious believers. 
Plantinga does suggest that belief in God is not groundless. He 
compares it to grounded perceptual beliefs ("I see a tree"), memory 
beliefs ("I remember eating breakfast this morning"), and beliefs 
that ascribe mental states to other humans ("That person is in 
pain"). These are the paradigm beliefs, as I suggested in Chapter I 
that we call them. Plantinga argues that, in a manner analogous to 
the grounding of these beliefs, "God exists" may be grounded. 
Following Calvin, Plantinga holds that we have a disposition to 
believe such things as "This flower was created by God" or "This 
vast and intricate universe was created by God. "24 On doing some­
thing wicked I may form the belief "God disapproves of what I 
have done." On reading the Bible one may feel compelled to be­
lieve "God is speaking to me. " These conditions ground the beliefs 
mentioned. Plantinga notes that none of these beliefs are, strictly 
speaking, the belief that God exists. But again, strictly speaking, 
what we are justified in believing is that "That person is in pain" 
rather than that "That person exists. "  We see no harm in ignoring 
the one step, immediate inference from the former to the latter, so 
it too is taken as properly basic. By analogy, there is no harm in 
saying that the belief that God exists is properly basic, even though 
there is a one step, immediate inference from the theistic claims 
mentioned above to the belief that God exists. This immediate in­
ference does not, presumably, provide anything more than a mini­
mally complex sort of discursive evidence. 
It is in this general context that Plantinga's parity thesis is most 
clearly seen. The thesis emerges when he compares theistic beliefs 
to paradigm beliefs, even though the comparison's role is not well 
spelled out. Clearly enough, however, the comparison of (or anal­
ogy between) the paradigm beliefs and theistic beliefs is no mere 
24. Ibid., p. So. 
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convenience. It is a major tenet of Plantinga's position. As a first 
account of Plantinga's parity thesis, let us say that, under appropri­
ate conditions, S's belief that p, where p is a belief about God, has 
the same nonclassical, normative justification as S's belief that p*, 
where p * is a paradigm belief. Of course, the paradigm beliefs 
should not be understood to be just the three examples mentioned, 
but any beliefs of like kind. So theistic beliefs have, according to 
Plantinga, at least the same kind of epistemic standing as many of 
our commonly accepted nontheistic beliefs, insofar as permissive, 
normative justification is concerned. 25 
But, as with Alston's parity thesis, one must distinguish between 
having the same kind of epistemic justification and having the 
same level or strength of that kind. With Alston, it is clear that Jnw 
is a weaker level of Jn than is Jn"' and so it is evident that his con­cern is with level and kind. Alston also tells us that he is aiming at 
the level of epistemic justification sufficient for "rational accep­
tance. " But with Plantinga the issue is not so clear. Perhaps, how­
ever, he means us to work with the notion of proper basicality 
understood as a kind of justification, namely, noninferential nor­
mative justification. It is natural then to suggest various levels 
within that kind. Thus we can say that the level of justification 
within the range of proper basicality is to be understood as the 
same for both theistic and paradigm beliefs .  But we need to con­
sider potential overriding conditions. For example, although there 
might be levels of strength of noninferential justification, they gen­
erally have to do with special circumstances, such as that the night 
is foggy rather than clear. The belief that there is a car ahead is 
properly basic when held on a clear night. The belief that there is a 
car ahead is also properly basic on a foggy night. But the former is 
more strongly justified than is the latter even though both are 
properly basic. (It might be two motorcycles, rather than a car. In 
either case, it is time to get off the road . )  In this way, then, there 
may be a range of strengths of justification within the category of 
proper basicality; as well, some overriders may remove justifica­
tion completely. To be clear about parity, we must allow for po­
tential overriding conditions .  Thus, given no special circum-
25. Plantinga also writes, at some length, about the defeasibility of properly 
basic beliefs, noting that the justification that accrues to them is prima facie only. 
This view meshes well with his normative account, as far as he has a developed 
account, of justification; see ibid. , pp. 83-85. 
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stances, theistic beliefs and paradigm belief can have the same level 
of justification-the strongest level-of the same kind of justifica­
tion-noninferential normative proper basicality. Thus, a more ac­
curate account of Plantinga's parity thesis is 
Parity ThesisPiantinga (PT pJ): Under appropriate condi­
tions, where no overriders are present, S's belief that p, 
where p is a belief about God, has the same nonclassical 
normative proper basicality (the strongest level) as S's be­
lief that p*, where p* is a paradigm belief. 
Thus PT PI is a broader claim than PT A• for it includes not only 
perceptual beliefs, but memory beliefs and beliefs about other 
minds as well. But both PT PI and PTA make claims not only about 
the kind but also about the level of epistemic justification. They 
differ, however, in that Alston's is a practice-based claim rather 
than a belief-based claim. 26 
Although Plantinga's discussion is broader than Alston's in that 
Plantinga's parity thesis makes reference to memory beliefs and to 
beliefs about other minds as well as to perceptual beliefs, it is easier 
in some contexts to discuss Plantinga's thesis if we narrow its 
scope. So consider a narrower version of PT p1: 
Parity Thesisi>Iantinga (PTpJ): Under appropriate condi­
tions, where no overriders are present, S's belief that p, 
where p is a belief about God, has at least the same non-
26. Plantinga's more recent claims, in "Justification and Theism," Faith and Phi­
losophy 4 (1987): 403-26, and "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function," 
point toward understanding positive epistemic status as the proper functioning of 
one's epistemic equipment. In Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper 
Function, he indicates his preference for the term "warrant" over "justification" for 
that thing, enough of which, together with true belief, is sufficient for knowledge. 
On that account, warrant is again a matter of proper functioning. The relationship 
between positive epistemic status as a necessary condition of knowledge and posi­
tive epistemic status as a condition of justification (in the normative sense being 
considered here) is not clear or, perhaps, even important. Plantinga indicated, in 
conversation, that his earlier work on Reformed epistemology asked the wrong 
questions, if one is interested in knowledge, but that perhaps there are some as yet 
uncovered relationships among knowledge, justification, and positive epistemic 
status. He does reject various accounts of normative notions of justification as 
necessary conditions of knowledge. It is thus difficult to know what to say about 
the relationship of normative, permissive justification and positive epistemic status. 
But then it is not clear that we need to have a position on the matter for the 
purposes here. I make some futher comments on this topic in Chapter 9. 
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classical normative proper basicality (the strongest level) 
as S's belief that p*, where p* is a perceptual belief. 
Since showing that the narrower thesis is false is sufficient for 
showing the broader thesis false, I concentrate mostly on the nar­
rower thesis. Hence, the majority of my discussion focuses on per­
ceptual beliefs in comparison with theistic beliefs. I return later to 
comment on memory beliefs and beliefs about other minds. 
We now have Plantinga's parity thesis before us. In the remain­
der of this chapter I present a challenge to it. 
6. The Universality Challenge Explained 
Plantinga's central goal is the defense of PT PI· Since paradigm 
beliefs can be properly basic, so can theistic beliefs. (For conve­
nience, I speak simply of proper basicality rather than the strongest 
level of proper basicality. )  I argue that PT PI or, more specifically, 
PTl>1 is incompatible with Plantinga's foundationalism, or at least 
with foundationalism as far as it relies on its traditional roots. 
Foundationalism's traditional roots are, I believe, largely eviden­
tialist concerns. Contrary to Plantinga's suggestion that evidential­
ism grows out of foundationalism, foundationalism seems more 
naturally understood to grow out of evidentialism, that is, to grow 
out of the desire of the evidentialist to avoid arbitrariness, where 
"arbitrariness" means, roughly, the claim that just any belief can be 
properly basic (or, more broadly, normatively, epistemically justi­
fied). If one is to avoid this arbitrariness, if one is to follow the 
spirit of the evidentialist, then one approach is to be a founda­
tionalist about justification. But I argue that PTpJ, and hence PT Ph 
is incompatible with Plantinga's foundationalist theory of justifica­
tion insofar as it rests in the desire to avoid arbitrariness. This is so, 
I argue, because of what I call the "universality challenge. " 
The universality challenge is this: given an experience shared by 
both theist and nontheist alike, nearly everyone will be led to form 
a shared nontheistic (perceptual paradigm) belief, whereas only the 
theist will be led to form a theistic belief. n So, whereas both theist 
and nontheist experience awe at the beauty of the universe, only 
27. This challenge is a more rigorous form of one presented in Richard Grigg, 
"Theism and Proper Basicality: A Response to Plantinga," International journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 14 (1983): 123-27. 
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the theist (and perhaps not even she in every instance) will form 
a belief about God's creativity. Or perhaps more telling (because 
avoiding potential problems with the aesthetic overtones of 
"awe"), when both theist and nontheist experience a tree, both will 
form the belief "I see a tree, " whereas only the theist will (some­
times) form the belief that God made the tree. 28 The challenger 
suggests that this universality of belief formation indicates the 
firmly grounded nature of the perceptual paradigm beliefs, and 
since the experience that generates the theistic belief does not pro­
vide universality, it does not provide sufficient grounds for proper 
basicality. 
The motivation behind this challenge is broadly egalitarian in 
spirit. The idea is that every fully rational human has certain belief­
forming practices for producing justified beliefs. A general account 
of these practices might be, roughly, that if some (cognitive) input 
I is taken in by some fully rational person S, then S will form a 
Uustified) belief p whose object is of kind K. For example, if Suzie 
takes in the sensory input of tree-shapedness, then she will form 
the justified belief that she sees a tree. The universality challenge 
has the background assumption that all fully rational beings have 
these practices and that, if one does have the practice, then one will 
form the corresponding beliefs .  As far as justified belief is con­
cerned, all belief formations must be universal in this sense, includ­
ing theistic belief formations. If one rejects this assumption, then 
the universality challenge is not relevant to the parity thesis. 
To flesh this assumption out somewhat, consider the following. 
Suppose two people are looking through their home for some ob­
ject, say, a particular copy of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. If both 
were to enter the den, look toward the lower left corner of the 
desk, epistemic equipment in full working order, and the copy of 
Kant's first critique were lying on the desk in that area, would they 
not both form the belief "there's the copy of Kant's Critique"? Not 
clearly, and for many possible reasons. Person S1 may be distracted 
28. To be exact, perhaps not everyone forms the belief "I see a tree." Perhaps 
one is not paying attention to one's experience or is distracted by the brilliance of 
the green color and so does not form any belief. Nevertheless, when asked what it 
is one is seeing, everyone, or nearly everyone with normal experiential equipment, 
will say "I see a tree." The theistic belief or description is not universal in this 
sense. To simplify the discussion, I assume this account but refer simply to the 
beliefs being formed. 
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by something else on the desk, or by his concern that he is making 
person S2 late for her class, having asked her to help him search. 
But if S2 picks up the book, holds it in front of S1 's eyes, and says, 
"here it is, " surely S1 will form the belief in question, or something 
very close to it, or at least a belief that entails it. The point of the 
egalitarian assumption is not that we form exactly the same beliefs 
when given the same input, but that we are capable of forming a 
belief about the kind of object providing the input, and, moreover, 
that rational people typically do so. And the more fully rational 
one is, the more likely one is to form beliefs that are in agreement 
with other fully rational people. As far as we are fully rational, all 
of us have the same doxastic tendencies. We all share, qua fully 
rational people, the same objectification scheme for generating 
justified beliefs. Finally, as far as one lacks these tendencies and 
schemes, the fully rational person ought to be able to obtain them. 
Another brief example. Suppose there is a glass of water in front 
of S1 and S2• S1 forms the belief that the glass is half full, S2 that it 
is half empty. There is a disagreement in the beliefs formed. But 
presumably both would agree that one half the glass's capacity 
contains water. It is the fully rational person's tendency to form 
beliefs about a certain kind of object, given a certain input, that is 
the egalitarian assumption's concern, not the details of what S1 or S2 
focuses on. If it is a glass of water in front of them, and they are 
concentrating on that rather than something else, they will form a 
belief about the glass of water. Background beliefs and attitudes 
may affect the details of the beliefs they generate, but the belief 
will be a belief about the glass and water. 
So, as the theist and nontheist stand in front of the majestic 
mountains, both will form a belief about the mountains. Why do 
they not both form beliefs about God's creative activity in the 
mountains? Should they not both have the capacity to do so? And 
if not, why not? 
What grounds can be produced for denying or affirming what I 
have been calling the "egalitarian assumption"? Kant assumed that 
all rational creatures share the same intuitions of space and time 
and the same categorical structures. Much like this, most epis­
temologists assume that human minds work alike. In particular, 
they assume that if we are all fully rational and all take in the same 
cognitive input we will all form beliefs of the same kind, barring 
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the typical epistemologist's standard special circumstances or dis­
torting conditions (poor lighting and the like). The best argument 
in the assumption's favor is that it seems to capture part of our 
broad notion of rationality. Two rational persons, in a frame of 
mind to concentrate on a given object, will, being rational, form a 
belief about that object. If one does not, then, barring special dis­
tractions or other excuses, one is rational and the other is not in 
this instance. To be rational is to belong to a community of be­
lievers who, given the full human capabilities, form similar beliefs 
given similar inputs. The assumption thus allows for the possibility 
of epistemological research; without the assumption, or some 
broader assumption that includes it, there would be no reason to 
think we can talk about human knowledge qua human. How could 
we talk about whether a belief is rational, or rationally produced, 
unless we assume that our cognitive practices deal with a given set 
of data in the same way, at least in terms of output? If you can 
excuse yourself from the requirements of rationality simply by say­
ing that you do not have the doxastic mechanism needed to form a 
given belief but yet still claim that you are fully rational, you can 
get away with epistemic murder. Perhaps this is reason enough to 
justify the assumption. Intuitively, at least, I am inclined to accept 
the assumption, and I do not see any reason to reject it. 
Some further explanatory notes on the universality challenge are 
in order. First, it is important to understand that the universality 
challenge does not depend on the theistic belief being generated by 
an experience only the theist has. That would not count against the 
proper basicality of the theistic belief any more than your not hav­
ing the experience of the tree would count against my properly 
basic belief that I see a tree, given my experience of the tree. Nei­
ther can the challenge find a response simply in the claim that not 
everyone objectifies experiences in theistic terms because one lacks 
the disposition to do so, lacks the conceptual scheme that allows 
one to do so, or, perhaps, simply lacks the ability to do so. The 
challenge assumes that fully rational people do have the same basic 
objectification schemes. One cannot lack the needed scheme qua 
rational being. A comparison of the universality challenge to two 
challenges suggested by Alston (see Chapter 2, Section 4) is helpful 
in understanding the former. Alston writes that PP and CP differ 
in that (1) the capacity for PP, and practice of it, is found univer-
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sally among normal adult human beings, and (2) all normal adult 
human beings, whatever their culture, use basically the same con­
ceptual scheme in objectifying their sense experience. Alston's re­
sponse to these objections is that, although those kinds of univer­
sality are interesting and comforting to us, they are not necessary 
for reliability. This is shown by the fact that not everyone engages 
in the practice of pure mathematics. But it is important to under­
stand why it is true that not everyone engages in pure mathemat­
ics. Here we must move beyond Alston's suggestions. 
Does the mathematically inclined student, for example, have 
some ability or means to objectify information in mathematical 
terms that other students do not have? I think not. Even where we 
speak of students not having mathematical ability, the students in 
question typically have some ability. The ability shows up in de­
grees. Although there are some who may not engage in the prac­
tice, this is not because of a total lack of ability. Rather, those who 
do not engage in the practice of pure mathematics, even at the 
lowest levels, fail to do so simply because they have no need of it, 
never thought about it, or have never been exposed to it. For those 
of different cultures who do not engage in the practice, perhaps 
their cultures have not developed the appropriate categories even 
though in principle nothing stops individuals from so doing. The 
slave boy in Plato's Meno is relevant here. At first he does not 
engage in the practice of geometric reasoning, but he quickly 
learns that he can. In short, two people one of whom engages in 
the practice and one of whom does not should be said to differ 
because the latter lacks the epistemic practice pragmatically al­
though not in principle. I suggest that this lack is the result of the 
fact that the one capable of engaging in the practice has the appro­
priate input whereas the other does not have that input. This latter 
case is comparable to people who have no theistic experience what­
soever and hence do not generate theistic beliefs. But how do we 
explain Plantinga's cases in which both theist and nontheist have 
the same experiential input but only one forms a theistic belief? 
It could be suggested that the difference is not in experience but 
in conceptual schemes. The theist has a theistic conceptual scheme, 
the nontheist does not-rather like the Meno's slave boy, who at 
first does not have certain geometrical concepts but later does. But 
surely the average atheist or agnostic has a noetic structure that 
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contains the concept of God, in spite of all its supposed difficulties. 
This raises all kinds of interesting and complex questions about the 
relationships between experience and the conceptual schemes used 
to understand or objectify them. Do experience and scheme arise 
together? Can one have an experience without a conceptual 
scheme? To what extent do conceptual schemes shape experience? 
But we need not answer these questions in detail to understand the 
thrust of the universality challenge. It is not that there are two 
experiences or that there are two different conceptual schemes 
working. The egalitarian assumption is that everyone, given the 
same input, will generate (roughly) the same belief, or at least a 
belief whose object is the same (kind of) thing. The challenge sug­
gests, that is, that there is a close connection between the input of 
an epistemic practice (the experience, in most cases) and the con­
ceptual scheme used to objectify that input. Whenever a person 
with normal epistemic practices takes in tree-shaped data, a tree 
belief is generated. Or, as with Alston's case, the notion of theistic 
objectification relies on an account of experience in which there is 
some sort of theistic content (as I argued in Chapter 2) . In the 
experiences to which the universality challenge calls attention, 
however, there is no theistic content per se. Rather, the emphasis is 
on the shared but nontheistic nature of the experience and the con­
ditions necessary to explain why the theist forms a theistic belief 
but the nontheist does not. Since the experience is nontheistic, 
it does not matter that the experiencer has a theistic conceptual 
scheme. No theistic scheme of objectification will generate a theis­
tic belief if there is no experience on which the scheme can work its 
magic. How then does the theist legitimately generate her theistic 
belief when the nontheist does not, given only a shared, nontheis­
tic experience? 
The assumption that the experiences are nontheistic in content 
may appear to be unfair to Plantinga, but I think not. First of all, 
many, if not most, of his examples appear to have the feature that 
the experience is one that both theist and nontheist could share­
looking at the flower, reading the Bible, feeling guilty. Second, an 
important result from the criticism of PTA applies to Plantinga if 
the experiences to which Plantinga calls attention are understood as 
having a theistic content not shared by the nontheist. Such exam­
ples fall prey to the background belief challenge. If the experiences 
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allow for noninferential justification, it is not of the conceptual­
reading but only of the noninferential mediated variety. Insofar as 
the experiences are taken to be direct experiences of God, there is 
nothing phenomenologically given in the experience that allows 
one to say truly, "this is phenomenologically an experience of 
God. " There must be background beliefs in the justification of the 
belief that one's experience is an experience of God. These back­
ground beliefs provide the mitigating circumstances that poten­
tially weaken the level of justification of the theistic belief, since 
these beliefs may themselves fail to have justification. Thus the an­
tecedent conditions set out in PT PI or PTJ,h namely, that there are 
no overriding conditions, may never be met. This in itself may 
remove the possibility that theistic and perceptual paradigm beliefs 
have the kind of parity suggested by PTJ,1. One does not use back­
ground beliefs to form the perceptual paradigm beliefs, but one 
does use them in the formation of beliefs about God. In the theistic 
cases, as in, perhaps, any case dealing with epistemically unique 
individuals, one may not have the strongest level of proper ba­
sicality, for such beliefs involve a special role for beliefs as opposed 
to concepts alone. 29 In defending PTJ,h Plantinga cannot retreat to 
unshared experiences with theistic content. Such experiences can­
not be direct, conceptual-reading experiences of God, since back­
ground beliefs are part of the epistemic conditions needed for justi­
fication. 
The universality challenge thus suggests that, when an exper­
ience is shared by a theist and a nontheist, both should form 
(roughly) the same beliefs, including theistic beliefs. If this does 
not occur, then that fact needs explaining. It is not sufficient to 
suggest that the theist has a practice by which she generates the 
theistic belief whereas the nontheist does not have the practice, for, 
by the egalitarian assumption, one should expect, given the same 
(cognitive) input, that theist and nontheist should both form the 
same belief. Of course, if the egalitarian assumption is false, then 
the universality challenge is irrelevant. But then some other story 
29. It will not do for Plantinga to make the content of the beliefs part of the 
conceptual scheme as in hyper-Kantian category analogues for the reasons Forgie 
rejects the hyper-Kantian understanding of mystical experiences (see Chapter 3 ,  
Section 3) .  To do so vitiates the presumption of  veridicality. 
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needs to be told about how to keep a restraint on the formation of 
any belief in any set of conditions and experiences whatsoever; ar­
bitrariness knocks at the door. The egalitarian assumption provides 
a kind of control over what can be legitimately taken as properly 
basic; it is a backdrop assumption needed for the avoidance of arbi­
trariness. 30 
I have presented Plantinga's pos1t1on on rationality and the 
proper basicality of beliefs about God. From this emerged his par­
ity thesis. The universality challenge to this version of the parity 
thesis suggests that Plantinga needs to explain why we do not all 
generate the same beliefs, given the same experience. There are 
several possibilities in this regard. In the next chapter I explain four 
of them. Of these, the first three are unlikely candidates for giving 
aid to Plantinga. The last, although a better candidate, leaves Plan­
tioga with results that are less than sanguine. 
30. There may, in fact, be other ways to provide the control needed, but the 
egalitarian assumption is a place to begin, even if ultimately not correct. Alston· has 
suggested to me, on several occasions, his own reluctance to admit that the egali­
tarian assumption is correct. 
[ 7 ] 
The Universality Challenge and 
the Resurrection of 
Evidentialism 
The universality challenge is this: since the experiences that gen­
erate theistic beliefs are shared by theist and nontheist alike, Plan­
tinga must explain why only theists generate theistic beliefs 
whereas (nearly) everyone generates the nontheistic, perceptual 
paradigm beliefs. I consider several possible responses to this chal­
lenge here. The first three of these fail to provide aid to Plantinga. 
In the last several sections I present and discuss a response which, 
although successful, leads to the resurrection of evidentialism and 
the evidentialist objection to theistic belief. 
I. A First Response to the Universality Challenge 
To respond successfully to the universality challenge one must 
provide an account of experience and belief formation such that 
both theist and nontheist can share the experience but which allows 
the theist alone to form a theistic belief that is properly basic. Is it 
enough to generate the challenge if there is a common core to the 
experience that both theist and nontheist share? Two "common 
core" cases can be suggested. Both theist and nontheist can admit, 
for example, that they are awed by the universe, that the flower is 
beautiful, or that the Bible is profound. But the theist can then 
either claim to interpret the experience differently from the non­
theist or claim to experience something more, a divine awe, a di-
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vine beauty, or a divine profundity. In either case, the experience 
leading the believers to different beliefs could be said to be shared 
only insofar as there is a common aspect or part of the experience. 
The first case does not help Plantinga, for although there is a com­
mon core of experience, there is an interpretation added to it. Pre­
sumably this is inferential and we are no longer considering a prop­
erly basic belief. In the second case-in which, for example, both 
theist and nontheist experience the common core of "awe at the 
universe" but the theist also experiences "the hand of God" 
alongside the common core-the aspect of the experience that is 
not common is the theistic part. But the theistic aspect of the expe­
rience, insofar as it is theistic and unshared, falls under the censure 
of challenges already discussed. Insofar as what is not common in 
the experiences constitutes an additional unshared experience, the 
universality challenge is not even applicable. At best the case falls 
under the background belief challenge to direct experiences of 
God, and at worst the case is irrelevant to Plantinga's goals. 
2. A Second Response to the Challenge 
A more promising line is suggested by the notion of superve­
nience. Two examples spell out the account. First, it is widely held 
that moral facts are supervenient on physical facts. W. D. Hudson 
provides an intuitive account of supervenience: "You would puzzle 
your hearers if you said that two things, A and B, are alike in 
every respect except that A is good and B is not; or if you said that 
two actions, C and D, were exactly the same except that C was 
right, or obligatory, and D was not. They would insist that there 
must be some other difference to account for this one. "' This 
"some other difference" is often taken to be a difference in physical 
fact. For instance, if two cases of a knife being raised above a child 
and then plunged into his flesh are not both to count as murder, 
there must be a physical difference in the two cases; perhaps one is 
done in the context of the operating room but the other is not. The 
difference may also be one of intention, so, for example, the per­
son raising the knife intends to murder the unfortunate recipient. 
I. W. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 
1970), pp. !64-65 . 
I :;:;: 
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According to this position there is no difficulty in claiming that 
moral beliefs are objectively true or false and epistemically justifia­
ble even though the moral facts making them true supervene on 
physical facts. Further, it is consistent with this position that there 
be two people, both of whom have exactly the same experience of 
the physical facts but one of whom does not form the same moral 
belief as the other. This second person, indeed, does not form any 
moral beliefs at all. Ethicists sometimes call such a person 
"amoral. " Here we have a case in which the experience of both 
persons is the same-they experience the same physical events or 
things-but in which one is led in quite a different direction in 
terms of belief. One requirement for a counterexample is met: the 
experience is the same. 
But there is a second requirement for a counterexample: the be­
liefs must not only be generated from the same experience but 
must also be properly basic. Are moral beliefs properly basic? It 
seems clear enough that moral beliefs are neither reducible to phys­
ical beliefs nor inferred from them. Yet they are typically treated as 
justified. Thus, it seems plausible enough that some moral beliefs 
are properly basic, and if so the second requirement for a counter­
example is met. 
But some may suggest that the claim that moral beliefs are prop­
erly basic is arguable, and perhaps a nonmoral example is best. 
John Rawls, in "Two Concepts of Rules, " writes: "Many of the 
actions one performs in a game of baseball one can do by oneself 
or with others whether there is the game or not. For example, one 
can throw a ball, run, or swing a peculiarly shaped piece of wood. 
But one can not steal base, or strike out, or draw a walk, or make an 
error, or balk; although one can do certain things which appear to 
resemble these actions such as sliding into a bag, missing a grounder 
and so on. Striking out, stealing a base, balking, etc. , are all actions 
which can only happen in a game. "2 There are new facts brought into 
existence by the practice of baseball. There would be no such thing as 
stealing second base were it not for the game of baseball. Baseball 
facts are supervenient on physical facts; stealing second base is super­
venient on a person running from one sandbag to another. 
2. John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," in Ethics, ed. Judith J. Thomson and 
Gerald Dworkin (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 128. 
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Now, suppose that I am ignorant of baseball and its rules but 
you are not. As we sit to watch the game, we both have the same 
experience of the physical facts. We both see some person running 
from one bag to another. You form the belief that the runner just 
stole second base; I do not. Furthermore, your belief that the run­
ner stole second base is quite plausibly properly basic. Here we 
have a counterexample that appears to meet both criteria for suc­
cess. The believers both share the same experience, but one is led 
to a belief that is properly basic and the other person is not. 
The supervenience account applies to the theistic case in this 
way. First, the theist and nontheist both have the same experi­
ence-being awed by the beauty of the universe. Second, the theis­
tic facts are supervenient on the physical (or aesthetic) facts. The 
theist is led to a theistic belief, the nontheist is not, just as the 
morally aware person and the person who knows baseball are led 
to moral and baseball beliefs, whereas the amoral person and the 
person ignorant of baseball are not led to moral or baseball beliefs. 
We have then allowed for the areligious (or atheistic) person, one 
who simply does not see the religious point of view, and the chal­
lenge appears to be met on its own grounds. There is a shared 
experience along with the generation of a nonuniversal but prop­
erly basic belief. 
So the universality challenge appears to be met. But we need to 
look more closely here. First of all, there probably is no separate 
epistemic "baseball practice. " Where beliefs about supervenient 
facts are generated, I suggest, the generation is because of the 
larger belief practices we all share. The difference appears to be that 
the non-baseball believer fails to have certain concepts the baseball 
believer has. Thus the supervenience cases seem to provide a prima 
facie counterexample to the egalitarian assumption lying behind 
the universality challenge. But I do not believe these cases provide 
true counterexamples. Apparently not everyone sharing the same 
experience will generate the same belief. As noted, some people 
grasp concepts that others do not. But this is not to say that their 
conceptual schemes are fundamentally different or, for that matter, 
that their belief-forming practices are fundamentally different. 
Surely we all have the ability to generate beliefs about supervenient 
facts. Nevertheless, we need to explain the nonuniversality of be­
lief formation about supervenient facts. I believe the best explana-
"II 
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tion is that not all people share the same concepts (although they do 
all share roughly the same conceptual scheme) . This failure to have 
certain concepts is a pragmatic failure, however, and thus, as in 
Alston's case of the practice of pure mathematics, it does not indi­
cate that we should be epistemically suspicious of the practice it­
self. 
Does this work for theistic belief formation? Can theistic beliefs 
be understood as beliefs about supervenient facts? One might sug­
gest that the non theist is epistemically deficient in just the way the 
non-baseball believer is: she lacks theistic concepts. The problem 
here is that many nontheists apparently have the requisite theistic 
concepts. How one is to explain the lack of theistic belief genera­
tion in their case is difficult. These observations suggest that we 
need to look elsewhere to explain the nonuniversality of theistic 
belief formation. 
Furthermore, even if the supervenience cases do meet the uni­
versality challenge, for the theist the supervenience approach qua 
supervenience is an unwise direction in which to seek solace. The 
problem arising with understanding theistic facts to be superve­
nient on natural facts is one of ontology. According to the gener­
ally accepted account of supervenience, (significant) change in the 
physical facts leads to change in the supervenient facts. And if there 
is a change in the supervenient facts, there must be a corresponding 
change in the physical facts. As far, then, as the ontology of the 
matter goes, the supervenient facts are inextricably related to the 
physical facts. In the supervenience account of moral facts, for ex­
ample, the moral state of affairs, although not reducible to the 
physical state of affairs, would have no ontological status without 
the physical state of affairs. And a stealing of second base would 
never occur if no one ran around a diamond-shaped field touching 
sandbags . 
So it would be in the religious case. If the experience shared by 
the theist and nontheist were of the same natural facts, and the 
theistic facts supervened on those natural facts, then the theistic 
facts would be inextricably bound up with the natural facts. But in 
the commonly accepted picture of theism, God is ontologically in­
dependent of the physical world. That facts about God are super­
venient on physical facts presents us with an ontologically inferior 
God, an unhappy state of affairs for the Christian theist and hence 
I 'Ill: 
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tion is that not all people share the same concepts (although they do 
all share roughly the same conceptual scheme). This failure to have 
certain concepts is a pragmatic failure, however, and thus, as in 
Alston's case of the practice of pure mathematics, it does not indi­
cate that we should be epistemically suspicious of the practice it­
self. 
Does this work for theistic belief formation? Can theistic beliefs 
be understood as beliefs about supervenient facts? One might sug­
gest that the nontheist is epistemically deficient in just the way the 
non-baseball believer is: she lacks theistic concepts. The problem 
here is that many nontheists apparently have the requisite theistic 
concepts. How one is to explain the lack of theistic belief genera­
tion in their case is difficult. These observations suggest that we 
need to look elsewhere to explain the nonuniversality of theistic 
belief formation. 
Furthermore, even if the supervenience cases do meet the uni­
versality challenge, for the theist the supervenience approach qua 
supervenience is an unwise direction in which to seek solace. The 
problem arising with understanding theistic facts to be superve­
nient on natural facts is one of ontology. According to the gener­
ally accepted account of supervenience, (significant) change in the 
physical facts leads to change in the supervenient facts. And if there 
is a change in the supervenient facts, there must be a corresponding 
change in the physical facts. As far, then, as the ontology of the 
matter goes, the supervenient facts are inextricably related to the 
physical facts. In the supervenience account of moral facts, for ex­
ample, the moral state of affairs, although not reducible to the 
physical state of affairs, would have no ontological status without 
the physical state of affairs. And a stealing of second base would 
never occur if no one ran around a diamond-shaped field touching 
sandbags. 
So it would be in the religious case. If the experience shared by 
the theist and nontheist were of the same natural facts, and the 
theistic facts supervened on those natural facts, then the theistic 
facts would be inextricably bound up with the natural facts. But in 
the commonly accepted picture of theism, God is ontologically in­
dependent of the physical world. That facts about God are super­
venient on physical facts presents us with an ontologically inferior 
God, an unhappy state of affairs for the Christian theist and hence 
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for Plantinga. At best this account allows a type of pantheistic God 
whose ontological status is not independent of the physical uni­
verse. 
Thus, although there may be counterexamples to the underlying 
claims of the universality challenge (and even this I am not willing 
to admit), they are not of a variety that rescues Plantinga's parity 
thesis from the grip of the challenge. To make this point explicit 
one need only consider the following modification of the chal­
lenge. Instead of "all properly basic beliefs are universal" being the 
central claim of the challenge, it can be replaced by "all properly 
basic beliefs about nonsupervenient facts are universal. "  Since 
theistic beliefs are not about supervenient facts, they must be uni­
versally formed. The challenge is not yet met. One must show 
how theistic beliefs can be nonuniversal and yet properly basic. 3 
3. A Third Response to the Challenge 
A final possible but unsuccessful response to the challenge relies 
on the notion of a gestalt shift. Two analogies to the theistic case 
bring out this possibility. 4 First, suppose I have a defect in my eyes 
so that I see only the dots on a surface covered with red and white 
dots. You, and everyone else without this peculiar defect, see a 
pink surface. Your experience, then, is infused with pinkness. 
There is a gestalt shift that I simply do not make. Thus we both see 
3· Hidden in these comments may be the beginning of a way to avoid certain 
difficulties with the egalitarian assumption. Perhaps the practices surrounding su­
pervenient beliefs are not universal, as the egalitarian assumption suggests, and 
perhaps this is because of background beliefs. There are, in fact, many cases each 
day of perceivers having the same experience but not generating the same beliefs. 
Perhaps some of these happen because of supervenience conditions that involve 
background beliefs, and perhaps others are not supervenience cases but still involve 
background beliefs-like the Tim and Tom Tibbetts case of identifying twins. But 
recall that the universality challenge, supported by the egalitarian assumption, is 
concerned with beliefs formed in an immediate way-unlike the Tim and Tom 
Tibbetts case. If there is a way background beliefs can play a noninferential role in 
belief formation, perhaps a reply to the universality challenge can be developed. I 
explore issues related to these suggestions in the following chapter. 
4· I have Francis W. Dauer to thank for these examples. He was also helpful in 
my thinking about the issue of supervenience. The suggestion that a supervenience 
understanding of religious experience provides only for an ontologically inferior 
God is his. 
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something different and form different beliefs. Can we both be 
said to experience the same thing? 
Two suggestions are available. On the one hand, one might ar­
gue that there is a common core to our experience-the white and 
red dots. In fact, if you pay very close attention to the surface, you 
too see the red and white dots. Nevertheless, it seems that the ex­
periences that generate the corresponding beliefs are phenome­
nologically quite different. You will not generate the pink surface 
belief unless you have the phenomenological experience of pink­
ness. And unless you make a special effort, your experience is one 
of being appeared to pinkly whereas mine is one of being appeared 
to dottedly. Our experiences are thus quite different. On the other 
hand, suppose your experience is so infused with pinkness that you 
simply cannot see the dots no matter how close you get to the 
surface. In this case, we do not at all share the same experience. In 
either case, the analogy does not suffice to reply to the universality 
challenge. 
Second, suppose you and I are at the symphony. You hear only 
a succession of musical notes played by the orchestra whereas I 
hear a melancholy melody. It is implausible that we both have the 
same core of experience but that I experience something more. 
Our experiences are the same: we both seem to hear the musical 
notes. Yet our beliefs are quite different. Further, I do not hear the 
melancholiness of the music above and beyond the musical notes 
or form the belief about the melancholy melody by inference. 
There are two ways of understanding this example, neither of 
which provides much ammunition against the universality chal­
lenge. First, the melancholy melody may be understood as a qual­
ity or feature that supervenes on the pattern of musical notes. This 
interpretation does not provide an alternative to the conclusion 
reached about supervenience earlier. Second, the experience I have 
of the melody may be explained by a type of gestalt shift, as in the 
former case in which one sees pink where there are, in fact, only 
red and white dots. Thus, just as in the former case in which you 
are appeared to pinkly, in this case I am appeared to in a melan­
choly-like manner. This understanding of the case challenges the 
claim that our experiences are the same, putting it on no better 
footing than the pink-surface case in which the perceivers have two 
different experiences. 
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Of the two interpretations, the second seems the weaker, for 
there appears to be a difference between the dot case and the mel­
ody case. In the red and white dot case, the belief that one sees a 
pink surface is tied to the phenomenological content of being ap­
peared to pinkly. To see the surface as covered with red and white 
dots, one presumably must "shake off'' the apparently pink phe­
nomenological experience. One must replace, so to speak, one ex­
periential content with another. But in the melody case I do not 
have to shake off the apparent melancholiness in order to hear the 
musical notes. Somehow the melancholiness rests in the musical 
notes, and I hear both, which is not to say that there is no phe­
nomenological difference between hearing the music as melancholy 
and not. 
The argument here does not, fortunately, rest on our making a 
choice between the alternative interpretations. Whether one takes 
the supervenience interpretation or the gestalt interpretation, the 
example does not help Plantinga reply to the universality chal­
lenge. He must turn elsewhere. 
4· Exaggerated Alstonian Epistemic Practice 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Alston suggests that one way to avoid 
the difficulties with the bifurcation of belief formation into experi­
ence and explanation is to understand belief formation in terms of 
what he calls objectification. He uses the term "objectify" to stand 
for "taking a certain kind of experience as an experience of some­
thing of a certain sort. " In the physical object case, we take percep­
tual experiences as experiences of physical objects (rather than psy­
chological data) . He suggests, then, that just as we form physical 
object beliefs directly on the basis of perception, so we form theis­
tic beliefs directly on the basis of theistic experience. 
Recall the suggestion that the "certain range of experience" ob­
jectified by CP must have, on Alston's own grounds, a theistic 
content not, presumably, experienced by the nontheist. As in the 
case of PP, in which there appears to be a link between how the 
experiencer would describe the experience and the belief generated 
by it-a lingo-conceptual link-so it is with CP. It is here that PTA 
falls prey to the background belief challenge that relies on the dis­
tinction between conceptual reading and noninferential mediated 
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beliefs, for the latter seem more weakly justified than the former. 
For a theistic belief to be formed, given Alston's account of direct 
experiences of God, the generation of the belief must rely on back­
ground beliefs as opposed to a mere conceptual scheme. 
In Plantinga's case, however, I suggest an even stronger reliance 
on background beliefs, for with his generation of theistic beliefs the 
experience and the belief generated through it are not linked in the 
lingo-conceptual manner suggested with regard to Alston's posi­
tion. Hence, there is nothing in the experience alone that even 
hints at a theistic belief. The theistic content of the generated belief 
appears to derive solely from the background beliefs. I suggest, in 
other words, that Plantinga could not simply adopt Alston's ac­
count of CP but could use only a modified, exaggerated version. 
This, in turn, brings the necessity of justification for the back­
ground beliefs into clear focus. 
It is possible that the theist's objectification of certain experiences 
in theistic terms does not rely on a lingo-conceptual link or a re­
lated underlying theistic experience as suggested by Alston's ac­
count. Although objectification of an experience in physical con­
cepts perhaps must rely on an experience that is describable in 
physical object language, in the exaggerated practice I am suggest­
ing, objectification of an experience in theistic concepts does not 
demand the possibility of a description of the experience in theistic 
object language. Rather, background beliefs may allow the theist 
to objectify any perceptual (or aesthetic or moral, etc.) experience 
into theistic language and beliefs. The reason some do not objectify 
their experiences in this way is just that not everyone shares the 
same set of background beliefs. 5 We all objectify perceptual beliefs 
in terms of physical object language because we all share the physi­
cal object conceptual scheme. We do not all share the theistic back­
ground beliefs. 6 
5. Here I call attention to the fact that the objectification must be noninferen­
tial. If it were otherwise, the resulting belief would not be basic and the case would 
not be significantly different from an interpretive common core type of experience 
and belief formation suggested in Section 3. 
6. Someone might raise an egalitarian-assumption question about this whole 
idea. This exaggerated CP does not solve the universality challenge, the critic 
might say, since it does not meet the egalitarian assumption driving the univer­
sality challenge. The reply to this suggestion is that the egalitarian assumption­
that everyone has (roughly) the same epistemic practices and hence given the same 
input will generate the same beliefs-does not come into play here. It associates a 
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Consider the following examples analogous to this kind of theis­
tic objectification. Suppose .Letitia recently married and one after­
noon on coming home finds her spouse, Jack, away. He left sev­
eral clues as to his whereabouts. She discovers that his truck is still 
in the laneway, but his bush boots are missing. Further, she notes 
that Jack's favorite foods are missing from the pantry. Finally, Let­
itia finds a note in Jack's handwriting stating that he has gone to 
the bush. Letitia makes the inference and forms the belief that Jack 
has gone to the bush. All kinds of beliefs come into play, and she 
reasons to the conclusion that Jack has gone to the bush. Here the 
belief is clearly not basic, it is inferred. Suppose, after a lengthy 
marriage, however, that Letitia comes to know Jack very well. As 
she comes in the door, Letitia notices Jack's bush boots missing 
from the normal spot. She immediately forms the belief that Jack 
has gone to the bush. In these circumstances the belief depends on 
a complex set of (background) beliefs about Letitia's husband-he 
acts in thus and so ways, for example, he only uses his bush boots 
for trips to the bush-but Letitia does not reason to it. Such a 
belief formation seems more than plausible; in fact, we form beliefs 
in like manner many times each day. When we are very familiar 
with circumstances and hold the relevant background beliefs, we 
do not reason to the belief we form; we form it immediately. Fur­
thermore, there appears to be no lingo-conceptual link, or at least 
the same kind of link, between the experience of the boots being 
missing and the belief that Jack has gone to the bush. 7 The belief 
certain kind of content, say, physical object content, with a certain kind of belie£ 
In the case of PP, for example, physical object experiential content generates, via 
the physical object conceptual scheme, physical object beliefs. The egalitarian as­
sumption does not just claim that everyone forms the same beliefs given the same 
input, but also that everyone has roughly the same practices and conceptual 
schemes available to them. Presumably the same (kind of) practice is available to 
everyone, as the examples that follow in the text indicate, but the practice is so 
widely variant in its application that just about any experience can generate just 
about any belie£ The difference between the beliefs one person forms as opposed 
to another are not because of a different practice or different concepts but because 
the application of the practice depends on one's background beliefs (and not merely 
a conceptual scheme). 
7. I say there is not a lingo-conceptual link, but there may be some kind of link 
between the experience of the missing boots and the belief that Jack has gone to the 
bush. There may be a link as well between experiencing a beautiful flower and the 
belief that God created it. But in neither case is it the same kind of link as that 
between "I see a tree" and "being appeared to treely." When I believe "I see a 
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formed is not about the boots' being missing but about Jack. Nev­
ertheless, such a belief is basic, since Letitia does not infer it. 
That this example would be acceptable to Plantinga can be de­
fended in the following manner. Plantinga writes that "a belief can 
easily change status from nonbasic to basic and vice versa. "8 His 
example is that I may now believe that 21 X 21 = 441 on the basis 
of calculation but later I merely remember it. It is at first nonbasic 
but later basic. He also claims that self-evidence is relative to per­
sons, and thus that what is self-evident to you may not be to me. It 
can therefore be suggested that what is at first nonbasic because not 
self-evident may later become basic because it becomes self-evi­
dent. For example, I may come to believe that 256 + 327 = 583 
only by calculating it, but later, if I am particularly talented at 
arithmetic, I may just "see" that 256 + 327 = 583. It is not that I 
merely remember that 256 + 327 = 583. Rather, I have become so 
adept with arithmetic that I know that 256 + 327 = 583 much like 
I know that 2 + 3 = 5· What is self-evident to the learned is not 
necessarily self-evident to the unlearned. We form all types of be­
liefs without reasoning to them, and, although it might be argued 
that we reason subconsciously that 256 + 327 = 583 or that my 
husband has gone hiking, this seems to be little more than an ad 
hoc defense. So, for Plantinga, a beliefs being basic for a person 
seems to come to little more than the fact that the person has not 
inferred it; it is a psychological fact about that person. If it is in­
ferred, it is nonbasic; if not, then basic. 
Furthermore, it appears that a belief formed in the context of 
other background beliefs can be basic even when that belief was 
once inferred from the background beliefs. Plantinga says simply 
that for a belief to be basic one must not hold it because one in­
ferred it by discursive reasoning; that is, one must not hold it on 
the basis of other beliefs, one must not consciously infer it from 
those beliefs. In the case of the wandering spouse and the bush 
boots imagined above, Letitia does not believe on the basis of evi-
tree," I also admit, when questioned, the truth of "I am being appeared to treely"; 
but Letitia need not admit the truth of "I am being appeared to missing-bootedly" 
whenever she has the belief "Jack has gone to the bush. " Neither is it the case that I 
always admit to the truth of "I am appeared to beautiful-flowerly" when I believe 
"God created the flower. " 
8. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 50. 
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dence that her husband has gone hiking, if what is meant by evi­
dence is that she inferred from some of her other beliefs that Jack 
went hiking. Letitia did not infer anything at all. It is simply a 
matter of fact that some beliefs require, for their formation, a com­
plicated set of background beliefs, and yet beliefs formed against 
that complicated background can be basic. She merely objectifies 
her experience in terms of Jack's having gone hiking. 
In cases such as Letitia's, not everyone who has the same experi­
ences will form the same beliefs. I may experience the spot where 
the bush boots should be as empty and not form any belief at all 
about Jack. What we have here is a noninferential mediated epi­
stemic practice with a twist. The beliefs in question are generated 
in the context of experiences and sets of background beliefs in 
which the burden of the work is on the background beliefs. By 
breaking the lingo-conceptual link between the experience and the 
generated belief I have, in effect, moved the role of the experience 
away from a justificatory toward a genetic position. The experi­
ences are much more the occasion for the belief generations, and 
their content is less important epistemically. 9 
How do these suggestions and examples help with the univer­
sality challenge to PTJ,1? First, the suggestion allows the theist to 
have exactly the same experience as the nontheist. We both experi­
ence the same flower and the same beauty (and in a parallel fashion 
the same lack of bush boots). Second, it begins to explain, al­
though admittedly in an extremely cursory fashion, how the theis­
tic belief comes to be held. It is not inferred and hence it is basic. 10 I 
do not infer from the flower's beauty that God created it anymore 
than Letitia infers from the missing bush boots that Jack has gone 
to the bush. The experience initiates a complex, noninferential be­
lief-forming process that leaves me with the belief, an objectifica­
tion of the experience in theistic language. Third, the experience 
need not lead to the same belief for everyone. Both of us may see 
9. Perhaps this could be understood as a kind of holistic justification rather 
than a foundational one, or at least a justification with a strong holist component. I 
return to this suggestion in the final three chapters. 
IO. Here one should compare note 9 and the account Plantinga gives of co­
herentism in "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God," p. 
125, in which he argues that coherentism is really a kind of foundationalism where 
all justified beliefs are foundational. 
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the beautiful flower but only one of us be led to believe that God 
created it, just as we may both experience the lack of bush boots 
but only one of us be led to the belief that Jack has gone to the 
bush. It seems, then, that there is a least one possible solution to 
the universality challenge. 
s. Evidentialism and the Intuitive Results 
Although the exaggerated Alstonian response appears to supply 
the features needed for a reply to the universality challenge, the 
response is not without its difficulties. These have to do with the 
thrust behind evidentialism, and thus a brief review of evidential­
ism's tenets may be helpful. 
Evidentialism, recall, is the view that claims the following: 
(1*) There are obligations, standards of excellence, or (other) 
normative patterns to follow with respect to belief that, 
when followed, provide permissive justification for belief. 
(2*) It is either intellectually wrong or intellectually defective 
for anyone to believe, on insufficient evidence, any belief 
requiring discursive justification. 
(3*) Since belief in God requires discursive justification, it is 
irrational, unreasonable, or unjustified to accept theistic 
belief in the absence of sufficient evidence or reasons. 
The evidentialist objector holds (1*), (2*), and (3*) along with this 
denial: 
(4) We have no evidence, or at any rate not sufficient evi­
dence, for the proposition that God exists. 
Plantinga, recall, rejects not only (4) but (3*) as well. 
One central motivation behind the evidentialist understanding of 
justification is the desire to avoid arbitrariness in what should be 
taken as justified. Not just any belief should be taken as justified; 
there must be some good reason or ground. Plantinga himself fol­
lows this general spirit when he rejects the Great Pumpkin objec­
tion as not applying to his theory. But the evidentialist objector 
goes one step beyond merely requiring grounds and requires dis-
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cursive grounds for belief in God. Since it has no discursive 
grounds, the objector says, belief in God is arbitrary and hence not 
justified. Plantinga denies that it must have discursive grounding. 
According to Plantinga, foundationalism is the theoretical sup­
port for evidentialism. The historical motivation behind the foun­
dationalist account of justification is the search for some means of 
tying our beliefs to the independently existing world. The motiva­
tion is a drive toward a guarantee of truth, the avoidance of arbi­
trariness. But more recent foundational accounts, Plantinga's in­
cluded, are not quite so bold. They do not seek such a guarantee. 
Nevertheless, the closer the foundational beliefs are to providing 
the link to the independent world, the more likely it is that the 
belief system built on those foundations is not arbitrary. We can 
sum up the thrust of the foundationalist/evidentialist platform with 
the claim that both attempt to avoid arbitrariness with respect to 
justified belief. Insofar as Plantinga strives to remain a founda­
tionalist, we can understand his goal to be to escape the arbitrari­
ness evidentialism seeks to avoid. 1 1  
But the spirit of the evidentialist seems to haunt the halls of the 
foundationalist mansion Plantinga builds for us. Doing away with 
classical foundationalism is not sufficient to do away with eviden­
tialism, or at least its central thrust. If the reply to the universality 
challenge provided in the earlier parts of this chapter is a represen­
tative account of how Plantinga must reply to the challenge, the 
evidentialist is surely going to press the arbitrariness charge against 
Plantinga's position. Three problems immediately come to mind. 
First, the account allows virtually any experience to be objec­
tified into theistic language and belief, since there is no mandatory 
lingo-conceptual link between the experience or its content and the 
belief formed. An experience of any event, object, or person po­
tentially leads to a theistic belief. Now, Plantinga himself denies 
that just any belief can be legitimately taken as properly basic. 
Properly basic beliefs are formed in certain kinds of difficult-to­
specify but nonarbitrary conditions. But he fails to spell out these 
conditions, and the pressure brought to bear against the parity 
thesis by the universality challenge questions the likelihood that 
1 r. Plantinga does admit to a kind of polemical relativism but does not seem to 
take this result to be of great importance. 
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Plantinga can spell out any conditions that rule out arbitrary beliefs. 
His claim that not just any belief can be legitimately formed seems 
somewhat idle. 
Second, the background beliefs that allow the objectification of 
any experience into theistic language and belief are extremely indi­
vidualized. Consider the following analogous case. Suppose some 
person, Norm, is not at all attentive to the amount of milk left in 
the refrigerator. Frequently his wife asks him to bring milk home, 
but he, being distracted by another hundred details in his life, fails 
almost as frequently to bring milk home. After being chastised 
many times for his failings, Norm begins to connect the experience 
of driving past Mike's Milk Store, and seeing the sculpted plastic 
milk jug in the front, to the belief that he should bring milk home. 
At first Norm has to use his seeing the sculpted plastic milk jug 
as a cue to his memory, not as to whether he was asked to bring 
milk home but rather to what belief his seeing the jug is to be 
connected to. He must, therefore, reason along the following lines: 
"That jug is supposed to remind me of something. What is it? Oh, 
yes. It's a milk jug. Why a milk jug? Probably has to do with milk. 
Oh, yes. I remember. I should bring milk home. " But after a while 
Norm does not reason this way. He simply sees the sculpted milk 
jug and forms the belief "I should bring milk home. " Here it is not 
Norm's memory at work but rather an idiosyncratic belief-form­
ing mechanism. 
Whatever goes on in Norm's mind, it seems so conditioned by 
his unique background and experience that a criticism of the justi­
fication of the belief may be impossible by someone who does not 
have the same background or experience. It might just as well have 
been an experience of a telephone or automobile that triggered the 
belief that Norm should bring milk home. The lack of common­
ality among background beliefs suggests a minimal likelihood of 
common ground for an evaluation of the justification of the belief. 
In other words, the general drift of the exaggerated Alstonian ac­
count suggests that such an individualized picture of the ground of 
belief formation makes it highly unlikely that we can ever agree on 
a set of criteria for justification. Plantinga admits that there may be 
no generally shared set of criteria when he suggests an inductive 
procedure to discover it. He even suggests that the criteria will not 
be polemically useful in coming to agreement on the grounds for 
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justification, at least across theistic-nontheistic lines. But this ad­
mission seems only to indicate the need for wariness. If Plantinga's 
only defense against the universality challenge is the exaggerated 
Alstonian defense, then extreme caution is suggested, for on that 
account even if there is a community to which one can appeal for 
shared examples of proper basicality (in the sense, say, of a Chris­
tian community) there is no guarantee that everyone in that com­
munity uses the same or even similar sets of background belief in 
their generation of theistic beliefs. This may be a more radical re­
sult than one with which Plantinga is willing to live. 
Finally, the plausibility that the belief "Jack has gone to the 
bush" is properly basic seems to derive from the fact that Letitia 
once reasoned to the belief. When she does not reason to it, what 
justifies it? Is there some experience that provides justification? 
One is tempted to suggest, following the spirit of the evidentialist, 
that if her belief is ever to be justified it must, at least somewhere 
back in her personal epistemic history, have been inferred. If this is 
so, the notion of a belief being basic may come to no more than an 
account of one's own psychology, and we can discover the ba­
sicality of beliefs merely by conducting an empirical survey. "Did 
you infer the belief consciously on this occasion?" "No. " "Then it 
is basic. " But thus far this has nothing to do with the propriety of 
the belief. On what grounds is a belief such as "Jack has gone to 
the bush" taken to be proper? Without some discursive grounds, it 
seems quite likely that it is not proper. So far, the account given 
only provides us basicality but not propriety. 
The exaggerated Alstonian view suggests that the background 
beliefs enable the objectification of experience into belief. Thus 
these beliefs are important. Following through with the example, 
it is natural to suggest that the role these beliefs play is something 
like this. What justifies the belief "Jack has gone to the bush" is 
that if Letitia's background beliefs were transcribed into discursive 
form they would provide reasons for her belief or, when taken 
together, they would provide an argument for the belief. If this is 
true, whence derives the propriety of properly basic beliefs? As 
suggested earlier, it appears that we can cash out being basic sim­
ply in terms of not being consciously inferred. Thus, basic beliefs 
may be beliefs held without discursive evidence but which must 
have been discursively held in the past. If what really provides 
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epistemic justification is the background beliefs or some relation­
ship between the supposed basic beliefs and the background be­
liefs, the evidentialist ghost begins to appear. 
These issues raise the suspicion that Plantinga's theory commits 
him to a type of arbitrariness insofar as he wishes to retain the 
parity thesis. But suspicions are only suspicions. We now need a 
more rigorous account of the problems; we need an explicit state­
ment of the revitalized evidentialist challenge. 
6. The Resurrection of Evidentialism 
The intuitive charge against the exaggerated Alstonian apparatus 
is that it results (theoretically) in any belief counting as properly 
basic. There is, in short, a kind of arbitrariness that results from 
Plantinga's theory. The only way Plantinga can protect his position 
against the charge of arbitrariness is to return to an evidentialist 
approach to theistic beliefs. 12 But to do so is to give up the parity 
thesis, for perceptual paradigm beliefs are then possibly properly 
basic, not needing background beliefs, whereas theistic beliefs are 
not. 
For the sake of argument, let us assume that there is a way a 
noninferred belief is justified for a person when she has appropriate 
background beliefs as in exaggerated Alstonian objectification. In­
sofar as Plantinga must use the objectification approach to avoid 
the universality problem, he must appeal to certain background 
beliefs. What is the status of these beliefs? First, it is clear that they 
have theistic content. It is hard to see how background beliefs that 
make no reference to God at all can be used to objectify theistically 
neutral experiences into theistic beliefs. For ease of discussion, let 
us call these background beliefs "theistic* beliefs. " Theistic* beliefs 
are the background beliefs needed to objectify an experience into 
theistic belief, and they are fairly high-level beliefs in terms of their 
theistic content. Second, theistic* beliefs stand in need of justifica­
tion. 13 Consider the following. Suppose I arbitrarily believe (with­
out justification) that there is a Great Pumpkin; I develop Great 
12. Or, as a secondary response, to retreat to a kind of holist justification for 
theistic beliefs; see Chapters Io-12. 
1 3. I do not mean that I have to justify them but rather that I am justified in 
them. 
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Pumpkin* beliefs. Suppose further that I then begin to objectify 
my everyday experiences in terms of Great Pumpkin beliefs. If I 
have no justification for these background beliefs, surely my objec­
tifications (although perhaps basic) are unjustified. So it is with 
theistic* beliefs. These background beliefs must be justified if the 
objectifications resulting from them are to result in properly basic 
beliefs. The central issue is, then, how theistic* beliefs are justified. 
I present several options here briefly, then return to them below. 
Theistic* beliefs could be properly nonbasic, that is, they could 
result from an inferential procedure. This option is not attractive to 
the Reformed epistemologist; if one needs natural theology (or 
some other inferential means, e.g. , inferential appeal to authority, 
Scripture, or tradition) to justify the very beliefs needed to allow 
for objectification, the Reformed epistemologist has only put off 
the evidentialist objection one step. The other options fall within 
the proper basicality camp. There is first the possibility that theis­
tic* beliefs are generated by another application of theistic objec­
tification; that is, at some time in the past one formed theistic be­
liefs via objectification of some experience. These beliefs then 
became part of one's noetic structure and are now the theistic* 
beliefs used to objectify other experiences into theistic beliefs.  This 
option has the obvious difficulty of generating an infinite regress. 
The final possible source of justification for theistic* beliefs is some 
externalist principle. It should not surprise us that Plantinga may 
need to appeal to some externalist principle, for it seems that all 
versions of foundationalism ultimately appeal to externalism. 14 This 
claim needs defending, however, so an argument is in order. 
One can distinguish among intemalist and extemalist theories of 
justification. Many foundationalists rely on an intemalist picture of 
justification. They say, for example, that it does not suffice for p's 
justification that it be the result of some reliable belief-forming mech­
anism outside my awareness or access. The evidence I have for p 
must be evidence in reach of my awareness and not merely some 
causal or lawlike connection between the fact of the matter and my 
14. Perhaps an internalism constrained by reliabilist requirements would do the 
trick here; see Alston's version of internalism discussed in Chapter 4· The impor­
tant point is that at some stage the epistemic principles allow one to be justified in 
holding a belief or using a practice without also demanding that one has to justify 
the belief or practice. 
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holding a belief about the fact. Hence, the emphasis on (conscious) 
discursive reasoning is a significant part of the justificatory procedure. 
But there is a sense in which all viable versions of foundational­
ism rely on externalist principles. 15 Typically this appeal to exter­
nalist principles occurs for properly basic beliefs. But then, since 
properly nonbasic beliefs rely on properly basic beliefs for their 
justification, the whole edifice collapses without an externalist 
principle (or principles) at the bottom. To see the need for exter­
nalist principles, consider the following strong understanding of 
internalism: 
lnternalism1 : S is justified in believing p if there is some 
causal or lawlike connection between p's truth and S's be­
lieving p and S is justified in believing that there is such a 
connection. 
This account can be made more general. Where <!> is some property 
that connects the truth of p to S's believing p, consider the follow­
mg: 
Internalism2: S is justified in believing p if p has some 
property <I> and S is justified in believing it does. 
This general version of internalism results fairly quickly in an infi­
nite regress the foundationalist will be quick to reject. 
The infinite regress is generated since on this strong kind of in­
ternalism the only justified beliefs are those for which I have justi­
fication for accepting the justification. Any foundational belief of 
mine must have its justificatory principles justified for me. But that 
justification must itself be justified, and so forth. The regress be­
gins early and perhaps the only way to avoid it while holding ei­
ther version of internalism is to move to a holist model of justifica­
tion in which justification is not foundational. Thus, this version of 
internalism begs the question against the foundationalist and 
against the idea of proper basicality. 
There must then be some externalist principle to which the 
foundationalist appeals without also being required to provide jus-
rs. I thank Francis Dauer for helpful discussion on this point. 
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tification for it. Any foundationalist must accept some externalist 
principle of this form: 
Externalist Principle1 :  If p meets such and such (external­
ist) criterion, then S is justified in believing p. 
One should not add to what is required for p's justification that S 
must be justified in holding to any externalist principles of the 
form suggested by this principle. To do so would be to add the 
strong internalist requirement that S must be justified in believing 
the principle before she is justified in believing any belief it de­
livers. 
An example helps clarify the point. The following principle 
meets the above form: 
Externalist Principle2: If p is self-evident for S, S is justi­
fied in believing p. 
There are no epistemic requirements in the antecedent; S need not 
believe or be justified in believing that p is self-evident. If this were 
required, the regress would begin; for S must then be justified in 
accepting the principles on which p's justification rests, and to do 
that S must be justified in accepting the justification for the justi­
ficatory principles themselves, and so on. One cannot have Al­
ston's foil reflective justification. This second externalist principle 
merely claims that, if p is self-evident for S, then S is justified in 
believing it and need not be justified in holding the principle itself. 
To demand a thoroughgoing internalism would be to demand too 
much of the foundationalist and hence of Plantinga. All viable 
foundational models must rely on some externalist principles. 
Returning now to the main argument, it is clear that there must be 
some source of justification for the needed theistic* beliefs. In light of 
the externalist requirement, a brief review of the options for this 
source of justification is in order, for one can now more clearly see 
the folly of several of the approaches to theistic* beliefs noted above. 
First is the possibility of properly nonbasic status for theistic* 
beliefs. Given that there somewhere (typically at the base) needs to 
be an appeal to externalist principles, one might suggest that theis­
tic* beliefs result from discursive reasoning at the bottom of which 
are at least some beliefs whose justification derives from externalist 
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principles. These beliefs are not theistic in content; they are garden­
variety beliefs about the world. This suggestion amounts to a 
return to natural theology (or some other kind of inferential justi­
fication procedure) , but my supposition is that Plantinga qua Re­
formed epistemologist cannot appeal to inferences to generate and 
justify theistic* beliefs. 
A second possibility is to claim that theistic* beliefs are properly 
basic. Here one can claim that they might result from the exagger­
ated Alstonian practice presented above; that is, theistic* beliefs 
might themselves be objectifications of nontheistic experiences. 
This possibility, however, has the obvious disadvantage of raising 
more forcefully the question with which we began: how are theis­
tic* beliefs justified given the requirement that appeal must be 
made to externalist principles? The present suggestion seems only 
to lead to an infinite regress we can now recognize as similar to 
that which the foundationalist is attempting to overcome via the 
appeal to externalist principles. 
Two things seem clear. First, the justification of theistic* beliefs 
must itself appeal to some externalist principle. In other words, 
one cannot put off an appeal to externalist principles for some 
other belief (a belief nontheistic in content) and then expect to de­
rive theistic* beliefs from it. To avoid evidentialism, theistic* be­
liefs must be generated out of, and justified by, some fact or expe­
rience directly. Second, the justification of theistic* beliefs must be 
nondiscursive. This, naturally, is part and parcel of the move to an 
externalist justification for theistic* beliefs, but it is also a reminder 
that natural theology or other inferential procedures are not avail­
able to the Reformed epistemologist. 
How then are we to understand this externalist generation and 
justification of theistic* beliefs? Suppose we model our understand­
ing of theistic externalist principles after the less controversial, 
nontheistic varieties suggested by epistemological externalists. 
Typically the suggestion is that externalist principles rely on some 
causal or lawlike relation between the world and one's belief. More 
specifically, one moves from an experience of the world to a belief 
about the world. A person takes in cognitive input i and forms 
belief p. In the typical perceptual model, i is some visual, tactile, 
olfactory datum which then, following lawlike or causal principles, 
generates a belief about the physical world. Further, it is important 
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to remind ourselves of the lingo-conceptual link between the expe­
rience and the formed belief. Earlier I suggested that the experience 
leading to a physical object belief is typically described by borrow­
ing from physical object language; for instance, the experience 
generating "I see a tree" is described by "I am being appeared to 
treely" (or some near relation of this language) . 
The exaggerated Alstonian practice of theistic belief generation 
does not have this lingo-conceptual link, at least not in every in­
stance. In fact, it cannot be required to have the link insofar as one 
is to have an account of theistic belief formation and justification 
which answers the universality challenge. The exaggerated Alston­
ian practice is a successful solution to the universality challenge 
only insofar as it disconnects the content of the experience (and 
hence its lingo-conceptual description) from the generated belief. 
This is the case since the universality challenge suggests that from a 
shared experience both theist and nontheist ought to generate the 
same belief. Since they do not, an explanation is needed. The ex­
planation is simply that the experience can be objectified in any 
way the belief framework of the perceiver allows. There need be 
no lingo-conceptual link tying experience to generated belief. The 
relevance of all this is just that, since theistic* beliefs also have 
theistic content, one must ask about the nature of the conditions 
that generate them. Can the conditions be described completely in 
nontheistic terms, or must they be described in theistic language; is 
the experience nontheistic in nature or is it theistic? If the condi­
tions are nontheistic, the lingo-conceptual link is lacking; in theistic 
cases it is not. 16 
If the experience is theistic in nature, the difficulties raised in 
Chapters 2 and 3 reappear. Any account of nondiscursive epistemic 
justification for theistic beliefs supposedly grounded in theistic ex­
perience alone needs to recognize the role of background beliefs in 
16. My suggestions here assume that it is legitimate to extend the claims about 
the exaggerated Alstonian practice to externalism. Is this move in fact legitimate? I 
believe so. For even if the externalist were to argue that the cognitive perceptual 
input is reducible to certain patterns of colors or shapes, or even to certain patterns 
of energy (light waves and the like), there is still at some level a description of the 
input that is conceptually tied to the output, the physical object belief. With theis­
tic belief formation, at least with varieties that avoid the difficulties raised by the 
universality challenge, the parallel does not hold. There need not be a conceptual 
link between the belief formed and the (description of the) experience. 
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the generation of the beliefs.  One should therefore wonder about 
the epistemic value of theistic experiences taken independently of 
other complex sets of beliefs-one's epistemic base or background 
beliefs.  The problem of noninferential mediated beliefs and prac­
tices is pressed once again. In short, it is difficult to see how so­
called theistic experiences can legitimately provide an increase in 
epistemic justification for theistic* beliefs without reintroducing 
the very question with which we began. The move from theistic 
experience to theistic belief via externalist principles is question­
able. 
What of the case in which the lingo-conceptual link between ex­
periential input and belief is lacking? Can one move by externalist 
principles from some nontheistic information to a theistic* belief? 
Given the universality challenge, it is hard to see how. Once again, 
one can simply reintroduce the challenge at this new level, raising 
the same questions of theistic* beliefs as were raised of theistic be­
liefs. 
Here it is relevant to consider the supposed lawlike nature of the 
externalist principles. If everyone has the same (nontheistic) input, 
why do we all not share the same theistic or theistic* beliefs? It is 
also important to remember why theistic* beliefs were first intro­
duced: the solution to the universality challenge was that we do 
not all share the same background beliefs and thus do not all objec­
tify experiences in the same way. As can readily be seen, this reply 
cannot be used here, for the question now is how theistic* be­
liefs-the background beliefs themselves-are justified. As we 
have already seen, to appeal to further theistic* beliefs begins Plan­
tinga on an infinite regress. There appears to be little promise for 
an externalist justification of theistic* beliefs, at least insofar as one 
uses a kind of lawlike externalism as a model. 
Perhaps one can develop an alternative view of externalism not 
patterned after the less controversial, nontheistic varieties put forth 
by externalist epistemologists. Perhaps theistic externalism does 
not rely on the typical lawlike mechanism model. Perhaps all that 
is necessary for externalism is something like the following: 
Externalist Principle3: If p has property <f> (that links up, 
in some reliable way, p's truth with S's believing p), then 
S is justified in believing p. 
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Maybe, for example, <I> is simply the property of having been 
formed by God in S. God does this for persons to whom he wishes 
to reveal himself. Here the "mechanism" is not a natural one about 
which lawlike predictions can be made. Indeed, there is no mecha­
nism at all. The formation of the belief is simply a result of a sort of 
divine telepathy, a supernatural action; it is God following through 
on his intention to reveal himself to at least some humans. Being 
God, he guarantees the truth of the belief, but he need not supply 
theistic beliefs for all. His actions are not lawlike and neither is the 
formation of theistic beliefs. There is nothing in us, the human 
knowers, to account for any pattern in the formation of beliefs. It is 
entirely God's doing. Our minds or noetic structures need not be 
understood in one way or another for God to do his work. 17 
The critic may reply that, although this seems possible, it does 
not provide a particularly attractive account of theistic belief. Why 
does God create theistic belief in some but not in others? Perhaps 
sin or spiritual blindness could be introduced here. But one must 
be careful to point out that the fault is not with us or with our 
noetic equipment. God can overcome any obstacle we set up. The 
reason God shows himself to some and not others must be a reason 
God has. We are dealing with God's intentions and motivations, 
not with faulty mechanisms. As long as this is understood, God 
may be justified in not revealing himself to all. 
The critic may continue with a second point. This is, he may 
say, a strange kind of externalism. It is difficult to see, for exam­
ple, how this type of externalism, if it can be so called, gives us 
justified belief. For the lawlikeness of the mechanism seems to be 
exactly what is attractive about externalism as an understanding of 
the criteria for justified belief. It enables us to explain why so many 
beliefs we typically take to be justified are held by most people. 
1 7. Consider these comments of Alston, in "Concepts of Epistemic Justifica­
tion," pp. 109-10: "Unlike justification, reliability of belief formation is not lim­
ited to cases in which a belief is based on adequate grounds within a subject's 
psychological states. A reliable mode of belief formation may work through the 
subject's own knowledge and experience. Indeed it is plausible to suppose that all 
of the reliable modes of belief formation available to human beings are of this sort. 
But it is quite conceivable that there should be others. I might be so constituted 
that beliefs about the weather tomorrow which apparently just 'pop into my mind' 
out of nowhere are in fact reliably produced by a mechanism of which we know 
nothing, and which does not involve the belief being based on anything." 
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In reply it could be suggested that the only important thing 
about externalism is that the formation of a belief, no matter how 
it occurs, is reliable. Since God is the source of the beliefs, and 
since he is reliable, the source is reliable. Is the predictive, lawlike 
mechanism really as important as the critic suggests? Perhaps not. 
Perhaps what is really important is that from within a developed 
set of beliefs and experiences there is some account of how the 
formation of theistic beliefs could be reliable even if they are not 
lawlike. I consider such an account in some detail in Chapter 10, so 
I suspend further commentary until then. 
The avoidance of arbitrary results via an externalist formation 
and justification of theistic* beliefs seems unlikely, unless we re­
turn to the natural theology (or otherwise discursive) approach. In 
order, then, to understand the justification of the required back­
ground beliefs by externalist principles, one must understand them 
as being basic but nontheistic beliefs on which the arguments of 
natural theology (or some other inferential argument) must be con­
structed. But this is to return Plantinga directly into the hands of 
the evidentialist and perhaps into the hands of the evidentialist ob­
jector. To avoid arbitrariness with Plantinga's foundationalist ac­
count of justification, one must rely on evidentialism's claims. 
Natural theology, discursive justification, is necessary to avoid just 
any belief being taken as properly basic on strictly foundationalist 
grounds. 
Plantinga's parity thesis fails because it does not take into ac­
count the role of background beliefs in the formation and justifica­
tion of theistic beliefs. His position, however, appears to be more 
precarious than Alston's since Plantinga seems to need an exagger­
ated Alstonian approach to explain why we do not all form the 
same beliefs given the same input. But this approach leaves Plan­
tinga's position open to arbitrariness which, in turn, demands a 
return to some type of discursive provision of evidence. In the next 
chapter I consider whether Alston's position is really any stronger 
and explain why Alston himself finally moves away from the par­
ity thesis. 
[ 8 ] 
Background Beliefs, 
Religious Plurality, and the 
Parity Thesis 
The goals of this chapter fall into two groups. The first group 
deals with tying together several loose ends surrounding the role of 
background beliefs in CP or, more generally, in noninferential me­
diated practices. Thus in Section I I answer the question whether 
Alston is better off, epistemically, with CP than Planting a is with 
an exaggerated Alstonian epistemic practice. The second group 
surrounds the issue of why Alston himself finally abandons the 
parity thesis between PP and CP. The goals of the remaining sec­
tions are first to explain Alston's position on how religious diver­
sity affects the rationality of engaging in CP and second to explain 
how his view fits in with the argument of this essay, as far as we 
have reached. 
I . The Resurrected Evidentialist 
My argument in Chapter 7 suggests that Plantinga's defense of 
PT Ph or more specifically PT Ph must appeal to an exaggerated ver­
sion of CP, thus opening the door to an arbitrary generation of 
beliefs or demanding a retreat to natural theology or other discur­
sive bases for theistic belief. I conclude that PT Ph and hence PT Ph 
are not true. Does PTA fare any better? This question cannot be 
answered without some further work. I argued that both CP and 
PP, as Alston construes them, are practices in which there is a 
)I 
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lingo-conceptual link between the experience and the belief gener­
ated by that experience: if one believes "I see a tree," then one does 
not fail to affirm, when queried, something like "I am being ap­
peared to treely"; if one sees God's creative work in this flower, 
then one does not fail to affirm, when asked, something like "I am 
being appeared to God-createdly." But I have also argued that CP 
is a noninferential mediated practice whereas PP is a conceptual­
reading practice. The background belief challenge suggests that 
there can be nothing in an experience itself that allows one to de­
scribe the phenomenology of the experience by propositions such 
as "It is of God." This is true for the same reasons that no experi­
ential phenomenon can itself be described as "It is of Tim Tib­
betts." In short, background beliefs are important when it comes 
to the experience of, and corresponding beliefs about, epistemically 
unique and spatiotemporal nonrooted individuals. The time has 
come for a further analysis of this claim, especially as it applies to CP. 
PP does not simply generate, as noted in Chapter 2, beliefs 
about epistemically unique physical objects; that is, it also gener­
ates beliefs about certain kinds of things, it classifies things. It is 
this fact, among others, that allows PP to be a conceptual-reading 
practice. We all seem to share, roughly, the same conceptual 
scheme, or at least we do pragmatically. Once PP is set into mo­
tion by an experience, the belief generated is one in which the 
physical object scheme allows us to read off a physical object be­
lief. But there is a distinction to be made between PP as a classify­
ing practice generating beliefs such as "Those are desks" and 
"These are trees" and the epistemic practice (or subpractice)' that 
allows us to generate beliefs about epistemically unique physical 
individual objects, such as "The desk in my office is brown" and 
"The tree in my front yard needs cutting down." One simple way 
to individuate between these two practices is to recall a point I 
made in discussing Alston's account of perception, namely, that 
with PP one has a set of concepts (e.g., tree, house, car) that can be 
applied in situations that are novel to the perceiver. One can im­
mediately objectify new perceptual experiences into physical object 
concepts, since the concepts are general enough to apply to newly 
experienced objects. This is not the case with epistemically unique 
physical objects such as Suzie's house. One may have the concept 
I. I believe the best choice here is a subpractice; see Chapter I I for details. 
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"house" before seeing the buildings in a neighborhood that is new 
to one's experience and hence be able to identify the buildings as 
houses. But one does not have a complete enough concept of 
Suzie's house before an experience (obtained in person or through 
someone's description of the house-see Chapter 3, Section 4) of 
Suzie's house, since that concept is not a general one applicable to 
many houses but a unique one that applies only to Suzie's house. 
So, one cannot have detailed concepts of Suzie's house before be­
ing "introduced" to the particular house that is Suzie's. And reap­
plication of such concepts relies on having memories, not of other 
houses that are like Suzie's (or at least not solely so) but of this 
particular house and one's earlier experiences of it. In short, the 
concepts we attach to unique objects are attached not by our being 
able to recognize, for example, that this is a house of the Suzie 
kind (as if there were more than one house that is Suzie's) but 
rather by our remembering earlier experiences of this (numerically 
the same) house. This distinction in approach suggests a distinction 
in epistemic practice. As I argued in Chapter 3, in PP the concepts 
that attach to epistemically unique physical objects are made up of 
kind concepts and information about local spatiotemporal location. 
Insofar as this position is right, then the practice, or subpractice, of 
forming beliefs about epistemically unique physical objects is a 
conceptual-reading practice. Let us call this (sub)practice that gen­
erates beliefs about epistemically unique physical objects the 
"unique physical object practice." 
Parallel to the distinction between PP and unique physical object 
practice, we should recognize a distinction between what I call "re­
ligious practice" and CP. Since CP generates beliefs about the 
unique God of the Christian faith, it seems somewhat parallel to 
unique physical object practice and its generation of beliefs about 
epistemically unique individuals. The practice that allows us to 
form beliefs with religious (as opposed to specifically Christian) 
content seems parallel to PP. The content of these religious beliefs 
is a little hard to spell out, but perhaps one could point to phenom­
enological analyses such as Rudolf Otto's mysterium tremendum.2 
Many (dare I say most?) humans have at least a (more or less) 
2. Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in 
the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, trans. John W. Harvey (I923; 
rpt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, I978), pp. I2-30. 
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vague sense of a reality beyond the merely physical or even the 
merely (humanly) personal. But as the plurality of religions indi­
cates, there are many ways to understand this reality. At the bot­
tom of all these, I suggest, is this awareness of a nonhuman, non­
physical reality. Religious practice puts us into contact with this 
reality. The additional and uniquely Christian beliefs generated do 
not come via religious practice but through CP, a practice that 
allows us to identify the experience as an experience of God the 
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, or the First Person of the Trinity, 
that is, as an experience of an epistemically unique individual. It is 
CP, and not religious practice, that clearly is a noninferential medi­
ated practice. 
It is CP, then, as contrasted to religious practice, that requires 
the use of background beliefs. Religious practice does not, for we 
have a conceptual scheme that alone allows us to objectify our ex­
perience into the kinds of vague categories I suggested above. 3 We 
need the background beliefs for the doctrinal content of the Chris­
tian beliefs. Do these background beliefs need justification? Here I 
plan to fulfill my promise of explaining why the ranking of PP 
over CP is an epistemic ranking and not merely one based on the 
cognitive desirability of PP's features over CP's. 
I suggest that the background beliefs required in CP need justi­
fication as much as do those beliefs required for the exaggerated 
CP to which I appealed in discussing Plantinga. I argued in Plan­
tinga's case that the content of the background beliefs is substan­
tively theistic, for there is no necessary lingo-conceptual link be­
tween the experience generating theistic beliefs and the beliefs 
generated. To avoid arbitrariness in belief, then, the evidentialist's 
demands seem to press in on Plantinga's position. It is thus fairly 
3. J. William Forgie's work, from which I drew the background belief chal­
lenge, may be faulty since it does not distinguish clearly enough between religious 
practice and other practices. If "God" picks out only the vague kinds of charac­
teristics that religious practice allows us to, then Forgie's argument needs refining. 
Compare, for example, an epistemic practice that allows me to be justified in be­
lieving that I am in the presence of a human person as opposed to one in which I 
am justified in believing that I am in the presence of Tom Tibbetts. In the former, 
I do not have to identify the person as Tom or Tim, but in the latter I do. But it is 
only in the latter that I need background information in the form of beliefs. There 
is more on this general view in the text, but what is said there applies not only to 
Alston's work but to Forgie's as well. 
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obvious that theistic* beliefs need justification. Although perhaps 
less obvious, so do the background beliefs for CP. Are these sub­
stantively theistic in content? Yes, but not only so. They are sub­
stantively Christian in content. Even though what I have said about 
religious practice allows for some religious content in experiences 
generating religious beliefs, 4 this experiential content itself does not 
allow for the generation of specifically Christian beliefs. The 
source of the Christian content, I suggest, rests entirely in the 
background beliefs-call them "Christian* beliefs." And surely 
these need justification. 
Granting the need for a religious content in the experience gen­
erating Christian beliefs (to allow for the spirit of Alston's direct 
approach), there is still nothing phenomenologically in the experi­
ence that makes it a Christian experience. What would make an 
experience a Christian experience, as opposed to a merely religious 
experience? For that matter, what could make an experience a 
Christian, as opposed to a merely religious, experience? I propose 
that nothing in experience alone can do so. When one holds Chris­
tian* beliefs, one may take the experience (and perhaps legit­
imately so) to be Christian. But taking an experience to be explic­
itly Christian and its actually being so are not at all the same thing. 
Why, then, understand any religious experience to be a Christian 
experience? Why not Buddhist, or Hindu? There is, I suggest, a 
kind of arbitrariness in doing so, a kind of arbitrariness in the use 
of CP. Of course, one does not typically select CP over some other 
practice, such as a Hindu practice (except, perhaps, in cases of radi­
cal conversion). Rather, one grows into the use of CP. So the arbi­
trariness is not one of choice but one that presses the question, 
what justifies my practicing CP rather than some other noninferen­
tial mediated practice? To avoid this arbitrariness, Christian* be­
liefs need justification. CP's noninferential mediated nature makes 
it epistemically inferior to PP. 
We can see the same point if we return to the background belief 
challenge. Compare the Tom and Tim Tibbetts case to the case of 
God. The reason one knows that it is Tim rather than Tom one 
4· There is, in other words, a lingo-conceptual link between religious experi­
ence and the beliefs religious practice generates. I am not convinced that this is best 
construed theistically; it may be even vaguer than that. 
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sees in the next yard is not given by the phenomena but requires 
that one have the belief that Tom is out of town. This background 
belief to which one appeals is of a fairly high level in terms of its 
content vis-a-vis Tom and Tim. Furthermore, although we do 
come to recognize human persons by their features, actions, and 
personality, as Alston says, we do so only on being introduced to 
them and learning their individual names. Our background beliefs 
about the persons we know seem to be fully personal in their con­
tent. I remember (or at least it is within the range of my memory) 
that Jack appears the way this phenomenal experience I am now 
having appears. Thus, my noninferential mediated generation of 
the belief "This is Jack," is justified. It will not do, as Alston sug­
gests, simply for it to be true that such and such an appearance is 
sufficient for the appearance to be "ofJack" in the circumstances in 
which I find myself. 5 The circumstances are too important to be 
passed over so lightly, for it is these circumstances that contain the 
information enabling me to objectify this experience as an experi­
ence of Jack. Since the circumstances cannot be confined to spa­
tiotemporal information picked up in the experience, this informa­
tion must be brought to the experience, presumably as beliefs. The 
background beliefs needed for identifying individual persons seem 
always to have a content that contains reference to that unique per­
son and thus, to avoid arbitrary application of proper names to 
phenomenal experiences that do not "contain" the proper-name in­
formation, the background beliefs need justification. 
Why should it be any different with God and experiences of 
him? In Alston's case, if one does need background beliefs, these 
cannot be without (theistic) Christian content. If they were with­
out such content, and given the constraint that no experience can 
be phenomenologically of the Christian God, then how could they 
give rise to the generation of a Christian belief, at least one with 
content that is specifically about the unique individual, God the 
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ? Assuming that they do need to 
have Christian content, then the beliefs need either inferential or 
noninferential justification. If, on the one hand, they are justified 
5· Alston has suggested to me that I am not willing to be externalist enough 
about the circumstances. Here, I guess, is the proverbial parting of the ways, since 
I think he is all too willing to be externalist where he ought not to be. 
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via inference, Alston's position succumbs to the evidentialist, just 
as Plantinga's does. On the other hand, if they are justified nonin­
ferentially, we are back into the same kind of infinite regress laid at 
Plantinga's feet. There must be, somewhere, a nonexperiential jus­
tification of theistic Christian beliefs. 6 
Here perhaps Alston can suggest that one need only be justified 
in the background beliefs (and not need to justify them) and the 
regress does not get started. But the need for being justified is all 
my argument rests on. Unlike Alston's appeal to similar strategies 
in other contexts-for example, where one may be justified in a 
certain epistemic principle and that enables one to be justified in 
another belief-there is no distinction in epistemic level between 
the belief in question and the theistic background belief. The latter 
does not function at a different level epistemically; it is a first-order 
belief and not a second-order principle. Alston may appeal to his 
externalist account of justification for these background beliefs, but 
one still can raise the infinite regress problem as long as the exter­
nalist account is rooted in experience. How are these justified (as 
opposed to justifiable)? My suggestion is that they too must appeal 
to background beliefs that in turn appeal to background beliefs, 
and the regress is off and running. 
Thus Alston's parity thesis appears to be in little better shape 
than Plantinga's. The deliverances of PP are conceptual-reading be­
liefs whereas those of CP are noninferential mediated beliefs. The 
latter are such that the background beliefs needed for their justifica­
tion stand in need of justification themselves. As such, they cannot 
have the same strength of justification as conceptual-reading be­
liefs. I have more to say about CP in Chapters 10 and 11, but I 
believe the argument here shows that the observation about back­
ground beliefs made in Chapters 2 and 3 is epistemically impor­
tant. Conceptual-reading beliefs differ from noninferential medi­
ated beliefs in that the latter have an additional step needed for 
their epistemic justification. The evidentialist specter is present in 
Alston's epistemology of religion as well as Plantinga's. 
6. We need to consider the theistic, nonlawlike kind of externalism mentioned 
in Chapter 7, Section 6, as a possibility. Alternatively, could we not be introduced 
to God much as we are introduced to a new human being? Is this nonexperiential? 
What about the credulity disposition? I consider these issues in Chapter 1 I. 
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2. Alston's Rejection of the Parity Thesis: Checking 
Procedures 
In Perceiving God, Alston moves away from the parity thesis. He 
does so for two reasons. The second bears the burden of my con­
cern in the next section, but the first deserves to be recognized as 
well. 
In his chapter on the Christian mystical perceptual practice 
(CMP), Alston contends that CMP satisfies the conditions for ra­
tional acceptance. As with sense practice (SP) (what I have called 
PP), CMP is acquired and engaged in long before one is explicitly 
aware of the practice, it involves procedures for evaluating its out­
puts, it is set in a broader context of epistemic practices that in­
volve interacting with perceived objects, it is socially transmitted 
and monitored, it depends on and is connected with other prac­
tices, it is subject to change, and it has its own set of distinctive 
presuppositions. There are differences, of course. CMP has a dis­
tinctive conceptual scheme, a distinctive subject matter, and its 
own overrider system of beliefs. Alston also gives an account of 
how CMP is to be distinguished from other epistemic practices, 
including other religious epistemic practices. 
In defense of CMP's being rationally engaged in, Alston sug­
gests that he has already made a prima facie case for its being so, 
since it is a socially established doxastic practice. But he does con­
sider at length reasons for denying that it is a genuine, full-fledged 
practice. These reasons include, but are not limited to, the charges 
that CMP is only partially distributed among the population, that 
CMP is not a widely shared practice, and that it is not a source of 
new information. The important issue for us is the supposed lack 
of checks and tests of particular perceptual beliefs. Alston fills sev­
eral pages dealing with this charge and, although he admits that 
CMP does lack the kind of checking system SP has, this does not 
show that CMP is unreliable. All that need concern us here is what 
Alston says toward the end of his discussion of the overrider sys­
tem. 
I am quite prepared to recognize that a checking system of the sort 
we have in SP is an epistemic desideratum. If we were shaping the 
world to our heart's desire, I dare say we would arrange for all our 
fallible doxastic practices to include such checks. It certainly puts us 
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in a better position to distinguish between correct and incorrect per­
ceptual beliefs than what we have in CMP. But though this shows 
that CMP is epistemically inferior to SP in this respect, that is not 
the same as showing that CMP is unreliable or not rationally en­
gaged in, or that its outputs are not prima facie justified. 7 
( I 6 3 
Here Alston links explicitly what he earlier referred to as "cog­
nitively desirable features" to epistemic concerns. An epistemic 
practice's failing to have certain cognitively desirable features that 
another has does indeed indicate a difference in epistemic level. So 
if SP is epistemically superior to CMP because of the kind of 
checking procedures available to it, even though the latter is still 
rationally acceptable, one suspects that a strict parity thesis be­
tween SP and CMP is not forthcoming. Still, both are prima facie 
rationally engaged in, on Alston's account, and that is all he sets 
out to show in Perceiving God. 
3. Alston's Rejection of the Parity Thesis: Religious 
Plurality 
The problem of religious diversity for the rationality of engaging 
in CMP, says Alston, cannot be handled in the same way as others 
he discusses, that is, by calling attention to "epistemic imperialism" 
or the "double standard." The intuition behind the problem with 
plurality is that "if the general enterprise of forming perceptual re­
ligious beliefs is carried on in different religions in such a way as to 
yield incompatible results, no such practice can be considered to be 
reliable, so none is rationally engaged in. "8 But Alston uses consid­
erable space spelling out exactly what the issue is. There are two 
questions. In what way are religious practices incompatible, and 
why or how does this incompatibility cast doubt on CMP's ratio­
nality? I take these in order. 
The incompatibility, says Alston, is not an internal one because 
there is more than one practice for forming perceptual religious 
beliefs. Any incompatibility is an interpractice problem, not an in­
trapractice problem. Thus, if there is incompatibility it is between 
the deliverances of two separate practices. If one takes it that these 
7. Alston, Perceiving God, p. 220. 
8. Ibid., p. 255. 
Rationality and Theistic Belief 
deliverances are of the singular subject-predicate form and that 
they attribute to the subject some putatively perceivable attribute 
or activity, then there are two questions to ask. First, is the subject 
the same? Second, are the predicates incompatible? 
Again, we can take these in order. Although there are' cases in 
which the subjects of the beliefs delivered by various religious epi­
stemic practices are (taken to be) the same (such as in Christianity, 
Judaism, and Islam), this is not always the case. The beliefs the 
Christian has about God are quite different than those held by the 
Hindu, and although different beliefs about an object do not entail 
that the objects are truly different, there seems to be good reason 
to think they are. So in these cases, even if the predicates attribut­
able to perceived religious objects are incompatible, that does not 
show that the beliefs are incompatible unless it can be shown that 
the objects are the same. 
On the predicate side, much of the apparent contradiction is not 
due to the positive content of the beliefs but rather to what Alston 
calls "implicit denials." Attributing to God the message that Jesus 
is his Son is not incompatible with Mohammed being God's 
prophet unless the former message also contains a rider claiming 
that Jesus' work is the only way to salvation. Even Thomas Aqui­
nas thought that mystical claims of God's being an undifferentiated 
unity (such as we find in Vedanta or Yoga mystical literature) are 
not incompatible with claims that God is personal. There must be a 
denial of the identity between God-as-undifferentiated-unity and 
God-as-personal assumed by the one who holds the former. At the 
very least, says Alston, caution is called for here. Seeming contra­
dictions are not always what they appear. 
To identify contradictions, Alston raises the issue of how doxas­
tic practices in other religions are to be separated from CMP. Most 
of his discussion in Perceiving God is cast in terms of "God." But 
nontheistic religions do not, obviously, describe the object of their 
epistemic experiences in that language. So Alston broadens his 
conception of religious (what he calls "mystical") practice by stat­
ing that "it is what is taken by the subject to be a direct experiential 
awareness of the Ultimate," where by Ultimate he means "the ulti­
mate determiner of one's existence, condition, salvation, destiny, 
or whatever. "9 This broader conception of religious practice pro-
9. Ibid., p. 258. 
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vides the basis for showing the incompatibility of the output of the 
competing practices. It is helpful to quote Alston here at some 
length: 
One's conception of the Ultimate will differ in different religions. 
Even where the broad outlines of the conception is the same, as it is 
among the various theistic religions, the details will differ. After all, 
a religiously very important feature of the Christian, Jewish, and 
Moslem conceptions of the Ultimate has to do with God's purposes 
for mankind and His work in history; and the account of this varies 
drastically from one of these traditions to another. And all these will 
diverge sharply from the conception of the Ultimate in Buddhism 
and certain forms of Hinduism, where the Ultimate is not thought 
of as a personal agent. Let's further note that one's conception of 
God (the Ultimate) enters, to a greater or lesser degree, into a par­
ticular subject's identification of the perceived object as God (Brah­
man ... ). When I take God to be present to me I will, if I am a 
Christian, but not if I am Moslem or a Hindu, most likely take it 
that He who became man in the person of jesus Christ to save us .from our 
sins is present to me. Indeed, it is generally true that we make use of 
what we believe about perceived objects when we perceptually iden­
tify them. When I take the person I see across the room to be Joe 
Walker, I thereby take him to be the person with whom I went to 
college, who lives two blocks from me, and so on. Because of this 
leakage of the background belief system into perceptual beliefs, the 
latter will be incompatible with each other across religious tradi­
tions, even if the predicates attributed in these perceptual beliefs are as 
compatible with each other as you like. 10 
The upshot of his discussion is that, even if the perceptual beliefs 
we have about God do not conflict themselves, the practices of 
forming such beliefs are still subject to serious conflict by virtue of 
the associated belief systems. 
After considering two ways one might strive to show that the 
associated belief systems are not incompatible (one is by trimming 
the exclusivistic claims from the various religions and the other is 
Hick's Kantian strategy), Alston says that most practitioners of re­
ligion are pre-Kantian in their beliefs, that is, they are realists about 
them. So, in fact, from the point of view of the actual practice of 
believers, the various religions are incompatible in just the way 
Alston suggests. 
IO. Ibid., pp. 258-59· 
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A second important question Alston discusses is why or how 
religious plurality influences the rationality of engaging in CMP. 
He considers two versions of an argument in which it is suggested 
that religiously diverse results of mystical practices lead �o the dis­
crediting of CMP. The stronger version is developed from "a natu­
ralist line." It suggests that the best explanation for the radical in­
commensurability of mystical practice output is that each result is 
nothing more than an internally generated practice, with no refer­
ent beyond the practitioners. But, says Alston, there is no reason 
to assume that this is the best explanation. There could very well 
be aspects of reality so difficult for us to discern that we end up 
with quite different results when we try to discern them. A more 
modest version of the charge against the rationality of engaging in 
any religious epistemic practice, and hence the practice of CMP, is 
"to suggest that the diversity is best explained by supposing that 
none of the competing practices is a reliable way of determining 
what that reality is like. "11 The argument behind this suggestion is 
that if one of the practices were reliable it would show itself to be. 
But why, says Alston, should we assume that? 
There is another possibility, however. Given the rich diversity 
among religious doxastic practices, only one, if any, of the prac­
tices can be reliable. Why suppose it is CMP? There are many rea­
sons internal to CMP, but do we not need reasons external to the 
practice, since all the practices presumably have internal reasons? 
The critic will suggest that no such external reasons are forthcom­
ing, so there is no reason to engage in CMP or, for that matter, in 
any other religious doxastic practice. Alston responds that perhaps 
there are external reasons, but he passes over them and takes the 
worst-case scenario by assuming that there is no external evidence. 
He concludes that the justificatory efficacy of CMP is not dissipated 
but may be significantly weakened by the fact of religious diversity. 
It is not dissipated because there is a significant difference be­
tween cases of religious diversity and nonreligious diversity. Con­
sider the different observation reports of an accident or competing 
means of predicting the weather. In both kinds of case there are 
accepted means by which to resolve the dispute, even when one 
cannot in fact use those means. Hence, when the reports or 
I I. Ibid.' p. 268. 
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methods appear to conflict, there is at least the possibility of reso­
lution. It is this very possibility of resolution that dissipates the 
rationality of engaging in all these diverse means of predicting the 
weather or trusting everyone's report about an accident. But with 
the case of religious diversity there is no possible means of resolu­
tion. So why then take the absence of such means to count against 
the reliability of the practice? Alston suggests that there is no good 
reason to do so and hence that religious diversity does not dissipate 
the rationality of engaging in CMP. 
It does reduce the strength of the justification, however. The 
basic reason is that, although it is possible to imagine ways we 
might differ in our viewing the world with competing SPs (say, by 
a "Cartesian" practice of seeing what is visually perceived as an 
indefinitely extended medium that is more or less concentrated at 
various points or a "Whiteheadian" practice of seeing the world as 
a series of momentary events growing out of one another vs. our 
"Aristotelian" practice of seeing the world as made up of more or 
less discrete objects scattered through space), such a possibility is 
just a possibility. With mystical practice, the possibility is actu­
alized. The various practitioners of mystical practices do indeed 
view ultimate reality differently. If this problem did not exist, pre­
sumably CMP would be taken to be more strongly trustworthy. 
Engaging in CMP remains prima facie rational, even if one cannot 
see how to solve the problem of religious diversity. But the 
strength of its overall rational status is less than that of other prac­
tices, such as SP, where there is no problem of diversity, as a mat­
ter of fact. And so Alston does not see himself as committed to 
parity between CMP and SP (CP and PP). 
If Alston is correct about this last point, then CP and PP do not 
share the same strength (or level) of epistemic status, although they 
are both prima facie rational. But in addition to the reason put 
forth in his discussion of religious diversity, there is Alston's point 
about checking procedures and epistemic desiderata, as well as the 
position argued throughout this book that there is a distinction be­
tween conceptual-reading and noninferential mediated practices, 
with CP being the latter and PP and unique physical object practice 
the former. So there is a triple reason to reject PTX as anything 
close to a complete description of the relationship between the ra­
tional status of CP and PP. 
I 6 8 ) Rationality and Theistic Belief 
I have argued that PT� fails as a complete account because en­
gaging in CP does not have the same strength of overall rationality 
as engaging in PP, even though it remains prima facie rational to 
engage in both. What remains to be done is to consider some of 
Plantinga's suggestions about epistemic warrant as those 
'sugges­
tions apply to the parity thesis, as well as to defend Plantinga's 
suggestion that beliefs about God can be properly basic against a 
challenge resting on confirmation. The discussion of confirmation 
serves as a springboard to the final goal of this book, which is to 
suggest and defend a new parity thesis. 
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Planting a on Warrant 
In Chapters 6 and 7 I argued that PTp) and hence PT PI founder on 
the need for background beliefs in the generation and justification 
of theistic beliefs .  The problem for Plantinga is generated by the 
kinds of examples he gives, examples in which the theistic believer 
and nonbeliever share the same experience but the former gener­
ates a belief about God whereas the latter does not. My discussion 
to this point has worked only with Plantinga's essays published 
before 1986. His research emphasis changes beginning with his es­
say "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in 
God, " in which he for the first time considers at some length the 
notion of warrant or positive epistemic status as opposed to epi­
stemic justification. Although in that essay he is still directly con­
cerned about the evidentialist challenge and the proper basicality of 
theistic beliefs, later essays and two books deal less directly with 
those concerns but tackle the issue of positive epistemic status or 
warrant-that thing or quantity enough of which separates mere 
true belief from knowledge. What is his account of warrant, and 
can it help his case for epistemic parity between paradigm and 
theistic beliefs?1 
In this chapter I attempt to answer these questions. I first explain 
Plantinga's account of warrant and suggest a new parity thesis on 
r. I use the terms "warrant" and "positive epistemic status" interchangeably. 
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the basis of his account. The new thesis is weighed and found 
wanting for reasons similar to those we have been considering all 
along. 
r. Plantinga' s Account of Warrant 
Plantinga shifts to the language of warrant and posttlve epts­
temic status from the language of justification. He writes: 
What is this quantity enough of which . . . epistemizes true belief? 
... Whatever exactly this further element or quantity may be, it is 
either epistemic justification or something intimately connected 
with it. So perhaps the natural procedure would be just to baptize 
this element, what ever it is, "epistemic justification." But this 
would be misleading. The term "justification" suggests duty, obli­
gation, permission, and rights-the whole deontological stable . 
Furthermore, one of the main contending theories or pictures here 
... explicitly identifies the quantity in question with aptness for epis­
temic duty folfillment; to use the term "justification," then, as a name 
for the quantity in question would be to give this theory a confusing 
and unwarranted (if merely verbal) initial edge over its rivals. I shall 
therefore borrow Chisholm's more neutral term "positive epistemic 
status" as my official name for the quantity in question. 2
Elsewhere he uses the term "warrant" for this same item. 3 
What is positive epistemic status? Plantinga says, following Chis­
holm, that it is a term of epistemic appraisal. Furthermore, it 
comes in degrees. Finally, it is related to knowledge. Thus, "posi­
tive epistemic status . . .  initially and to a first approximation, is a 
normative property that comes in degrees, enough of which is 
what epistemizes true belief. "4 
In various places Plantinga examines and finds wanting other ac­
counts of warrant. He rejects Chisholmian internalism, non-Chis-
2. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function, " pp. 2-3. 
3. See Plantinga, "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in 
God, " p. 1 19, Warrant and Proper Function, and Warrant: The Current Debate. These 
last two works give the fullest account of Plantinga's thinking on warrant. Unfor­
tunately, at the time the present book went to press, Plantinga's books were not 
yet published. Unless otherwise noted, where I quote in this chapter from these 
works, the page numbers are those of Plantinga's final manuscripts. 
4. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function, " p. J. 
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holmian internalism, coherentism, and reliabilism. I do not recount 
the details of his criticisms, but his basic point in many, if not all, 
cases is that the accounts "come to grief when we reflect on the 
variety of ways in which our noetic faculties can fail to function 
properly. "  In each case, the reason for the failure of the accounts 
"is cognitive malfonction, failure of the relevant cognitive faculties to 
function properly. "5 This observation results in a positive charac­
terization of positive epistemic status. Following Plantinga's lead, 
let us consider this account one aspect at a time. 
One necessary condition of positive epistemic status is that one's 
"cognitive equipment, one's belief forming and belief sustaining 
apparatus, be free of . . .  cognitive malfunction. A belief has posi­
tive epistemic status for me only if my cognitive apparatus is func­
tioning properly, working the way it ought to work in producing 
and sustaining it. "6 Planting a notes that proper functioning is not 
to be identified with normal functioning. One's cognitive equip­
ment might be functioning normally (in the statistical sense) when 
one forms the wishful belief that one is about to win the Nobel 
Peace Prize. Under such conditions, one's equipment is not func­
tioning properly; it is not functioning the way it ought to, but it is 
functioning normally. 
Furthermore, consider a case in which your cognitive equipment 
is functioning well in the environment for which it was meant but 
you are moved to an environment in which your equipment was 
not meant to function-Alpha Centauri, for example. Suppose 
there are subtle epistemic differences in the two worlds. Cats are 
invisible in Alpha Centauri, but whenever one is present to a hu­
man he or she forms the belief that a dog is barking. Suppose there 
is a cat present, and hence you hear a dog barking. Even if there is 
a dog barking (in a soundproof room) and thus one's belief that 
there is a dog barking is true, the belief has little by way of positive 
epistemic status. One's equipment may be functioning properly for 
its home environment, but it does not match the environment in 
5. Quotation from Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Func­
tion , "  p. 32. On these issues, see also Plantinga, "Chisholmian Intemalism, "  in 
Philosophical Analysis: A Defence by Example, ed. David Austin (Boston: D. Reidel, 
1 987), "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God," "Justifica­
tion and Theism, " Warrant and Proper Function, and Warrant: The Current Debate. 
6. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function, "  p. 32. 
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which it is operating. "So we must add another component to pos­
itive epistemic status; your faculties must be in good working or­
der, and the environment must be appropriate for your particular 
repertoire of epistemic powers. "7 
The final aspect to warrant is the addition of a "firmness of be­
lief' rider. Plantinga says that it is tempting simply to identify a 
beliefs having positive epistemic status with its being produced by 
properly functioning equipment in the appropriate environment. 
This identification would be mistaken, however. Two beliefs could 
be thus formed and yet one have much more warrant than the 
other. Belief in the corresponding conditional of modus ponens has 
more warrant than a vague memory belief even though both are 
formed by properly functioning equipment in the correct environ­
ment. What is needed here is recognition that when one's epistemic 
equipment is working well one's beliefs are held with the appropri­
ate level of firmness: 
Obviously another element of positive epistemic status is the degree 
to which I do or am inclined to accept the belief in question; I can't 
be said to know p, for example, unless I believe it very firmly in­
deed. If my faculties are working properly, the more strongly I be­
lieve . . . p the more positive epistemic status p has for me. When 
our cognitive establishment is working properly, the strength of the 
impulse towards believing a given proposition . . . will be propor­
tional to the degree it has of positive epistemic status-or if the 
relationship isn't one of straightforward proportionality, the appro­
priate functional relationship will hold between positive epistemic 
status and this impulse. 8 
So, at this stage Plantinga's account of warrant is this: "In the 
paradigm cases of warrant, belief B has warrant for S if and only if 
that belief is produced in S by his epistemic faculties working 
properly in an appropriate environment, and if both B and B* 
have warrant for S, B has more warrant than B* for S if S believes 
B more firmly than B*. "9 This account, he says, needs further re­
finements, some of which he attempts. I do not, for the most part, 
consider these in detail, but only list several of his concerns. First, 
7· Ibid. , p. 3 3 -
8. Ibid. , p .  34· 
9. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 8 .  
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he notes that not all my cogmttve faculties need to be working 
properly for a belief to have warrant for me. One's memory may 
play one tricks, but that is not a reason to reject introspective be­
liefs. Second, proper functioning also comes in degrees. A faculty 
does not have to be functioning perfectly in order to produce war­
ranted beliefs. Third, that one's environment is misleading need 
not deprive one's belief of warrant. "What counts . . .  are uncor­
rected and uncompensated malfunctionings. "10 
A more central issue is what Plantinga calls the "design plan. " 
Comparing human beings by analogy to an automobile, he sug­
gests that, just as there are specifications for an engine's operation, 
so there are specifications for the way a human being operates. He 
writes that there is 
something like a set of specifications for a well-formed, properly 
functioning human being-an extraordinarily complicated and 
highly articulated set of specifications. . . . Suppose we call these 
specifications a "design plan," leaving open the question whether 
human beings and other creatures have in fact been designed. Then 
of course the design plan will include specifications for our cognitive 
faculties (as well as for the rest of our powers and faculties). They 
too can work well or badly; they can misfunction or function prop­
erly. They too work in a certain way when they are functioning 
properly-and work in a certain way to accomplish their purpose. 11 
Our design plan is such that our faculties are "highly responsive 
to circumstances. "  Intuition, sight, memory, and so forth do not 
all operate the same way. Experience-both sensuous experience 
and the sort of experience involved in feeling impelled or disposed 
to accept a given belief-is important in the responses of our epi­
stemic faculties. And the design plan orders us such that the pur­
pose of our epistemic faculties is the production of beliefs that are 
true rather than false. There may be aspects of the design plan that 
allow for other ends for faculties. It might be part of the design 
plan that a person with an illness that typically leads to death be­
lieves that she will be the exception to the statistics telling her that 
it is highly likely that she will die. This feature of the design plan 
ro. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function," p. 36. 
I I. Ibid. ' pp. 36-37-
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may increase the chances of survival. Nevertheless, she is not war­
ranted in such a belief. Or certain kinds of wishful thinking-that 
one's girlfriend still loves one, for example, when the evidence is 
against it-may reduce one's suffering and hence be a �ood 
thing-part of the design plan-and yet one is not thereby war­
ranted in that belief. And so Plantinga wants to concentrate on that 
segment of the design plan aimed at the production of true beliefs. 
He also argues that his picture of warrant can help us deal with 
Gettier problems: 
We might generalize the idea of a design plan: there is a design plan 
not only for our cognitive faculties, but for the entire cognitive situ­
ation. Take the metaphor in this notion of design more seriously for 
the moment; then the designer of our cognitive powers will have 
designed those powers to produce mostly true beliefs in the sorts of 
situations their owners ordinarily encounter. The designer will be 
aiming at a kind of match between cognitive powers and cognitive 
environment; there will be, we might say, a sort of design plan not 
just for cognitive faculties but for cognitive-faculties-cum-cognitive­
environment. In Gettier situations, however, there are relatively 
minor departures from the design plan for the cognitive situation in 
question; the cognitive environment [or the cognizer's equipment] 
then turns out to be misleading for someone with our cognitive 
powers. And the force of saying that in these cases the beliefs just 
happen to be true, are true by accident . . . [is that] the belie£Is]'s being 
true [are] not a result of things working in accordance with the de­
sign plan. '2 
This account of warrant is, clearly enough, a kind of external­
ism. What are its relationships to internalism? Let me point out 
only a few highlights. In speaking of Alston's account of justifica­
tion-an account that we have seen has both internalist and exter­
nalist components-Plantinga says that, once Alston (rightly) re­
jects the deontological notion of justification, he has to choose 
among many "epistemically valuable but non-deontological states 
of affairs" such as usually believing the truth, now believing the 
truth, having a belief formed by a reliable belief producing mecha­
nism, and so forth. Plantinga suggests that Alston is guided in his 
choice by the received tradition in epistemology which "involves a 
marriage of the idea that deontological justification is central to 
12.  Ibid. , p. 42. 
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warrant . . . with the notion that . a fundamental intellectual 
duty is that of believing only on the basis of evidence. " Hence we 
find Alston's emphasis on grounds and on the accessibility of those 
grounds. But Plantinga notes that the received tradition is incoher­
ent: although it claims that deontological justification is sufficient 
for warrant, clearly it is not. One can have done all one's duties, be 
within one's epistemic rights, and so forth, and yet have little if 
any warrant for one's beliefs. Also, there is supposed to be a con­
nection between evidence and warrant. But the deontologically 
justified belief need not rest on evidence. Plantinga's point is that, 
insofar as Alston's understanding of justification is constrained by 
the received tradition (even though Alston explicitly rejects a 
straightforwardly deontological account of justification) , it foun­
ders on the fact that all we need for counterexamples to it are 
"cases where some phenomenon is in fact a reliable indicator of the 
truth of a proposition, but my believing the proposition in ques­
tion on the basis of that phenomenon arises from cognitive mal­
function. " So even though Alston moves away from deontological 
notions of justification, he does not completely escape their influ­
ence, at least according to Plantinga. 13 
So, says Plantinga, epistemic duty fulfillment is not nearly suffi­
cient for warrant. Since the internalist tradition is, by and large, 
deontologically understood, an internalist aspect to justification is 
not sufficient either. But is it necessary? In particular, is epistemic 
duty fulfillment necessary? Plantinga's answer is an initial no. But 
his answer here is not firm. 14 First he notes that one can conclude 
that in general the doing of one's intellectual duty is neither neces­
sary nor sufficient for warrant. But then he goes on to wonder 
whether it sometimes is important. He specifically wonders how to 
state a question about this issue, for if duty fulfillment is not neces­
sary, how can it be important, ever? He concludes by stating: 
The deontological internalist ordinarily exaggerates our degree of 
control over our own beliefs; and she is certainly mistaken in think­
ing that epistemically dutiful behavior is sufficient for warrant. It 
13. Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, pp. 246, 248, 252. 
14. In, perhaps, more ways than one. What I say and quote in this paragraph is 
not derived from the version of the manuscript Plantinga sent to the publisher. 
The discussion does not, to my knowledge, appear in those final versions. I there­
fore do not wish to put too much weight on this point. 
I76 ]  Rationality and Theistic Belief 
also seems that dutifulness isn't necessary for high degrees of war­
rant (although here there is more room for doubt). Still, there are 
indeed circumstances when a failure to be dutiful is all that stands 
between me and high warrant. And now the main point: when 
things are going properly, when I am behaving in accord with the 
design plan for human beings, I will not be violating my epistemic 
duty. Perhaps it is my duty not to take drugs that will prevent me 
from forming true beliefs or cause me to form wildly false ones; our 
design plan, you might say, presupposes that I �on't do that; it 
makes no provision for my doing that, and if I do that my faculties 
will not produce the results they are supposed to. No doubt it is 
part of my epistemic duty not to try to alter my noetic inclinations 
and tendencies just for the fun of it, to try to become extremely 
skeptical, for example, so that I come to believe next to nothing­
or, on the other hand, to become unduly gullible .... Our design 
plan includes our doing our epistemic duty, at least for the most 
part." 
So there is some kind of "epistemic duty fulfillment intemalism" in­
volved in warrant, but the relationship is not a clear one-except that 
this intemalist aspect is neither necessary nor sufficient for warrant. 
In another place Plantinga allows for an intemalist aspect to war­
rant-conferring circumstances that is not obviously related to de­
ontological considerations. Plantinga notes Alston's rejection of the 
demand that one must know or justifiably believe the epistemic 
principles on which one's beliefs rest. He grants that one may be­
lieve that 2 + 1 = 3 on the basis of its just seeming utterly obvious 
to one. Neither justification nor warrant requires that one have any 
views as to whether its seeming that way to one is a reliable indica­
tion of its actually being that way. But this is not true in all cases, 
says Plantinga. One may believe that a bear has passed by on the 
basis of the way the brush looks; and to have warrant for this be­
lief, one must know or warrantedly believe that the brush's having 
that particular crushed sort of look is indeed a reliable indicator 
that a bear has been by. In summary Plantinga writes: 
So there isn't anything at all like a simple, single answer to the ques­
tion whether warrant for grounded beliefs requires that the subject 
know that the ground is [a reliable] indicator of the belief; some­
times this is required and sometimes it is not. And the reason is not 
1 5 . Quoted from an early draft of Plantinga's work on warrant, the chapter on 
externalism, p. 22. 
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far to seek. In some cases it is perfectly in accord with proper cogni­
tive function to believe A on the basis of B even if you have never 
had any views at all as to whether B is an indictor of A; in a wide 
variety of other cases a properly functioning human being will be­
lieve A on the basis of B only if she has first learned that B reliably 
indicates A; in certain cases where you are aware of partial malfunc­
tion, to have warrant you will have to believe of a ground that it is a 
reliable indicator, even though in the absence of such malfunction 
you would not have had to have any views at all on the subject. Of 
course there will be many other complications. And the point is that 
it is the complex, highly articulated nature of the human design plan 
that makes impossible simple generalizations of these sorts about 
rationality and warrant. 16 
One presumes that such an occasional requirement does not lead to 
an infinite regress of the type that motivates Alston to deny the 
requirement that one be justified in believing the justificatory prin­
ciples that ground one's beliefs. 
The central point in all this is just that the basic idea of Plan­
tinga's account of warrant is extemalist even though intemalist fea­
tures sometimes come into play. These cannot be specified ahead 
of time, for they are dependent on details of the epistemic situa­
tions. In sum, then, Plantinga says, there is a presupposition in 
thinking about warrant in the way he suggests. This presupposi­
tion is that 
when our faculties function in accord with the design plan (in an 
appropriate environment) the beliefs they produce are for the most 
part true .... Further, we take it for granted that these faculties are 
reliable; they not only do produce true beliefs, but would produce true 
beliefs even if things were moderately different .... our presupposi­
tion is that in general (for a person S with properly functioning 
faculties in an appropriate environment, and given the above quali­
fications [not all of which have been discussed in this chapter]) the 
more firmly S believes p, the more likely it is that p is true. 17 
2. Warrant, Knowledge, and the Parity Thesis 
Recognizing that Plantinga's concerns just explained are not 
those of his earlier essays in which he directly argues for an epi-
1 6. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 56. 
1 7. Ibid. ,  p. 19. 
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stemic parity between paradigm and theistic beliefs, it is neverthe­
less worth while to ask how his account of warrant might apply to 
the issue of parity. Can it help PT p1? The first thing to note is the 
obvious role Plantinga's theism has played in the development of 
his account of warrant. This role is explicitly discussed in "Justi­
fication and Theism. " To keep the point short, since Plantinga is a 
theist, it is natural for him to think of humans, made in the image 
of God, as cognitive creatures capable of knowing. Hence God is 
the designer, and the notion of a design plan is a natural outflow­
ing of this view of the world. But Plantinga does not suggest that 
one has to be a theist in order to accept his account, or that his 
account obviously entails theism. It may, but he does not press the 
point. 
Nevertheless, given that God is the maker of the design plan, 
and that he is loving, kind, and interested in us knowing him, it is 
natural to think that God would have included in the human de­
sign plan a way we could come to know God. Plantinga's occa­
sional reference to Calvin's sensus Divinitas illustrates this. What is 
the relationship between these suggestions and the claim that be­
liefs about God can be properly basic? Plantinga himself asks this 
question and urges other theistic philosophers to consider it too. 18 
Clearly, a beliefs being properly basic is not the same thing as its 
being warranted; a beliefs being properly basic is not sufficient for 
warrant. Since proper basicality, as I have been using the term, is a 
kind of justification, and warrant and justification are not the same 
thing, then warrant and proper basicality are not the same thing. 19 
But is a beliefs being warranted (in a noninferential manner) 
sufficient for its being properly basic? This is not clearly the case; 
even though one is generally doing one's epistemic duty when 
one's epistemic equipment is functioning properly, Plantinga indi­
cates that the connection is not a necessary one. So being properly 
basic, that is, being noninferentially normatively justified (being 
within one's rights in holding a belief without discursive evidence) 
is not straightforwardly analyzable in terms of proper function. 
Nevertheless, Plantinga's earlier work certainly relies on the sup­
position that there is one piece of our belief-forming equipment 
r 8. Plantinga, "Justification and Theism," p. 425. 
19. In Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga does make use of the notion of 
basicality in ways not necessarily connected to justification. See Chapters 3 and 5, 
for example. 
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that generates theistic beliefs. So perhaps to the extent that he 
would say that the generation of theistic beliefs is due to the proper 
functioning of our equipment it is fair to suggest that PT PI receives 
some support from his latest analysis. Just as our equipment func­
tions properly to generate and warrant paradigm beliefs, so it oper­
ates to generate and warrant theistic beliefs. To the extent that a 
beliefs having warrant for us makes that belief justified for us, it is 
true to say that Plantinga's analysis of warrant supports PT PI· 
More direct yet is this suggestion. Although epistemic justifica­
tion (and its internalism, deontologism, proper basicality, etc . )  is 
an interesting and important notion, it does not provide us with an 
analysis of the feature that turns mere true belief into knowledge. 
Since we are interested in the strongest account of epistemic parity, 
what more could we ask than to say that propositions about physi­
cal objects, other minds, and the past, on the one hand, and God 
and his actions, on the other, can all be known? So, just as Mary 
can know that there is a tree in front of her, she can know that 
God exists, or perhaps that he wants her to concentrate on philo­
sophical theology rather than the ontology of art. Such a parity 
thesis would certainly be interesting. And I believe Plantinga's 
work might allow him to make such a claim. But let us set knowl­
edge aside for the moment and simply ask about a parity thesis 
making reference to warrant. 
Plantinga might suggest that both paradigm beliefs and theistic 
beliefs have warrant, but since there are levels of warrant, to make 
it a parity thesis he might propose the following: 
Plantinga's Parity Thesis* (PTti) :  For person S, whose 
epistemic equipment is functioning properly in the appro­
priate environment, paradigm beliefs and theistic beliefs 
have the same level of epistemic warrant. 
A more narrowly construed parity thesis is 
Plantinga's Parity Thesis*' (PT;;) :  For a person S, whose 
epistemic equipment is functioning properly in the appro­
priate environment, physical object beliefs and theistic be­
liefs have the same level of epistemic warrant. 
If that level of warrant is strong enough for knowledge, and if one 
believes a true theistic proposition, then one can know the theistic 
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proposition, just as one can know the paradigm propositions, or, 
more particularly, 
J
hysical object propositions. 
Are PTt\ or PT PI true? I suggest not, for something like the rea­
sons we have considered all along. Let us suppose that, for the 
kinds of reasons discussed throughout this essay, even where one's 
equipment is functioning properly, the part that generates and 
warrants theistic belief must rely on background beliefs. Where it 
is justification, as opposed to warrant, that is at stake, the back­
ground beliefs themselves need justification. At least so I have ar­
gued. With warrant, however, this is not true. One's epistemic 
equipment may need background beliefs for the generation of cer­
tain kinds of beliefs, but warrant may derive simply from the 
proper function of the equipment in the appropriate environment 
(and so forth) . The background beliefs appealed to may not them­
selves need to be warranted. Nevertheless, the reliance of our 
equipment on background beliefs worries us epistemically, even if 
no warrant is explicitly required for them. The basic reason for this 
is complexity. There is more room for slip-ups or mistakes. Epi­
stemic practices involving background beliefs may function as well 
as those that do not, but the simple fact of their greater complexity 
warns us away from trusting them as much, even if they are func­
tioning properly in their environment. Put another way, even if 
functioning properly, two practices may function differently and 
one may not function as well as the other. Memory, for example, 
may not be as reliable in producing true beliefs as perception. So, 
noninferential mediated practices may not be as reliable as concep­
tual-reading practices. This is true whether Plantinga understands 
the role of experience to be of the direct Alstonian type or the 
exaggerated Alstonian type considered in earlier chapters. In the 
case of PT�, physical object beliefs and theistic beliefs are always 
separate, epistemically, since the practice delivering one is a nonin­
ferential mediated practice and the practice delivering the other is a 
conceptual-reading practice. The appeal to background beliefs in 
identifying an experience as one of an epistemically unique individ­
ual simply puts epistemic practices that make such an appeal on a 
different epistemic level. This does not entail that one does not 
have warrant for theistic beliefs, or that one can not know them. It 
only says that there is some reason to think that the level of war­
rant is not the same. Furthermore, this does not mean that belief-
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forming practices that are noninferential mediated practices are not 
practices capable of generating warranted beliefs. It may be part of 
the design plan that some practices are noninferential mediated 
practices, just as some practices, or at least some application of 
practices, need access to beliefs about the reliability of the practice, 
as Plantinga suggests. 
What about memory beliefs and beliefs about other persons? The 
issue is less clear, at least to me, in the case of memory. It seems 
that memory is a conceptual-reading practice, or at least not a 
practice in which one uses background beliefs. Suppose one's 
memories are attended by the sensuous experience to which Plan­
tinga refers in several places. Surely one simply forms the memory 
belief in the conceptual-reading manner noted above. At least it 
seems obvious that one generally does not bring in background 
beliefs. If, on the other hand, one's memories are not attended by 
the sensuous experience, as some apparently are not, then it seems 
quite clear that no background beliefs are needed for the formation 
of memory beliefs; they are simply present to one's consciousness. 
The practice or subpractice of generating beliefs about other per­
sons needs further analysis, which I defer until the next chapter. 
Let me just say that, as with PP versus unique physical object prac­
tice, and religious practice versus CP, there seems to be a distinc­
tion between the practice of forming beliefs that categorize what is 
experienced into kinds of things (persons) and the practice of form­
ing beliefs about epistemically unique persons. Insofar as Plan­
tinga's concern is the former, then PTt\ (as well as PT Ph for that 
matter) is not true with respect to other-mind paradigm be­
liefs. 
Back to the main point. There is some reason to think PTt\ is 
not true, most obviously in the case of the parallel between the 
formation and warranting of theistic beliefs and physical object be­
liefs. But even though I suggest that there are different levels of 
warrant for theistic beliefs as opposed to physical object beliefs, 
this does not show that one could not know theistic propositions. 
There is, as Plantinga notes, a minimal level of warrant needed for 
knowledge. But nothing says that a proposition could not have 
more warrant for me than is needed for knowledge (and thus one 
could perhaps know one thing more strongly than another) . So 
even though, as it seems to me, PTt\ is not true, a parity thesis 
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according to which one can know both paradigm beliefs and theis­
tic beliefs might be made out. 
Plantinga's account of warrant does not help the parity thesis 
vis-a-vis justification. In the next chapter I consider a challenge to 
Plantinga's claim that belief in God can be properly basic. It is 
found unsuccessful, but the discussion leads to some further obser­
vations and the development of a new parity thesis that does not 
fall prey, I believe, to the background belief challenge. 
( IO ] 
Confirmation and Theism 
My focus has been to explain and analyze various versions of the 
parity thesis. One goal in this chapter is to explore a challenge to 
Plantinga's claim that theistic beliefs can be properly basic. In 
Chapter 2 I explained Alston's response to a challenge relying on 
the supposed lack of confirmation of theistic beliefs. In Chapter 4 I 
used a similar challenge to refute PT AS· The challenge to Plan­
tioga's position also rests on the notion of confirmation. The lesser 
part of my purpose here is to show that Alston's reply to the con­
firmation challenge is appropriately applied to the challenge to 
Plantinga's position. The more important goal is to use the discus­
sion of confirmation as a springboard to further observations. This 
discussion enables me to develop, in the next chapter, a new parity 
thesis that does not fall prey to the challenges brought against PTA 
and PT PI· Thus, in Sections I and 2 I present what I call the "pre­
dictive confirmation challenge" and show that it fails. Section 3 
fulfills the other goal, that of making certain observations that feed 
into my suggestion that a holistic approach is needed for the justi­
fication of theistic belief. 
I. The Predictive Confirmation Challenge 
The challenge to Plantinga's parity thesis is brought by Richard 
Grigg, who writes: 
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Plantinga points out that a belief such as the one that I had breakfast 
this morning is properly basic in certain circumstances, i.e. , as long 
as I have no reason for supposing that my memory is defective. But 
note that we can trust beliefs such as . . . [the paradigm beliefs] not 
only because we are unaware of defects in our experiential equip­
ment but also because we constantly have outside sources for confir­
mation of such beliefs. Indeed, is it not only through such outside 
sources that we can become aware of a defect in our equipment? For 
example, when I return home this evening, I will see some dirty 
dishes sitting in my sink, one less egg in my refrigerator than was 
there yesterday, etc. This is not to say that .. . ["I had breakfast this 
morning"] is believed because of evidence. Rather, it is a basic belief 
grounded immediately in my memory. But one of the reasons that I 
can take such memory beliefs as properly basic is that my memory 
is almost always subsequently confirmed by empirical evidence. But 
this cannot be said for a belief about God, e. g., the belief that God 
created the world.' 
Grigg's argument, briefly stated, is that paradigm beliefs are 
properly basic because of some type of confirmation they have, 
whereas belief in God is not similarly confirmed. Since according 
to PT PI paradigm beliefs and beliefs about God are both properly 
basic, the lack of confirmation for beliefs about God proves the 
thesis false. That Grigg's confirmation challenge to Plantinga is re­
lated to the confirmation challenge to CP Alston considers is ob­
vious. The deliverances of CP are said not to have the kinds of 
confirmation that the deliverances of PP have, so, although PP's 
results are justified, CP's are not. As we know, Alston argues that 
the challenge is irrelevant to his claims. For the same reasons, the 
challenge is irrelevant to Plantinga's claims. 
Why should Grigg's disanalogy show that theistic beliefs are not 
properly basic? Grigg's assumption seems to be that properly basic 
beliefs are beliefs that are reliably produced by a mechanism or 
practice that generates beliefs about objects that are regular in a 
way that allows for predictions to be made about them. Thus, in­
sofar as Grigg's challenge rests on the belief that confirmation is 
necessary for reliability, his challenge falls prey to Alston's re­
sponse to similar confirmation challenges. The nature of the confir­
mation for which Grigg calls is not clear, however, and some clari-
r. Richard Grigg, "Theism and Proper Basicality, "  p. 1 26. 
Confirmation and Theism ( I 8 5 
fic�tory terminology and distinctions are in order. At one point 
Gngg seems to call for the confirmation of beliefs, as when he sug­
ge�ts that "I had breakfast this morning" is confirmed by there 
hem� �irty dish:s i?-. 
the sink. At another point he seems to suggest 
that It IS the rehabihty (where, I take it, "reliability" refers to the 
tendency t� produce true beliefs) of the belief-generating practice 
�?at stands m �eed of confirmation. Grigg says, for example, that 
my memory IS almost always subsequently confirmed by empiri­
cal evidence. " It is convenient to call the confirmation of a prac­
tice's reliability the "validation" of a practice, reserving the term 
"confirmation" for the confirmation of the truth of a belief Con­
firming that a belief is in fact true, however, does not entail that it 
is pro�erly basic. But one clear feature of properly basic beliefs, 
accordmg to the challenge, is that their confirmation at least makes 
it likely that they are true and thus, perhaps, if not inferred from 
other beliefs, basic and properly so. 
A second point is simply that not every properly basic belief is 
confirmed, and thus confirmation of a given belief is not necessary 
for its proper basicality. Two issues come to mind. First, some 
beliefs, even when we try to confirm them, fail to be confirmed. 
Ne�ertheless, it does not follow that such beliefs fail to be properly 
basic. The memory belief that I took a walk by myself in the 
woods yesterday may not be confirmed because no one else saw 
me. My hiking boots show no evidence of the walk, I brought 
back no evidence of the walk from the woods, and so on. So, even 
though many memory beliefs are confirmed, some are not. Nev­
ertheless, such beliefs do not fail to be properly basic, at least on 
those grounds. The second issue deals with the simple fact that 
many beliefs are not confirmed because we have neither the time 
the interest, nor any special reason to do so. Generally speaking, I 
�o not concern myself with the confirmation of my memory be­
hefs unless there is some special reason to do so. I do not worry 
about :vhether I ate breakfast this morning, unless, for example, I 
am bemg asked by the physician just before she does surgery. If 
my �emory seems vague on the topic, I might then try to confirm 
or disconfirm my memory belief. The failure of a given belief to be 
co�firmed surely does not entail that the belief fails to be properly 
basic. 
Two morals should be drawn here. First, the concern ought to 
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be not that each and every properly basic belief is confirmed but 
that, when, in general, one attempts to confirm certain kinds of 
belief, they are confirmed. There are, however, some exceptions to 
the rule. This brings to focus the second moral, that attention 
should be paid to the source of the belief to be confirmed-the 
epistemic practice-rather than to the belief alone. This brings 
Plantinga's and Alston's positions close together on the issues of 
confirmation and reliability. Some important relationships seem to 
hold between the confirmation of beliefs and the validation of the 
practice that generates the beliefs. One of these relationships �ay 
be, for example, that, since many beliefs generated by a gtven 
practice are confirmed, the practice is validated. If this relationship' 
were to hold, then it might be enough for defense of Plantinga's 
theory against the confirmation challenge to show that, if the prac­
tice from which a belief comes is validated as reliable, then any 
belief generated by the practice, all other things being equal, can be 
legitimately taken to be properly basic. Here we find a potential 
explanation for the fact that we generally trust our beliefs even 
though not every belief can nor should be confirmed. But, as Al­
ston correctly notes, such an approach to showing a practice reli­
able is epistemically circular. Thus, talk about validation on 
Grigg's behalf is better recast in terms of the rationality of engag­
ing in such practices. More on this below. 
We cannot yet reply to the confirmation challenge. The nature 
of confirmation and validation remains unclear. How exactly 
are we to understand the challenge? We can take one clue from 
W. V. 0. Quine, who has taught us well that beliefs do not face 
the tribunal of experience alone. The web of our beliefs is complex 
in many ways, not the least of which is the very detailed set of 
confirming and disconfirming relationships that hold between one 
and another belief (or sets of beliefs) and between beliefs and expe­
rience. What I suggest here is that this web of belief and experience 
provides various understandings of the nature of confirmation 
from within, depending on the kind of belief one considers. To 
develop this point, we can concentrate initially on beliefs and expe­
riences having to do with the physical world, drawing out some 
implications of Alston's suggestion about the practices he calls b�­
sic. Recall that a basic practice is "one that constitutes our baste 
access to its subject matter. [For example, ] we can learn about our 
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physical environment only by perceiving it, by receiving reports of 
the perceptions of others, and by carrying out inferences from 
what we learn in these first two ways. We can not know anything 
a priori about these matters, nor do we have any other sort of 
experiential access to the physical world. "2 Alston's suggestion, in 
part at least, is that any judgment about the truth or falsity of a 
claim about the physical world (or the reliability or unreliability of 
a practice giving us information about the world) must be made 
within the epistemic practice that provides access to the physical 
world. There are, to be sure, some overlapping situations. For ex­
ample, memory might be partly but not wholly validated by what 
we learn from perception (a second practice) , even if the remaining 
parts involve appeal to memory. But the basic point stands: we 
think that paradigm beliefs have a link to something that makes 
them likely to be true only because we accept (pragmatically) the 
practices that generate them. It is only within the basic practices 
that we discover the nature of the physical world that gives the 
paradigm beliefs that confirming link. Alston goes further than this 
with his doxastic practice approach when he suggests that we 
should understand reliability through the notion of rationality. 
Compatible with this position is the suggestion that, because of 
the nature of the physical world and the epistemic practices we use 
to form beliefs about it, we take confirmation to be predictive in a 
certain way; we take it that, when we go about confirming the truth 
of a certain belief, we ought to look to see if certain other things 
are true. We expect certain features or facts about the world to 
become apparent to us as we continue to use the epistemic practice 
(and its many subpractices) that grants us access to the physical 
world. If, for example, I want to confirm that I see a tree, I look 
again or ask someone else to look. Similarly with nonperceptual 
practices. If I believe that I ate breakfast (a memory belief) and I 
wish to confirm it, I look to see if I left dirty dishes in the sink. 
Since physical objects do not normally disappear from view with­
out some reasonable explanation, and since my epistemic faculties 
are operating normally (as far as I can tell from within the prac­
tice) , I fully expect to find my beliefs about the world confirmed 
when I try to confirm them. Thus, as Alston suggests, PP is self-
2. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief, " p. II7. 
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supported; it is then prima facie rational to engage in PP and, fur­
thermore, the rationality that attaches to engaging in PP extends 
beyond the kind that comes from the trivially supported type of 
self-support accruing to all epistemic practices. 
2. The Failure of the Predictive Confirmation 
Challenge 
Grigg's challenge, interpreted through the notion of basic pra�­
tices, comes to the following. Although many of the paradigm 
beliefs can be confirmed (and their corresponding practices vali­
dated) in a predictive way, theistic beliefs and practices cannot. 
Therefore, theistic beliefs cannot be properly basic. We have al­
ready seen, in Chapters 2 and 3, that this kind of predictive confir­
mation challenge fails, according to Alston, because of irrelevance. 
Alston's response to the fact that CP lacks confirmation whereas 
PP does not is that the perceptual world is regular, and on the basis 
of this regularity we can confirm and disconfirm our beliefs. The 
physical world and our access to it are predictable simply because 
the things about which we are seeking confirmation are regular 
and predictable. We do not, however, find the regularities in our 
access to God or his activities that we find in perceptual or mem­
ory experiences. The regularities in religious experience are absent 
not because of any fault in our epistemic faculties but because the 
object about which we seek information is not regular or predict­
able; God is not predictable. We can say, in summary, that theistic 
beliefs are not confirmed and the practice by which theistic beliefs 
are formed is not validated-not nontrivially self-supported-sim­
ply because the attempts at validation and confirmation depend on 
the regularity of the objects that the beliefs are purportedly 
about. 
This much we saw in Chapters 2 and 3. But the additional, posi­
tive claim Alston makes, which I have mentioned before but only 
briefly, is that if the confirming features were true of CP they 
would tend to show CP unreliable. Alston writes: "The reality CP 
claims to put us in touch with is conceived to be vastly different 
from the physical environment. Why should not the sorts of pro­
cedures required to put us in effective cognitive touch with this 
reality be equally different? Why suppose that the distinctive fea­
tures of PP set an appropriate standard for the cognitive approach 
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to God?"3 In other words, our access to God and information 
about him is different in an important way from our access to per­
ceptual objects. The object of the former lacks the regularity of the 
object of the latter. Whereas the breakfast dishes I put in the sink 
remain there, enabling me to perceive them (ceteris paribus) when 
I try to, God does not act in this predictable fashion. 4 We do not 
even know which features of things, if any, God typically uses to 
reveal himself. For all we know, there is no typical revelation of 
God. But there is an explanation for this lack of regularity: God's 
revelation of himself is not confined by the regularities of the natu­
ral order. The lack of regularity in our experience of God, then, is 
no reason to reject the reliability of the practice by which we some­
times form beliefs about him or his activities. In fact, if some of the 
things Christian's believe about God are true, then not only is pre­
dictive confirmation not necessary for the trustworthiness of the 
practice of forming theistic beliefs, but if we did discover great 
regularity in God's dealings with us we would have reason to dis­
trust the deliverances of the practice. 
Simply stated, then, the Alstonian reply is that the predictive 
confirmation challenge is irrelevant. An account of confirmation 
internal to one kind of practice cannot be relevantly applied to an­
other kind of practice. That theistic belief-forming practices do 
have predictive confirmation available for their deliverances should 
be no surprise. Let us consider an example that illustrates the reluc­
tance of theists themselves to appeal to predictive confirmation. 
The prayer of a Christian student that he score well on the medical 
school entrance examinations may not be answered affirmatively. 
Thus, a belief formed in the context of the prayer, for example, 
"God will help me do well on the exams, " would remain uncon­
firmed. In this case it is not that one cannot imagine what will 
confirm the belief but rather that one receives more or less direct 
disconfirmation. This in itself is not a problem for the notion of 
predictive confirmation of theistic beliefs, but it does point in the 
general direction of a rather telling fact about the way theists deal 
with confirmation. Many Christian theists specifically make al-
3 .  Ibid . ,  p. 1 28. 
4. There may be an object of the belief that remains regular. For example, in a 
case in which "God created the flower" is taken to confirm that "God created the 
world, " the flower is regular (parallel to the dishes) although God is not. On the 
analysis supplied, however, the latter irregularity is the real issue. 
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lowances for "unanswered" prayer. Hence they would admit that 
prayer-related beliefs such as "God will help me to score well on 
the examinations" often fall into one of two categories. They are 
either forthrightly disconfirmed (God does not act as the theist ex­
pects, as when the prospective medical student fails the entrance 
exams) or they are neither confirmed nor disconfirmed (at least 
immediately-perhaps God makes the student wait for years to 
take the exams) . In fact, the mature believer would say that such 
beliefs ought to be held with a great deal of tentativeness, if th�y 
are held at all. 
This does not mean that one could never receive confirmation of 
this type, 5 and many theists do take events in their lives as confir­
mation that God exists or that he wants them to do one thing 
rather than another. Nevertheless, it points out a certain reluctance 
on the part of theists "to put God to the test" or to be so pompous 
as to think that they have this kind of access to the mind or will of 
God. The central point is that, although one might receive confir­
mation of these specific beliefs on occasion, theists are reluctant to 
claim that such confirmation is readily available. The question to 
be asked is why theists make such allowances. The lesson to be 
learned is that theists understand that God's actions toward us are 
not always predictable, at least not in the same manner as natural 
phenomena. For all the importance of predictive confirmation in 
realms dealing with physical objects, it is clearly not as important 
to theists or to the practice by which they form beliefs about God. 
In short, basic practices can give us different, internal accounts of 
what confirmation should look like, and to apply the standards 
internal to one kind of practice to another is simply to apply an 
irrelevant standard. Perhaps, then, we should look for another 
kind of confirmation for theistic beliefs. 
3. Nonpredictive Confirmation 
I turn now to explore two examples, one theistic and one deal­
ing with a human person. My purpose is twofold. I note both 
5. As already noted, however, a great deal of such confirmation might tend to 
show the theistic belief practice unreliable. Still, one could receive such confirma­
tion on occasion without it affecting one's judgment of the practice's reliability. 
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differences and similarities between the two kinds of examples in 
terms of confirmation and epistemic justification. I also provide 
further grounds for my Alstonian observation that, although the 
theist might know what would confirm her theistic beliefs, she 
does not know when or if the confirmation will occur. The main 
implication of this observation is that there is a kind of nonpredic­
tive confirmation that, given the framework of basic practices de­
veloped by Alston, is exactly what one should expect given the 
nature of beliefs about individual persons and God. 
Grigg gives an example of a theistic belief that is unconfirmed, 
at least in terms of predictive confirmation: God created the world. 
How might one approach confirmation of such a belief? It cannot 
be done through predictive means, for the object of the belief­
God-is not predictable. So, for what kinds of things should one 
look? Two possibilities suggest themselves. First, it might be 
enough for the provision of confirmation if there were some non­
theistic event or fact to which one has epistemic access; that is, it 
might be enough to confirm the belief that God created the world 
if we can discover some ordinary, nontheistic fact about the world. 
If this is enough, then one could have confirmation via a nontheis­
tic belief-forming practice such as one of the paradigm practices­
perception, for example. Take the mere existence of the world. 
After all, if God created the world, then the world must exist. And 
surely we can discover that the world exists. The second possibility 
is that we need some other theistic belief to provide confirmation. 
If this is the case, perhaps the practice through which one forms 
theistic beliefs must come into play. This, and thus that nonpredic­
tive confirmation for theistic beliefs is a possibility, is what I argue 
here. 
Return now to the first alternative. It perhaps provides some 
kind of confirmation. It seems, however, that if confirmation of 
theistic beliefs occurs through a nontheistic practice, the confirma­
tion provided is very weak. Consider this analogy. Suppose it is 
suggested that the belief "Kirsten created this sculpture" is con­
firmed by the fact that this sculpture exists. Now, although it is 
surely true that the creation of something entails the entity's exis­
tence (or at least entails that the thing exists for some time), the 
entity's existence seems to do little to confirm the belief needing 
confirmation. It is best described as a fact that is necessary to the 
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confirmation but not sufficient for confirmation. Thus, although 
the sculpture's existence can immediately be inferred from 
Kirsten's creating it, the discovery of the sculpture does little to­
ward confirming that Kirsten created the sculpture. The same 
seems to be true in the theistic case. If the existence of the sculpture 
were enough to provide confirmation for the belief that Kirsten 
created the sculpture, then the analogous theistic belief about God's 
having created the world would be confirmed by the existence of 
the world. But in neither case does the mere existence of the entoity 
in question confirm one's beliefs about its creator. What seems to 
be needed is an experience of, or belief about, the world (or the 
sculpture) that more strongly links it to its creator. 
We can now turn to the second possibility for confirming theis­
tic belief, in which another theistic belief is needed for the confir­
mation. Here I appeal, once again, to Alston's notion of a basic 
practice. Continuing with the sculpture analogy, what is needed to 
confirm that Kirsten created the sculpture is some information 
about the sculpture that more strongly links this sculpture to 
Kirsten's creative touch. What could this link be? 
Although many suggestions could be made, perhaps we can di­
vide the various options into three types. First, there could be 
some sort of uniquely identifying features of the sculpture that al­
low one to judge that it is indeed Kirsten's creation. One could be 
an expert on Kirsten's style, for example, and be able to recognize 
this piece as being in her style. Second, one could rely on the au­
thority of someone who knows that this sculpture is Kirsten's cre­
ation; perhaps an expert testifies to the claim or perhaps one is told 
by a friend that this sculpture comes from Kirsten's creative hand. 
Finally, perhaps the creator herself informs you that the sculpture 
comes from her hand; maybe Kirsten simply tells you that she 
made it. All these link this sculpture to Kirsten. 
Some observations about the sculpture example can provide in­
sight into the possibility of nonpredictive confirmation of theistic 
beliefs. Parallel to the sculpture case, there seem to be three possi­
ble means of linking the theistic belief to be confirmed with the 
world created. First, one may be an expert on God's "style" and 
thus be able to recognize the world as being in that style. Second, 
one may be told (perhaps by one's parents or one's religious com­
munity) that the world was created by God. Third, one may be 
told by God that he created the world. 
Confirmation and Theism [ I 9 3 
What do we learn from these three parallel pairs of possibilities? 
First, on the assumption that I am an expert and that I am paying 
attention and trying to see whether this sculpture did indeed come 
from Kirsten, I should be able to find features that (more or less) 
uniquely identify this sculpture as Kirsten's creation. But note that 
at some point I have to learn that this style is Kirsten's style. There 
is nothing at the phenomenological level that allows me to identify 
this object as the unique one that is the center of my concern. Nor 
is there anything that uniquely connects the object to another indi­
vidual qua that unique being. To return to the language developed 
earlier, one simply cannot develop conceptual-reading beliefs about 
such situations. There is always information in the background 
somewhere that has significant content about the individuals in­
volved. This information is held in the form of beliefs; more than 
just a conceptual scheme is needed. Thus, one does not link the 
unique features of some object to a unique person without at some 
point learning about the intimate connections between the two; 
and what is learned has substantial belief content. So it is with 
God's creative work, or at least one might suspect. One cannot 
know that this world was created by God through unique features 
of the world unless one follows through with a learning process 
that moves beyond a conceptual-reading level. 
The comparison indicates some disanalogies as well. There are 
two. First, what is the significance of "being an expert"? Are there 
any experts when it comes to recognizing God-touched features of 
the world?6 But a more important disanalogy is that there appear to 
be no uniquely identifying features of the world that link its cre­
ation and God's creative touch. Unless one claims that the world's 
apparent design is sufficient to conclude Christian theistic creation, 
I see little promise here. So, although there are some interesting 
parallels between the Kirsten case and the case of God in terms of 
where one might look for confirmation (both involve background 
content beliefs) , there is an important difference in that when it 
comes to God's creation of the world there appear to be no unique 
features of the world that can be attributed only to God (or least 
none to which we have epistemic access) . Why the God and Father 
of Jesus Christ, for example, instead of Krishna? 
6. It might be interesting here to look closely at how difficult it is to become an 
art expert and the interesting phenomena surrounding forgeries in the art world. 
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I suggest that in fact this disanalogy teaches us something im­
portant about CP. I have already noted (Chapter 8, Section I) that 
CP needs Christian* beliefs to generate religious beliefs with spe­
cifically Christian content. I argued that these background beliefs 
need justification. Where are they to be found? My argument is 
that such a demand leads to either an infinite regress of justification 
or natural theology (or other inferential reasoning) with a Christian 
result. Neither of these is felicitous for the Reformed epistemolo­
gists. But there is another possibility that I considered briefly 
(Chapter 7, Section 6) : a theistic, nonlawlike externalism. 
This kind of externalism is not lawlike in that its working in us 
is not natural (in a sense that allows for predictive possibilities) but 
supernatural. It depends on God's inclining himself toward us and 
not on some lawlike mechanism. It is rather like the reliabilism 
Alston rejects in arguing that justification is not simply reliability 
but has, rather, a reliability constraint. He says that it may be that 
accurate weather predictions simply pop into my head-but I have 
no access to their source even though they are reliable. Rather like 
that, perhaps God simply pops things into the theist's head. Let us 
call this "theistic reliabilism. " But would this reliable source of be­
lief provide the kind of justification required for Christian* beliefs? 
Certainly not on Alston's account of justification, for theistic re­
liabilism has no internal access as Alston requires. What about ac­
cording to Plantinga's view? Insofar as one is impelled to believe 
these God-inspired beliefs (and one has met whatever normative 
requirements there are) , they would meet Plantinga's criteria for 
justification or proper basicality. But that is just to raise an impor­
tant question about the extraordinarily weak notion of justification 
in which Plantinga's account of proper basicality is embedded. 
Why should we take such beliefs to be justified, even prima facie? 
Alston seems to have the happier account of justification here, and 
once again, the theistic reliabilism I have suggested does not spec­
ify an internalist constraint. 
Why not add one? The answer is that, unlike other reliable prac­
tices in which one can return again to the practice for "retesting, " it 
is not clear that one can do so with CP. The account of God pro­
vided by CP is one of a deity who hides himself. One can have a 
religious experience and never have another by which to test the 
first. At least with the human case-Kirsten and her sculpture-
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one can check the features of Kirsten's style, or check with Kirsten 
herself, or ask other experts. In the religious case, can these other 
approaches be used to check earlier experiences? Perhaps, but an­
other problem arises here. 
Recall my distinction between CP and religious practice. Al­
though it is true that many, if not most, Christian believers have a 
large number of religious experiences, they must learn to take 
these as Christian experiences since nothing in the phenomenon of 
the experience is explicitly Christian. What is the source of the 
Christian content? This brings us to the second possibility noted 
above, my being told by my parents that God created the world. Is 
this really parallel to my being told by a friend that this is Kirsten's 
sculpture? In the case of the sculpture there are other means of 
checking the story. I can appeal to features of the sculpture that 
pick it out as Kirsten's or I can ask Kirsten. 7 Can I ask God? Per­
haps, but asking does not imply receiving a reply. Of course, the 
same is true for Kirsten; she does not have to grace us with a reply 
either. And here we learn something of value. The access we have 
to information about persons qua unique individuals depends in an 
important way on the self-revelation of the person involved or on 
information given to us by others. Let me expand on this. 
Just as I must learn from someone to take the markings on the 
sculpture to be in Kirsten's style, thus connecting this sculpture to 
Kirsten, so I must learn to take religious experiences to be Chris­
tian. Where do we learn such things? Barring prophets and the 
founder of Christianity, we learn the set of Christian beliefs, sym­
bols, and concepts from our parents, the broader Christian com­
munity, and, more generally, the entire tradition-its history, 
myths, and scriptures. Here what Reid calls-and the Reformed 
epistemologists call attention to-the "credulity disposition" is im­
portant. We all have a natural disposition to trust what others tell 
us. This disposition is modified as we mature as epistemic agents. 
We learn not to trust certain people, or not to trust them on certain 
issues. This disposition, I suggest, is important in the formation of 
Christian beliefs (as well as those of competing traditions such as 
7· The former approach seems ruled out in the God case, for there may be no 
unique features to which I can appeal as evidence that this world was indeed cre­
ated by God. 
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Buddhism or Hinduism). In fact for most of us-once again bar­
ring prophets and religious visionaries-this is the sole source of 
our Christian framework of beliefs and concepts. But one of the 
things we learn as we mature epistemically is that, although much 
of what we learn through the credulity disposition is true, when it 
is crucial we should check the claims of others ourselves. 
Is it crucial to do so for the Christian tradition? It appears so, for 
the tradition is in competition with others as it claims exclusive 
truth for its central beliefs. And unlike other epistemic practices 
that are conceptual-reading practices, CP is not-it is completely 
self-contained in its belief content. By "completely self-contained" I 
mean that, for those in the tradition whose sole source of that be­
lief content is the authority of others, we must either find some 
means of checking our employment of the credulity disposition or 
recognize the rather radical circularity of our Christian world view. 
The former seems unlikely, for the only people who seem to have 
access to Christian truth by some means other than the word of 
other Christiaas are the prophets and founders. This brings us to 
the third possibility suggested above, that I am, or some human is, 
told by God that he created the world. But just how would God 
communicate such a thing? Scripture tells us, but that is little if any 
better than being told by a friend. And prophets are the source of 
Scripture. Furthermore, information we have about the prophets is 
largely internal to the tradition, its scriptures, and its authority; 
once again we must rely on the credulity disposition. Even if we 
could ask Jesus himself-and what better source than him to ask­
if he is the Son of God, would we not have to take his word for it? 
Not even his miracles take us from this-worldly events to theo­
logically laden beliefs. Although they are certainly surprising, all 
historical research can give us that they happened. What history 
does not give us is why they happened, and in particular that they 
happened at the hand of God. So this route seems unpromising­
unless, perhaps, one wants to return to natural theology. But even 
here it seems that we cannot get explicitly Christian results but at 
best only a rather generic theism. 
What of the other option-recognizing the rather radical circu­
larity of the Christian world view? This is the position I believe we 
should take, but not without noting the fact that such circularity 
has been thought by many to provide justification for the beliefs 
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the circle contains. This is a holistic kind of justification, or  at  least 
a justification with a strong holistic component. This should not, I 
think, be a surprise, for when I presented the account of exagger­
ated CP above I in effect greatly loosened the justificatory connec­
tion between the experiences that are the occasion for the genera­
tion of theistic beliefs and the resulting theistic beliefs. This is an 
important claim of the holist: experience is the genesis of belief but 
is not needed for justification. This distancing of justification from 
experience is no less true for CP. Although there is a religious 
experience at the bottom of CP, the generation and justification of 
the explicitly Christian reading of that experience depends wholly 
on other Christian beliefs. I have more to say on this below. 
Now, this all seems parallel to cases of linking individual hu­
mans to their activities. It seems clear enough that the belief or 
experience needed for confirming that Kirsten created the sculpture 
is one that makes reference to Kirsten. It is not sufficient to know 
some "bare" fact about the sculpture, that is, a fact that stands free 
of some attribution of Kirsten's activity or even, for that matter, 
the fact that some person created it. So it seems with the belief that 
God created the world. If the world's existence is to be understood 
to confirm the belief that God created the world, there must be 
some information that links the world to God besides the original 
belief. There must be some means of access to further theistic data 
for the confirmation of theistic beliefs to occur. And this is, I sug­
gest, just where the holist justification, with its reliance on the cre­
dulity disposition, comes into play. 
The theist may be quite willing to suggest that she does have 
access to further theistic data. The theist may receive confirmation, 
on occasion, that God created the world. The predictive confirma­
tion challenger can point out, however, that this access fails to 
have an important feature. The access to theistic data needed for 
confirmation does not, unlike the access to ordinary perceptual ob­
jects, allow for predictive confirmation. Why? Because whatever ac­
cess one has to the needed information-information that has a 
theistic component-relies on God's revealing himself or his activ­
ity. When trying to confirm that it is the desk in my office that had 
ink spilled on it, I can put myself (typically) in a position to con­
firm it by looking (again) to see if the ink stain is still there. But I 
cannot put myself in a position for God to speak to me and be in 
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the least guaranteed that he will. Although one can predict what 
event would confirm a theistic belief (e. g. , God's telling us he did 
something) , one cannot predict the occurrence of the event. Its oc­
currence relies on God's action, to which we have no predictive 
access. In summary, with perceptual beliefs and PP there appear to 
be (under many if not most circumstances) means by which we can 
predict the occurrence of happenings or events that would confirm 
the belief in question. Although sometimes these predictions fail, 
generally they do not. We believe this because the predictions" rely 
on a certain understanding of the physical world and the epistemic 
practice through which we have access to that world. This under­
standing is internal to the set of beliefs we have about the world, 
the experiences we have of the world, and the practice through 
which these two are connected. Furthermore, the perceptual epi­
stemic practice can become internally validated through repeated 
confirmations, allowing us generally to trust the practice as reli­
able. With theistic beliefs the case is different. We can say what 
(theistic) facts or events might provide confirmation, but we can­
not say ahead of time when (or even if) we will have access to 
them; we cannot predict their occurrence. I suggest that the prac­
tices through which we have access to God, through which we 
form theistic beliefs, do not give an understanding of God that 
provides for predictive confirmation-and that is precisely as it 
should be. The same is true, however, for belief-forming practices 
that provide us with beliefs about epistemically unique, spatiotem­
porally nonrooted individuals, especially those with free will. 
There is no epistemic access to such individuals apart from the 
practice that generates beliefs about them. One must always turn 
to the same practice (or subpractices) to confirm the belief in ques­
tion. And with these practices there is no predictive element. The 
objects of the beliefs are unpredictable, just as God is. 
To complete the discussion of our examples, one further issue 
needs consideration. There is a sense in which any person holding 
the belief "God created the world" has access to the information 
needed to confirm theistic beliefs. For example, it follows imme­
diately from the fact that God is the creator-sustainer of the world 
that God created the flowers, the hills, the trees. It might be sug­
gested that these (theistic) beliefs provide the needed confirmation. 
I believe this suggestion does not suffice, for this "access" is not 
really access and therefore does not provide an interesting kind of 
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confirmation. Grigg speaks of the confirmation being "outside. " 
Although it is less than fully clear what Grigg means by outside 
confirmation, it surely should not include confirmation by beliefs 
whose truth is known simply by an immediate, one-step inference 
from the belief needing confirmation. 
The problem can be seen by exploring the following case. Con­
sider meteorologist Smith who, after research, forms the belief p 
that sundogs can be seen whenever conditions C are met. As she 
continues her research, Smith discovers that conditions C are, in 
fact, about to occur. To confirm her belief, she predicts that at 
time t and location 1 a sundog will appear. Those conditions come 
about, the sundog appears, and Smith has confirmation of p. Now 
Smith holds the belief that sundogs appear under certain condi­
tions. Were she merely to infer that a sundog did in fact appear 
under those conditions, without the corresponding experience, she 
would not have truly confirmed her belie£ Armchair science is ruled 
out. Likewise, without some further data beyond the theistic belief 
"God created the world, " confirmation seems unlikely. The confirm­
ing information must be generated from an "outside" source. 
This raises the important issue: what exactly is the appropriate 
sense of "outside"? I do not think I can provide a full answer to this 
question. Two things can be noted, however. First, I have already 
suggested that to be outside is to extend beyond immediate infer­
ences from the belief to be confirmed, beyond what can be done in 
the armchair. Second, in some ways confirmation is always "in­
side. " This is where Alston's notion of basic practices, the notion 
of epistemically circular reasons, Alston's larger doxastic practice 
approach to epistemology, and the possibility of holistic justifica­
tion come into play. The sculpture analogy is a case in point. What 
confirms the belief that Kirsten created the sculpture is an aware­
ness of a further fact connecting the sculpture to Kirsten's creative 
work. The information needed for confirmation must make refer­
ence to or contain at least some of the members of the very set of 
notions contained in the belief being confirmed. A belief about 
Kirsten must be confirmed by some further information about 
Kirsten; a belief about God must be confirmed by further informa­
tion about God. 8 
8. It is not clear that one can draw a hard and fast conclusion on this point. For 
example, the confirmation in the breakfast case does not directly rely on the notion 
200 ] Rationality and Theistic Belief 
A somewhat different although related point is that I have access 
to this connecting information by Kirsten telling me, someone else 
telling me, or some feature "telling" me that Kirsten did indeed 
make the sculpture. The source of the confirming data is, presuma­
bly, the same source as (or a source closely allied with) the source 
from which I derived my original belief. Otherwise the content of 
the data is not likely to be immediately related. It seems true that 
there are only a limited number of means through which one has 
access to the needed information and also true that certain kinds of 
information can be discovered only by certain kinds of approach. 
This is in part the point of Alston's suggestion that beliefs about 
physical objects are formed through a basic practice. My claim is 
that I came to hold the belief that Kirsten created the sculpture via 
a belief-forming practice that relies on someone telling me 
(whether Kirsten or someone else) or recognizing that the sculp­
ture is one of Kirsten's and that any confirmation I come by is not 
outside these practices (or closely related practices) and their related 
beliefs and experiences. 
The lesson I wish to draw from these observations is that it ap­
pears that confirmation is circular in two senses. First, confirma­
tion seems to rely on the fact that the confirmation available for a 
given belief must typically appeal to the epistemic practices and 
related beliefs and experiences that formed the original belief need­
ing confirmation. Thus, if there is a link between confirmation and 
validation, one might begin to suspect that it is somewhat circular. 
Such confirmation and validation are not "outside" in any absolute 
sense. Second, confirmation is circular, since even how it should be 
conceived is dependent on the practice and the nature of the objects 
about which the practice provides us beliefs. For practices dealing 
with regular predictive things, confirmation should be predictive. 
For those not dealing with predictive things, confirmation should 
not be predictive. Accordingly, if confirmation is to have an epi­
stemic role, one should suspect that that role has a large holistic 
component, especially where a noninferential mediated practice is 
at stake.9 
of breakfast. It does, however, seem to rely indirectly on the notion: there is one 
less egg in the refrigerator because I ate it for breakfast. 
9. A general note on this chapter. Alston makes the point, in Perceiving God, pp. 
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A New Parity Thesis 
One goal in this chapter is to suggest and explore a new parity 
thesis in terms of its appeal to holistic principles, Reid's credulity 
disposition, and the theistic nonlawlike externalism introduced 
briefly earlier. A second goal is to consider two potential rejoinders 
to the position developed here. In Sections 1-3 I concentrate on the 
first goal; in Sections 4-6 I deal with the second. 
1 .  Interpersonal Practice and the New Parity Thesis 
Many of the concerns uncovered in the discussion to this point 
grow out of two issues. The first is that according to both PTA and 
PT� epistemic parity exists between theistic beliefs that are about 
an epistemically unique, spatiotemporally nonrooted individual­
God-and beliefs about epistemically unique but spatiotemporally 
rooted things. The second issue is the confirmation of justified be­
liefs. Just what constitutes confirmation, what role does it play in 
justification, and do theistic beliefs have it? 
Taking these in order, the first issue suggests that perhaps a suc­
cessful parity thesis is to be found in beliefs that parallel one an­
other more closely-in a comparison between beliefs about God 
understood as an epistemically unique, spatiotemporally nonrooted 
individual and beliefs about other individual entities akin to God in 
just that way, that is, epistemically unique and spatiotemporally 
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nonrooted. Humans fit the bill here, and something to which Al­
ston alludes can help us get started in our thinking about a new 
parity thesis. In wondering whether there is some way CP 
"proves" itself, as PP does with all its "payoffs in terms of predic­
tion and control of the course of events," Alston calls attention to 
another epistemic practice: 
interpersonal perception, our awareness of other persons as persons. 
There is controversy over whether to regard this as an autonomous 
practice or simply as a department of perceptual practice, but I shall 
adopt the former view. That is, I shall suppose that we have a prac­
tice of objectifying certain ranges of our experience in terms of the 
presence, condition, characteristics, and activities of other persons, 
and that this practice can no more be justified from the outside than 
any of the others we have been considering. It is, in a way, inter­
mediate between PP and CP. In particular . . .  its internal self-justi­
fication is not so purely in terms of predictive efficacy as is PP. To 
be sure, by perceiving what we do of other persons we are thereby 
enabled to anticipate their behavior to some extent, and this is of 
pragmatic value. But persons are notoriously less predictable than 
things, and the value of this practice for our lives is not restricted to 
that payoff. To compensate for this relative unpredictability there is 
the possibility of entering into communication, fellowship, compe­
tition, and so on with other persons. And, most basically, that is 
what this practice enables us to do. ' 
Alston notes that this practice is intermediate between CP and 
PP. He does not say in detail exactly in what regard this is true. He 
would, I am sure, include the fact that persons are less predictable 
than things and that God is even less predictable than we humans. 
But I believe there is another important distinction to which Alston 
does not call attention but toward which I have been aiming. The 
practice through which we generate Christian theistic beliefs is a 
practice that has, as its central focus, a single epistemically unique 
spatiotemporally nonrooted individual-God, and his desires, 
thoughts, and actions. God is the only member of his kind. Inter­
personal perception does not have as its focus the solitary member 
of a kind. Here I wish to distinguish between interpersonal percep­
tion, as the practice through which we generate beliefs about per-
r. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief, "  pp. 1 3 1-32. 
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sons qua persons, and another practice through which we generate 
beliefs about persons qua epistemically unique individuals. Alston's 
discussions do not make such a distinction, but it is precisely this 
failure that leaves his position open to the background belief chal­
lenge. The practices that generate beliefs about individuals qua 
epistemically unique spatiotemporally nonrooted individuals re­
quire background beliefs for the formation of their deliverances, 
and thus all such practices are noninferential mediated practices (or 
perhaps, if some are inferential, then simply mediated) . 
As Alston notes, there is debate about whether interpersonal 
perception is an independent practice or a sub practice of PP. Like 
that, one might debate the existence of independent practices that 
generate beliefs about epistemically unique objects and suggest that 
they are subpractices of broader practices. So, for example, the 
practice that allows us to come to know Tom versus Tim, and Jack 
versus Tom, and so forth, is really a subpractice of interpersonal 
perception, the practice that allows us to generate beliefs about 
persons qua persons. I treat them as independent practices. 
I suggest that some of the practices that generate beliefs about 
individual things qua epistemically unique spatiotemporally non­
rooted individuals are on the same level as CP. These practices are 
more parallel to CP than they are to PP. Let us call the practice that 
allows us to generate beliefs about persons qua persons "interper­
sonal perceptual practice" and the practice that allows us to gener­
ate beliefs about persons qua epistemically unique individual per­
sons "unique person practice. " What kind of beliefs does 
interpersonal perceptual practice generate? Interpersonal perceptual 
practice is closer, I think, to religious practice than to PP. Whereas 
PP gives us fairly clear and specific sortal beliefs-that thing is a 
tree, for example-religious practice does not. Religious practice's 
deliverances, recall, are somewhat vague and general recognitions 
of a reality beyond the physical and the (humanly) personal. Inter­
personal perceptual practice, I suggest, gives us (more or less) gen­
eral beliefs about the realm of the humanly personal. It is interper­
sonal perceptual practice that allows us to recognize that we are in 
the company of personal beings rather than merely physical things. 
It is a difficult practice to describe, or to individuate, for we almost 
always engage in unique person practice when we engage in inter­
personal perceptual practice. Whenever we form beliefs about per-
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sons based on experience, we pick out individual persons (either by 
proper names, indexicals, or unique descriptions) and not just the 
reality of the personal. Nevertheless, our ability to pick out the 
personal from the nonpersonal seems necessary for us to pick out 
the individual person. 2 
Given this distinction between unique person practice and inter­
personal perceptual practice, and continuing with Alston's concern 
with rationality, a new parity thesis can be suggested: 
Parity ThesisNew (PT N) : Under appropriate conditions, 
engaging in CP and engaging in unique person practice 
have, for S, the same level and strength of overall ratio­
nality. 
There is no extension to beliefs, for overall rationality, as we have 
been using the term, is a metaepistemological notion applicable 
only to the evaluation of practices. 
Why suggest parity only between CP and unique person practice 
and not either unique physical object practice or memory beliefs 
about epistemically unique things? In the latter case, as I indicated 
earlier (Chapter 9, Section 2), memory beliefs are formed by a con­
ceptual-reading practice. There appears to be no parallel to unique 
person practice or CP. Although we do have memory beliefs about 
epistemically unique individuals, it is not clear that they are gener­
ated or justified in a way different from memories about anything 
else. Perhaps this is because the kind of experiences attached to 
memory beliefs is always internal to the rememberer. 3 As to the 
former, it seems to me that, because of the regularity of physical 
objects and the intimate connection between this regularity and the 
spatiotemporal nature of these objects, a practice for the generation 
and justification of beliefs about unique physical objects is best un­
derstood as a subpractice of PP. Unique physical object practice 
turns out, thus, to be a conceptual-reading practice. The identifica­
tion of epistemically unique physical objects seems to rely in im-
2. Consider a young child's ability to tell the difference between a stuffed, grey 
toy cat and a real grey cat-or science fictional androids who are supposedly con­
scious or alive and the confusion this engenders for legal cases against the androids. 
3. Plantinga has some interesting comments about the role of experience in 
memory; see Warrant and Proper Function, Chapter 3 .  
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portant ways on the spatiotemporal web that is part and parcel of 
the world picture of PP, as well as on the predictive nature of PP. 
Another way to state this point is that this subpractice does not 
seem to be independent of PP and its requirements in the manner 
in which CP is independent of religious practice, or unique person 
practice of interpersonal perceptual practice. CP and unique person 
practice seem, in short, to be noninferential mediated practices and 
therefore entirely self-contained in terms of their belief content. 
We have seen this with CP: the Christian content seems to be 
wholly internal to that religious tradition and is communicated 
through authority and the credulity disposition. I submit that 
unique person practice functions in roughly the same way. Our 
coming to learn the names of people, and hence to identify and 
reidentify them, is entirely internal to the authority of others, the 
credulity disposition, and certain social relationships conditioned 
by these first two factors. Accordingly, if our unique person prac­
tice beliefs are justified, it is through holistic considerations and not 
experiential ones (more on this below) . I think, then, that PT N 
stands the best chance of being true, rather than a parity thesis in 
which CP is paired with unique physical object practice or a prac­
tice generating memory beliefs about epistemically unique individ­
ual things. 
One final point needs to be clarified. In Chapter 5 ,  Section 2, I 
argued that one could rank epistemic practices within the subclass 
of nontrivially self-supported practices. This could be done, I said, 
on the basis of the closeness of the cognitive connection between 
experience and belief (the issue of conceptual-reading vs. nonin­
ferential mediated practices) . I also called attention to Alston's 
claim that one might rank practices from a cognitive point of view 
because of features such as predictive power, and I raised the issue 
of the relationship between these "cognitive attractions" and what I 
argued above are the epistemically important roles of the back­
ground beliefs. One might raise the following question: if concep­
tual-reading practices are epistemically and not simply cognitively 
superior to noninferential mediated practices, then why cast PT N 
in terms of rationality rather than justification? Briefly, it seems to 
me that Alston's characterization of the relationship of the justifica­
tion of beliefs to doxastic practices is correct, and, although we 
have an intuition about the epistemic superiority of conceptual-
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reading practices over against noninferential mediated practices, 
this intuition rests in the cognitive attractiveness of the former over 
the latter. At the end of the day, the best way to get at these rank­
ings, even though they have an epistemic justificatory component, 
is to discuss them in the metaepistemological framework of ratio­
nality, with its internal judgments that the practices are more, or 
less, reliable. In addition to this point, I believe that, although the 
distinction between conceptual-reading and noninferential medi­
ated practices is an epistemically important one, the epistemic ad­
vantage of the former over the latter does not remove the latter 
from being reliable or justified. 
PT N has, then, at least one advantage over the others we have 
considered. It does not fall prey to a disanalogy in regard to the 
need for background beliefs. Both CP and unique person practice 
are noninferential mediated practices. The obvious question to ask, 
however, is why this is an advantage, since I have already argued 
that the appeal to background beliefs seems to force the Reformed 
epistemologist into either natural theology (or other inferential evi­
dence provision) or an infinite regress of justifications, in either 
case calling the Reformed epistemology project into question. The 
best response to this issue is seen in the move to certain holistic 
considerations that seem to be required by noninferential mediated 
practices or at least such practices that strongly rely on their back­
ground beliefs. I have hinted at certain aspects of these holistic con­
siderations. In the next section I make them at least somewhat 
more explicit. Natural theology or arbitrariness are not the only 
options for CP's background beliefs. 
2. Comportment and Confirmation 
Beliefs are not held individually; they are held in complex 
groups. The web of belief is intricate. The relations between one 
belief and another, and between beliefs and experiences, are not 
easily untangled. This complex of beliefs and experiences might be 
described in terms of beliefs more or less "fitting" well together, 
"cohering" well together, or, as I say here, "comporting" well to­
gether. The example of remembering eating breakfast this morn­
ing provides an illustration of what I mean by comportment. But, 
208 ] Rationality and Theistic Belief 
before looking at the example, some observations are in order. 
First, consider the more traditional models of foundationalism such 
as those that emphasize self-evidence or incorrigibility as the crite­
rion for proper basicality. On such models a person would, under 
normal circumstances at least, not attempt to confirm a properly 
basic belief. After all, a basic belief has the advantage of being so 
well grounded that no other belief is more firmly grounded. Thus, 
not only is there supposed to be no need for further justification or 
confirmation, no such justification or confirmation is even 'possi­
ble. To which beliefs would one appeal? Properly basic beliefs are 
considered certain or unassailable in terms of their epistemic justi­
fication. No other belief or set of beliefs could provide assurance of 
justification for a properly basic belief, because no other belief is 
more firmly justified. On such models properly basic beliefs are 
considered to have a privileged epistemic status. 
With weaker models of foundationalism, Plantinga's included, 
basic beliefs do not hold such a special status. They can be chal­
lenged, and one may then wish to appeal to other beliefs to shore 
up the status of the belief in question. Returning again to the dis­
cussion of the confirmation challenge, recall that Grigg claims that, 
although we constantly have outside sources for confirmation of 
such beliefs, this shoring up does not provide justification. He is 
correct, if justification's only source is experientially grounded. 
Here Grigg seems to be wary of the danger of letting beliefs slip 
from a properly basic status to an inferential status. But if confir­
mation provides holistic grounds for justification, and Plantinga's 
account of coherence systems is correct (i. e. , given that coherence 
provides justification, all justified beliefs in coherent systems are 
properly basic) , 4 then the beliefs in question can remain properly 
basic even though other beliefs are involved in their justification. 
Putting this concern into Alston's language, such beliefs could be 
justified by coherence relationships but not be mediated inferen­
tially. Furthermore, confirmation need not be understood in a 
strictly predictive manner. Instead, we may simply appeal to the 
fact that under most circumstances the paradigm beliefs comport 
well with the rest of our experiences and noetic structure. 
4. See Plantinga, "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in 
God, " pp. 1 23-26. 
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What does it mean to say that a belief comports well? Return 
now to the breakfast example. Even on the weaker foundational 
models one would not, in most circumstances, worry about con­
firming one's belief that one ate breakfast this morning. It is a 
memory belief and under typical conditions can be legitimately 
taken to be properly basic. Although I may rely on the fact that the 
practice that generated this belief-memory-is validated by many 
other sets of circumstances and beliefs, I do not typically set out to 
confirm my memory beliefs or to validate the practice from which 
they come. But suppose I have the belief that I ate breakfast this 
morning and then come home to discover that there are no dirty 
dishes in the sink. This bit of information may be disconcerting, 
for I know that this week my wife is away on one of her research 
trips, my son is with some friends, no one else has a key to my 
condo, I never wash the dishes in the morning because they are 
few (being aware of our current drought, I do not wish to waste 
water in a half-empty dishwasher), and so forth. Now, to discover 
a lack of dirty dishes at least generates a certain amount of wonder; 
why are there no dishes in the sink? Here we have a lack of com­
portment between belief and experience (or the belief generated by 
the experience)-a lack of confirmation, as it were. 
How can this lack of comportment be explained? There are 
many ways, no doubt, but one example suffices. Although I do 
remember eating breakfast this morning, what I had forgotten is 
that I woke up late and therefore merely stopped for a doughnut 
on the way to work rather than taking time to cook. This explains 
the lack of dishes in the sink, and now the complex of my noetic 
structure confirms the original belief. The lack of comportment I 
discovered initially as I found the sink barren of dishes is explained 
by reference to other factors. The important thing to note is that 
my belief is related in detailed ways to my other beliefs and experi­
ence and that these relations provide a certain kind of confirma­
tion. Also important is that one cannot tell ahead of time which 
(set of) belief(s) will be problematic in the face of new experiences 
or beliefs that lack comportment with present beliefs. 
Given this somewhat broader understanding of confirmation, 
the theist can suggest that she has what I call comportment among 
her theistic beliefs, or at least comportment similar enough to that 
found for beliefs delivered by unique person practice to allow the 
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move from that comportment to the status of being nontrivially 
supported (in Alston's sense) . From there she may legitimately 
claim that many of her theistic (or Christian) beliefs are properly 
basic or immediately justified. I believe there is comportment for 
PP's and interpersonal perceptual practice's deliverances as well. 
These constitute nontrivial self-support for those practices. Com­
portment for CP and unique person practice's deliverances plays 
dual roles, however. Not only does it provide nontrivial self-sup­
port for the practices, but it provides justification for the beliefs in 
question. This is necessary for the deliverences of CP and unique 
person practice, for they do not have the advantage of being expe­
rientially justified as do the deliverances of PP, interpersonal per­
ceptual practice, religious practice, and unique physical object 
practice. 
3· Examples 
I think the best evidence for these claims is to develop a set of 
examples of unique person practice beliefs and CP beliefs that 
comport well with other beliefs and experience, within their re­
spective frameworks. That, at least, is the approach I take here. 
First consider unique person practice and its deliverances. Our 
use of proper names for individual humans is in many ways philo­
sophically problematic. What do we do when we pick someone 
out of the crowd with such utterances as "Stan went over there"? Is 
"Stan" to be understood as a definite description or a proper name? 
What is the nature of reference? What about extension, or inten­
sion? Fortunately, here we need not worry about these issues. I 
want simply to call attention to certain epistemic considerations 
that come into play with our everyday use of proper names in 
perceptual contexts. Note, first, that when one learns to pick out, 
perceptually, a unique individual person one either has to be intro­
duced to that person by the individual in question or by someone 
else. One is told (by an authority) that "this or that individual" is 
"so and so" -that person by the tree wearing the bright orange 
shirt is Stan (or, in first person, "I am Stan") . Our credulity dispo­
sition is activated at the very introduction of the name and the link 
to its referent. Is there some independent vehicle for checking this 
information? Maybe one could attempt to verify the information 
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by checking the government records, but here one still relies on 
authority. Once the name is learned-once the person is epi­
stemically baptized with the name-we can only appeal to mem­
ory or other "reintroductions" to access the information. Where do 
beliefs thus generated get their justification? The best one can do is 
appeal to that initial learning situation and the trust we have in the 
source. Wherein lies that trust? The credulity disposition, as noted 
above, is modified as we mature epistemically. We learn to trust 
others, but only with discrimination. In particular, some people are 
bad with names. It is in circumstances in which one believes one's 
sources not to be good with names that one's belief that that is 
Stan needs confirmation-at least explicitly. And so we listen to 
others' identifications of the person in question and in particular 
note the extent to which the belief (or its near relatives) is socially 
embedded. Once we have the belief that Stan is such and such a 
person, then we learn to use and apply the name in appropriate 
contexts. In particular, we learn how Stan (typically) looks or acts: 
that he has certain features (a young face for his middle-fifties, and 
slightly stooped shoulders) or that he is habitual in certain ways 
(his office door is always closed when he is working inside, he is 
friendly with David but he greatly dislikes Sue). It is this complex 
of associations, physical and social, along with other background 
information (such as that Stan is back from vacation) that allows 
unique person practice to generate beliefs such as "Stan is coming 
down the hill. " But suppose I know that Stan said he would not be 
back in town until the 2oth and it is only the I 5th, and the figure I 
see, although it has stooped shoulders and a characteristically 
youthful facial appearance, is laughing and talking with Sue? Then 
unique person practice does not, except when not working well, 
generate the belief "Stan is coming down the hill. " In short, we 
learn to generate beliefs about epistemically unique individual per­
sons-and are justified in holding these beliefs-only if they com­
port well with other beliefs and experiences. 
In short, justification of unique person beliefs is holistic in these 
ways. First, no experience itself (qua phenomenon) gives us beliefs 
about persons qua epistemically unique individuals. There is al­
ways reliance on ,authority and credulity. There is, then, some kind 
of experience that is the source of belief, but the experience itself 
does not justify beliefs generated by it. Second, such beliefs either 
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fit or do not fit with our other beliefs and experiences. They either 
comport well or they do not (there is, of course, a continuum 
here) . When they do, they are justified. 
What of the deliverances of CP? Theists, in particular Christian 
theists, do not hold their religious beliefs as free-standing beliefs. 
Much as humans hold more ordinary beliefs in complex patterns 
and with more or less loose relationships to experience, theists or­
ganize their religious beliefs in patterns that entangle beliefs �me 
with another as well as with experience. For example, the belief 
that God loves me is often connected to beliefs about God's provi­
dential care for me. Beliefs about God's providential care may well 
be related to beliefs about God's gracious activity in molding my 
character, to beliefs about the activity of God through the loving 
actions of others, or to beliefs about God's meeting my needs, 
emotional and otherwise. Furthermore, these beliefs may well be 
entangled with some of my experiences. 
Consider this. The pastor of a church believes that God cares for 
her and her church deeply, but the pastor is discouraged about the 
progress in her parish. New converts are not coming into the faith, 
the parishioners are not as active as they ought to be, and the like. 
Suppose, however, a parishioner who has not been active is coun­
seled by the pastor. This is the beginning of an education in the 
meaning of Christian service and in the meaning of sharing the 
gospel. The parishioner begins to serve and to share. Eventually, 
through the work of this parishioner, the parish begins to grow, 
people begin new relationships with God and other people, and so 
forth. Over a period of time, the discouragement wanes, the pastor 
is renewed. She has, it appears, had confirmation that God does, 
indeed, care for her and her church. 
A further example. Christians and Jews believe that the dove is a 
symbol of the renewal of the world. Noah sent out a dove when 
he tested to see if the waters of the great flood had subsided. The 
dove was sent out three times. On the first it returned not having 
found a place to rest. It returned from the second carrying a newly 
sprouted olive leaf to Noah. On the third it did not return. Noah 
then knew the waters had abated. And for the Christian there is an 
additional layer of meaning: the dove is also a symbol of the Holy 
Spirit. When Jesus came to John the Baptist to be baptized, "the 
spirit, descending as a dove, " came to rest on Jesus (John I :J2, 
NASV). These symbols are entwined in the minds of many Chris-
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tians by the belief that the Spirit is both the Comforter and the 
Creator, the one who encourages and the one who renews the 
world. The Spirit, the dove, is thus considered the one who re­
news discouraged believers. Now suppose a Christian, holding a 
set of beliefs such as those described, becomes discouraged. He is 
questioning whether God really cares for him. As he walks out 
among the trees of the church grounds, a dove descends and 
alights on his shoulder. The bird rests there for four or five min­
utes, as the Christian considers his plight, his commitments, his 
God. Could this dove's activity be taken as confirmation that God 
does indeed care? As the dove wings its way back toward heaven, 
the Christian feels his burdens lightened and a sudden rush of joy 
fills his heart; he is emotionally and spiritually renewed. Although 
the link may be weak from the point of view of a nontheistic web 
of belief, for the Christian holding a full-blown set of theistic be­
liefs this event would be very strong confirmation that God does 
indeed love and care for him. 5 
There are clear parallels to our beliefs about individual humans. 
Suppose I am discouraged by a disagreement I have some morning 
with my wife. On arriving at work later that day, I find some 
freshly cut blue flowers in my office. Knowing that the first 
flowers I ever gave my wife were blue, that they have become a 
symbol of faithfulness and love for us, that many if not most peo­
ple would not give flowers to a man, I believe that these flowers 
came from my wife. I cease being discouraged, believing that all is 
well with our relationship. 
A final example. Suppose a committed Christian-call her Re­
becca-believes that God calls some people to leadership. In fact, 
Rebecca believes that God wants some believers to be in leader­
ship, in particular academic leadership. Suppose further that after 
prayer Rebecca has the impression that God wants her within the 
halls of academia. Thus motivated, she acts in ways consistent with 
5· A series of events similar to these happened to my pastor, Curtis D. Peter­
son. On reading part of an earlier draft of this essay, Burleigh T. Wilkins noted 
that my pastor was lucky that the dove wasn't a turkey vulture! But what would 
such an event have meant for the Christian? Perhaps nothing, or perhaps it would 
have been understood as one more bit of evidence for the evil in the world. How 
Christians respond to such evil can itself be part of the web of belief and experience 
which, when taken together, provides confirmation for the Christian worldview. 
Compare the stories of Job and Habbakuk from the Hebrew testament. 
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this impression; she asks her academic advisers about her suitability 
for further graduate work. She is encouraged to, and does, apply 
to several of the best graduate schools. In the midst of this en­
deavor, Rebecca maintains her cautious skepticism. She thinks ac­
ceptance at these schools quite unlikely. As human beings are wont 
to be, she is not particularly self-assured. 
To complicate matters, Rebecca is married to another graduate 
student. She is concerned that her marriage remain strong, for a� a 
Christian she believes God is unhappy with broken relationships 
and, in particular, broken marriages. In this regard, she is con­
cerned that her husband's career not be adversely affected by her 
plans coming to fruition. Finally, suppose Rebecca is also concerned 
that she not go further into debt to pay for her education. She is thus 
inclined to pray that, if God truly wishes her to attend graduate 
school, he confirm her rather tentatively held belief that she should 
go to graduate school in order to be eventually enabled to work 
within academia. Specifically, she asks God for the following two 
things. First, if she is to attend one of these graduate programs, God 
must provide sufficient funds so she can avoid further debt. Second, 
if she is to attend, her husband's career ought not to be hurt. 
In light of the first request, three things occur. First, Rebecca is 
admitted to four of the five Ivy League schools to which she ap­
plies. Second, three of the four schools that grant her admission 
provide financial support. Third, two of the three schools offering 
support provide very large financial packages, one covering three 
years of tuition and living expenses, the other covering four years. 
This appears to be confirmation that God wants Rebecca in gradu­
ate school and, by extension, that he wants her in academic ser­
vice. As to the other request, Rebecca's husband, having not yet 
finished his Ph.D . ,  is offered a one-year teaching post (an event, 
given the job market of recent years, that is nigh unto a miracle in 
itsel£1) .  This offer is quite unexpected and certainly furthers his ca­
reer more quickly than were he not gaining teaching experience. 
Rebecca's attending the graduate school of her choice seems to be 
open at this point and her belief confirmed. 
The web of Rebecca's belief system is complicated; the experi­
ences she has and beliefs she later forms comport well with the 
belief that God wants her to serve within the halls of academia. 
This case and the earlier two (and others that can be generated 
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easily) seem close enough to cases of unique person practice belief 
and unique person practice experience comportment to allow the 
move to proper basicality or justification for Christian theistic be­
liefs; one's engaging in such practices is rational and nontrivially 
supported. 
Furthermore, unique person practice and CP are parallel in more 
than the comportment of their deliverances with other beliefs and 
experiences. They also have quite parallel self-support in terms of 
relational development. As Alston notes, CP receives nontrivial 
self-support from the fact that its participants develop spiritually. 
In short, they mature and develop in their relationship to God. 
Unique person practice allows us to develop similarly in our rela­
tionships to other people. Alston claims that it is interpersonal per­
ceptual practice that does this. More likely, I believe, it is unique 
person practice, for in most cases our relational skills develop only 
where we know, more or less intimately, other people. Interper­
sonal perceptual practice, as I characterized it, is not the practice 
that allows us such intimacy. But there is no hard and fast rule 
here. Interpersonal perceptual practice can perhaps generate beliefs 
such as "humans are the types of beings who suffer when in pain" 
even when I have no names attached to them, and hence no inti­
macy. I can still feel impelled to provide aid and thus become more 
relationally sensitive. Parallel to this, religious practice may make 
us more religiously sensitive, but it is only the intimacy allowed by 
CP (or other practices, e.g. , Buddhist practice, Hindu practice) 
that provides for deep spiritual and relational growth. 
In short, these sets of beliefs and experiences, when the beliefs 
and experiences are taken together, seem to provide some reason 
for one to think that the Christian theistic beliefs in question are 
true (or at least as much reason as in unique person practice cases, 
given that there too confirmation comes from within the very 
practice from which the original belief came) , even though the sit­
uations and circumstances are not predictable. They thus give the 
theist some reason to take her beliefs to be properly basic or imme­
diately justified, even though the experience that provides for their 
genesis does not function in a justificatory manner. It is, of course, 
important to remember that comportment is not (typically) con­
sciously inferential. When it is, then the beliefs generated are not 
basic or immediate. 
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4· The Anything-Goes Challenge 
The critic is likely to raise a challenge to PT N that is related to 
the confirmation challenge. She can claim that the problem with 
these examples is that, although it may be true that the suggested 
beliefs comport well with other beliefs held by the Christian or 
theist, just about any experience or belief can be taken to comport 
well with such beliefs. The theist can twist and turn to make any 
beliefs or experiences fit. The important question, the critic con­
tinues, is this. What exactly does not comport well with the theist's 
beliefs? Let us call this the "anything-goes challenge. " 
The anything-goes challenge introduces some new issues into 
the discussion which merit attention. Perhaps the challenge is cor­
rect. The disanalogy is not that theistic beliefs do not comport well 
with other beliefs and experiences but that they comport too well. 
Perhaps theistic noetic structures can be manipulated to fit what­
ever facts come along, whereas nontheistic structures cannot. The 
anything-goes challenge is a kind of arbitrariness challenge. It is 
reminiscent of the challenge brought against theists by Antony 
Flew in the now famous discussion "Theology and Falsification. " 
There Flew challenges the religious believer thus: "What would 
have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof 
of the love of, or the existence of God. "6 Now, Flew's challenge is 
intimately tied to the question of the falsifiability of theological 
assertions, but we can avoid that issue to concentrate on another. If 
we rephrase Flew's challenge in terms of the present discussion, it 
can be understood in this way: just what set of beliefs and experi­
ences would lead the theist to conclude that there is a lack of com­
portment within the theistic noetic structure? 
Considering Basil Mitchell's parable given in response to Flew's 
challenge sheds some light on this issue: 
In time of war in an occupied country, a member of the resistance 
meets one night a stranger who deeply impresses him. They spend 
that night together in conversation. The Stranger tells the partisan 
that he himself is on the side of the resistance-indeed that he is in 
command of it, and urges the partisan to have faith in him no mat-
6. Antony Flew, R. M. Hare, and Basil Mitchell, "Theology and Falsifica­
tion, " in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. Antony Flew and Alasdair Mac­
Intyre (New York: Macmillan, 1955),  p. 99. 
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ter what happens. The partisan is utterly convinced at that meeting 
of the Stranger's sincerity and constancy and undertakes to trust 
him. 
They never meet in conditions of intimacy again. But sometimes 
the Stranger is seen helping members of the resistance, and the par­
tisan is grateful and says to his friends, "He is on our side." 
Sometimes he is seen in the uniform of the police handing over 
patriots to the occupying power. On these occasions his friends 
murmur against him: but the partisan still says, "He is on our side. " 
He still believes that, in spite of appearances, the Stranger did not 
deceive him. Sometimes he asks the Stranger for help and receives 
it. He is then thankful. Sometimes he asks and does not receive it. 
Then he says, "The Stranger knows best. " Sometimes his friends, in 
exasperation, say "Well, what would he have to do for you to admit 
that you were wrong and that he is not on our side?" But the parti­
san refuses to answer. He will not consent to put the Stranger to the 
test. And sometimes his friends complain, "Well, if that's what you 
mean by his being on our side, the sooner he goes over to the other 
side the better. "7 
[ 2 1 7 
Mitchell's parable is rich in insight and deserves fuller treatment 
than I give here. I wish to concentrate on only one facet. The parti­
san has some experiences that do not comport well with the rest of 
his Stranger beliefs. When the Stranger is in the uniform of the 
police and turns over members of the resistance to the enemy, the 
partisan wonders about the loyalty of the Stranger. One might 
even imagine a slightly different-but more existentially power­
ful-parable in which the Stranger appears to be turning over the 
partisan himself to the enemy. Surely neither of these events com­
ports well with the partisan's commitment to the Stranger's being 
"on our side, " just as the theist's commitment to the love of God 
may not comport well with the appearance of God's giving the 
theist over to evil. But in neither the Stranger nor the God case 
does the believer hurriedly give up the belief in question. 
This brings to light an important fact. Although it is true that 
some things may not comport well with a given theistic structure, 
this seems equally true of nontheistic structures. If we take a natu­
ralistic (read: the physical universe is all there is) worldview to be a 
competitor of the Christian worldview, we discover that not all the 
7- Ibid. , pp. 103-4. 
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"facts" always fit. Suppose we take the scientific theorizing of the 
naturalist to be (roughly) parallel to the theologizing of the Chris­
tian, and then take scientific methodology to be a subpractice of 
PP. I do not mean to conflate science and naturalism here. Rather, 
I am relying on what appears to be the temptation, and indeed 
practice, of many naturalists to take science as the best approach to 
the discovery of the most general truths about "all that is. " On this 
kind of naturalism, PP, scientific methodology, and the scientific 
theorizing that go along with them take on the role of being the 
primary, if not the only, means of obtaining truth. Insofar as the 
naturalistic worldview provides control over what will or can be 
taken to be factual or meaningful, metaphysics reduces to the re­
sults of science. Accordingly, science can be construed as essential 
to naturalism in a way that it is not to theism. But I do not mean 
to suggest that science and naturalism are identical, nor that science 
has no home within a theistic worldview. 
With this framework understood, consider the problem of 
anomalies in scientific theorizing. What does one do when one's 
theory conflicts with some newly discovered data or when one's 
confirming experiment fails to confirm? Or what happens when 
one's naturalistic science runs up against an apparent miracle? 
Something has to be given up, but it is not always clear which 
belief (or beliefs) ought to go. Sometimes it is hard to tell, and the 
best policy is to wait. This is, indeed, what the naturalist does. 
Likewise with the theist, at least on occasion. There are things that 
engender a lack of comportment with a theistic noetic structure, 
and it may appear to the anything-goes critic as if the theist can 
take anything to comport. But this is not the theist's special prob­
lem. The theist learns to live with some of that lack of comport­
ment, as does the naturalist. 
Mitchell rightly recognized a similar thrust behind Flew's chal­
lenge and hence raised a question of his own parable: when does it 
become silly for the partisan to continue to believe in the Stranger? 
We can paraphrase the question and ask at what point it becomes 
silly for the theist to modify her noetic structure so that any experi­
ence or belief comports well. Such a point exists, or at least so it 
seems. Plantinga, for example, admits that counterevidence against 
theistic belief may lead one away from theistic belief. Ultimately, 
then, not just any and all beliefs or experiences can be made to 
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comport well with theistic beliefs. Although one must admit that 
some theists may be irrational and allow anything to comport well 
with their theistic beliefs, we need only consider a believer who is 
closer to being a model of rationality. The anything-goes chal­
lenge, I claim, does not apply to her. 
Which beliefs and experiences can and which cannot be made to 
comport well with the rest of one's noetic structure must be de­
cided on an individual basis. But it seems that the critic who ac­
cuses the theist in general of taking just any and all beliefs and expe­
riences as comporting well with her noetic structure is wrong. 
Suppose Rebecca, after her prayer, had not received financial aid. 
Suppose further that her husband did not obtain a job. Could she 
have incorporated these events into her noetic structure and main­
tained it as well-comporting? Do these experiences and beliefs con­
tinue to fit with her belief that she should go to graduate school? 
Possibly. Suppose Rebecca also believes that God is testing her 
faith; she understands these new circumstances as God's means of 
encouraging her to fulfill her commitment of faith to him in some 
other way. As noted in Chapter 10, one of the cautions mature 
Christians often urge on the younger is that requested confirma­
tion not be of a predictive variety. The premedical student who 
asks God to help him do well on the entrance exams fails to get the 
kind of confirmation he wishes. A caution against expecting too 
much, however, does not mean that God never provides. 
But there are some things that Rebecca could not incorporate, at 
least not in any simple way. Suppose her husband becomes quite ill 
and she is needed at home. Or suppose it becomes clear that Re­
becca's attending graduate school will indeed bring her marriage to 
an end. Depending on how deeply rooted her commitments to 
marriage are and perhaps on how deeply entwined her beliefs 
about marriage are with Christian beliefs, she may be unwilling to 
understand these new events as comporting well with her belief 
that God wants her to attend graduate school. Clearly she is wrong 
about something, and given the hierarchy of beliefs she has within 
her noetic structure, it would seem that her belief that God wants 
her in graduate school is the one that should be given up. Not just 
anything comports well with a theistic noetic structure. 
If the anything-goes challenger is persistent, she might press 
again. She might suggest that, with enough alterations in the the-
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ist' s noetic structure, Rebecca can make these beliefs comport. She 
may need to alter her understanding of God in some radical way­
maybe God is really evil and intent on destroying her marriage. At 
this point the defense can rest on two points. First, such a radical 
modification of Rebecca's noetic structure seems to destroy the claim 
that it is theistic or at least that it is specifically Christian. To demand 
this much of one's noetic structure in order to retain one's commit­
ment seems somewhat disingenuous. Second, if theistic structQres 
face the problem of radical noetic modification to protect a cherished 
belief, a similar point is true of nontheistic noetic structures. 
This last point can be fleshed out. R. M. Hare's contribution to 
the "Falsification and Theology" discussion can help here: 
A certain lunatic is convinced that all dons want to murder him. His 
friends introduce him to all the mildest and most respectable dons 
that they can find, and after each of them has retired, they say, 
"You see, he doesn't really want to murder you; he spoke to you in 
a most cordial manner; surely you are convinced now?" But the 
lunatic replies, "Yes, but that was only his diabolical cunning; he's 
really plotting against me the whole time, like the rest of them; I 
know it I tell you. " However many kindly dons are produced, the 
reaction is still the same. 8 
Clearly the lunatic is prepared to take any experience to be consis­
tent with his belief that the dons want to murder him. Nothing 
will stand in his way. 
The lesson to be drawn from this parable for the anything-goes 
challenger seems to be that the reading of a set of beliefs and cir­
cumstances can vary widely and that the possibility of such a wide 
variety of changes in one's noetic structure is not limited to theists. 
One can always attempt to add explanatory epicycles to one's be­
liefs in order to hold on to them. When should one add epicycles? 
That varies with the circumstances and with the depth of ingres­
sion of the beliefs involved. How many and what kind of epicycles 
can be rationally added is a function of how deeply entrenched the 
beliefs are in one's epistemic structure and how much other evi­
dence is connected to the beliefs. These issues cannot be decided 
independently of looking at a given noetic structure. 
8. Ibid. ,  pp. 99-IOO. 
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If the picture presented here is correct, the anything-goes chal­
lenge is met. Not just any data can be made to comport well with 
one's theistic noetic structure, at least for the model rational theist. 
There comes a point beyond which it is silly to add explanatory 
epicycles to one's noetic structure. Furthermore, just as one can 
move beyond being a model rational theist, one can move beyond 
being a model rational nontheist. There is nothing unique about 
theistic noetic structures, at least in this regard. 
5 .  Religious Plurality Revisited 
A second challenge to PT N depends again on the existence 
of diverse religious epistemic practices. The critic might challenge 
PT N in the following way. There is an important difference be­
tween unique person practice and CP. Those who engage in 
unique person practice with particular persons do not generally dis­
agree about the existence or the characteristics of persons with 
whom they do not (but others do) engage in unique person prac­
tice. And those others can come to engage in unique person prac­
tice with the persons with whom the former engage in it without 
giving up all previous involvements. But among the beliefs in­
volved in CP is the belief that there is only one God and that that 
God has certain characteristics. Therefore, one cannot engage in 
CP and, for example, Jewish practice or Muslim practice or Hindu 
practice. Thus, the decision to engage in CP implies the decision 
not to engage in any of these other particular religious practices. 
But those who engage in CP typically do not merely refrain from 
engaging in these other practices. They also claim that these prac­
tices are based on (or essentially involve) false beliefs. But there is 
no analogy to this in unique person practice. In short, to engage in 
CP I must hold that there are false beliefs involved in the religious 
practices of others, but to engage in unique person practice with 
my colleagues I do not have to hold that there are false beliefs 
involved in the interpersonal belief-forming practices of other peo­
ple. Nor do I have to hold that people engaged in unique person 
practice with those with whom I do not engage in it are all some­
how badly mistaken about the existence or characteristics of those 
with whom they engage in unique person practice. If it is said that 
adherents of different religions are not involved with a different 
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deity but instead have different beliefs about the same deity, then 
one should still have to ask why one should think that distinctively 
Christian beliefs about this deity are correct. The presence of this 
feature in CP (and presumably in other religious practices as well) 
raises the specter of arbitrariness again. The same sorts of confir­
mation available to Christians who engage in CP would be avail­
able to Jews who engage in Jewish practice and to Muslims who 
engage in Muslim practice. And it is likely that confirmations actu­
ally occur in the lives of people engaging in Jewish practice and 
Muslim practice in roughly the same quantity and quality as the 
confirmations that occur in the lives of those who engage in CP. 
But some beliefs essential to each of these practices seem to contra­
dict each other, so they cannot all be true. For example, either God 
reconciled the world to himself in Jesus or God did not, so either 
Christians or Jews are wrong on this matter. Why then engage in 
CP rather than Jewish practice, Muslim practice, or Hindu prac­
tice? PT N turns out not to be true, since there is a kind of arbitrari­
ness involved in engaging in CP that does not exist when one en­
gages in unique person practice. Let us call this challenge the 
"religious plurality challenge. "9 
There are several issues involved in the religious plurality chal­
lenge to PT N• but perhaps the central one is that anyone engaging 
in CP must claim that those who engage in other competing reli­
gious epistemic practices have false beliefs. In short, there are inter­
practice contradictions. This criticism has similarities to the chal­
lenge of religious diversity to the parity thesis between PP and CP 
which is the straw that breaks the camel's back in Alston's discus­
sion. Recall that, according to Alston, the challenge of religious 
plurality to the rationality of engaging in CMP (CP) arises in the 
following way. Even if the perceptual beliefs we have about God 
do not conflict themselves, the practices forming such beliefs are 
still subject to serious conflict by virtue of the associated belief sys­
tems. Given the rich diversity among religious doxastic practices, 
only one, if any, of the practices can be reliable. Why suppose it is 
CP? There are many reasons internal to CP, but we seem to need 
9. The source of this criticism is an anonymous reviewer for Cornell Univer­
sity Press. Although not an exact quotation, the previous two paragraphs are a 
very close paraphrase of a section of the reviewer's report to the press. 
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reasons external to the practice, since all the practices presumably 
have internal reasons. 
As we have seen, Alston argues that this fact does not dissipate 
the justificatory efficacy of CP, but it does reduce the strength of 
justification for CP vis-a-vis PP, and therefore a parity thesis be­
tween PP and CP is not forthcoming. Similar points can be made 
about CP here. CP is not stripped of its rational efficacy because of 
plurality. But then the religious plurality challenge does not sug­
gest that it is. The criticism is that PT N is not true not because CP 
lacks rationality altogether but because the strength of rationality 
that accrues to CP is not as great as that which accrues to unique 
person practice. But exactly why should that be taken to be true? 
CP requires that those who engage in it claim that those who do 
not (but rather engage in competitors to CP) are engaged in a prac­
tice based on or essentially involving false beliefs. Unique person 
practice does not. But what exactly is the problem? Is it that 
unique person practice has more overall rationality than CP? That 
is not the criticism, at least not explicitly. But that is what it would 
take to show that PT N is false. Why think that the "arbitrariness" 
attached to engaging in religious practices shows that the overall 
rationality is lower than it would be without that arbitrariness? The 
basic point seems to be that, because of the existence of competi­
tors to CP, engaging in CP is arbitrary. Therefore, as Alston sug­
gests in discussing the justificatory efficacy of CP, even though the 
existence of these other practices does not dissipate the justifica­
tion, it does seem to reduce it significantly. 
In Alston's case, however, the comparison is between competing 
practices-CP, Muslim practice, Jewish practice-and PP, which 
has no actual competitors. The comparison is between practices 
taken, so to speak, from the "outside. " What I mean by "outside" 
is that CP and PP are compared from a sort of neutral point of 
view. CP, Jewish practice, Muslim practice, and so forth are, taken 
as individual practices, each supposed to put us into effective epi­
stemic relationship to the Ultimate. Thus each one provides us 
with competing understandings of the Ultimate. PP has no such 
actual competitors. It has only possible competitors-the White­
headian or Cartesian ways of viewing physical objects as opposed 
to the Aristotelian way of so doing. Alston suggests that because 
these are only possible ways of viewing the world, whereas with 
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the religious practices there are actual ways of viewing the Ulti­
mate, the epistemic status of CP (and its competitors) is lower than 
that of PP. 
But this "outside" view is not the one taken by the religious 
plurality challenger vis-a-vis PTN. Rather, the criticism relies on 
"inside" features of the various epistemic practices. Although there 
are no competitors to unique person practice, an important feature 
of unique person practice is that it can be engaged in with many 
different people, thus giving us beliefs about many different peo­
ple. This is not true of CP. There is, supposedly, only one person 
with whom CP puts us into contact. This, in addition, perhaps, to 
certain exclusivity claims involved in CP ("No one comes to the 
Father but through me, " as Jesus says) , leads to a denial of CP's 
competitors understood as legitimate means of gaining rational be­
liefs about the Ultimate. With unique person practice the assump­
tion is that when you and I engage in it, if we meet and get to 
know two different people, I will not suggest that your engaging 
in unique person practice with Sally rather than Jim, say, is based 
on false beliefs. This assumption is internal to the practice itself. 
From this internal perspective, there is no arbitrariness involved in 
engaging in unique person practice with different people. If you 
were to met Jim, as I have, you too would have Gustified) beliefs 
about him. In contrast, if I engage in CP, while you engage in 
Muslim practice, I will not admit that you are in contact with Al­
lah, nor will I admit that Allah, understood as a being meta­
physically distinct from the God and Father of Jesus Christ, exists. 
These beliefs are internal to CP. 
But why does this show that the strength of rationality accorded 
to CP is less than that accorded to unique person practice? There 
are many, many human persons with whom we can have social 
engagement, and unique person practice is a practice designed to 
allow just that. But there is only one God, according to CP. The 
religious plurality challenge, as construed above, treats all the com­
peting religious epistemic practices as if, taken as a group, they 
were like slices of a grand, Ultimate unique person practice, one 
slice, let us say, being the Christian unique person practice, another 
the Muslim unique person practice, and another the Jewish unique 
person practice. This would be c�mparable to dividing up unique 
person practice into slices, one being, let us say, the Jim unique 
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person practice, another the Sally unique person practice, and 
again, the Frank unique person practice, and yet another, the Mary 
unique person practice. To get an appropriate analogy between 
unique person practice and CP, on this understanding, one would 
have to say that those engaged in the Jim unique person practice 
are suggesting that those engaged in the Sally unique person prac­
tice, Frank unique person practice, or Mary unique person practice 
are engaged in practices based on or essentially involving false be­
liefs about Sally, Frank, or Mary. But this is ludicrous. It is part 
and parcel of unique person practice that one assume that there are 
many other humans with whom one engages in unique person 
practice. That is part of unique person practice's nature. This is not 
true of CP or, for that matter, ofJewish practice, Muslim practice, 
or (at least many of) the other religious epistemic practices. It is the 
reverse of surprising, then, that there are competitors in the field of 
religious epistemic practices, at least from the point of view of a 
strict analogy between the "inside" commitments of unique person 
practice and CP. It simply is not required of us, when we engage 
in unique person practice, that we make the kind of denials that are 
required of us when we engage in CP or the other religious epi­
stemic practices. If it were otherwise, we would suspect something 
amiss in our epistemic conduct of the religious practices. 
Perhaps, however, the religious plurality challenger means only 
to suggest something closer in line with Alston's evaluation of the 
parity between PP and CP. Perhaps the criticism is simply meant 
to claim that the important difference between unique person prac­
tice and CP is that, taken from the outside, unique person practice 
has no actual competitors whereas CP does, and although this does 
not dissipate the rationality of engaging in CP it does lower the 
strength of the rationality by lowering the strength of the non­
trivial self-support of CP. What is to be said here? If one admits 
that Alston's account of the matter vis-a-vis PP and CP is accurate, 
does the same not hold true here? 
The best way to combat this challenge is head-on. There are two 
steps to so doing. First, the argument relies on the fact that Jewish 
practice, Muslim practice, CP, and so forth all have, more or less, 
the same strength of internal support and, furthermore, that there 
is little if any external support. Recall, as a first step, that Alston 
takes the worst-case scenario and assumes that there is no external 
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support for CP over other practices. One thing to do, in response 
to the religious plurality challenge, is to consider the possibility 
that there is external support for CP. That, of course, is a tall order 
and one I do not attempt to fill here. It is, furthermore, one I 
consider to be an unlikely source of solace for the religious be­
liever. Nevertheless, if it could be shown that there is significant 
external support for CP which is not matched by other religious 
practices, that would effectively kill the criticism. 
The second step, and to my mind a more promising one, is to 
challenge one of the central assumptions of the criticism-that 
Jewish practice, Muslim practice, CP, and so forth all have the 
same strength of internal support. The critic certainly assumes this 
to be the case, as does Alston. As far as Alston's case goes, and this 
is not to belittle its strength, there may be much more to say about 
the internal support of various religious practices . But to say any­
thing about them in this regard requires a great deal of work on the 
details of various religions and the epistemic practices in which 
their practioners engage. This is a much larger task than I am able 
to take on. But before the religious plurality challenge can be said 
to be successful against PT N• this work needs to be done. Of 
course, in an era of pluralism and of extreme religious tolerance, 
the suggestion that we need to engage in what Paul Griffiths calls 
"inter-religious apologetics" is going to be controversial. 10 Nev­
ertheless, it needs to be done. Until it is, the religious plurality 
challenge to PT N cannot be fully evaluated. 
I have not done the hard work needed for a full reply to the 
religious plurality challenge to PT N· I have pointed out where the 
digging needs to start and that is, I believe, enough at least to raise 
questions about the success of the criticism. In short, it is not ob­
vious that it will be successful. People on both sides need to engage 
in more work before the grave can be completed. 
6. Confirmation, Validation, and Rationality 
Two final comments about confirmation are in order before we 
leave the subject. First, in some cases nonpredictive confirmation 
10. See Paul J. Griffiths, "An Apology for Apologetics, " Faith and Philosophy 5 
( 1988): 399-420. 
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of theistic beliefs may be possible only where the theistic belief to 
be confirmed is a fairly general or broad belief. This is one sim­
ilarity between (some cases of) nonpredictive and predictive confir­
mation. The more general is confirmed by the more specific. "All 
swans are white" is confirmed by the next swan; "All sundogs are 
formed in conditions C" is confirmed by the next set of conditions 
and the next sundog; "God loves me" is confirmed by the love of 
my Christian brothers and sisters empowered by the Holy Spirit. 
Second, could we ever validate theistic practice? It was men­
tioned early in Chapter 10 that, perhaps when one confirms a suffi­
cient number of beliefs delivered by a given practice, the practice is 
then validated. This suggestion seems to rely on predictive confir­
mation, for it seems clear enough that what connects the confirm­
ing instances and the validation of the practice is an inductive argu­
ment that relies on the regularity of the objects about which the 
beliefs are formed. This is not unlike Alston's appeal to the induc­
tive subargument in his overall justificatory argument for a belief 
in the reliability of a doxastic practice. Induction, resting as it does 
on our trust in the regularity of nature, provides grounds for the 
move from confirming instances to validation only if the principle 
of induction is assumed (practically, at least) within the practice. 
If this model for the relationship between validation and confir­
mation is correct, then insofar as nonpredictive, comportment con­
firmations do not rest on the regularity of nature the inductive in­
ference is not possible. We could never have validation of a theistic 
practice, at least if that validation rests on predictive confirmation. 
This aligns well with Alston's claim that, if we discovered that 
God was dealing with us in a predictable fashion, we would have 
evidence that the theistic practice is unreliable. To expect valida­
tion of this type is to expect too much. Perhaps we must be satis­
fied with nonpredictive confirmation of individual beliefs or per­
haps, for many of us, no confirmation whatsoever. 
But this is not to say that there is no nontrivial self-support pro­
vided for CP. Is there another model for understanding the rela­
tionship between the confirmation of beliefs and the validation of 
practices? I believe so. On the comportment understanding of con­
firmation, if beliefs and experience fit together well, they are con­
firmed. One of the beliefs that fits with the rest of the beliefs in a 
theistic noetic structure is that, although God does not reveal him-
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self on demand, he does love us and will provide enough informa­
tion to allow us to become committed to him. The confirmation I 
have of certain theistic beliefs occurs when those beliefs are taken 
together with my entire set of beliefs and experiences. The practice 
that allows me to move from experience to theistic belief-CP, 
exaggerated CP, or whatever other practice-is "validated, " in this 
case shown to be rational, within the broader system of beliefs and 
experience. I can judge beliefs generated by a practice to be reliable 
because the belief that it is reliable comports well with my entire 
(or at least a large part of my) noetic structure; there is nontrivial 
self-support for the practice. This comportment is exemplified in 
particular by the relationship between the belief about the reliable 
nature of the theistic practice and the belief that God loves me and 
will provide sufficient information for me to commit myself to 
him. 
This is circular but not, I think, in a surprising way. As Alston 
suggests, our epistemic practices are basic practices. We should 
not, therefore, hope for a noncircular type of confirmation. 
Unique person practice and CP seem to be just such circular prac­
tices. Since we have no other access to the objects about which we 
form beliefs besides the practices that generate the beliefs, we can­
not appeal to outside, independent information as a source of con­
firmation. 
So, just as the only access we have to the physical world is 
through perception, perhaps at the end of the day the only access 
we have to God is through the practice that generates theistic be­
liefs. Thus the range of practices from PP through unique person 
practice and CP are nontrivially self-supported. The confirmation 
of their deliverances relies on the practices that form them, and in 
turn the validation of the practices themselves-their rationality­
relies on the confirmation (predictive or nonpredictive) of the be­
liefs generated by them. The confirmation challenger might argue 
that we could have access to theistic beliefs by using a discursive 
belief-forming practice (natural theology) and that this is what 
should validate the practice of forming theistic beliefs. But given 
the lack of success with natural theology (comparable to the lack of 
success in epistemology with confirming perception's deliverances 
by reasoning from beliefs about sensations, or from sensations 
themselves, to beliefs about the external, physical world) , it hardly 
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seems likely that we should turn there to show the rationality of 
the practice or, by extension, confirmation ofbeliefs. Furthermore, 
discursive reasoning is no less a basic practice, on Alston's terms. 
Whatever one demands of beliefs about God, one should de­
mand no more of them than that demanded of unique person prac­
tice beliefs. Confirmation and validation of an independent, non­
circular variety is not available for either unique person practice or 
CP beliefs. Since an independent check is not available, one should 
anticipate a kind of circularity in their confirmation. So, there is or 
can be as much link between basic CP beliefs and other informa­
tion (which makes the theistic beliefs likely to be true, or at least 
our taking them as such to be rational) as there is between unique 
person practice beliefs and other information (which makes unique 
person practice beliefs likely to be true, or our taking them as such 
to be rational) . In either case, the beliefs can be properly basic or 
immediately justified: their practices can have rationality and that 
at the same level. Thus the requirement that theistic beliefs be con­
firmed and theistic practices validated in the sense that confirma­
tion requires predictive regularity is overly strong. The demand 
assumes that regularity of the object of belief is a necessary feature 
for confirmation of belief. In turn, this assumes that justified beliefs 
can only be formed about objects for which regular, predictive 
confirmation is possible. But what is necessary for justification is 
not regularity but trustworthiness or reliability. Alston provides an 
account of how a practice can be reliable without having a regular 
object behind it. I have attempted to provide an extension of his 
account, suggesting that confirmation of some beliefs about non­
regular objects may occur. Whether a given belief about a non­
regular object is confirmed is an empirical question to be answered 
by whether one has the appropriate experiences and forms the 
needed beliefs. 
I have suggested a new parity thesis between CP and unique 
person practice. I have also suggested a sketch of how the begin­
nings of a holistic framework for a defense of PT N could go, along 
with a defense of PT N against two potential criticisms. In the final 
chapter I suggest another holistic principle in which Christian be­
liefs may find justification, and I provide a summary of the book's 
argument. 
[ 1 2  ] 
World-Ordering Power and 
Passionate Commitment 
There are two goals for this final chapter. The first is to suggest 
another holistic principle by which Christian beliefs may be justi­
fied, thus indirectly strengthening PT N· Although this by no 
means provides a full account of holism vis-a-vis theistic belief, it 
provides another small piece of the sketch of a map for further 
exploration. The second goal is simply, by way of conclusion, to 
summarize briefly the positions argued in this book. 
I .  More on Holism 
All that was suggested in Chapter I I about the holistic frame­
work for defending PT N dealt with confirmation understood from 
within the various epistemic practices. This was an attempt to meet 
the internal consistency requirement that is typically taken to be 
part and parcel of holist theories. But there is much more to holist 
theories of rationality than mere confirmation and consistency. 
There is also a comprehensiveness requirement. A holist theory of 
rationality must include a description of how much of our experi­
ence is taken account of by the set of beliefs taken to be justified. 
The most comprehensive system is the rational one, other things 
being equal. I say nothing further about this requirement vis-a-vis 
showing CP to be rationally engaged in except this brief point. To 
argue that CP is the most comprehensive system of religious be-
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liefs would be to argue that the internal support of CP is not only 
equal but superior to that of other religious epistemic practices. So 
arguing would be doing the work required to reply more fully to 
the religious plurality challenge discussed in Chapter I I .  
There is also what we can call the requirement of "coherence," 
that is, the supposed internal relatedness of beliefs in a holist sys­
tem. This requirement is notorious in that it is very difficult to say 
just what this relatedness comes to. Is it logical entailment, or a 
kind of probabilistic relation, or explanatory power, or aesthetic 
harmony? There is also the requirement of congruence, that is, the 
ability of the system of beliefs to deal with empirical data, or, put 
otherwise, the appropriateness of the interpretive scheme to expe­
rience. I say nothing in detail of either of these. But I do say some­
thing about one feature of our religious belief systems that is often 
overlooked or at least not dealt with to any degree by epistemolo­
gists. The issue touches to some degree on each of the require­
ments listed here, but what I have to say is not meant to be a fully 
developed thesis about holism. 
2. Belief, Acceptance, and Commitment 
As is well known, the Bible commands Christians and Jews to 
love the Lord their God with all their hearts, souls, and minds. 
Some act on this command. One question to ask is this. When 
they do, how is the resulting firm religious commitment epi­
stemically acceptable, given what many, theists and nontheists 
alike, see as the limited amount of evidence for theistic claims? 
Before answering this question, I need to make some preliminary 
distinctions. 
We can identify at least four senses of the term "belief, " labeling 
them as follows: (a) proposition, (b) belief, (c) acceptance, and (d) 
commitment. In the remainder of this chapter, I mean by "propo­
sition" what logicians sometimes do-that which is asserted by de­
clarative utterances or that which is either true or false. The re­
maining three senses of "belief' stand in relation to this first sense. 
A proposition is that which is believed or accepted or that to which 
one is committed. Thus, belief, acceptance, and commitment are 
all propositional attitudes. I took note of some of Plantinga's com­
ments about these distinctions in Chapter 6, but I said little of them 
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save for calling attention to them. Returning to a few of his com­
ments illustrates more fully what I have in mind. 
Plantinga lists what he thinks should be given in an account of a 
person's noetic structure. 1 In particular, he notes that one can dis­
tinguish between belief and acceptance: 
Consider a Christian beset by doubts. He has a hard time believing 
certain crucial Christian claims-perhaps the teaching that God was 
in Christ, reconciling the world to himsel( Upon calling that belief 
to mind, he finds it cold, lifeless, without warmth or attractiveness. 
Nonetheless he is committed to this belief; it is his position; if you 
ask him what he thinks about it, he will unhesitatingly endorse it. 
He has, so to speak, thrown in his lot with it. Let us say that he 
accepts this proposition, even though when he is assailed by doubt, 
he may fail to believe it-at any rate explicitly-to any appreciable 
degree. His commitment to this proposition may be much stronger 
than his explicit and occurrent belief in it; so these two-that is, 
acceptance and belief-must be distinguished. 2 
Plantinga says no more about this distinction. Nevertheless, we 
can extract from his example that beliefs have warmth, attractive­
ness, and liveliness whereas acceptances do not. Two things should 
be noted here. First, these characteristics are surely metaphorical. 
What exactly they come to, when stripped of the metaphor, is dif­
ficult to say. Perhaps these characteristics just are the fact that one 
believes rather than (merely) accepts. Second, whatever they come 
to, these characteristics surely have more to do with the psychol­
ogy of the one holding the belief than they do with the proposi­
tions held. 
Plantinga also seems to suggest that one can doubt that p is true 
and yet accept it, whereas (employing the same notion of doubt) 
one cannot doubt p and yet believe p. One can accept some propo­
sition, in spite of its lack of warmth, liveliness, and attractiveness. 
This may simply be an extension of the point above; perhaps 
doubt simply is the absence of these phenomenological features, 
just as belief is their presence. We have, thus, an intuitive picture of 
belief and acceptance with which to work. 
r. What follows is an incomplete list of Plantinga's suggestions; see his "Rea­
son and Belief in God" for further information. 
2. Ibid., p. 37· 
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Plantinga also includes in his requirements for an account of a 
person's noetic structure both an index of degree of belief and an 
index of degree of acceptance. This brings us to the last sense of 
"belief, "  that is, commitment. Planting a writes: "I believe both 
that 2 + 1 = 3 and London, England, is north of Saskatoon, Sas­
katchewan; but I believe the former more resolutely than the lat­
ter. "3 Presumably he would say something similar about the index 
of degree of acceptance. At any rate, here we have what I wish to 
isolate as commitment. Commitment, as I understand the term, 
has to do with the relative unwillingness of the epistemic subject to 
give up a proposition. The more unwilling one is to give up a 
proposition as true, the more firm one's commitment to that prop­
osition is. So, we hold various propositions with different levels of 
firmness. This is true whether they are held as beliefs or accep­
tances; one can be more or less committed to a proposition in 
terms of how firmly one believes it as well as in terms of how 
firmly one accepts it. In short, one can be more or less strongly 
committed to a proposition; thus, there are levels of commitment. 
Furthermore, it appears that commitment of these two types 
(belief- and acceptance-commitment) can be at odds with one an­
other. In his example, Plantinga suggests that the Christian's com­
mitment to the proposition he accepts (but has a hard time believ­
ing) is greater than his occurrent belief in that proposition. 
Although there are many questions one could ask of Plantinga's 
example, it seems clear enough that there are various levels of 
commitment to propositions, and this commitment is intimately 
related to belief and acceptance, even when belief and acceptance 
conflict. 
Now, it is certain that the demands of the Judea-Christian tradi­
tion involve passionate commitment. What kinds of epistemic con­
straints is such commitment under? 
3. The Justification Maxim 
Let us say that one requirement of commitment is expressed by 
what I call the "justification maxim. "  Roughly, the justification 
maxim is that no proposition should be given more (or less) com-
3· Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, " p. 54· 
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mitment than its (epistemic) justification can bear. More formally, 
where PA is any propositional attitude, 
Justification Maxim1 : The commitment allotted p by S, 
via S's PA, ought to be commensurate with S's (epi­
stemic) justification for p. 
Note that, so described, the justification maxim is a normative 
claim. Need it be? Perhaps not. Perhaps the thrust behind it could 
be understood in Alston's evaluative sense. Thus, one might sug­
gest that the justification maxim is better described as: 
Justification Maxim2: It is a good thing, from the epi­
stemic point of view, that the commitment allotted p by 
S, via S's PA, is commensurate with S's (epistemic) justi­
fication for p. 
Whichever framework the justification maxim is best understood 
in (I work with the evaluative version here, without defending it 
explicitly), it suggests a certain kind of problem with theistic be­
lief. 
Theistic belief is often, if not typically, taken by the mature be­
liever as seriously as, or more seriously than, any other belief. This 
frequently means that, when other beliefs conflict with theistic be­
lief, the others lose out: the competing beliefs are modified or re­
jected in accordance with the demands of the theistic beliefs. This 
signals the extraordinary firmness of the believer's commitment to­
ward her theistic belief. The question on which I focus here is, 
then, how such firm commitment is justified vis-a-vis what many 
people, theist and nontheist alike, take to be the relative lack of 
evidence for theistic beliefs. 
My concern is not that theistic propositions lack evidence alto­
gether; it seems clear enough that they do not. It is not, that is, 
that theists are irrational in believing or accepting certain claims. 
That, it seems to me, is the burden and the success of Reformed 
epistemology. Rather, the problem is how to provide sufficient evi­
dence for one's believings and acceptings in light of the very firm, 
heartfelt commitment the theistic believer often has toward these 
propositions. In suggesting a solution to this problem, the follow­
ing discussion indicates another reason to move toward a holistic 
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account of CP's epistemic status, as well as some principles with 
which to begin the conversation. Conveniently enough, some of 
Plantinga's claims are suggestive of a solution to the problem of 
theistic commitment. Thus, I once again engage Plantinga's claims 
directly, but that is not my primary aim. His work is simply a 
good place to begin. I briefly review Plantinga's criticism of classi­
cal foundationalism and then move on to a challenge to his posi­
tion. I suggest a response and then use that response as a spring­
board for further discussion. 
4. Plantinga's Criticism of Classical 
Foundationalism Revisited 
Plantinga's response to the evidentialist challenge, insofar as it is 
rooted in classical foundationalism (see Chapter 6) , is twofold. The 
first claim is that the classical account of the criterion for a beliefs 
being properly basic is self-referentially incoherent. The second as­
pect of Plantinga's challenge is that the history of skepticism 
teaches us that, rather than being a steady rock on which to rest 
knowledge and rational belief, classical foundationalism has been 
the rock on which knowledge and rational belief founder. Accord­
ing to the skeptical tradition, classical foundationalism's criterion 
does not allow many of our ordinary beliefs to be justified. That 
Susan is in pain, or that there is a tree in front of us, are claims that 
are not properly basic according to the classical criterion for proper 
basicality (a belief is properly basic if and only if it is either self­
evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses) . Yet we have no 
argument for these beliefs or their kind; we can give no discursive 
account of them vis-a-vis the requirements of classical founda­
tionalism. They are thus not properly nonbasic either, and skepti­
cism is at the door. How can classical foundationalism remain a 
viable theory when many of our widespread beliefs cannot be justi­
fied in light of its demands? For Plantinga it is not viable and ought 
to be rejected. 
If classical foundationalism is not viable, then neither is eviden­
tialism insofar as it grows out of classical foundationalism. Thus, 
the evidentialist challenge to theistic belief is not viable either. As 
we have seen, however, Plantinga has opened the door to another 
theory of rationality that does not, he thinks, rule out the proper 
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basicality of either our widespread beliefs or the religious believer's 
theistic beliefs. 
Since the classical criterion for proper basicality has been rejected 
as too narrow, whatever replacement is suggested should be broad 
enough to allow our widespread beliefs to be rational. In particu­
lar, Plantinga mentions beliefs about other minds, beliefs about the 
external world, and beliefs about the past. I do not think Plantinga 
would be against adding to this list beliefs about how we discover 
things about the world, specifically the principles of induction, de­
duction, the scientific method, and the like. But I see no easy way 
to capture such principles. Let us just say that those principles we 
typically use to advance our knowledge ought not to be ruled out 
by the replacement criterion. 
With these restrictions on what we can take as an acceptable cri­
terion, recall Planting a's suggestion that we should use an induc­
tive procedure to discover a criterion for proper basicality. Can this 
approach be successful in producing the results Plantinga desires, 
namely, allowing for the proper basicality of beliefs about God but 
ruling out a too-narrow criterion? Why, for example, can the clas­
sical foundationalist not argue that, since Plantinga's suggested 
procedure is person- or community-relative, it may be possible to 
find a group of classical foundationalists who hold the traditional 
classical criterion for proper basicality and who find it to be self­
evident? This is possible on Plantinga's own grounds, they might 
say, for Plantinga suggests that self-evidence is a person-relative 
notion. 4  
Suppose, then, that the classical foundationalists do some field­
work, finding a group of epistemologists who have done Plan­
tinga's suggested inductive procedure. Furthermore, suppose this 
group finds the classical criterion to be self-evident. For these epis­
temologists (call them the "entrenched classical foundationalists"), 
since the classical criterion is self-evident, the self-referential criti­
cism fails. 
4· See Plantinga, "Is Belief in God Rational?" in Rationality and Religious Belief, 
ed. C. F. Delaney (Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 
where Plantinga discusses self-evidence at length. In a delightfully humorous 
story, George Mavrodes, "The Stranger, " in Faith and Rationality, ed. Planting a 
and W olterstorff, pokes fun at the notion of self-evidence as described by Plan­
ting a. In the story, a proof for God's existence begins with the self-evident premise 
that Jesus Christ rose from the dead. 
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Plantinga can retort as follows. First, by suggesting that self­
evidence is person-relative, he never meant that just anything can 
be taken to be self-evident. Generally, self-evident propositions are 
person-relative only in the sense that, as one's knowledge of a field 
grows, one's grasp of the truths in that field becomes deeper. For 
example, some mathematical proposition that was self-evident for 
Einstein is not for me. It might become self-evident for me if I 
study enough mathematics, but it is not right now. Nevertheless, 
it is unlikely that one's knowledge of epistemology will ever help 
one come to grasp self-evidently a proposition as controversial as 
the classical criterion. Unlike some mathematical propositions, 
even if the classical criterion is explained to me I will never self­
evidently "see" it. On this basis Plantinga might ask the entrenched 
classical foundationalists if they . really find the classical criterion 
self-evident or if they are only stretching to reach something that 
protects their favorite theory. 
Second, and more important, Plantinga can fall back on the 
widespread belief criticism. Even if the classical criterion truly does 
seem self-evident to entrenched classical foundationalists, accord­
ing to classical foundationalism all one's beliefs must be justified. 
This demand extends to principles by which we come to know 
things. In addition to the classical criterion, there are the principles 
of induction, for example. Yet the classical criterion seems to rule 
out their legitimate use, since they are not self-evident, incorrig­
ible, or evident to the senses. Nor do they follow from beliefs that 
are. This problem has been a skeptical thorn in the classical founda­
tionalist's flesh since Hume at least. 
The entrenched classical foundationalists might suggest that in­
ductive principles are themselves self-evident, but this move seems 
to open the foundations to just about anything being self-evident. 
Such a move would play into Plantinga's hands, for if that is what 
one means by self-evidence, why not take theistic beliefs to be self­
evident (and thus properly basic) as well? As an alternative, the 
entrenched classical foundationalists may suggest that inductive 
principles ought to be understood as part of a heuristic meta­
epistemological framework. By definition, however, this move is 
ruled out. Foundationalism requires that all rational beliefs be ei­
ther properly basic or nonbasic. Belief in the principles of induc­
tion cannot be outside one's noetic structure. How then are induc­
tive principles to be justified? 
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Plantinga's modified foundationalism fares better in answering 
this question. Caution is needed, however, for if there is one thing 
to be learned from the widespread belief criticism it is this: the 
criteria for properly basic beliefs cannot be overly strong. But it is 
simple enough to desire overly strong criteria. Plantinga seems to 
do this himself in his response to the Great Pumpkin objection, 
where he writes: 
If belief in God is properly basic, why can't just any belief be prop­
erly basic? Couldn't we say the same about any bizarre aberration 
we can think of? What about voodoo or astrology? What about the 
belief that the Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween? Could I 
properly take that as basic? . . .  If we say that belief in God is prop­
erly basic, won't we be committed to holding that just anything, or 
nearly anything, can properly be taken as basic, thus throwing wide 
the gates to irrationalism and superstition?5 
In his response, Plantinga makes it clear that not just any belief 
can be properly basic but that a properly basic belief, although 
lacking discursive evidence, does not lack grounding. Thus, some 
beliefs are not properly basic for they lack grounding. Further, 
Plantinga claims that arriving at the criterion for proper basicality 
leads to charging belief in the Great Pumpkin with irrationality. 
But why should the Great Pumpkinite accept this? Admittedly, 
belief in the Great Pumpkin is not something I take to be rational, 
but what if we come on some tribe that believes it is? Suppose this 
tribe has read Plantinga, followed his inductive procedure, and 
takes Great Pumpkin belief as properly basic? Suppose they even 
specify their criterion for proper basicality and it does not lead to 
incoherence? What is Plantinga to say? 
Perhaps Plantinga's desire to rule out Great Pumpkin belief is 
motivated by the fact that we do not have any natural inclination 
to believe in the Great Pumpkin whereas we do have a natural 
inclination to believe in God. Nevertheless, Plantinga qua theist 
would surely admit the rationality of Great Pumpkin belief insofar 
as such belief actually resembles theistic belief. But is this not just 
to say that the force of Plantinga's response is derived from the 
oddity of the example he chooses? Had he chosen Judaism, Islam, 
s. Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," p. 58.  
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or Hinduism perhaps the rejection of  the objection would not seem 
to follow quite so quickly. 
How would it be possible, once the inductive procedure is com­
pleted, for Great Pumpkin belief to be rejected as irrational? First, 
if no one ever had Great Pumpkin experiences and simply chose 
arbitrarily to believe in the Great Pumpkin, no such belief would 
be rational. It would not be grounded. Second, if one did have 
Great Pumpkin experiences to ground such belief and Plantinga 
still rejected the belief as irrational, he must mean that no Great 
Pumpkinite's belief is rational. He must, in other words, have 
some independent reason for rejecting Great Pumpkin belief, 
namely, it fails to meet Plantinga's criterion. He must hold that the 
criteria for proper basicality are quite strong-so strong as not to 
be person- or community-relative. Plantinga seems to think this 
way, at least part of the time; if one inductively arrives at P as the 
criterion for proper basicality and P rules out Great Pumpkin be­
lief, then no one's belief in the Great Pumpkin could be rational. 
But, with respect to Plantinga, what if the Great Pumpkinite takes 
his belief to be properly basic and thus arrives at a different crite­
rion? Plantinga's response is inconsistent with his inductive pro­
cedure and its potential results. To be consistent, he must allow for 
such a potentiality. The Great Pumpkin objection, understood as 
the demand for a very liberal openness to what might count as 
properly basic, seems to stand against his theory, and thus Plan­
tinga appears to be committed to a weaker sense of rationality than 
some of his comments indicate. 
Since Plantinga himself struggles with the status of the criterion 
for proper basicality, one wonders about the proper way to under­
stand it. We can say at least two things. First, any criterion must 
itself be rationally justified. Second, inductive procedures can jus­
tify some criteria. This latter point entails that the proposition ex­
pressing a criterion is non basic, since the proposition (or rather its 
belief or acceptance) is based on others. The principles of induc­
tion, on the other hand, can be either basic or nonbasic. Either 
way, the criterion must not be overly strong or the grounding of 
the principles of induction becomes impossible. If the principles are 
to be properly basic, the criterion cannot rule them out. If they are 
to be non basic, there must be some properly basic belief (or set of 
beliefs) to justify the principles of induction which is not itself 
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ruled out by the criterion. For our purposes, given a sufficiently 
weak criterion, the principles of induction can be properly basic. 
The following sketch shows how. 
Suppose we set out to discover which of our beliefs are properly 
basic. We decide that, if anything is properly basic, beliefs A, B, C, 
and the principles of induction are. Of course, at this time we do 
not know the criterion for proper basicality. Intuitively, however, 
we take these beliefs as basic and properly so. We discover induc­
tively that these beliefs all share property P. Property P is thus the 
criterion for proper basicality. The statement that expresses the fact 
that P is the criterion for proper basicality can be based on at least 
one other belief, specifically, one of the principles of induction. 
Thus, the statement of the criterion is nonbasic, yet P functions as 
a criterion for A, B, C, and the principles of induction. Induction 
thus legitimately justifies P as the criterion. The principles of in­
duction, however, need not be discursively justified but are 
grounded, since they fall under the criterion discovered by the in­
ductive approach. So, Plantinga's modified foundationalism can 
fare well, potentially at least, on the issue of how inductive princi­
ples are to be justified. 
5 .  Widespread Beliefs as Fundamental Assumptions 
of Rationality 
The above suggestions leave open the possibility of accounting 
for our widespread belief in the principles of induction. In fact, on 
the account sketched above these principles are important in dis­
covering the replacement for the classical criterion for proper ba­
sicality and yet do not lead to the kind of self-referential incoher­
ence found in classical foundationalism. But what about other 
widespread beliefs such as beliefs about other persons, the external 
world, or the past? Do these fare as well? I believe they do, but I 
do not take the time here to consider them individually. Instead, I 
consider why these so-called widespread beliefs are important to 
rationality. 
It would be a mistake to think that the importance of these 
widespread beliefs for rationality lies in the fact that most everyone 
takes them to be true. First of all, it clearly does not follow from 
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the fact that most people hold (versions of) the widespread beliefs 
that the beliefs are indeed true. This is a variation of that infamous 
freshman fallacy of the bandwagon. But even if they were all true, 
their truth does not necessarily make them rational. What does? 
Consider these propositions. "There are other people alive. " 
"There are real trees (or rocks, or mountains, or the like) . "  "I 
remember yesterday's events accurately. " Such propositions, 
whether held as beliefs or acceptances, are central in our lives. One 
cannot imagine, at least with any seriousness, living life without 
them (or at least their near relatives). Why do we take them so 
seriously? Why do we take them as a necessary starting point for 
any theory of rationality? Simply stated, I believe they have the 
ability to greatly arrange and order our other beliefs and accep­
tances. 
There appears to be a hierarchy of beliefs and acceptances in our 
noetic structures. Some we are willing to give up quite quickly; 
others we are not. What I have been calling widespread beliefs fall 
into the latter category. Another notion from Plantinga's work can 
help us explore the importance of this observation. He claims that 
in describing one's noetic structure one must include an index of 
"depth of ingression": 
Some of my beliefs are, we might say, on the periphery of my no­
etic structure. I accept them, and may even accept them quite 
firmly, but if I were to give them up, not much else in my noetic 
structure would have to change. I believe there are some large boul­
ders on the top of the Grand Teton. If l come to give up this belief, 
however, . . . that change wouldn't have extensive reverberations 
throughout the rest of my noetic structure; it could be accommo­
dated with minimal alteration elsewhere. So its depth of ingression 
into my noetic structure isn't great. On the other hand, if I were to 
come to believe that there simply is no such thing as the Grand 
Teton, or no such thing as the State of Wyoming, that would have 
much greater reverberations. And if, per impossible, I were to come 
to think there hadn't been much of a past . . .  or that there weren't 
any other persons, that would have even greater reverberations; 
these beliefs of mine have great depth of ingression into my noetic 
structure. 6 
6. Ibid. , p. 5 5 ·  
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To give up some beliefs would radically alter one's noetic struc­
ture. The connections between beliefs can be enormous in number 
and complicated in kind. I suggest that the reason the so-called 
widespread beliefs are so important to rationality is that they have, 
to borrow Plantinga's phrase, the greatest depth of ingression. Per­
haps more intuitive terminology would be helpful here. Let us say 
that such beliefs have the greatest world-ordering power. 
Before moving on, it is important to clarify exactly which beliefs 
or acceptances have the status of being widespread, as well as the 
relationships between the notion of world-ordering power and no­
tions such as level of commitment, belief, and acceptance. Obvi­
ously we cannot simply identify widespread beliefs as person-spe­
cific beliefs. For example, 
(1) I am writing at a brown desk 
is not widespread. Since you are reading, rather than writing, (1)  is 
not one of your current beliefs. Neither, in all likelihood, is (1) a 
belief many people have right now. 
It is also not the case that 
(2) There is an external world 
is widely held in the sense that most people now believe it. Many 
nonphilosophers have not even thought about it, let alone believe 
it. In fact, it is not belief qua propositional attitude that is impor­
tant at all. Instead we should consider beliefs qua propositions. 
But it is not idiosyncratic propositions that are truly central ei­
ther. Rather, it is the kind of proposition that is important. Here 
the kind is picked out by the various contents of beliefs; there are 
beliefs about physical objects, others about other persons, still 
others about the past, and so forth. It is certain kinds of proposi­
tion that are widely held, rather than any idiosyncratic proposition. 
Everyone holds these kinds of proposition: physical object proposi­
tions, other-mind propositions, and so forth. And although we are 
willing to admit that we can be wrong about some individual 
members of the various kinds, we are not typically willing to ad­
mit that we can be wrong about the entire kind. 
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So the terminology "widespread belief'' is misleading in two 
ways. What is important for our discussion is not beliefs qua prop­
ositional attitude. Nor is it belief qua idiosyncratic proposition. 
What is important is rather that certain assumptions are made by 
every person with ordinary beliefs . It is here, I believe, that the 
distinction between beliefs and acceptances becomes important. As 
noted, most people do not explicitly believe propositions such as 
"There is an external world, " or "There are other minds, " and the 
like. I have little doubt, however, that on inquiry most people 
would admit that they at least accept such propositions as back­
ground assumptions. These propositions are immediately entailed 
by the ordinary kinds of propositions we all hold. Even though 
many, if not most, people do not explicitly believe them (not ever 
having really thought about them), they do believe propositions 
that fall into the kinds "external world propositions," "other-mind 
propositions, "  and so forth. Our acceptance/ assumption of propo­
sitions such as "There is an external world" and "There are other 
minds" simply expresses our commitment to our ordinary beliefs 
being (generally) rational. 
These acceptances are greatly world-ordering. They are parts of 
the complex of speech and action that go into making up our 
shared lives together. One cannot successfully ignore or question 
these acceptances; questioning comes to an end. These acceptances 
are so deeply embedded in our noetic structures and our human 
culture that we simply cannot shake them off. Since we must start 
somewhere in giving an account of rationality, we might just as 
well begin with the paradigm cases that seem to be necessary for 
human communication and culture. These acceptances, in a way, 
are what make us rational. 
If I am right about this, then the concerns of Plantinga' s "wide­
spread belief criticism" turn out to be concerns about giving an 
account of certain acceptances that all rational persons have. We all 
accept certain propositions about reality. Any theory of rationality 
that fails to explain them is to be rejected on the grounds that it 
overlooks fundamental constituents of rationality. In light of all 
this, let what I have been calling widespread beliefs now be re­
ferred to as "fundamental assumptions of rationality. " 
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6. World-Ordering Power and Fundamental 
Assumptions of Rationality 
I turn now to give an account of how fundamental assumptions 
of rationality are related to commitment and world-ordering 
power. First we need a more formal account of world-ordering 
power: 
World-Ordering Power: The ability of a (change in) belief 
in, or acceptance of, a (given) proposition to adjust other 
beliefs or acceptances in S's noetic structure. 
All beliefs and acceptances have the power to make us adjust our 
noetic structures. When we take on a new belief, we make other 
changes as well. When we lose an acceptance, we make other ad­
justments to go with the loss. What I wish to propose for consid­
eration is that world-ordering power is connected to a principle of 
rationality, namely, the justification maxim suggested earlier. 
The justification maxim demands that no proposition be held 
with greater commitment than that permitted by its justification. 
Taking commitment to be the level of (un)willingness to give up 
one's propositional attitude toward a proposition, one must find 
some principle that connects one's commitment with one's justi­
fication for the proposition. One possibility for linking commit­
ment to epistemic justification is to make commitment a function 
of world-ordering power. Let us call this the "principle of commit­
ment. " 
Principle of Commitment: It is a good thing, from the 
epistemic point of view, if S's (belief or acceptance) com­
mitment to a proposition p is commensurate with the 
world-ordering power of p for S. 7 
Accordingly, the more world-ordering power a belief or accep­
tance has, the more epistemic justification it has. Thus the beliefs 
7. There is also a normative account of the principle of commitment: S's (belief 
or acceptance) commitment to a proposition p ought to be commensurate with the 
world-ordering power of p for S. Again, the version one picks depends on other 
considerations. Just as I elected to work with the evaluative version of the j ustifica­
tion maxim, so I elect to work with the evaluative version of the principle of 
commitment. 
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or acceptances having the least world-ordering power are those to 
which the least commitment accrues, and those having the greatest 
world-ordering power are those with the greatest commitment, at 
least in a rational noetic framework. 8 This raises the obvious ques­
tion, what does the world-ordering power of a belief or acceptance 
have to do with its epistemic justification? 
A variety of answers could be given here. I limit my discussion 
to two, rejecting the first. Return to the sketch in Section 4 where 
Plantinga's inductive procedure was used to discover a criterion for 
proper basicality while allowing the widespread belief in induction 
to be rational. There it was suggested that some property P is 
shared by all the beliefs we intuitively take to be properly basic. 
Thus P is the criterion for proper basicality. My initial answer link­
ing world-ordering power to justification is simply that P may be 
the world-ordering power of the properly basic beliefs in question: 
A, B, C, and the principles of induction all share the same level of 
world-ordering power. What level? It seems that it would have to 
be the greatest level of world-ordering power for S, for, according 
to foundationalism, properly basic beliefs are to play a special role 
in one's noetic structure. 
Traditionally, foundationalists thought that one's properly basic 
beliefs were beliefs without epistemic fault; in particular, they were 
thought to carry a guarantee of truth. More recent versions of 
foundationalism have given up the high goal of truth guarantee. 
Nevertheless, the assumption that basic beliefs play a special role 
remains. Plantinga, for example, writes: "From the foundationalist 
point of view not just any kind of belief can be found in the foun­
dations of a rational noetic structure; a belief to be properly basic 
(that is, basic in a rational noetic structure) must meet certain con­
ditions. It must be capable of functioning foundationally, capable 
of bearing its share of the weight of the whole noetic structure. "9 
What is it for a belief to be capable of functioning founda­
tionally, to be able to bear its share of the weight? Well, on the 
classical model of foundationalism, it was to be self-evident, incor­
rigible, or evident to the senses. But, as we have seen, these sug-
8. This is contrary to the above quotation from Plantinga in which he indicates 
that a belief can be firmly held but be on the periphery of one's noetic structure 
(not greatly world-ordering). 
9. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God, " p. 5 5 .  
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gestions are problematic vis-a-vis the demands of classical founda­
tionalism itself, as well as in giving an account of the fundamental 
assumptions of rationality. 
One suggestion is that to be foundational, and properly so, is to 
have the greatest level of world-ordering power. One can see right 
away, however, that this suggestion is problematic. One of the 
most ob�ious difficulties is that beliefs such as "Susan is in pain" 
and ''There is a tree over there" (examples of beliefs that are obvi­
ously properly basic in the right conditions) do not have the great­
est level of world-ordering power. One can give up one of these 
idiosyncratic propositions without making much change in one's 
noetic structure at all. Perhaps one is hallucinating, or perhaps 
Susan is feigning pain for sympathy. 
Recall that the propositions I identified earlier as being of the 
most significance were not idiosyncratic propositions but rather the 
fundamental assumptions of rationality. On the account given to 
this point, only the fundamental assumptions of rationality turn 
out to have the greatest world-ordering power, whereas other 
cases of properly basic beliefs (such as "Susan is in pain") do not. It 
seems clear enough, then, that aligning world-ordering power 
with the criterion for proper basicality as a means to accounting for 
commitment will not do. 
Since the fundamental assumptions of rationality are the propo­
sitions that have the greatest world-ordering power, it is important 
to provide a theory of rational noetic structures that takes this into 
account. My second answer linking world-ordering power to justi­
fication is that the world-ordering power of a proposition within a 
noetic structure is one of a number of coherence relations that hold 
among one's beliefs and acceptances. With this suggestion we leave 
a foundationalist account of rational noetic structures and move, 
once again, to holism. 
It has been said that foundationalism is the most attractive posi­
tion vis-a-vis epistemic considerations for the theist. One reason 
for this suggestion is the supposedly strong justification for prop­
erly basic beliefs. When a basic belief is grounded, according to 
foundationalism, there is a tie to the independently existing world; 
the belief is justified independently of the system of beliefs. This 
independent tie is often associated with a realist understanding, 
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both in metaphysics and epistemology, a view attractive to theists 
who typically believe that God created the world and that the 
world therefore exists independently of human thought about it. 
But if God is who the theist thinks he is, why could one not know 
about God in the independent way foundationalism suggests? Thus 
the attractiveness of foundationalism for theists. 
With holism, however, one has no tie (or at least less of one) to 
the independent world. Holist models of epistemic justification 
tend to give little or minimal justification for a given belief. 
Rather, a belief is only justified within a given noetic structure. In 
fact, it is the structure that is justified rather than individual propo­
sitions. The system relativity of holism and the lack of (or weak­
ened) tie to the supposedly independently existing world are two 
reasons for the theist to balk at holism. 
Nevertheless, realism in metaphysics may have little to do with 
epistemology. Some things may be real, and independently so, and 
yet our access to them be limited. We may be, as finite humans, 
trapped within our systems of beliefs. They may not reflect reality. 
But if to give a holist account is the best we can do, so be it. Being 
a theist does not clearly, or even naturally, lead to being a founda­
tionalist. 
Furthermore, I believe the present discussion gives some reason 
to move to holism. Foundationalism, even Plantinga's relatively 
weak version, does not provide much potential for providing an 
account of passionate commitment or, for that matter, levels of 
commitment that match our experience of how religious people act 
vis-a-vis their religious beliefs. The account of the criterion for 
proper basicality Planting a provides may give us nondiscursive jus­
tification for single, individual beliefs such as "I see a tree," but it 
does little to account for the fundamental assumptions of ratio­
nality. What is really important are not Plantinga's widespread be­
liefs understood as individual beliefs but the fundamental assump­
tions of rationality underlying them. These propositions, and our 
attitudes toward them, are what are truly central for rationality. A 
holist account of rationality that provides a means of accounting 
for levels of commitment must include some principle of ratio­
nality connecting commitment to something like world-ordering 
power. 
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7·  The Justification Maxim and Theistic Belief 
I have suggested that the justification maxim demands commit­
ment commensurate with epistemic justification and that one po­
tential principle that might provide a link between the two is the 
principle of commitment. By way of conclusion, I wish to make 
some observations about religious belief and its world-ordering _ 
power. 
I have said that the fundamental assumptions of rationality are 
not in the typical case beliefs, but rather that they are closer to 
acceptances. Most people do not explicitly believe that there is an 
external world, or that there are other minds, and so forth. They 
simply accept (often unconsciously) such propositions; the propo­
sitions are fundamental assumptions of rationality. Nevertheless, 
the commitment people have toward these propositions is great 
indeed, a fact illustrated by the difficulties teachers of philosophy 
have in convincing their students that the problem of the external 
world is a real problem. Such assumptions are deeply embedded. 
If this is true, then it may appear that my suggestions do not 
apply to religion, or at least not to Christianity, and that the central 
goal I set for this chapter-explaining how a theist can be firmly 
and passionately committed to her beliefs in the face of what ap­
pears to be insufficient evidence-are not met. Theism, after all, 
involves beliefs. Christianity in particular calls for belief. One is to 
"believe on the Lord Jesus Christ" to be saved. But if belief is 
fundamental to theism, and yet the fundamental assumptions of 
rationality qua acceptances have the greatest world-ordering 
power, then how is it that radical, heartfelt theistic commitment 
can be justified vis-a-vis the justification maxim and the argument 
of the previous several sections? 
This question can be more easily handled if broken down into 
two questions. First, does religion involve fundamental assump­
tions of rationality? The theist, and in particular the Christian the­
ist, responds from within his or her system of belief. The answer, 
given the truth of Christianity, is that yes, theistic beliefs and ac­
ceptances are part and parcel of what it is to be rational. What 
rational person would refuse the call and demands of God, the 
Creator, in his or her life? The Christian may not be so bold as to 
suggest that someone is irrational in not being a Christian, but it 
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seems quite consistent to say that one is  not fully rational if one 
lacks Christian faith. 
The second question is this. The fundamental assumptions of 
rationality are closer to acceptances than they (typically) are to be­
liefs. But theistic faith involves belief, not mere acceptance. How 
can theistic belief then involve the great level of world-ordering 
power that the other fundamental assumptions of rationality do, 
but in particular those involving other human persons? A complete 
answer to this question would take another long essay. Perhaps the 
following suffices. 
It is often noted that the nature of theistic belief is far more com­
plicated than our more ordinary beliefs in propositions. Theistic 
belief is much closer to trusting one's spouse or best friend than it 
is merely to believing that there is a tree in the front yard. But 
theistic faith is complicated in another way as well. It functions, at 
least for the mature believer, as a grid through which other com­
petitors for belief and acceptance are sifted. 10 I think these two 
points are intimately connected. The following analogy aims our 
thinking in the right direction. 
I believe in my wife, much in the same way as I believe in God. I 
love her, I react to her wants and de-sires, I listen to her, and so 
forth. I do likewise with God. I love him, I move on (what I take 
to be) his wants and desires, I listen to him, and so forth. But with 
my wife I also evaluate my actions and thoughts through her con­
cerns. This is not always conscious. Neither is it always done with 
passionate belief There are things, for example, that I simply accept 
about my wife, and that I do not necessarily believe, at least occur­
rently. I accept that she will act in certain ways toward me, I accept 
that her character will be more or less consistent over a period of 
time, and so forth. 
It seems to me that I have not always accepted these things. 
Before my having come to accept them, I believed them. It was 
much more important for me, in the relative immaturity of our 
early relationship, to have these things before my mind's eye as 
things to which I was attracted, as things that I found warm. But it 
was when I moved from explicitly believing these things to accept-
IO. Nicholas Wolterstorff develops this theme in some detail in Reason within the 
Bounds of Religion (Grand Rapids, Mich. : Eerdmans, 1 976). 
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ing them that the beginnings of real maturity in my marriage be­
came possible. It was by my very acceptance of them that I began 
to recognize my deep commitment to them and, by extension, to 
her. This is not to say that I never have the propositional attitude 
of belief toward these things. It is only to say that often I do not 
and that the lack of belief does not adversely affect the good rela­
tionship I have with my wife and, in fact, sometimes allows for an 
increase in the maturity of the relationship. 
Likewise with belief in God. The mature believer accepts certain 
things about God, his nature, his character, and so forth. He or she 
need not believe them in the explicit, conscious sense to which I 
have made reference. This is why in Plantinga's example of the 
doubting Christian the doubter has not lost his faith. He accepts 
the problematic proposition; he has thrown in his lot with it. Thus 
there are several important parallels between theistic belief and be­
liefs about other individual human persons, that is, between CP 
and unique person practice. 
Be that as it may, there is an aspect of acceptance that was over­
looked in the earlier description of the distinctions between belief 
and acceptance. Some might think of acceptance as a less important 
propositional attitude than belief. This, I suggest, is not the case, at 
least not for all acceptances. That there is a material world, that 
there are other persons, that we have some principles by which 
knowledge can advance, are acceptances of which we are largely 
not conscious; our propositional attitude toward them is not as ex­
plicit as belief is. Yet we do not treat them lightly when they are 
challenged. The religious believer in Plantinga's example still ac­
cepts, although doubts, that God was in Christ reconciling the 
world to himself. Belief may come and go; it waxes and wanes 
with the times. But acceptance is something we do more out of a 
sense of necessity-the necessity of making sense of our experience 
of reality. 
Religious faith does involve acceptances, and thus propositions 
involved in such faith can be members of the fundamental assump­
tions of rationality. As such, deep commitment given to theistic 
propositions is justified, at least potentially, by the great level of 
world-ordering power the propositions have for theists. 
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8.  Summary and Conclusion 
My objective in this book has been to explain, evaluate, and 
defend what I have called the parity thesis. I conclude with a brief 
summary of the points argued. First I explained and criticized PT A• 
PTAs• and PTt The first and last of these founder on Alston's 
failure to take into account a special role for background beliefs in 
the generation and justification of Christian beliefs. PT AS• on the 
other hand, fails to be true since it does not take into account the 
special place for induction in the justifying argument for PP. Plan­
tinga's basic parity thesis is PT PI, but the more narrow thesis, PT� , 
is the focus of my discussion, since showing the latter to be false 
shows the former to be false. PT� is criticized by what I have 
called the universality challenge. In defending Plantinga against 
this challenge, I argued that Plantinga is committed to a kind of 
arbitrariness because of, once again, a special role for background 
beliefs in the generation and justification of theistic beliefs. I then 
argued that Alston and Plantinga are more or less in the same epi­
stemic boat vis-a-vis background beliefs. 
In the course of these analyses, I introduced a distinction be­
tween conceptual-reading and noninferential mediated practices. 
The latter require, according to the position taken here, back­
ground beliefs that need themselves to have justification. Thus I 
introduced the notion of a holist aspect to the justification for both 
unique person practice and CP, since both are noninferential medi­
ated practices. In the process, I introduced a new parity thesis. Fi­
nally, I developed the notion of comportment/nonpredictive con­
firmation as one aspect of the holism, and, in response to what I 
have called the problem of commitment I suggested a holist princi­
ple connecting world-ordering power to epistemic commitment. 
My initial goals were three. The first of these was to contribute 
to the ongoing discussion of the rationality of belief in God. I hope 
to have at least clarified some of the issues surrounding the parity 
thesis and Reformed epistemology. The second was to provide an 
account and analysis of various versions of the parity thesis. I have 
considered several such accounts and found them all wanting, 
more or less for the same reason-the role for background beliefs 
in the justification of religious beliefs. The third and final was to 
Rationality and Theistic Belief 
introduce a new parity thesis that does not fall prey to the difficulty 
of the others. I have sketched some of the parallels between CP 
and unique person practice and attempted to argue that PT N does 
not fall prey to the background belief challenge. To defend PT N� 
fully would require a complete and general account of holist epi­
stemic justification. I cannot embark on that discussion here. Per­
haps, however, we have now before us a few places from which to 
launch the raft. 
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